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ABSTRACT 
KATHLEEN J. NAWYN: “Striking at the Roots of German Militarism”: Efforts to Demilitarize German 
Society and Culture in American-Occupied Württemberg-Baden, 1945-1949 
(Under the direction of Konrad H. Jarausch) 
 
Most scholars interested in cultural change in western Germany after World War II have focused on 
the issue of “democratization.”  This dissertation looks instead at social and cultural “demilitarization,” 
examining efforts initiated by the Americans during their postwar occupation aimed at eliminating the sources 
and symptoms of militarism from German society and culture in hopes of preventing another war.  Ultimately, 
it argues that, by late 1949, life in the state of Württemberg-Baden was characterized far less by militarism than 
by “civilianism” and maintains that this transformation was neither solely a spontaneous German reaction to the 
horrors of war, nor an unchallenged development.  Rather, despite troublesome flaws in their thinking and 
sometimes inconsistently applied regulations, the Americans perceptibly influenced the character and 
parameters of tangible change.  In addition to making concrete demands, such as requiring the removal of 
militaristic books from libraries, they monitored personnel appointments and policed German educational and 
youth programs, thereby preserving the public sphere for sympathetic native voices and enabling and nurturing 
a discourse condemning war and militarism.  At the same time, American efforts were facilitated and 
strengthened by the many Germans who also wished to see “German militarism” eradicated, even when they 
did not always agree with their occupiers regarding methods or exact objectives.  Although social and cultural 
demilitarization as a basic goal was widely supported by the Germans, its nature and extent remained contested 
throughout the occupation, with individual views determined in part by concerns regarding the time and costs 
involved in making substantive changes and in part by personal beliefs regarding Germany’s past and the causes 
of the country’s recent descent into war. 
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Bracing themselves against the sides of the trucks, the men looked out blankly as the convoy 
grumbled, hissed, and wheezed its way through the narrow streets of yet another south German village.  Ahead, 
a black automobile led the noisy procession, its uniformed occupants sitting silent and unmoving, their hands 
folded, chins up, shoulders back, boots polished, and pistols holstered.  Defeat in Italy at Allied hands was now 
far behind; prisoner-of-war cages awaited further to the west.  In the meantime, Wehrmacht military discipline 
prevailed.  Rounding the corner, the vehicles paused briefly as an MP cleared the way, motioning the women 
and children in front of the shops away from the edge of the road.  The men in trucks strained to see the cause 
of the delay, then adjusted frayed collars, smoothed stained shirtsleeves, and began to wave.  On both sides of 
the street, those assembled waved back, accompanying the flurry of handkerchiefs with a shower of rose, daisy, 
and iris bouquets.   
Watching this scene and others like it in late May 1945, New York Times correspondent Raymond 
Daniell was less than impressed.  He later recounted his observations of Germany’s “bedraggled” enlisted men 
and their “neatly pressed” officers who “stare[d] arrogantly” and complained, “It is quite clear from the attitude 
of the people, that, whatever they think of Hitler and nazism, the German Army is still the idol of the 
countryside.”  Frustrated that Allied regulations permitted scenes like these, Daniell also recalled the previous 
evening when men in a large convey had been singing as they moved slowly through a city at dusk.  “Several 
hundred voices were raised, incongruously but defiantly, in singing “Wir Fahren Gegen Engelland” [We Go 
Against England].  To a casual visitor unacquainted with recent events,” he added, “it would be hard to tell from 
outward appearances who had won the war.”1 
For Daniell, it seemed self-explanatory that Germans would idolize soldiers, disheveled and dirty 
though they might be.  He intimated, too, that the stereotypically haughty German officers were not only still 
                                                 
1
 Raymond Daniell, “Germans Hail Own Army,” New York Times [NYT], 28 May 45. 
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impeccably dressed, but also somehow refusing to take responsibility for the defeat of the dirty and disheveled 
men who accompanied them.  Critical of persistent German military trappings and protocol, Daniell 
nevertheless seemed to concede that the German soldiers were proceeding in an orderly and obedient, if defiant, 
fashion.  Wehrmacht discipline might be dangerous, but it was also effective.  If all of this was true, moreover, 
it was vitally important that the Germans be reminded exactly who had just defeated whom.  The handkerchiefs 
must be stilled, the officers humbled, and the Germans made subject to the victors.  If the Germans could be 
soundly defeated and still hold their noses high and worship the uniform, there were presumably more serious 
problems to correct as well. 
 
The Problem 
Clearly, fluttering handkerchiefs and daisy nosegays are not incontrovertible proof of unhealthy hero-
worship and may simply have reflected German affection for long-absent fathers, sons, and husbands.  And 
suspect American policies undoubtedly had less to do with inadequate military attention to residual German 
delusions of victory than with the sudden and overwhelming need to transport and control several million 
German soldiers.2  Yet Daniell’s observations are instructive, for they reveal certain basic assumptions about 
the German people and an interpretation of what he was seeing that was rooted in beliefs shared by many 
Americans. 
For the second time in less than 30 years, the United States had helped to achieve a decisive victory in 
Europe after being drawn into a military conflagration that was not of its own choosing, nor of its own making.  
Blaming Germany for foolishly and arrogantly instigating both world wars, many Americans sought the origins 
of this bellicosity in a past that stretched beyond Adolf Hitler.  For some, this search led to the German Empire 
or to Frederick the Great’s Prussia; for other less historically grounded observers, the wellspring of German 
militarism lay in the murky reaches of early Germanic history.  Regardless of its starting point, the history of 
German militarism had culminated in the Third Reich.  America’s enemies were inveterate militarists, 
                                                 
2
 In the weeks immediately following Germany’s surrender on May 8, 1945, American forces had in their custody more than 
3 million German prisoners of war and disarmed troops.  Between the surrender and mid July 1945, U.S. troops handled 
some 7.7 million German military personnel “including Volkssturm and other paramilitary groups, camp followers, and 
prisoners returned from Norway, Italy, and camps in the United States and England.” Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the 
Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975), 291n60, 291. 
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congenitally or culturally prone to regimentation, obedience, and war.  Born to goose-step, they were 
excessively deferential to soldiers, too proud of their army machine, and overly influenced by their military.3   
Expressed with varying degrees of firmness, virulence, and condemnation, these ideas held widespread 
currency.  More importantly for Germany, most influential American policymakers shared them, either in part 
or in full, and worried about what they meant for the world’s future.  How to prevent Germany from launching a 
third world war became a fundamental concern of American postwar planning.  And the role that German 
militarism played in the thinking of the United States and its Allies was no secret.  “When Hitler and the Nazis 
go out,” President Franklin D. Roosevelt told the U. S. Congress in September 1943, “the Prussian military 
clique must go with them.  The war-breeding gangs of militarists must be rooted out of Germany—and out of 
Japan—if we are to have any real assurance of future peace. . . .”4  Eighteen months later, just two months 
before the war’s end, he reported to Congress on Allied discussions at Yalta, emphasizing the Allies’ 
commitment to Germany’s unconditional surrender.  Unconditional surrender, he stressed, meant “the 
termination of all militaristic influence in the public, private, and cultural life of Germany.”  It meant total 
disarmament, the end of weapons production, the dissolution of the armed forces, and “the permanent 
disbandment of the German General Staff which has so often shattered the peace of the world.”5 
The preservation of world peace thus required not only demobilizing Germany’s Wehrmacht and 
dismantling its munitions factories, but also destroying the militarism pervading all of German life.  And 
eliminating the military’s revered position in German society and excising militarism from German culture 
became key objectives of U.S occupation policy.  Regulations accordingly deprived officers of their pensions, 
banned unauthorized parades, prohibited the flying of German flags, and outlawed the wearing of Wehrmacht 
gray uniforms, while mandating the removal of war-glorifying monuments, the confiscation of militaristic 
books, and the disbanding of sports clubs.  American officials left no symptom or potential source of militarism 
untouched.   
                                                 
3
 For typical expressions of these attitudes, see Lawson G. Lowrey, “To Make the Germans Men of Peace,” New York Times 
Magazine [NYTM], 17 Jun 45, and Letters to the Editor, NYT, 25 Aug 46.  Raymond Daniell was a particularly loud critic of 
the Germans in this regard.  See, for example, “‘At Our Knees—Or at Our Throats,’” NYTM, 27 May 45, and “Speed of 
Demobilization Adds to German Problem,” NYTM, 21 Oct 45. 
  
4
 U.S. Department of State, Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress, 1945-1946 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 
1947), 2. 
 
5
 Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 13, Victory and the Threshold 
of Peace (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 575. 
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The breadth of American concerns meant that demilitarization measures interfered in some way with 
myriad aspects of German everyday life.  Teachers, mayors, librarians, journalists, policemen, coaches, 
veterans, and housewives faced military government rules that influenced what they taught, what they wrote, 
what they wore, and what they did.  German local and Land (state) officials almost immediately received 
responsibility for publicizing, implementing, and enforcing military government instructions, while also 
providing feedback and, on occasion, voicing demands of their own.  At the same time, German voices, often 
calling from the left of the political spectrum, proffered their own critique of Germany’s militaristic past and 
pleaded for and planned initiatives to address problems they identified. 
Significantly, already by the early 1950s the Germans seemed to have evolved from dangerously 
aggressive targets of American demilitarization policies into stubbornly resistant opponents of West German 
rearmament.  In fact, the striking aspect of the rearmament debate was not that the Germans could not rearm 
because their generals were selling stationery and their machine tools were humming in the Urals, but rather 
that when the question of rearmament arose, most Germans did not want to rearm.  More importantly, it is now 
apparent that there was a permanent shift in German attitudes toward war and the military during the middle of 
the twentieth century.  Looking at the Federal Republic of Germany’s postwar defense and security policies, as 
well as at the political culture that birthed, nurtured, and shaped them, political scientist Thomas Berger has 
gone so far as to assert that West Germany developed a “culture of antimilitarism.”6 
Yet even scholars who have taken note of this change have asked very few questions about the 
influence of American social and cultural demilitarization measures.7  In truth, they have asked very few 
questions about social and cultural demilitarization as a whole, neglecting not only the American program’s 
scope and significance, but the sometimes strongly expressed opinions of the Germans as well.   
                                                 
6
 Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998), x. 
 
7
 Berger, for instance, points to the “strong antimilitarist sentiments”—“strictly at odds with” Germany’s “martial 
traditions”—that appeared in Germany after its World War II defeat and notes that not only did they “fundamentally 
reshap[e]” German military and security policies immediately after the war but they were “institutionalized.”  Despite 
changes over time in the Federal Republic’s “culture of antimilitarism,” he argues, the “core principles remained much the 
same as they were in the 1950s and 1960s.”  However, he offers only a superficial historical analysis of the years when these 
principles were presumably solidified.  Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, x, 22-37. 
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Historiography 
This is not to say scholars have entirely ignored social and cultural demilitarization efforts in occupied 
Germany.  Political and general policy histories of the American occupation always point to the eradication of 
German militarism as an essential goal and sometimes describe one or more initiatives undertaken to 
demilitarize “the German mind.”  But this is not their primary concern, nor even a major secondary concern.  
Studies of this genre that do address demilitarization at length usually concentrate on its economic aspects, 
including decartelization, reparations policies, and the dismantling of munitions-related industries, partly 
because disagreements over Germany’s economic future drove important debates in the U.S. between “hard” 
and “soft” peace advocates and also strained Allied relationships.8   
A related group of works examines demilitarization in connection with the western Allies’ decision to 
rearm West Germany in the early 1950s.  In this context, social and cultural measures are treated in greater 
detail, if still briefly and superficially.  Gerhard Wettig, for example, suggests that the Allies sought to transfer 
the Germans to a new spiritual world where war had no place, treating the German people as a dangerous 
predator which not only should be kept from hunting, but also must forget that it had ever hunted before.9  
David Clay Large summarizes Allied policies and underscores some of the difficulties they confronted.  Where, 
for instance, might one “draw the line between militarism and the propagation of widely cherished martial 
                                                 
8
 Studies in this genre include Lucius D. Clay’s early personal account, Decision in Germany (Melbourne: William 
Heinemann Ltd., 1950), John Gimbel’s classic study, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 
1945-1949 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), and Earl F. Ziemke’s examination of U.S. Army occupation 
policy and operations, U.S. Army in the Occupation.  More recently, see, for example, Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing 
the line: The American decision to divide Germany, 1944-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Klaus-
Dietmar Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995); Wolfgang Krieger, 
General Lucius D. Clay und die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik, 1945-1949 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987).  On 
deindustrialization and decartelization see, for example, S. Jonathan Wiesen, West German Industry and the Challenge of 
the Nazi Past, 1945-1955 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Wilfried Mausbach, Zwischen 
Morgenthau und Marshall: Das wirtschaftspolitische Deutschlandskonzept der USA, 1944-47 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1996); 
Raymond G. Stokes, Divide and Prosper: The Heirs of I.G. Farben under Allied Authority, 1945-1951 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988); Volker R. Berghahn, The Americanization of West German Industry (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
 
9
 Gerhard Wettig, Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland, 1943-1955 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 
1967), 105-106. 
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values such as obedience, discipline, comradeship, and self-sacrifice?”10  The principal focus of these works, 
however, also lies elsewhere.11 
A third set of studies deals with the position of former soldiers in western Germany after the war.  In 
this context, Bert-Oliver Manig, James Diehl, and Jay Lockenour directly address Allied attempts to wipe out 
militarism.  Manig and Diehl evaluate the political activities of veterans during the late 1940s and early 1950s 
as they reacted to Allied regulations that not only stripped them of their decorations but also of their pensions, 
social standing, and right to organize.12  Lockenour considers former officers’ integration into and gradual 
acceptance of the new democratic West Germany, despite what they considered to be ill treatment—and 
unwarranted accusations of militarism—by both Allied occupation authorities and their own countrymen.13  In a 
complementary approach, Jörg Echternkamp examines public perceptions of the Wehrmacht during the 
occupation by analyzing the content of contemporary, American-licensed newspapers that show the conscious 
attempt of editors to reeducate the German people away from Nazism and militarism and offer evidence of 
popular engagement with the legacy of the Wehrmacht.14   
Interestingly, Lockenour briefly alludes to the effect measures aimed at veterans had on the German 
people as a whole, noting, too, that Germans regularly wrote to  newspaper editors attacking former officers 
who complained about their own situation, in part reacting to the formerly privileged status of these men and in 
part blaming them for defeat and hardship.  But opinion polls also continued to report a high regard for the 
military, a development he suggests resulted from the fact that most Germans had family members who had 
                                                 
10
 David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1996), 18. 
 
11
 Other works examining various facets of demilitarization and rearmament include Alaric Searle, Wehrmacht Generals, 
West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003); David 
Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1988); Alexander Fischer, Entmilitarisierung und Aufrüstung in Mitteleuropa 1945-1956 (Herford: E.S. 
Mittler & Sohn, 1983); Roland Foerster, ed., Von der Kapitulation bis zum Pleven Plan, vol. I of Anfänge westdeutscher 
Sicherheitspolitik, 1945-1956, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1982). 
 
12
 Bert-Oliver Manig, Die Politik der Ehre: Die Rehabilitierung der Berufssoldaten in der frőhen Bundesrepublik 
(Hamburg: Wallstein Verlag, 2004); James M. Diehl, The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second 
World War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). 
 
13
 Jay Lockenour, Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001). 
 
14
 Jörg Echternkamp, “Wut auf die Wehrmacht?  Vom Bild der deutschen Soldaten in der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit,” in 
Die Wehrmacht: Mythos oder Realität, ed. Klaus-Jürgen Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann (München: R. Oldenbourg 
Verlag, 1999), 1059-1060. 
 
 7 
served in the Wehrmacht.15  Echternkamp, on the other hand, deliberately moves beyond an examination of 
former soldiers themselves to look at the little-studied relationship between the armed forces and the German 
postwar public.  He contends that reports concerning war crimes trials put military involvement in some of the 
most egregious crimes of the Third Reich at center stage, while other articles, editorials, and letters complained 
about Wehrmacht culpability for both prolonging a lost war and increasing its casualties and illuminated the 
degree to which the German public condemned Wehrmacht leaders for their cowardly capitulation to Hitler and 
the Nazi ideological program.  Yet competing arguments were emerging, too, including those that absolved 
many soldiers of the taint of Nazism and focused on ideas of honor that transcended military defeat and 
conceptions of apolitical duty that excused inaction.16  Taken together, Manig, Diehl, Lockenour, Echternkamp, 
and others illuminate certain facets of the postwar demilitarization program and raise issues that warrant deeper 
exploration.17  However, not only is militarism not their central concern, but former military men constituted 
just one segment of a society that was accused, en bloc, of militarism. 
A fourth category of studies is much less interested in soldiers specifically than in the breadth of 
German society and culture, analyzing American efforts to “reorient” German attitudes and political behavior 
by eliminating Nazism and militarism and instilling tolerance, individual initiative, and democratic values.18  
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Margaret F. Stieg and Jennifer Fay, for instance, offer details concerning programs in which notable social and 
cultural demilitarization initiatives were imbedded.  Stieg describes Allied efforts to remove public library 
books infected with Nazism and militarism and notes that German officials often struggled with understanding 
what should be viewed as “militaristic.”19  Fay draws attention to the gap between, on one hand, American 
intentions and expectations and, on the other, German reactions to the various films distributed by U.S. officials 
for German consumption.  American authorities, for example, assumed that Germans would identify with the 
defeated German troops in American war movies; instead, the films were particularly popular with “militaristic 
German youth.”20 
While highlighting the value of additional inquiry into American activities in occupied Germany, these 
works are ultimately concerned with the “democratization” aspects of the American reorientation program, i.e., 
how occupation officials fostered political democracy and new civic attitudes, and provide only limited analysis 
of American concerns about militarism.  Certainly, those components of the social and cultural demilitarization 
program which condemned excessive military influence on the state and tried to reduce automatic obedience to 
uniformed officers helped encourage democratic thinking, but these and other measures, such as the removal of 
militaristic street signs, also sought to promote peace more directly.  Similarly, although regulations designed to 
purge National Socialist ideology from German life and remove Nazis from positions of authority typically 
included “militarism” and “militarists” in their official scopes, most studies of these initiatives discuss only the 
denazification aspects of the regulations, or blur the two categories into one group.21  Even if Nazi civilian 
authorities encouraged or embodied German militarism and, especially after 1938, had effectively negated the 
independence of the Wehrmacht, Allied officials plainly did not see one category entirely subsumed within the 
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other.  Nor, it might be added, did German officers, who were often quick to distinguish themselves from the 
Nazis, both before and after the war.  For all of these reasons the “militarism” component of these efforts 
deserves more careful study. 
Finally, scholars studying women’s experiences and changes in gender relations during the 1940s and 
1950s have noted that in postwar Germany the influence of the military on the formation of German gender 
roles and identities was greatly reduced.  During World War II, German women necessarily took on new 
responsibilities in and outside of the home when German men left for the Wehrmacht and, sometimes, failed to 
return.  After Germany’s surrender, they mastered challenges such as feeding and clothing their families in the 
midst of chaos and shortages. Even the return of male relatives did not always change this situation, research 
has shown, as the returnees were often physically, psychologically, or practically ill-equipped to deal with the 
disorganized economic system and changed social landscape of postwar Germany.  With women also 
noticeably outnumbering men because of wartime casualties and postwar captivity, occupied Germany was, in 
the words of one observer, a “country of women.”22  Perhaps not surprisingly, some historians have also pointed 
to a corollary of these developments.  The demonstrated survival capabilities of German women tended to make 
German men appear that much weaker, particularly when they might also be physically or psychologically 
broken after years of fighting, sometimes did little to help support their families, and suffered from the 
perception that they had not lived up to their masculine duties when they failed to protect and provide for their 
wives and children. During the immediate postwar years, Heide Fehrenbach has suggested, there was a “crisis 
of masculinity.”23 
In light of these circumstances, scholars have asked how the Germans coped with the muddling of the 
traditional gender order and how they reconstructed—or reconfigured—gender roles and relationships during 
the early years of the Federal Republic.  Especially significant, they stress, was the emphasis most Germans 
placed on reestablishing the German family as a foundational element of society, an emphasis that had broad 
repercussions.  Robert Moeller, for instance, has observed that although German women received equal political 
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rights in recognition of their wartime and postwar accomplishments, they were also prodded or pushed back 
into the bosom of their families.24  Historians have likewise cited the importance of the postwar exaltation of the 
family for understanding Germany’s transition from a “total war” to a “postwar” society.  Families, and the 
women who sustained them, were expected to assist in Germany’s recovery from the war by helping to integrate 
returning soldiers into a new, still evolving civil society.25  More recently, scholars have also begun examining 
the position of men in early postwar Germany, considering new conceptions of masculinity that arose in the 
wake of war and occupation and under the influence of American popular culture.26  Both Moeller and Frank 
Biess, for example, have analyzed German responses in the 1950s to the survivors of years of captivity in the 
Soviet Union and argue that, by this time, the dominant militarized masculinities of the first half of the 
twentieth century and the damaged masculinities of the immediate postwar period had both been replaced in 
part by new prescriptive ideals of manhood that presented German men as morally strong, devoted family men.  
They also identify these ideas as consistent with the rearming Federal Republic’s new benign military ideals.  
“Unlike the militarized and overtly aggressive masculinities of the Nazi years, the emphasis on returning POWs 
as fathers and husbands highlighted their identity as civilians,” writes Biess.  “West German responses to 
returning POWs thus signaled a significant break with a thirty-year process of militarization during which male 
identities had primarily rested on their functions as soldiers. . . . These tamed masculinities then corresponded 
precisely to the tamed militarism of the new West German army and its ideal soldier as the ‘citizen in 
uniform.’”27 
                                                 
24
 Moeller, Protecting Motherhood. 
 
25
 Karen Hagemann, “Home/Front: The Military, Violence and Gender Relations in the Age of the World Wars,” in 
Home/Front: The Military, War and Gender in Twentieth-Century Germany, ed. Karen Hagemann and and Stefanie 
Schüler-Springorum (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 29. 
 
26
 See, for example, Frank Biess, “Survivors of Totalitarianism:  Returning POWs and the Reconstruction of Masculine 
Citizenship in West Germany, 1945-1955,” in The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968, ed. 
Hanna Schissler (Princeton: Princeton University Pres, 2001), 63-72; Biess, Homecomings; Uta G. Poiger, Jazz, Rock and 
Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); 
Uta G. Poiger, “A New, ‘Western’ Hero?  Reconstructing German Masculinity in the 1950s,” Signs 24, No. 1 (1998): 147-
162; Robert G. Moeller, “‘The Last Soldiers of the Great War’ and Tales of Family Reunion in the Federal Republic of 
Germany,” Signs 24, No. 1 (1998): 129-145; Heide Fehrenbach, “Rehabilitating the Fatherland: Race and German 
Remasculinization,” Signs 24, No. 1 (1998): 107-127; Kasper Maase, Bravo Amerika: Erkundungen zurJugendkultur der 
Bundesrepublik in den fünfziger Jahren (Hamburg: Junius, 1992). 
 
27
 Biess, “Survivors of Totalitarianism,” 72; Frank Biess, “Men of Reconstruction – The Reconstruction of Men: Returning 
POWs in East and West Germany, 1945-1955, in Hagemann and Schüler-Springorum, Home/Front, 335-358; Moeller, 
“‘The Last Soldiers of the Great War.’” 
 
 11 
Scholars interested in these questions have not yet turned their attention to the ways in which the Allies 
intentionally attempted to alter German attitudes toward soldiers  and military service, however.  While the 
Americans did not consciously set out to change German ideals of masculinity, the dominant conception of 
masculinity during the interwar war period—a uniformed, militarized masculinity—was sure to be undermined 
by a program that explicitly banned the wearing of uniforms, the glorifying of war, and the idolization of the 
soldier hero.  If German wartime and postwar experiences ultimately led to a redefinition of what it meant to be 
a German man, the deliberate intervention of the Americans during the occupation years may have assisted in 
creating an environment that would be receptive to this development, might well have encouraged it, and 
perhaps even made it necessary.  What implications did it have for German society, for example, if military 
government regulations stipulated that youth programs for teenage boys might no longer involve military style 
uniforms, shooting practice, and drill?  
Overall, the lack of scholarly attention to Allied demilitarization initiatives may be explained in part by 
the fact that Germany appeared to change relatively quickly and painlessly after the war.  Scholars often 
implicitly or explicitly attribute this development to the sheer horror and destructiveness of World War II itself: 
millions killed, injured, or maimed; hundreds of thousands of people having lived for months in fear of Allied 
bombs and eventually invasion; entire cities gutted and left in ruins; and streams of refugees overwhelming 
welfare agencies and housing capacity.  “In the face of the resulting hatred of war, [military government] laws 
were inconsequential,” writes one historian.28  “During the immediate postwar years, the war experience and, in 
particular, the shock of the extreme violence of 1944 and 1945 led to a radical shift in German mentalities.  A 
fundamental tenet of Nazism—the belief in the virtue of war, of the military and military values—had been 
dealt a severe blow,” writes another.29  Evaluating the occupation as a military operation, another historian 
criticizes the objective the Americans set for the occupation, that of preventing Germany from again threatening 
world peace.  This goal, he notes, was “admirably suited to preventing a repetition of the 1920s and 1930s but 
                                                 
28
 Edward N. Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
1977), 138. 
 
29
 Richard Bessel, Nazism and War (New York: Modern Library, 2004), 200. 
 
 12 
inadequate to meet the situation of the late 1940s. . . . The Germans did not have to be shown the consequences 
of defeat, and after 1945, Germany was not likely again to rank as a major threat to world peace.”30 
Based on this reading of the past, the American program to eradicate German militarism was 
unnecessary.  If the war demilitarized the Germans, then there was little reason for the United States—or 
anyone else—to undertake this task, and the many military government regulations were superfluous, excessive, 
and likely without impact.  At the very least, the American measures probably generated little controversy.  As 
one of these scholars puts it, “Demilitarization was welcomed by most, resisted by none.”31  And a presumed 
lack of controversy may well have led to a corresponding lack of scholarly interest. 
But did the war alone demilitarize Germany and the Germans?  Or were there ways American 
initiatives contributed to this process?  If so, how and to what extent?  Similarly, was there, in fact, little 
resistance to American demilitarization measures?  In reality, many contemporary American policymakers 
assumed the Germans would have little taste for another war in the immediate aftermath of World War II, but 
they were also committed to solving the German problem in the long term.  And in the mid 1940s a radical 
change in German attitudes and beliefs was not yet obvious, nor was this assumed to be inevitable.  To many 
Americans, the 1920s and 1930s had proven such a supposition to be foolhardy.  While it may be difficult to 
determine what influences most shaped postwar changes, the clear shift in German culture during the mid 
twentieth century, with its possible implications for other militarized societies, begs for closer scrutiny. 
 
Conceptual Approach 
Fashioning a history of postwar social and cultural demilitarization in American-occupied Germany 
requires consideration of a series of interrelated questions.  As a starting point we must ask about the motives 
and assumptions of American policymakers and how these shaped concrete policies.  How, for example, did 
they distinguish between “militarism” and “patriotism” or between the function of a military in a democracy 
and its role in an autocratic state?  Exploring the relationship between American officials and their German 
counterparts and determining how they together implemented U.S. policies in Germany is also key.  Were 
German officials cooperative or obstructionist?  Did any opinions they expressed result in changes in U.S. 
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policy?  And how did American occupation authorities posted in German communities interact with German 
administrators?  German perceptions of American efforts are of interest as well.  Did they experience these 
actions as an attack on an integral component of their own identity, for instance, or as an annoyance that 
effectively put the finishing touches on a process that was already largely complete?  To what extent did the 
German people themselves engage in a conversation regarding militarism?  To what extent did they act 
independently to demilitarize their physical surroundings and social structures?  And, finally, can we see 
evidence of a new or nascent “culture of antimilitarism” already in 1949? 
American demilitarization goals and policies clearly form the springboard for this study and in many 
respects frame its organization.  But in this instance investigating American policy formulation and 
implementation does not lead into diplomatic arenas or national political forums but rather into German society 
and culture, to the activities and attitudes of local officials and the German reading and writing public and to 
changes in the landscape of German education, material culture, and associational life.  It thus illuminates the 
intersection of geopolitical policy and grassroots experience—and the sometimes porous boundaries between 
political, military, social, and cultural history.  As a whole, this study therefore falls within a growing body of 
literature that has expanded our understanding of the occupation period to include actors and influences with no 
role in the high level diplomacy and policy deliberations that remained the focal point of German and American 
historical scholarship into the 1980s.  In particular, it follows the lead of Hermann-Josef Rupieper, Richard 
Merritt, and others who have analyzed the occupation from the perspective of ordinary Germans, scrutinized the 
relationship between local American and German authorities, and asked how—and how successfully—cultural 
values were transmitted from victor to vanquished.32  Adding texture to our understanding of the ruptures and 
continuities of 1945 and the relative influence of America on Germany’s postwar transformation, it also offers 
insights into the dynamics at work when outsiders deliberately attempt to reconstruct and reshape the culture of 
other nations following periods of war and societal collapse. 
By cutting across national borders to look at both American and German attitudes and activities—and 
at those which were shared—an examination of social and cultural demilitarization contributes to the rapidly 
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fermenting field of transnational history as well.33  Rather than regarding German demilitarization solely as an 
American national project, or considering it only as an occupation policy imposed on the Germans from above 
by hostile occupiers, this study explicitly approaches demilitarization as an interactive enterprise.  The 
American effort was built on national ideals; American policymakers possessed a well-defined sense of national 
self and intentionally sought to eradicate negative characteristics they associated specifically with the German 
nation.  Yet not only did American occupation authorities need to rely on Germans to implement their 
directives, there were Germans who themselves had long criticized “Prussian militarism.”  The Americans’ 
power and authority gave them greater influence in the relationship, but the demilitarization program cannot be 
understood without recognizing it as a project shaped by dialogue and often strengthened by mutual goals.   
Acknowledging this also underscores the importance of rejecting ideas of American “cultural 
imperialism” in favor of an understanding of the international role of the United States that recognizes the ways 
other societies adopt, reject, or manipulate elements of American culture they encounter.34  On the whole, 
however, concepts such as “Americanization” or “westernization” are less applicable in a situation where the 
cultural change involved did not have as its primary objective the recreation of Germany in the image of 
America or existing western liberal democracies.  In 1945, the Americans did hold a distinctive notion of what 
an army’s role in society should be.  Where Germany’s military historically had dominated state and society in 
many ways, the United States had resisted military intrusions into civilian affairs and, as U.S. Military Governor 
Lieutenant General Lucius Clay once observed with reference to military training at West Point, had sought to 
instill in its soldiers both a “high standard of military conduct” and a “deep faith in democratic ideals.”35  But 
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American diagnoses of German character led U.S. officials to demand a degree of demilitarization in Germany 
much greater than that found in the United States itself.  Rather than merely restraining the German military’s 
influence on society and politics, the Americans chose to abolish the military altogether.  Martial anthems, war-
oriented museum exhibits, and other fixtures of daily life in America were likewise deemed unacceptable in 
Germany.  In short, the Americans attempted to create something entirely different, a society that resembled 
neither that of the United States nor its European allies.   
 
Dealing with “Militarism” 
Recognizing that historically the role of the military in Germany was very different than in the United 
States serves as an appropriate point of departure for examining the larger problem of “militarism” as a concept.  
A firm definition of “militarism” is difficult to isolate, as one of the concept’s distinguishing characteristics is 
its malleability.  Volker Berghahn also rightly observes that defining the term is complicated by the fact that 
“militarism is and always has been a word of political propaganda and polemic.”36  During the last half century, 
militarism has attracted the attention of scholars in a range of disciplines who have explored the meaning and 
influence of the “military-industrial complex,” demarcated the features of militarism in the developing world, 
and questioned the relationship between militarism and patriarchal structures.37  But if early conceptions of 
militarism and claims regarding its influence were not as varied as these, wartime critics of German militarism 
were hardly wielding a term that held a fixed meaning.   
In his study Militarism: The History of an International Debate, Berghahn provides a helpful 
introduction to significant developments in the evolution of thinking concerning militarism.  First used by Pierre 
Proudhon in the 1860s, the term bore a wealth of associations from the very start.  But within the space of 
several decades, Berghahn suggests, two key lines of reasoning were evident among the multiple assessments of 
“military organization and its effect upon civilian society.”  On one hand were “those analysts who saw it in a 
                                                                                                                                                       
A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present,” in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American 
National Security, ed. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 215-246. 
 
36
 Volker Berghahn, Militarism: The History of an International Debate, 1861-1979 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), 
2. 
 
37
 Ulrich Albrecht, “Der preussisch-deutsch Militarismus als Prototyp—Aspekte der internationalen wissenschaftlichen 
Diskussion,” in Militarismus in Deutschland 1871 bis 1945: Zeitgenössische Analysen und Kritik, ed. Wolfram Wette 
(Münster: Lit, 1999), 41-46. 
 
 16 
political and constitutional framework,” criticizing, in particular, excessive military influence on civilian 
governing institutions which they believed impeded the growth of representative governance; on the other were 
“those who examined it as a socio-economic problem,” disapproving, for example, of what they perceived as an 
increasingly militarized civil society in imperial Germany resulting from the introduction of universal 
conscription.38   
By the start of World War I, Marxists had come to agree that militarism was a natural outgrowth of a 
capitalist system, with militaries employed as instruments of working class oppression at home and imperialistic 
expansion abroad, perpetuating the increasing accumulation of capitalist wealth.39  Among those of other 
political persuasions, however, interpretations of militarism continued to vary.  Where the British, French, and 
Americans characterized their war effort as a fight to protect parliamentary government against German 
militarism, which they saw as a negative product of lesser, backward social and political systems, many 
Germans conceived of the war as a great battle between inferior, materialistic, democratic western “civilization” 
and highly developed, spiritually engaged German Kultur, with German military prowess increasingly viewed 
as a vital element of this Kultur.  Militarism in this context carried distinctly positive overtones.40   
Following the war, pacifist voices grew louder among both the victors and the defeated.  But if the 
western critique changed little, the situation in beaten and resentful Germany was altered markedly by the 
proliferation of paramilitary groups who adopted military patterns of organization, conduct, terminology, and 
dress and made their presence felt in society and, increasingly, in politics.  Within this paramilitary milieu, 
perspectives could vary.  Some looked to the past, reverencing Wilhelmine military culture; others took World 
War I as their reference point, elevating romanticized ideals of camaraderie, a posited equality based on shared 
experience rather than on social standing, and manly heroics and soldierly virtues.  Paramilitarism permeated 
German political life during the Weimar Republic—a reality Berghahn views as responsible for the fact that 
contemporary observers “found the psychological and psychopathological dimensions of interwar militarism 
most noteworthy,” often discounting the relevance of a nation’s army and stressing, instead, the dominance of 
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military values and objectives in civilian life.41  The primary problem, wrote German journalist Franz Carl 
Endres, was “the spirit of the uniform.”42  Others in Germany pointed to sociological aspects of militarism.  
Historian Eckardt Kehr, for instance, linked the idea of militarism “to the existence of an officer corps 
upholding the ethos of a warrior caste and to the acceptance of this ethos as a higher form of human order by the 
civilian bourgeoisie,” suggesting, further, that this acceptance was in some fashion related to the appearance of 
capitalism in Prussia.  His countryman Heinz Fick highlighted the relationship between militarism and 
feudalism—East Elbian social and political structures providing the economic fuel for militarism—and noted 
how the self-interest of entrepreneurs led them to militarism.43 
In 1937, German émigré historian Alfred Vagts wove together many of these ideas in his influential 
History of Militarism.  Focusing on the history of the military profession, Vagts argued that an army that 
operated “in a military way” was “marked by a primary concentration of men and materials on winning specific 
objectives of power with the utmost efficiency; that is, with the least expenditure of blood and treasure.”  It was 
“limited in scope, confined to one function and scientific in its essential qualities.”  This he contrasted with an 
army operated in a “militaristic way.”  Militarism, he contended, “presents a vast array of customs, interests, 
prestige, actions and thought associated with armies and wars and yet transcending true military purposes.”  Its 
influence was not restrained, but rather could “permeate all society and become dominant over all industry and 
arts.”  Not scientific, it exhibited “the qualities of caste and cult, authority and belief.”44    
Vagts argued, moreover, that militarism was “not the opposite of pacifism” but rather of “civilianism.”  
Love of war was the “counterpart of the love of peace, pacifism.”  Militarism, however, was “more, and 
sometimes less than the love of war” and included “every system of thinking and valuing and every complex of 
feelings which rank military institutions and ways above the ways of civilian life, carrying military mentality 
and modes of action and decision into the civilian sphere.”  This “‘militarism of moods and opinions’” he 
                                                 
41
 Ibid., 32-37.  Quote is on page 37.  On paramilitary groups during the Weimar Republic, see James M. Diehl, 
Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977); Volker R. Berghahn, Der 
Stahlhelm.  Bund der Frontsoldaten, 1918-1935 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1966); Karl Rohe, Das Reichsbanner Schwarz Rot 
Gold.  Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Struktur der politischen Kampfverbände zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik (Düsseldorf: 
Droste, 1966). 
 
42
 Quoted in Berghahn, Militarism, 37. 
 
43
 Ibid., 38. 
 
44
 Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Romance and Realities of a Profession (New York: W.W. Norton, 1937), 11. 
 
 18 
added, “has been more clearly in evidence in Germany than elsewhere, except in Japan, because there the 
soldier has been admired in peace time, and not, as in other lands, mostly in war.  Even in peace, the German is 
inclined to acknowledge the primacy of the military and accept its absolute good regardless of its use in war, its 
victories, or defeats.”45  Vagts, Berghahn observes, regarded militarism as a “phenomenon of modern mass 
society.”  Overall, befitting his émigré status, he attempted to “blend the Central European preoccupation with 
militarism as a state of mind with Anglo-Saxon concerns of civilian control.”46   
Shortly thereafter, American Harold Lasswell inserted a new element into the contemporary militarism 
debate, emphasizing in a 1941 article the critical role in modern militarism of technology and bureaucratic 
organization.  With an eye on fascism, he saw a future in which “specialists on violence” would achieve the 
upper hand in modern states, leading to what he termed “garrison states.” Unlike traditional military officers, he 
noted, modern “specialists on violence” devoted much of their attention to “the skills and attitudes judged 
characteristic of non-violence” and would be likely to function like civilian managers.  Centralized, 
bureaucratic, and hierarchical, the “garrison state” would prevent those who resented oppressive bureaucratic 
dominance from rebelling through the use of appeasement, coercion, manipulation, and violence.47  
Understandably, World War II, the collapse of the Third Reich, and Allied accusations elicited 
additional scrutiny of militarism by intellectuals both in Germany and abroad.  German historian Friedrich 
Meinecke, for example, addressed the problem of German militarism already in 1946.  In his The German 
Catastrophe, Meinecke traced a line from Frederick William I of Prussia to the Third Reich in discerning a 
distinctive, all-embracing German militarism birthed by the Prussian army.  Viewing militarism as “an 
outgrowth of the age of science and rational planning,” he saw the German General Staff created in the 
nineteenth century as the purest embodiment of German militarism.  But he also identified a second 
manifestation of militarism, “an irrational one which came to bear after the First World War: the intoxication of 
the younger generation with nationalistic and militaristic ‘ideals.’”  The National Socialist dictatorship, 
Meinecke contended, was the product of both.  The same year, historian Hans Herzfeld also emphasized 
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modern militarism’s technological character, though he stressed that this was a recent development, with 
rationalization and automation bringing uniquely destructive results.  “Militarism was therefore ‘the increased 
perfection of all the possibilities of military organization.’”  But he also defined militarism as the incursion of 
military thinking into politics and thus distinguished between “militarism” and “soldierdom.”  Both men 
ultimately presented militarism in Germany within the context of broader European developments, an approach 
considerably different than that of their colleagues abroad such as A.J.P. Taylor and John Wheeler-Bennett, 
who, much like Allied occupation officials, identified a uniquely German historical phenomenon.48   
In the latter regard, Meinecke and Herzfeld shared a perspective with Gerhard Ritter, who became a 
key proponent of a new orthodoxy among German historians that portrayed the Third Reich as a 
“Betriebsunfall,” an industrial accident, an aberration in German history caused by a plague of National 
Socialist criminals.49  In keeping with this, Ritter posited a tightly circumscribed, but influential, definition of 
militarism that effectively exonerated Prussia’s military tradition.50  According to Ritter, militarism involved 
both the requirements of the military taking precedence over the total political interests of the state and “‘the 
one-sided predominance of militant and martial traits in a statesman’s or nation’s basic political outlook’ to the 
extent that the most important task of a state is neglected, which is ‘to create a durable order of law and peace 
among men, to promote general welfare and mediate continuously in the eternal struggle among divergent 
interests and claims in domestic affairs and between nations.’”51  With this definition, he could exclude the 
kings of Prussia and Otto von Bismarck from the ranks of the militarists.  Instead, in his view, the situation 
began to deteriorate only when Bismarck’s successors succumbed to military pressures and the German people 
became a chauvinistic hoard.  For Ritter, Berghahn notes, “the dominance of [military] technical factors and 
martial popular passions conspired to produce the militaristic policy of the late Wilhelmine period.  It was 
during the First World War . . . that the fatal preponderance of the soldier over the politician became 
irreversible.”  The end of the Weimar Republic, meanwhile, was “caused ‘by the militarism of the National 
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Socialist people’s movement,’” although in Ritter’s view most of Hitler’s enthusiastic followers had not 
anticipated another war, but rather sought unity and a restoration of Germany’s status.52 
The specific ideas of American policymakers during this period are discussed at length elsewhere in 
this study.53  But a few introductory words will help to situate their thinking, which serves as the frame to this 
study, within the broader developments outlined above.  On the whole, American officials tended to survey 
Nazi Germany from across the Atlantic and announce that what they saw there was militarism, rather than 
defining “militarism” as an abstract formulation and then concluding that Germany met certain theoretical 
criteria.  Their demilitarization plans nevertheless point toward an interpretation of militarism similar to Vagts’ 
broad assessment, which merged political and psychological conceptions of militarism in citing the “domination 
of the military man over the civilian, an undue preponderance of military demands, [and] an emphasis on 
military considerations, spirit, ideals, and scales of value, in the life of states.”54  Military historian Wolfram 
Wette offers additional insight into the American perspective in stressing that militarism refers to a system.  
“Influence of the military on politics, science and the economy, social militarism, glorification of violence, war 
ideologies, friend-foe thinking, nationalistic and racist ideologies, militaristic education, the interests of the 
arms industry, and other phenomenon are to be understood as parts of the greater whole,” he explains.  In this 
context, “militarization” refers to the process by which different facets of state and society are shaped by the 
military or by military models and thinking.  In short, militarism as a system is the result of the militarization of 
multiple aspects of state and society.55  While U.S. officials did not explicitly discuss German militarism as a 
system, and their employment of the terms “militarism” and “militaristic” was varied and inconsistent, their 
plans for eradicating the problem were all-encompassing.56  At the same time, the limitation of Wette’s 
description for our purposes is its focus on the outcome, rather than the mechanism of militarization.  For the 
Americans, the means were integrally tied up with the results.  Critical to their appraisal of militaristic Germany 
was the notion that Germans were congenitally militaristic or, much more often, that Germans were culturally 
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conditioned to be militaristic—in effect, the creation of a militaristic system was a circular, self-perpetuating 
process. 
Considering demilitarization from a systemic perspective, without losing sight of the presumed means 
of militarization, helps to explain the nature and parameters of American efforts. “Demilitarization” involved 
undoing the damage caused by the militarizing process.  German militarism was seen in twisted national 
political goals, misguided industries, and military-oriented museums and schools.  Destroying militarism meant 
ensuring non-militaristic civilian leadership in politics and administration, restoring civil society to civilians, 
and wiping out ways of thinking that glorified war and the military.  If military officers—in particular, the 
general staff—furthered the militarizing process, their influence had to be curtailed.  Abolishing the Wehrmacht 
and shutting down factories would eliminate an army guilty of aggression and industries wrongly directed 
toward war production.  Ultimately, both the institutional structures and the individuals contaminated by and 
promoting militarism had to be demilitarized.  And only by attacking both ends of the problem could it finally 
be eradicated. 
With this understanding of militarism as a backdrop, my own approach in this study also becomes 
clearer.  Specifically, I am concentrating on a subset of this more expansive demilitarization program,57 
intentionally disregarding matters of industry and economy, political developments, and measures related to the 
formal dissolution of the Wehrmacht, which have long interested other scholars, not least because they were 
central to early Cold War confrontations between the western Allies and the Soviet Union.58  In focusing instead 
on “social and cultural” demilitarization, I am drawing on a definition of “culture” articulated by historian Akira 
Iriye, that of “culture as a ‘structure of meaning,’ including ‘memory, ideology, emotions, lifestyles, scholarly 
and artistic works, and other symbols.’”59  The “social” dimension here refers principally to relationships 
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between individuals and within groups, rather than to the social structures German Bielefeld school historians 
have subjected to careful scrutiny in analyzing the problem of militarism in modern German history.60  In 
particular, I am looking at measures that expressly targeted symbols (uniforms, military decorations, flags), 
material culture (street signs, monuments), rituals (parades, salutes), group activities (sports clubs, youth 
groups), and informal and formal education (literature, schoolbooks, curricula).  While this scope is broad, it 
does not encompass every aspect of the occupation that could be considered part of the social and cultural 
demilitarization project.  It leaves out, for example, film, theater, and the writings of Germany’s intellectual 
elites.  Due to the breadth of American efforts, aspiring to comprehensiveness would have resulted in a study of 
unmanageable proportions.  I have therefore centered my attention on measures which fall into one or more of 
the following categories: 1) those most significant in terms of coverage or effect; 2) those that illuminate or 
exemplify key attributes of the demilitarization program; and/or 3) those which are particularly distinctive or 
have been little studied elsewhere to date.61 
 
Militarism and the Third Reich 
Any effort to “demilitarize” assumes, of course, that a state and society are militarized in the first 
place.  Interestingly, however, few historical studies have looked beyond the archetypal militarism of the 
Wilhelmine era to pose questions regarding German militarism in the Third Reich.  As noted, German historians 
in the immediate postwar period briefly considered the role militarism had played in their nation’s recent past, 
but this discussion died quickly.  During the decades following, only a handful of scholars exhumed the 
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question.62  Wette, for instance, called attention to facets of this relationship in centering an analysis of 
militarism in the Third Reich on the “ideologies of those who advocated a policy in which military force was to 
play a decisive role and military methods of organization were to be applied to society in general.”  Ultimately, 
he argued, all levels of society—not just elites—became part of a “militarized Volksgemeinschaft.”63 Wilfried 
von Bredow offered a similar view, suggesting that the German people responded wholeheartedly to the Nazi 
call for total war, fighting until the bitter end on foreign soil and on the home front even when all hope was lost, 
due to the success with which the Nazis had pushed the “collective inner militarization of the people.”64   
In a 1999 literature review, political scientist Ulrich Albrecht observed that most works dealing in 
some fashion with the Nazi state and militarism had tended to concentrate on certain subgroups, particularly 
high-ranking officers and high-level Nazi officials.  He also concluded—admittedly with some exaggeration—
that most studies addressing militarism fell into one of two camps, describing either a militarism grounded in 
the Wehrmacht and divorced from the National Socialists or a Nazi militarism that had little connection with the 
Wehrmacht.65  Wette has made a similar point, citing the many works on the Nazi dictatorship and the many 
works on the Wehrmacht, but the virtual absence of any books in which “the National Socialist state, the 
Wehrmacht, and the militarization of society and economy are combined with one another.”66  Calling for 
studies connecting National Socialism and the Wehrmacht during the war in ways that went beyond examining 
the militarism of professional officers or institutional entanglements in Nazism, Albrecht laid out a possible 
                                                 
62
 Albrecht, “Der preussisch-deutsche Militarismus als Prototyp,” 38-39, 47-49.  Among these were Manfred 
Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Zeit der Indoktrination (Hamburg: R.v.Decker, 1969); Klaus-Jürgen Müller, 
Das Heer und Hitler: Armee und Nationalsozialistisches Regime, 1933-1940 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1969); 
Wolfgang Sauer, “Die Politische Geschichte der deutschen Armee und das Problem des Militarismus, Politische 
Vierteljahrshefte 6 (1965); Karl Rohe, “Militarismus, soldatische Haltung, und Führerideologie,” in Militarismus, ed. Volker 
R. Berghahn (Köln: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1975); Stig Förster, “Der deutsche Militarismus im Zeitalter des totalen 
Krieges,” in Neue Politische Literatur 27, No. 2 (1982). 
 
63
 Albrecht, “Der preussisch-deutsche Militarismus als Prototyp,” 50; Wolfram Wette, “Ideology, Propaganda, and Internal 
Politics as Preconditions of the War Policy of the Third Reich,” in The Build-up of German Aggression, ed. Wilhelm Deist 
et al., vol. 1 of Germany and the Second World War, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990), 15, 147-155.  The German version of this volume appeared in 1979. 
 
64
 Quoted in Albrecht, “Der preussisch-deutsche Militarismus als Prototyp,” 51.  See also Wilfried von Bredow, Moderner 
Militarismus: Analyse und Kritik (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1983). 
 
65
 Albrecht, “Der preussisch-deutsche Militarismus als Prototyp,” 51-52, 59-60. 
 
66
 Wette, “Für eine Belebung der Militarismusforschung,” 17.  The interpretive model “militarism,” Wette suggests, would 
be an appropriate tool to use to integrate the two lines of inquiry.  See also Wolfram Wette, “Der Militarismus und die 
deutschen Kriege,” in Schule der Gewalt: Militarismus in Deutschland, 1871-1945, ed. Wolfram Wette (Berlin: Aufbau 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005), 14. 
 
 24 
analytical agenda for better understanding National Socialist militarism.  Specifically, he suggested three 
potentially fruitful “dimensions” of investigation: the “munitions technological”; the “ideological,” namely, the 
affinities between National Socialism and Wehrmacht “ideology”; and the “militärische [military],” 
“culminating in the idea of total war,” with its absolute enemies, total mobilization of all of society for war, and 
elimination of distinctions between soldiers and non-combatants, resulting in the destruction of entire groups of 
people.67   
Recently, several historians have moved in this direction, if generally not choosing to employ the 
concept of militarism as a heuristic tool.  In a recent study drawing heavily on the many scholarly works from 
recent decades that analyze the Wehrmacht’s wartime conduct, Wette himself has stressed the overlap between 
Nazi ideology and beliefs characteristic of Germany’s armed forces even prior to Hitler’s seizure of power.  In 
addition to sharing an anti-semitic outlook, Wette notes, the Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht agreed “on the 
question of whether ‘great matters’ could be solved by other means than warfare.”  In short, they could not.  
German military tradition likewise put forward the idea that “in case of doubt the so-called ‘necessities of war’ 
overrode any limits imposed on the conduct of warfare by international law.”68  As scholars have long observed, 
both the Nazis and Germany’s military elites were also committed to freeing Germany from the shackles of 
Versailles and believed that success in this endeavor demanded the total (peacetime) mobilization of all 
Germans.69 
Focusing more specifically on National Socialism, Richard Bessel has offered an analysis of the Third 
Reich that places “racist war” at its heart.  Nazism, Bessel stresses,  
was inseparable from war.  As a political movement German National Socialism grew and triumphed 
in a country deeply scarred by the experience of, and defeat in, the First World War. . . . The ideology 
of Nazism was an ideology of war, which posited an eternal struggle between supposed races, and 
which was realized in wars launched in order to redraw the racial map of the European continent.  The 
political practice of Nazism was aggressive and bellicose, bringing violence to Germany’s streets and 
glorying in uniformed, military-style formations of political soldiers.  The language of war was rarely 
absent from the propaganda of the Nazi movement and the Nazi regime.  Once its leadership had 
captured state power, they steered a remarkably consistent, if irrational and ultimately self-destructive 
course to war.  The Nazi leadership sought to militarize the German economy and society and to 
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indoctrinate the German population into the willing acceptance and even enthusiastic approval of war.  
It launched a second world war that proved even more destructive than the  
first. . . .70 
 
In deliberately seeking to delineate the “new face of German militarism” during the Third Reich, 
military historian Manfred Messerschmidt has reminded that it is not sufficient to think of militarism in terms of 
the relative influence of the military on politics.  Rather, military organization and civil society, and military 
and political leadership, were no longer separate.  Nazi militarism tended to dissolve the boundaries between the 
two.  In the end, he suggests, National Socialism bundled, absorbed, and radicalized to the point of criminality 
all older forms of militarism, pulling all Germans into preparations for war and establishing the authority of the 
Nazi state on two armed pillars: the Party with its armed forces and the Wehrmacht which was completely 
subordinate to Hitler and responsive only to his destructive, hate-filled, racist will.71 
Surveying the relative barrenness of the historiographical landscape pertaining to German militarism 
during the Third Reich, Wette has emphasized the importance of recognizing in “Prussian-German militarism” 
another line of continuity in the history of the German national state stretching from the nineteenth century to 
1945.  Such a view, he makes clear, does not presume that German militarism was homogenous and 
unchanging.72  In fact, Wette, Albrecht, and Messerschmidt all imply that the militarism of the Third Reich can 
best be understood not only in relationship to other “militarisms” of the twentieth century, but also in 
comparison with German militarisms of the Wilhelmine and Weimar eras.73  In this regard, Wette’s position is 
unequivocal.  It “cannot be overlooked,” he has argued, “that the militarized Volksgemeinschaft of the Nazi 
period effectively represented the . . . most radical form of state and social militarism.”  Particularly during the 
war’s latter half, he notes, Germany’s conduct of the war “came increasingly closer to the idea of total war.  The 
militarization of society, science, propaganda, thinking, and everyday life assumed an extent that history had 
not known to that point.”  Contending that applying a conception of militarism such as Vagts’ classical version 
to the Third Reich is inadequate, Albrecht suggests that the idea must instead be broadened or reconceived and 
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describes the militarism of the Third Reich as “hypermilitarism,” meaning, Wette adds, “that the militarization 
of Germany under the rule of National Socialism reached its absolute high point.”74 
An underlying assumption of this study, then, is that Nazi Germany was highly militaristic.  By the late 
1930s, the German officer corps had lost most of its influence in government policy formation, but had become 
an important instrument of the Nazi state, with its traditions and values co-opted as exemplary.  Army, industry, 
science, and bureaucracy were preparing for war—a war of annihilation, scholars now stress, though this was 
not obvious to the Germans’ Allied contemporaries.  The Nazi Gleichschaltung had transformed the missions of 
cultural institutions, sporting clubs, and other groups to assist in this task, while schools and Nazi youth 
organizations trained and motivated young men to fight and sought to guarantee that their sisters and wives 
would support them.  In doing so, they preached an ideology that sanctified military vengeance and glorified 
soldierly values and achievements.  Military aesthetics and methods of organization permeated public spaces 
and private lives in the form of martial songs, military titles, hierarchical structures, and parades of marching 
uniforms and fluttering flags.  Some Germans resisted regimentation and opposed the reorientation of German 
life.  Many more continued to cling tightly to a desire for peace.  But even those who had no longing for another 
war welcomed Germany’s renewed geopolitical strength and the jobs and restored financial well-being that a 
mobilizing economy brought with it.75 
Assessing the scale and character of militarism in Nazi Germany is critical if one of our tasks is to 
begin to evaluate the efficacy and impact of American and German demilitarization efforts during the 
occupation years.  But to fully understand American policies, German actions, and contemporary rhetoric, it is 
equally important to appreciate what contemporaries thought was the character of Nazi Germany and the 
relationship between German militarism and World War II. 
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Despite our ability today to draw broad conclusions regarding the overall approach of “the Americans” 
or “the Germans” to the problem of militarism, it is clear  that contemporary policymakers, occupation 
authorities, journalists, bureaucrats, and the general public could not always agree on exactly what militarism 
was.  Instead, “militarism” and “militarist” were plastic terms that could be molded into various and sundry 
shapes, even when retaining certain essential qualities.  Sometimes ideology determined their contours, 
sometimes differing conceptions of history did.  Sometimes the terms served as useful shorthand for undesirable 
traits; sometimes they were synonymous with soldiers, particularly officers.  And differing ideas concerning the 
nature of militarism might result from, or lead to, differing ideas as to its cause and preferred method of 
eradication.  Most observers associated militarism in some sense with fundamental beliefs regarding the 
purpose of war, the desirability of war, the nature of a nation’s military, and/or how societies, their leaders, and 
their militaries view and conduct war.  But under this umbrella—as cause, symptom, or effect—they might 
point especially to spit-and-polish “Prussianism,” marching school children, the excessive influence of a 
“military caste,” overbearing non-commissioned officers, or some combination of these and other elements. 
This study presumes a widespread militarization of German society and culture during the Third Reich, 
but recognizes, too, that the “militarism” invoked during the occupation period was a flexible, multi-faceted 
idea.  How Germans and Americans understood, interpreted, evaluated, or identified it becomes itself an object 
of consideration.76  Furthermore, it is essential to distinguish between several related, but not automatically 
identical, things: militarism, war, and specific practices.  If opposing “militarism” did not always mean 
opposing the same set of problems, criticizing militarism might, but did not always, mean opposing war.  Nor 
did criticizing militarism or opposing war necessarily mean approving of or championing official measures 
conceived to stamp out militarism, whether introduced by the Americans or Germans. 
In the following pages, I have tried to rely on contemporary definitions and descriptions of militarism, 
while at times problematizing them.  If an individual labeled a practice or person militaristic, I accept their 
definition as evidence of their engagement with the issue of militarism.  But I also broaden the scope of my own 
exploration of demilitarization to include an appraisal of German attitudes toward war more generally.  There 
are three primary reasons for doing so.  First, because the definition of militarism is so nebulous, casting a broad 
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net can capture relevant details and reveal attitudes that a narrower focus might not.  Second, as noted above, 
some observers have suggested that World War II itself was responsible for demilitarizing the Germans.  
Considering German views of war provides a tool for evaluating the validity of these assertions.  Finally, in the 
end, this was what the American program was about: the United States wanted to change German attitudes 
toward war.  Munitions industries, the Wehrmacht, ubiquitous uniforms, military models of education, and 
other similar elements of German life were important.  Yet they would not by themselves lead to war.  
Compressed to its essence, the ultimate goal of American policymakers in calling for the eradication of German 
militarism was to destroy any German desire to start another war. 
 
Geographic Focus and Sources 
In analyzing postwar social and cultural demilitarization in Germany, I have focused as a case study on 
the southwestern German Land of Württemberg-Baden, the portion of present-day Baden-Württemberg that fell 
within the American occupation zone.  In particular, I have concentrated on four cities varying in personality 
and size: Heidelberg, Karlsruhe, Stuttgart, and Ulm.  While Heidelberg and Karlsruhe were located in the 
former Grand Duchy of Baden, Stuttgart and Ulm were situated in what had been the Kingdom of Württemberg.  
Capital cities of their respective Lands until 1945 and thus home to numerous civil servants, Karlsruhe and 
Stuttgart were also host to vital war industries (both Bosch and Daimler-Benz had large facilities in Stuttgart, 
for example) and were consequently heavily damaged by Allied bombs.  Both cities, along with surrounding 
areas, were first occupied by the French, before being turned over to the Americans in July 1945 after Allied 
officials finalized zonal boundaries.  Ulm historically had been a garrison city.  Due to the presence of a large 
number of factories, its wartime fate was similar to that of its neighbors to the northwest, with the city’s center 
boasting little more than a magnificent minster and a labyrinth of ruins by the time its inhabitants surrendered to 
the Americans.  In contrast, the scenic university city of Heidelberg survived the hostilities nearly untouched.  
Because of this, however, the war’s end brought a deluge of refugees and expellees and eventually the 
command headquarters of U.S. ground forces and its relentless requisitioning of houses and public buildings. 
Wartime labor migration, evacuations, refugee arrivals, and other factors make it difficult to determine 
the exact composition of the four cities during the occupation.  But official population figures document the 
number of inhabitants at selected times and offer a sense of the physical size of each city, even as they shed 
 29 
light on the magnitude of population fluctuations and the resulting emptiness and congestion that shaped the 
cities’ postwar experiences.  German federal sources show that in 1939 Heidelberg had a population of 86,467; 
Karlsruhe 190,081; Stuttgart 496,490; and Ulm 74,387.77  By the end of the war, these figures had changed 
substantially.  Local sources indicate, for instance, that Karlsruhe had only 60,000 inhabitants in December 
1944, while Stuttgart had just 265,000 and Ulm approximately 28,000 when they capitulated.78  According to an 
American study (which did not include Ulm in its tabulations), these numbers changed rapidly after Germany’s 
surrender.  By late 1946, the population of Heidelberg had increased to 113,079, with that of Karlsruhe standing 
at 176,301 and that of Stuttgart at 411,333.79 
Analyzing American and German attitudes and decision-making processes, as well as the give-and-
take between American and German authorities that shaped demilitarization efforts in Württemberg-Baden, 
necessarily required the review of sources on both sides of the Atlantic.  At the U.S. National Archives, relevant 
collections included those containing records generated by the various federal agencies involved in postwar 
planning and by the assorted entities responsible for governing Germany.  The latter responsibility lay with the 
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) until July 1945 when the American Zone came 
under the supervision of U.S. military government officials, with further policy guidance provided by the 
quadripartite Allied Control Authority beginning in August 1945.  Files of the U.S. Departments of State, 
Treasury, and War, and a number of related interdepartmental committees, thus contributed valuable 
information regarding American policymaking, as did the records of SHAEF, which also provided useful details 
concerning operations in Germany during the pre-surrender and early post-surrender periods.  Most important 
were the records of zonal, Land, and local offices of the U.S. Office of Military Government for Germany, 
together with records produced by the Allied Control Authority.  To supplement these materials, I also 
consulted the archived and published papers of several key American policymakers. 
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Research in Germany involved the review of a broad assortment of official sources as well.  Much to 
the chagrin of the Badenese and the Swabians of Württemberg, Allied decisions at the end of the war divided 
both Baden and Württemberg between the French and the Americans, with the Americans governing the 
northern portion of each.80  In late September 1945, moreover, the Americans fused their two partial states into 
one Land, to be administered as a single unit under the leadership of a newly appointed German minister-
president, Dr. Reinhold Maier.81  Although Württemberg and Baden were both known for their liberal 
traditions—leading at least one Allied handbook to assert, hopefully, that this history, combined with the area’s 
“social composition” and abundance of “cultural centres,” “should make the work of reconstruction easier here 
than in other more regimented and Prussianized regions” of Germany82—each had its own traditions, customs, 
and administrative system.  Therefore, in addition to aggravating regional antagonisms, the creation of a unified 
state presented Land officials with very real obstacles to efficient administration.  To reduce friction and combat 
management problems, the Americans very quickly introduced a hybrid government.  All Land ministries were 
located in Stuttgart, but “Landesbezirk Baden” had its own cabinet-level president, Heinrich Köhler.  Separate 
administrative departments retained responsibility for governing North Baden according to instructions received 
from the Land ministries; these ministries, in turn, received orders from American occupation officials and 
governed North Württemberg directly. 
For research purposes, this organizational structure presented both challenges and benefits.  On one 
hand, because the two formerly independent states maintained separate records, obtaining a full picture of 
events in Württemberg-Baden required the review of two sets of Land-level files.  On the other, correspondence 
between officials in Stuttgart and Karlsruhe often served to clarify the views of German officials and their 
American occupiers, with civil servants describing new directives, plans, or meetings with the Americans and 
recording information and opinions they might otherwise have left undocumented.  Moreover, the two sets of 
records were at times complementary in terms of content; where one group was weak, the other might be strong. 
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Providing a perspective even closer to the everyday experience of most Germans, records reviewed at 
the municipal archives of the four cities of interest were in some respects also complementary.  The city 
archives of Heidelberg and Stuttgart, for example, held detailed sets of weekly reports submitted by municipal 
officials to local military government offices.  While few reports of this type were extant in Karlsruhe, holdings 
there included meaty city council minutes and extensive correspondence between the central city government 
and its 16 administrative districts.  Similarly, where one set of city records yielded only the most fragmentary 
snippets of information on a topic, another included sufficient detail to serve as an informative case study.   
Although focusing on four major cities permits close examination of a range of occupation 
experiences, it necessarily privileges the experiences of cities.  To offset this bias, I also screened a sampling 
Landkreis (administrative district) files, which provided insight into the experiences of Württemberg-Baden’s 
many small towns and villages. 
Along with government records, the Land and city archives in Baden-Württemberg maintained other 
materials that proved critical to my research.  These included case files from denazification proceedings, 
interview notes and transcriptions, autobiographies and manuscript histories, press clippings, and assorted 
collections of papers from individuals and extra-governmental groups.  Using many of these sources to gain a 
better sense of the views and experiences of Germans other than Land and local officials, I also supplemented 
them with materials culled from two archives that hold collections of diaries and autobiographies and with 
information from several personal paper collections located at Germany’s Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv.  
Additionally, I consulted four newspapers: Heidelberg’s Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung, Karlsruhe’s Badische Neueste 
Nachrichten, Stuttgart’s Stuttgarter Zeitung, and Ulm’s Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung.   
 
Organization and Overview 
In reviewing these records, one thing quickly became clear: the pervasiveness of the problem of 
militarism.  Generating much less paper than critically pressing matters such as food supplies and housing 
shortages, the tentacles of demilitarization were nevertheless striking in their reach.  From American military 
planners considering how to send German troops home from POW camps to municipal police administrators 
questioning how subordinates should greet their superiors, from newspaper editors calling for street name 
changes to Land education officials developing new school curricula, countless Germans and Americans 
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pondered how they could best prevent a resurgence of German militarism.  At the same time, although 
demilitarization concerns touched multiple aspects of public and private life, most official initiatives were well 
underway or already completed by mid 1947.  In other words, American policies did not typically build on one 
another over time, but were implemented concurrently in diverse arenas during a period lasting less than three 
years.   
These factors helped to establish the organization of this study.  In its general progression, it is 
chronological.  However, much of the body of the text is organized into thematic chapters centering on 
particular aspects of the demilitarization program that were unfolding simultaneously.  Thus, the first two 
substantive chapters discuss, respectively, the conceptions of German militarism evident in American 
policymaking circles during World War II and the formulation of specific regulations intended to address the 
social and cultural manifestations of German militarism.  The following two chapters focus on “militarists,” 
looking, first, at the problem of determining who was a militarist and how the Germans dealt with such 
individuals and, second, at the evolution of Allied policies relating to Germany’s elite officers and their 
treatment during the occupation.  Chapters Six and Seven consider how the Americans and Germans handled 
the problem of German culture, examining the implementation of prohibitions on uniform wearing, marching, 
flags, and saluting, as well as efforts to eliminate militaristic museum exhibits, street signs, monuments, and 
books.  Chapter Eight then explores a range of issues pertaining to Germany’s youth, concentrating, in 
particular, on textbook vetting, history teaching, youth groups, and the ban on certain sporting activities.  The 
final chapter outlines the status of the demilitarization project at the end of the formal occupation period in 1949 
and draws conclusions concerning its overall evolution and results.   
In the end, this study shows that changes in German culture and society that would prove to be both 
genuine and lasting were evident already by the end of the occupation, but that this transformation was neither 
entirely spontaneous nor unchallenged.  Rather, despite troublesome flaws in their thinking and sometimes 
inconsistently applied regulations, the Americans perceptibly influenced the character and parameters of 
tangible change in Württemberg-Baden.  Not only did they make concrete demands, such as requiring the 
removal of militaristic books from libraries and forbidding paramilitary youth activities, but by watching over 
personnel appointments and policing the content of media sources and education, they protected the public 
sphere for sympathetic native voices, thereby facilitating and fostering a discourse condemning war and 
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militarism.  At the same time, these efforts were aided and strengthened by the many Germans who also wished 
to see “German militarism” eradicated, even when they did not always agree with their occupiers on methods or 
exact objectives.  Although social and cultural demilitarization as a basic goal was widely supported, its nature 
and extent remained contested throughout the occupation, with individual views determined in part by concerns 
about the time and costs involved in making substantive changes and in part by personal beliefs regarding 
Germany’s past and the causes of the country’s recent descent into war.
  
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
“BEETHOVEN IN THE TRENCHES”:  
AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF GERMAN MILITARISM 
 
 
“The militarists of Berlin and Tokyo started this war,” President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced to 
the United States Congress on January 6, 1942.  “The enemy,” he explained, “has trained his people to believe 
that their highest perfection is achieved by waging war” and for years “has prepared for this very conflict—
planning, and plotting, and training, arming, and fighting. . . .”   But this would not continue.  The war would 
end, he asserted, “just as soon as we make it end, by our combined efforts, our combined strength, our 
combined determination to fight through and work through until the end—the end of militarism in Germany and 
Italy and Japan.  Most certainly we shall not settle for less.” 1 
Giving his first State of the Union address since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and subsequent 
German declaration of war, Roosevelt described an intimidating, evil trinity—three nations melded into one 
powerful, ruthless enemy—and identified as the objective of the war to be fought not merely the defeat of the 
warmongers, but the eradication of militarism itself.  During the years that followed, he would return to these 
themes repeatedly.  In January 1943, he advised Congress that the United States had “learned that if we do not 
pull the fangs of the predatory animals of this world, they will multiply and grow in strength—and they will be 
at our throats again once more in a short generation.”  Germany, Italy, and Japan therefore must be permanently 
disarmed and must “abandon the philosophy, and the teaching of that philosophy, which has brought so much 
suffering to the world.”2  Chatting with a radio audience in late 1943, the president specifically addressed the 
issue of Germany, a nation he viewed as a repeat offender: 
After the Armistice in 1918, we thought and hoped that the militaristic philosophy of 
Germany had been crushed; and being full of the milk of human kindness we spent the next twenty 
years disarming, while the Germans whined so pathetically that the other Nations permitted them—and 
even helped them—to rearm. 
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 For too many years we lived on pious hopes that aggressor and warlike Nations would learn and 
understand and carry out the doctrine of purely voluntary peace. 
The well-intentioned but ill-fated experiments of former years did not work.  It is my hope 
that we will not try them again.  No—that is putting it too weakly—it is my intention to do all that I 
humanly can as President and Commander in Chief to see to it that these tragic mistakes shall not be 
made again.3 
 
In his determination to ensure a lasting peace, Roosevelt was not alone.  Nor was he alone in accusing 
Germany of repeated transgressions.  In the smoky government conference rooms of wartime Washington, one 
question dominated discussions of the future of Europe: how to ensure that the Germans could not and would 
not start another war.  And like Roosevelt, American policymakers returned again and again to what they saw as 
the heart of the problem: German militarism.   
Yet if the heart of the problem seemed clear, the nature of that heart was less so.  Did Germany, in fact, 
have a “militaristic philosophy” that dated back to the days prior to World War I?  Were the Germans an 
“aggressive and warlike Nation”?  Or had German “war lords” “imposed” militarism “upon their enslaved 
peoples,” as Roosevelt suggested to Congress in 1942?4  What exactly was “militarism” and who were the 
“militarists”?  And, most importantly, how did one get rid of them? 
Fashioning a policy for dealing with militaristic Germany was not a simple matter, but rather involved 
multiple federal agencies, layers of bureaucracy, a plethora of committees, Allied consultations, and careful 
consideration of Roosevelt’s wishes.  Diplomats, soldiers, corporate officers, professors, German émigrés, and 
lifelong civil servants combined forces in these efforts, relying on scholarly treatises, government position 
papers, conversations with experts, stated military requirements, and their own experiences to inform their 
deliberations.  Although few documents or discussions tackled German militarism’s origins and character 
directly, clear lines of agreement concerning the nature of German militarism did emerge.  And these 
assumptions regarding the influence of Prussia, Germany’s officer corps, and the multitude of militarizing 
agents in German society and culture would ultimately serve as the guiding principles of the  American 
demilitarization program. 
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Making Policy: The Apparatus and the Efforts 
American opinions regarding German militarism took shape and were revealed in the many 
discussions and reports of a complex network of policymaking offices and groups.  To better appreciate the 
role, disposition, and influence of the various parties involved and, ultimately, the origins and significance of an 
assortment of ideas pertaining to German militarism, it is first necessary to understand the character and 
evolution of American postwar planning activities as a whole. 
Preliminary German policy discussions began in earnest in the office of Under Secretary of State 
Sumner Welles some two months after the bombing of Pearl Harbor when a new Advisory Committee on Post-
War Foreign Policy met for the first time.  Created at Roosevelt’s behest to consider the breadth of American 
foreign policy concerns, the committee included high-ranking government officials and State Department staff 
members, as well as individuals drawn from the private sector, among them a number affiliated with the 
Council on Foreign Relations.5  Subcommittees supplemented with additional experts almost immediately 
began handling the bulk of the body’s work, scrutinizing a set of global problems and developing 
recommendations concerning them with the help of both outside materials and research and policy papers 
prepared by the department’s Division of Special Research.  Secretary of State Cordell Hull and other 
committee members kept Roosevelt apprised, informally, of the substance of ongoing talks.  The subcommittee 
deliberations, moreover, not only influenced the thinking of State Department policymakers, but Hull and 
Welles also drew on them in crafting policy addresses and offering advice to the president.6 
In July 1943, the department suspended most of this committee work, determining that the evolving 
international situation now required more definitive policy discussions and recommendations, rather than the 
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open-ended debate and evaluation of alternatives that had characterized the committee’s labors.7  The research 
staff, meanwhile, intensified an ongoing effort to distill the results of the many discussions into a set of 
analytical policy summaries.  Later, these either became the basis for final recommendations and for the 
preparation of materials used in negotiations with foreign powers or were used by State Department officials in 
departmental operations.8   
Stimulated in part by the need to have documents ready for possible use by Hull during an October 
1943 conference with the British and Soviet foreign ministers in Moscow, the State Department also began 
setting up “country committees” comprised of research staff members and desk officers responsible for 
particular geographic areas, with the Interdivisional Committee on Germany (ICG) officially established in 
September under the chairmanship of Dr. David Harris, a former (and future) history professor at Stanford 
University and head of the Division of Political Studies’ central European unit.  Past deliberations of the 
Advisory Committee’s subcommittees and the policy papers resulting from these served as the starting point for 
discussions within the country committees, while the committees themselves became the primary forum for 
interdivisional policy consultation and consensus building.9   
In early 1944, Hull created yet another committee, the Postwar Programs Committee, whose 
membership officially included Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.; Assistant Secretaries Adolph 
Berle, Breckenridge Long, and Dean Acheson; various special assistants to the secretary; assorted division 
chiefs; and several outside experts.  Charged with assisting Hull in developing postwar policies, the group 
frequently received briefings from research staff experts such as Harris and signed off on many policy papers 
initially considered and revised by the ICG.10  Significant among these was a “Treatment of Germany” paper 
that Hull had originally presented informally at Moscow.  Revised by the ICG during the spring of 1944, the 
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paper argued against dismembering Germany and for demilitarization, control of German education, punishing 
war criminals, and decentralizing the German government.  Approved by the Postwar Programs Committee in 
May, it served as a statement of basic policy.11 
Already by the end of 1943, planning activities had expanded beyond the Advisory Committee and the 
department’s research staff and, in the words of the chronicler of State Department postwar planning, had 
“become an effort involving many operating units of the Department, interdepartmental collaboration, 
consultations with the Congress and the President, increased public discussion, negotiations among the major 
powers, and exchanges of view with other United Nations looking toward the establishment of international 
agencies of both a transitional and permanent character in various specialized fields.”12  In January 1944, joint 
Anglo-American-Soviet planning began formally when the European Advisory Commission (EAC), a 
deliberative body conceived at the Moscow Conference, set up shop in London to coordinate Allied policy for 
Germany.  Aware that U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain John G. Winant, the American representative on the 
EAC, would need clear instructions from Washington, Hull formed a Working Security Committee (WSC) 
composed of high level administrators from the Departments of State, War, and Navy to facilitate the process of 
securing clearance from multiple government agencies for State Department policy papers prepared for 
Winant’s guidance.13 
If by the fall of 1943 State Department officials had recognized the importance of starting to firm up 
their recommendations, American military leaders were beginning to ask for concrete policy guidance as well.  
Their work involved not only dealing with issues of strategy, tactics, and supply, but also administrating 
liberated and occupied territories. The initial reluctance of civilian leaders to cede them too much authority for 
civil affairs and military government functions eventually had given way to grudging recognition of the logic 
and necessity of granting the armed forces responsibilities in this arena, if only temporarily—a concession 
encouraged by problems that arose following Anglo-American victories in North Africa during the winter of 
1942-1943 and the realization that insufficient civilian personnel were available to do the job.  The 
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developments in North Africa also had alerted War Department officials to the vast scope and complexity of the 
activities they would be handling in the present war and, in March 1943, led them to establish a Civil Affairs 
Division to oversee these operations.14 
Guidance as to policy, however, came largely from elsewhere.  During the spring of 1943, Britain and 
the U.S. formed an organization in England to prepare for the invasion of the European mainland the following 
spring.  Along with plotting potential military operations, this group began considering future civil affairs tasks.  
In July, the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) set up a Combined Civil Affairs Committee 
(CCAC) chaired by Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy “to recommend civil affairs policies for 
occupied and liberated areas, and to coordinate military and civilian agency interests.”15  By the end of April 
1944, several months after Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed control of invasion planning as head 
of the new Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), the SHAEF staff was preparing some 
72 studies on Germany, including a number dealing with civil affairs problems.  Eisenhower’s chief of staff 
nevertheless soon asked the CCS for political and economic guidelines regarding military government, seeking 
to ensure that SHAEF’s plans were in line with higher-level policies being formulated for the post-surrender 
period.  Technically, the European Advisory Commission was developing a program for Germany, but delays 
on this front and the urgent need for immediate orders spurred the CCAC to oversee the framing of an 
appropriate directive.  Issued to Eisenhower in late April 1944, the new directive, CCS 551, contained military 
government guidelines for the period preceding German surrender, with the furtherance of successful military 
operations, the elimination of Nazism and German war-making capabilities, and the restoration of normal 
conditions as primary concerns.16 
By July 1944, Allied troops had landed in Normandy and had started their drive through France, while 
in London the EAC was considering proposals regarding the future control machinery for Germany.  At this 
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juncture, Eisenhower, in his role as commander of all U.S. forces in Europe, grew increasingly concerned that 
he would have no team to turn to if a joint administration of Germany was soon required.  He therefore pushed 
for creating the kernel of an American element of a future control administration.  In August 1944, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) acceded to his wishes and a new U.S. Group Control Council for Germany (USGCC), 
headed by Brigadier General Cornelius W. Wickersham, began planning for American participation in the post-
surrender occupation of Germany both within an American zone and as part of an Allied Control Council which 
would govern the entire country.  Upon arrival in Germany, the USGCC would form the nucleus of the U.S. 
component of the Allied control authority.17  The JCS informed the new USGCC that in drafting operational 
plans it should “be guided by such directives as may be issued as a result of recommendations made by the 
European Advisory Commission.”  If such directives did not appear, the USGCC was to bear in mind “such 
U.S. views as may be pending before the Commission.” 18   
In point of fact, the tripartite EAC was accomplishing very little.19  Theoretically, State Department 
officials in Washington were to send Winant instructions to use in EAC negotiations on long-term policies for 
Germany, but interdepartmental disputes, military wariness regarding the EAC’s scope of action, and delays in 
clearing the proposed policies within the messy federal bureaucracy had left him with little guidance during the 
spring and summer of 1944.  Frustration with Washington’s policymaking logjams finally led Winant to attempt 
to expedite the process by having his advisors prepare draft directives for the occupation armies which he then 
submitted to Washington for approval.  However, these also quickly became ensnared in bureaucratic tangles.20 
Near the end of the summer, new challenges to unified decision-making suddenly arose when 
Secretary of the Treasury Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr., jumped into the policymaking fray.  In mid August, 
Morgenthau learned of the State Department’s general approach to postwar planning which, in its commitment 
to preventing a third world war, endorsed firm punitive and preventative measures in handling Nazis and 
German war-making capabilities, but maintained as its end objective the relatively rapid reconstruction of 
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Germany and its reintegration into the economies of Europe and the world.  Over time, the department’s 
planners had also begun to assume that the German economy would require immediate assistance at the close of 
hostilities to prevent economic collapse and excessive hardship for the German people.21  Appalled at 
Germany’s behavior over the past years and decades, and convinced that Allied control measures could not 
prevent Germany from launching another war, Morgenthau believed the Germans deserved much harsher 
treatment and advocated the destruction or removal of German heavy industry, even to the point of turning 
Germany into a primarily agrarian nation.  Only in this way could the Allies be certain of its future inability to 
wage war.  This meant, further, that no efforts should be made to alleviate German suffering; the Germans 
would have to deal with circumstances they themselves had created.22   
Given a draft copy of a “Handbook of Military Government for Germany” being prepared by SHAEF 
for military government officers who would enter Germany with the tactical units now nearing its borders, 
Morgenthau was distressed to find it, too, embodied what he believed was an attitude toward the German people 
which was far too benevolent, with plans to immediately take action to assist the German people and restore the 
nation’s economy.  Morgenthau delivered the handbook to Roosevelt, who shared the secretary’s opinion and 
quickly sent a letter to the War Department bluntly expressing his dissatisfaction and demanding the 
handbook’s revision.  Chiefly by means of a flyleaf insert expressing basic principles to be followed by military 
government officers, the handbook’s mild provisions were eventually made more severe.23 
Roosevelt had thus far largely shied away from making definitive commitments regarding postwar 
Germany.  As late as October 1944 he wrote to Hull that he “dislike[d] making detailed plans for a country 
which we do not yet occupy.”24  Yet his general beliefs regarding the character of the Germans, German history, 
and what this meant for postwar planning were much closer to those of Morgenthau than to those of the State 
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Department.25  Shortly after Morgenthau raised a red flag concerning the direction of current planning, 
Roosevelt acted on Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s recommendation and asked Morgenthau, Hull, and 
Stimson to meet as a Cabinet Committee to discuss long-term policy for Germany.26   
Morgenthau had already instructed his staff to prepare a proposal for the treatment of Germany that 
encapsulated his thoughts—a document that served as the first written iteration of ideas that eventually came to 
be referred to as the “Morgenthau Plan.”27  State Department officials likewise prepared a memorandum 
outlining their views.28  Officials from all three departments then discussed both documents during several early 
September gatherings to lay the groundwork for the first Cabinet Committee meeting.  Because Allied troops 
were at the time steadily advancing in France, McCloy also took the opportunity to point out that an interim 
post-defeat directive for Eisenhower was urgently needed, pending formulation of a long-range policy for 
Germany.  As a result, Treasury officials now joined their State and War Department colleagues in reworking 
an appropriate document already being prepared under the auspices of the Working Security Committee.29  
Several days later, the three secretaries met and discussed a State Department memo summarizing the views 
expressed at the preliminary meetings, which indicated agreement on the need for demilitarization (here limited 
to dissolution of the Wehrmacht and paramilitary groups, as well as destruction of armaments and prohibition of 
munitions manufacturing); punitive and prohibitive measures against Nazis and other “objectionable elements;” 
and extensive controls over the German press, communications, and education.  Differences remained regarding 
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the questions of dismemberment and economic affairs.30  The latter issue proved especially divisive, with 
Morgenthau at one end of the spectrum and Stimson at the other.  Holding opinions close to those of the State 
Department, the Secretary of War repeatedly and vehemently expressed his view that the Germans should be 
treated humanely and their industries not recklessly destroyed, both to ensure the economic well-being of 
Western Europe and to avoid laying the seeds of a future war in the form of deprivation and resentment.31  
Conflict regarding financial and economic matters dominated subsequent discussions of long-term American 
policies towards Germany, heightening tensions between the departments and raising the stakes for presidential 
approval in the process.  These disagreements, moreover, would persist into the post-surrender period.32  
Even as the secretaries were clashing over long-term policies for Germany, their subordinates were 
dealing with the more pressing problem of an interim directive for Eisenhower.  Treasury Department revisions 
made to the State and War Department draft document produced a stricter directive with less discretion for the 
supreme commander of Allied forces, who would head the occupation immediately after hostilities ended. Here, 
too, the most serious wrangling centered on economic issues.  Nevertheless, after five meetings over the course 
of three weeks, a group of officials from the three departments on September 22 approved an interim directive 
applicable following German defeat but prior to the introduction of tripartite policies.  Subsequently shunted 
through the proper channels of Washington bureaucracy, the document received Roosevelt’s approval, acquired 
the file designation JCS 1067, and, by the end of the month, had been forwarded to Europe for Eisenhower’s 
guidance.33  American officials intended for JCS 1067 to follow the path of CCS 551: first obtaining CCS 
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endorsement, then governing all territory under SHAEF control.  The British, however, rejected the document 
as too stringent.34  In his role as supreme commander of Allied forces, Eisenhower therefore had no post-
surrender directive.  In addition, he continued to be subject only to the outdated pre-surrender CCS 551 until 
November 1944 when SHAEF issued a new pre-surrender directive comprised essentially of the main 
provisions of CCS 551 augmented by the guiding principles attached to the revised handbook.35   
During the fall of 1944, SHAEF officials were themselves busy formulating an operational plan to 
succeed Operation OVERLORD.  Code-named “ECLIPSE,” the plan was to take effect upon German 
surrender, or when most German troops had capitulated, and had as key objectives preventing further hostilities, 
ensuring adherence to the terms of surrender, establishing law and order, initiating disarmament and 
demobilization, and deploying Allied troops to their assigned occupation zones.  In the absence of a CCS post-
surrender directive, “ECLIPSE” also incorporated basic military government functions spelled out in the 
November 1944 pre-surrender directive, including the “care, control, and repatriation of displaced persons; 
apprehension of war criminals; establishment of property and financial controls; elimination of nazism and 
militarism; and preservation of suitable civil administration to accomplish all the objectives.”36 
Meanwhile, as the only general statement of U.S. policy for Germany approved by all relevant 
government departments and by the president, JCS 1067 began to serve other purposes.  In late October, 
Wickersham informed his USGCC personnel that draft directives prepared by Winant’s advisors could be used 
for planning purposes even when not yet officially approved by Washington, but should first be checked against 
JCS 1067 to determine whether they required modifications.37  A month later the USGCC—which had already 
been consulting with Winant’s advisors and effectively assisting in the preparation of draft directives for EAC 
consideration—received instructions from the War Department to use the interim directive in preparing 
directives for military government.  Telling his men that JCS 1067 was now to be the USGCC “Bible,” 
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Wickersham noted that the War Department was no longer interested in approving the detailed directives 
written by Winant’s staff.38  In fact, officials in Washington had decided to transform JCS 1067 into a long-
range policy paper for submission to the EAC, hoping to secure its approval as a statement of general principles 
for all occupation zones, with the military or Control Council to work out specifics later.39   
In January 1945, the State Department sent Winant a revised JCS 1067 for EAC consideration, but 
some six weeks later asked him to hold off on submitting the document.  Decisions made by Roosevelt, 
Winston Churchill, and Josef Stalin at the February 1945 Yalta Conference now needed to be integrated into 
American policy.  The department’s attempt to prepare a new general policy statement touched off yet another 
round of interdepartmental quarreling, as War Department officials protested the degree of authority granted to 
the Control Council at the expense of American zonal commanders and Treasury Department personnel tried 
again to beat back attempts to soften economic plans for Germany.  Finally, on March 23, 1945, Roosevelt 
initialed a short document which all three departments had approved titled “Summary of U.S. Initial Post-
Defeat Policy Relating to Germany.”40   
In the end, neither the revised JCS 1067 nor the new post-defeat policy summary ever received EAC 
consideration.  However, the policy summary served as a guide for the deliberations of still another committee.  
Established as an affiliate of the recently created State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (a high profile 
successor to the Working Security Committee), the new Informal Policy Committee on Germany (IPCOG) 
included McCloy, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White, and representatives of the Navy 
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Department and Foreign Economic Administration, with Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton as chair.  
In April, the new committee produced yet another draft of JCS 1067, and, with the approval of the new 
president, Harry Truman, the JCS finally forwarded it to Eisenhower on April 28, 1945.  Issued to the general as 
commander of all American forces in Europe, the directive applied to the post-SHAEF phase and was to guide 
him both in administering the American occupation zone and in negotiating joint policies for Germany within 
the sphere of the future Allied Control Council. 41  Though intended as a temporary directive for the immediate 
post-defeat period, JCS 1067 remained the governing document of American occupation policy for more than 
two years. 
 
Defining Militarism 
The Need to Pull the Fangs of Germany 
American postwar policymaking efforts clearly involved dozens, even hundreds, of officials, 
administrators, and consultants on both sides of the Atlantic.  Yet despite their numbers, and despite sometimes 
strongly expressed diverging opinions, most could agree on certain basic ideas.  In particular, they believed that 
once defeated Germany would again grow strong and need to be, at the very least, controlled and restrained, 
and, at best, as Roosevelt had suggested, defanged.  In addition, they blamed Germany’s bellicose willfulness 
on its “militarism”—a term Americans had associated with the Germans for many decades. 
 “The problem arises because it may be anticipated that after defeat and initial disarmament Germany 
will rearm unless prevented by international action from doing so,” a 1943 State Department policy paper on the 
prevention of German rearmament explained.42  “Mr. Kohn is convinced we cannot trust the Germans,” 
reported a 1944 Treasury Department memorandum describing a recent meeting that Secretary Morgenthau’s 
key advisors had arranged with two émigré scholars, one of whom was Czech-born Smith College professor of 
modern European history Hans Kohn.  “Unless we adopt stern measures,” Professor Kohn had argued, “they 
will try again; the overwhelming majority of the officers, government officials, university professors, ministers, 
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etc, will be determined to make another attempt at world domination as soon as it is at all possible.”43   “History 
provides abundant examples of the manner in which the German Armed forces, reduced by peace treaty to 
apparent impotence, blossom forth in an astonishingly brief period into an even deadlier and more efficient 
organization,” concluded a 1944 SHAEF planning study on the German officer corps.  “History will without 
doubt repeat itself,” it continued, “but the process may be considerably delayed if the action taken by us at the 
end of this war is sufficiently drastic.”44   
 Given these views, policymaking for Germany essentially entailed considering which drastic actions 
would most effectively prevent, or at least delay, the seemingly inevitable German resurgence.  Would partition 
help preserve peace by breaking up a centralized political and economic power?  Or would partition plant the 
seeds of revanchism?  Would flooding the mines of the Ruhr permanently disable German war-making 
capabilities?  Or would it fatally disable the German economy and stoke smoldering resentment against the 
Allies?   
 Lacing the countless discussions, memoranda, policy studies, and draft directives addressing these 
concerns, moreover, were references to the problem of German militarism.  If Germany had destroyed world 
peace in the past and was destined to rise again, its militarism was to blame, ran the refrain.  Interesting is the 
fact that few questioned this assessment; it seemed to be, rather, an a priori assumption of all planning 
discussions.  Such thinking clearly started at the top.  Roosevelt himself made this argument before Congress, 
and Hull, Morgenthau, Stimson, and McCloy likewise denounced German militarism and sought its 
eradication.45  But almost without exception, their views were shared by policymakers at all levels of 
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government—a uniformity of thinking that almost certainly reflected both American historical experience and 
more recent developments. 
 Concerns about German militarism had a long history in the United States.  When liberal democracy 
and industrial modernization had begun rapidly transforming Europe during the nineteenth century, Prussia’s 
Hohenzollern monarchs had staunchly resisted the power of these forces.  Instead, Prussia had remained a 
bastion of conservatism grounded in a tradition of aristocratic military service to the state and had transferred 
these values to the new Germany after 1871.  In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the provocative rhetoric of 
influential German writers like Heinrich von Treitschke and Friedrich von Bernhardi, which glorified war as a 
means of progress and the elevation of the German people, had intensified the anxiety of Germany’s neighbors, 
who were already wary of the dominance of privileged Prussian Junker military elites in German society.46  
Many Americans—particularly educated elites who had personal experience in Germany—had likewise 
criticized Germany for its militarism, a flaw they frequently saw embodied in its uniform-wearing, sometimes 
belligerently blustery Kaiser and its overly influential military.47  By 1914, overall American attitudes toward 
Germans were nevertheless ambivalent: disapproving of German militarism and autocracy, but generally 
appreciative of perceived qualities of orderliness and industry (ideas formed in no small part by exposure to 
German immigrants.)48 
With the outbreak of World War I, however, negative German images gained ascendancy.49  Erupting 
less than two years after Bernhardi called for “Weltmacht oder Niedergang [world power or downfall],” the new 
war appeared to confirm the danger German militarism posed to the rest of the world.50  Stimson himself had 
not been immune to these intellectual and political currents.  “From the very beginning, Stimson’s sympathies 
were strongly on the side of the French and the British,” recounts McGeorge Bundy, who assisted Stimson in 
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writing his memoirs.  He attributes this in part to the influence of Stimson’s father, who had studied medicine in 
Paris when the secretary was a child.  “Dr. Stimson had begun his studies in Berlin,” Bundy explains, “and had 
quickly departed, disgusted by the martial swagger of the youthful German Empire.  Stimson had thus learned 
from his father to mistrust the Prussians and admire the French. . . . And the German invasion of Belgium was 
so evidently cynical and brutal that it at once hardened his sympathies against the Central Powers.”51  Overt 
wartime propaganda characterizing the Germans as militaristic and blood-thirsty barbarians bolstered negative 
opinions of Germany.52  Usually unfair in their vehemence and hyperbole, these depictions were nevertheless 
hardly counteracted by Germany’s overrunning of neutral Belgium and its unrestricted submarine warfare, by 
the virtual military dictatorship installed in Berlin during the war, or by the tendency of German intellectuals to 
categorize militarism among Germany’s admirable cultural achievements.  The Treaty of Versailles further 
solidified some critical views in assigning Germany blame for starting the war. 
During the 1920s, American revisionists removed much of the burden of German war guilt,53 and 
polemics concerning German atrocities shifted from accusations of barbarity to condemnations of British 
propaganda lies.  Sympathy for the new Weimar Republic and its economic troubles also led some observers to 
more positive opinions of Germany.54  But Adolf Hitler and his Third Reich again silenced many supportive 
voices.  Unabashedly defying the Versailles settlement, Hitler reintroduced conscription, rearmed openly, and 
remilitarized the German Rhineland.  Newsreels and newsmagazine photos now showed a new leader in 
uniform, this time surrounded not by bemedaled and mustachioed Prussians, but by masses of uniformed 
marching men and boys.   
Grappling with the international crises in Asia and Europe in the late 1930s, Americans tended to focus 
on the new post-World War I dictatorships in trying to explain the world situation.  When questioning the 
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differences between these dictatorships and American democracy, they pointed especially to the influential role 
the military played in each of the states.  Each dictatorship, notes Benjamin Alpers, “seemed committed to the 
aggressive use of military power to resolve international disputes and expand the nation’s power.”  Moreover, 
“in Germany, Italy, Russia, and Japan, the military had begun to serve as a model for the larger organization of 
social life.”  Worried that the United States itself might be susceptible to dictatorship, with the Great Depression 
and war requirements potentially spurring America’s transformation into a fascist state, some Americans tried 
to prevent this by way of citizen education programs that deliberately contrasted the peaceful, voluntary nature 
of democratic American life with regimented militaristic dictatorships like Nazi Germany.55 
Government policymakers who took a moment to examine current scholarly literature would also have 
encountered a Germany characterized as a shining example of modern militarism.  German émigré Alfred 
Vagts,56 for instance, awarded the Germans special mention in his 1937 classic, A History of Militarism.  In 
describing a “militarism of moods and opinions” that privileged military institutions and methods in society and 
showed excessive military influence on civilian thinking and behavior, Vagts held up Japan and Germany as the 
preeminent examples.  In Germany, he noted, soldiers were admired in peacetime as well as during war, while 
the German people were “inclined to acknowledge the primacy of the military and accept its absolute good 
regardless of its use in war, its victories, or defeats.”57  His comments regarding fascist Germany’s “devotion to 
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the uniform,” the influence of the military on German education, and the new legality of dueling in the Third 
Reich as “‘a manly settlement of an offense to honor’” only served to underscore his assertions.58 
American government sources abroad also emphasized the worrisome character of the new Germany.  
Reporting on a recent trip through Germany, U.S. Ambassador William Dodd wrote Assistant Secretary of State 
R. Walton Moore in late 1934 that “in almost every city or town there was marching, either of Hitler Jugend or 
of SS and SA men in uniform.”  In Bayreuth, he continued, “marching and singing kept me awake nearly all the 
night.”  Descriptions of billowing smokestacks supported Dodd’s further observation that “from everything I 
could learn there is great preparation for war”—a contention further supported by a Deutsches Luftsportverband 
recruiting poster he enclosed which bore the slogan “The German People Must Become a Nation of Flyers” and 
a graphic of Germany that included Alsace-Lorraine and its lost eastern territories.  Dodd explained that he had 
obtained the poster in a hotel, adding,   
While we were eating, at least 2,000 Hitler Jugend marched past the hotel door.  They were singing the 
usual songs, one of which starts “Siegreich wollen wir Frankreich schlagen.” This song was formerly 
forbidden.  It is now heard everywhere, at least I have reports that it is sung in Berlin when the troops 
are marching.  When the hotel man handed me the picture, I said: “Are all of you learning to fly, as 
Göring suggests?”  He replied: “A very great many.  We have twenty expert flyers in this town (9,000 
population), and they have registered 2,000 flyers in Stuttgart (capital, as you know, of Württemberg).”  
I said to him: “Well, that would make a good many flyers for the whole of Germany.”  He replied: 
“Yes, all the big business men want war, and the little men are opposed.  I don’t know what will 
happen.”  This man did not know who I was, as nobody else knew during the whole trip, but he 
showed his natural reactions and was not a little concerned.  I merely mention this as illustrative of the 
feeling that is frequently reflected in conversations but is never indicated in any public manner.  It is 
fairly certain that nearly all the population is being held under the strictest control, and as I said above, 
the object is to put France out of business.59 
 
Finally, while it is hard to gauge the extent to which U.S. policymakers read the profusion of wartime 
books and articles analyzing Germany and the Germans, certain voices did make themselves heard.  Treasury 
Department officials, for instance, were not alone in seeking out or receiving unsought advice from German 
émigrés.60  The State Department also circulated materials obtained from other experts.  Already in 1942, for 
instance, the members of one of its Advisory Committee’s subcommittees received copies of a piece titled 
“What Shall We Do with Germany?” written by Bernadotte Schmitt, a University of Chicago historian 
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unrepentantly critical of Germany whose scholarly work insisted on the Germans’ guilt for World War I.61  
Blending together details from German history and literature, Schmitt painted a picture of an aggressive, 
haughty, self-centered nation and at one point declared, “In truth, Hitler’s ‘New Order’ is nothing more than 
Prussian militarism brought up to date.”62  Similarly, in 1944, Dr. Richard M. Bricker sent a White House 
official a report on a recent conference of psychiatrists who had adopted a “psycho-cultural” approach to the 
German problem.  A covering abstract explained that, among other things, the conference members had 
concluded that “the image the German has of his world is never that of equals with whom he can cooperate; and 
the image he has of peace is never that of a stable condition.  Peace, for him, has always in it the tension of 
waiting and preparing for war.”63 
 
The Nature of German Militarism 
If this cultural milieu makes the widespread condemnation of “German militarism” understandable, the 
varied assumptions regarding German flaws and failings were only rarely analyzed systematically by 
government policymakers.  What was militarism?  How did it work?  And who exactly should be considered 
dangerous?  Amidst the mounds of paper cluttering the tables, inboxes, and file drawers of American postwar 
planners, documents addressing the issue of militarism directly were few and far between.  This might suggest 
an unstated, shared understanding of its origins and character, and to a certain extent this was true.  But it was 
also true that when pressed to articulate their views, officials often unintentionally illuminated the 
inconsistencies, uncertainties, and diverging emphases that characterized American beliefs concerning German 
militarism.   
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At their most imprecise, American policymakers effectively equated militarism with aggression, or 
with the Germans’ “tendency to be always engaged in war or preparing for war,” as Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull once put it when discussing the Germans’ “militaristic ways.”64  However, the stacks of planning materials 
also suggest several narrower, more considered trends in American thinking, trends that not surprisingly often 
mirrored current scholarly and popular conceptions of German militarism.  In particular, American officials 
associated German militarism with Prussia and with the German officer corps—above all, with the German 
General Staff.  Typically deemed the core or quintessence of German militarism, Prussia and German military 
officers were also frequently labeled insidious influences on the rest of Germany.  In this way, they could be 
viewed as particularly culpable for a state of affairs that American policymakers in the end decided was the 
primary problem: the Germans as a people were historically inclined and culturally conditioned toward a 
militarism that encompassed not only a belief in the use of force in international relations but also the strong 
influence of martial ideals and the military itself on state and society. 
 
 The Problem of Prussia.  For American officials, German militarism was inextricably bound up with 
Prussia.  Perhaps not always consciously linking contemporary German actions with the decisions of the 
eighteenth-century Prussian ruler Frederick the Great or even with Bismarck’s “blood and iron” unification 
strategy of the nineteenth century, many U.S. officials nevertheless saw Prussia as the “center of German 
militarism.”65  In particular, concerns about Prussia arose repeatedly during discussions regarding the 
advisability of dismembering Germany.  In 1942, for instance, disagreements within the State Department 
Advisory Committee’s Political Problems Subcommittee centered on whether partition would provoke German 
resentment and eventual aggression or would instead “tend to decentralize German energies and free them from 
the old military compulsions of the Prussian-dominated Reich.”66  Later summarizing some 16 months of 
deliberations, the subcommittee reported its conviction that it was “essential that the political and military 
power of Germany be reduced and that the domination of Prussia over the rest of Germany be broken.”67  In 
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supporting partition, Treasury Department officials in 1945 likewise wrote of the need to end Prussian 
ascendancy, citing “Prussia’s vicious role in the history of Germany and Europe.”68  Certain policymakers thus 
assumed that Prussia, as a physical component of Germany, had continued to exert a predominant, and 
predominately negative, influence over the rest of the state.   
 Others were not so sure.  In May 1944, the State Department’s Committee on Postwar Programs 
considered how future German decentralization or federalization might affect Prussia’s power.  While some 
committee members worried that a return to the type of federalism characteristic of imperial or Weimar 
Germany would “tend to restore Prussian predominance” simply because Prussia controlled the majority of 
Germany’s territory, others suggested that Prussian hegemony had since 1918 “been a factor of declining 
importance” and that “Prussianism” had now “become a state of mind rather than an attribute of any particular 
part of Germany.”69  Though not defined, this “state of mind” was clearly militaristic.70  In fact, department 
officials occasionally substituted the word “Prussianism” for “militarism.”71  In discussing “Prussianism” as an 
idea, rather than a geographic descriptor, official dialogue reflected a trend one student of American views of 
the German military has identified in published works from the 1940s.  The terms “Prussia” and “Prussianism,” 
he notes, were assigned “an almost mythical quality, on which all the incomprehensibilities and differences of 
these apparently war-obsessed Germans could be projected.”  A geographical location designation essentially 
evolved into a “spiritual [geistiges] concept.”72 
 Despite Prussianism’s nearly “mythical quality,” American policymakers believed it had some very 
concrete earthly representatives, most notably a group of men who were Prussian in the geographical as well as 
spiritual sense.  Long viewed with suspicion in the liberal democracies as both anachronistic and unhealthily 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
68
 Mr. Nathan to Mr. Coe, 21 Apr 45, NA, RG 56, Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs [OASIA], Acc. 
69-A-4707, Box 77, F: Germany: Directives Vol. 3. 
 
69
 Minutes of Department of State Committee on Post-War Programs, 18 May 44, NA, RG 59, Notter File, Entry 499, Box 
140, PWC Committee Minutes 1 to 66. 
 
70
 See also David Harris to Mr. Notter, 13 Sep 43, NA, RG 59, Notter File, Entry 489, Box 79, F: S-Germany (Swope) & 
Welles. 
 
71
 H-136, 14 Feb 44, attached to note from D[avid] H[arris], 11 Mar 44, NA, RG 59, Notter File, Entry 500, Box 154, F: H-
Summaries 126-149. 
 
72
 Uwe Heuer, Reichswehr—Wehrmacht—Bundeswehr: Zum Image deutscher Streitkräfte in den Vereinigten Staaten von 
Amerika; Kontinuität und Wandel im Urteil amerikanischer Experten (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1990), 174. 
 
 55 
influential, the aristocratic Prussian Junkers, large landholders residing east of Germany’ Elbe River, aroused 
special concern among State Department planners as socially and economically powerful “carriers of German 
militarism.”73  Officials also frequently pointed to their dominance of the German armed forces.  In 1944, one 
Treasury Department official reminded Morgenthau advisor Harry Dexter White that this small group had 
historically supplied Germany’s exceptional military leaders and that Germany’s military successes had been 
due primarily to their efforts.74  Morgenthau himself would later argue that the Junkers had been the “backbone 
of the German General Staff, the most ardent warmongers in Europe and the core of German aggression.”  Their 
estates, moreover, had given them “the political power which did so much to keep alive the harsh militarism of 
Germany.”75 
 In October 1943, the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) produced 
a rare study on militarism in order to provide guidance for psychological warfare activities relating to Allied 
war aims, specifically the goal of eradicating “Prussian militarism.”  Drafted by two German émigrés, historian 
Felix Gilbert and social theorist Herbert Marcuse76—a fact that explains an analysis that clearly echoed certain 
contemporary scholarly interpretations of German history—the study defined “Prussian militarism” as “a 
definite social and political complex in German society” involving the “semi-feudal authoritarianism” of Junker 
owners of large East Elbian agrarian estates, a privileged class that had “exercised its political influence either 
directly . . . or, through its sons in the high officer corps of the German army and the higher ranks of the Civil 
Service.”77   
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 First describing the substantial political and military influence of the Junkers from the late eighteenth 
century through the founding of the German Empire, the OSS analysts contended that although the Junkers’ 
economic strength “did not keep step with their political power” in the face of nineteenth-century 
industrialization, “their political influence was strong enough to prevent the bourgeoisie from ushering in a new 
form of social life.”  The higher bourgeoisie had instead adhered to conservative standards in order to be 
admitted to “the ruling group,” while “through the institution of the Reserveoffizier, the way of life of large 
parts of the German bourgeoisie came to be patterned on the ideals, code of honors, the behavior of the Prussian 
Junker.”  Gradually the Junkers’ declining economic position had undermined their political position, and their 
political influence had declined still further during the Weimar Republic, due in part to the introduction of 
universal suffrage.  No longer controlling the government, the Prussian elites nevertheless had retained 
influence in the civil service, saw one of their own elected president in 1925, tightened an alliance with industry 
first initiated in the nineteenth century, and “remained firmly entrenched in the Officer Corps of the Republican 
Reichswehr.”  More than 27 percent of all German officers were nobles in 1932, the report’s authors 
maintained, pointing out that this was “vastly more than the percentage of nobles among the Reich population 
would warrant,” though the nobles tended to be less influential in the “newer technical arms which became 
increasingly important.”78 
 According to Gilbert and Marcuse, however, after seizing power in 1933 the Nazis had “completed the 
process of eliminating the Prussian Junkers as a decisive political power.”  Transforming Germany into a 
“centralized totalitarian state,” they had dissolved Prussia as a political entity.  To effectively prosecute the war, 
the Nazis had reorganized Germany’s economy “in the interests of the industrial sector,” which meant “the 
political power (direct and indirect) of big industry increased steadily.”  The Nazi state had “adopted a new 
ideology oriented to the standards of technocratic efficiency regardless of traditional status and privileges,” 
while “the initial petty bourgeois and equalitarian character of Nazi popular support demanded a type of social 
and governmental regime hostile to the Junker tradition.”  All of this, they noted, “resulted in the practical 
disappearance of the Prussian Junkers from the policy making level.”79 
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 The German army presented a somewhat different picture.  The proportion of “nobility” within the 
upper ranks of the officer corps was still “rather large,” although this nobility included more than just Prussians, 
had no representative in the High Command, and comprised a much smaller percentage of the lower ranks of 
the corps.  In branches such as the Air Corps and Waffen SS, founded more recently and requiring “technical 
knowledge or abilities not typical of the Prussian Junker,” the presence of nobles was much more rare.  “The 
requirements of modern warfare,” Gilbert and Marcuse continued, “undoubtedly led to a democratization of the 
army, to new relations between officers and men, and to a decline of the Prussian ‘spirit.’”80 
 In terms of the broader reach of German government, only a few noble names appeared on the lists of 
administrative and political officials.  Alone in the German diplomatic corps was the influence of Prussian elites 
still strongly felt—a deliberate Nazi negotiating tactic, the report’s authors suggested.81 
 The Junkers had lost their political predominance, the OSS analysts ultimately concluded, even though 
they had retained certain social and economic advantages in the Third Reich.  Moreover, other groups currently 
represented the most influential sources of German aggression.  In making this argument, Gilbert and Marcuse 
essentially treated “Prussian militarism” as a unique sociological phenomenon which they divorced from 
German reactionary impulses and imperialistic aggression more generally.  The term “Prussian militarism,” 
they argued, 
no longer denotes a real political, governmental or social factor in present-day Germany.  Prussia is no 
longer the core of Germany, nor are the Prussian Junkers the decisive driving force behind German 
aggressiveness.  German aggressiveness is rooted in the expansionist tendencies of the armed 
command [elsewhere referred to as “the militarists”] and many of the big industrialists, and finds its 
popular support among the nationalistic middle classes.  In addition, the government has frequently 
used chauvinism as a means of overcoming the sharp social and economic conflicts within the country.  
As far as the Junkers still play a role, they are only subservient instruments of these forces.82  
 
 Perceptive, insightful, and, in retrospect, remarkably accurate, the OSS study did not necessarily shape 
American policymaking.  In fact, it is unclear exactly how widely the document circulated within the 
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government.83  On the other hand, its authors were not alone in questioning the continuing influence of Prussian 
Junkers.  Others with access to the highest levels of government also made this point, though they backed their 
contentions with less thoroughgoing analyses of the present situation in Nazi Germany.  Perhaps more directly 
influential, for example, was a March 1944 memo concerning a range of postwar German policy issues that War 
Department Civil Affairs Division head Major General John H. Hilldring gave to McCloy and the USGCC’s 
Wickersham.84  In it, a Captain Oppenheimer, who had served with the German army during World War I,85 
asserted that “many persons outside Germany have a wrong conception of the position and influence of the 
junkers.”  He was not arguing that they should be permitted to retain their lands after the war, he explained, but 
wanted “to make it clear that the German militaristic and aggressive spirit will not be killed as a result of a 
liquidation of the junkers and their estates.”  Painting a dismal picture of the Junkers’ economic management 
skills and what this meant for disposing of their estates after the war, Oppenheimer added that the influential 
days of the Junker were over.  “Since the Kaiser abdicated,” he maintained, “one does no longer hear of persons 
with high sounding names occupying key positions in the government, in the Army, in the industry or anywhere 
else.  In fact, they have neither the ambition nor the mental ability to take active part in the shaping of political 
events in Germany.”86  McCloy later reported to Hilldring that he found Oppenheimer’s extended remarks to be 
“intelligent” and “sound,” though he also admitted that there were “some things I know nothing about, such as 
the problem of the liquidation of the Junker estates. . . .”87 
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 The German Officer Corps.  While there may have been some doubt as to the current political and 
economic influence of Prussian Junkers, their unique relationship to Germany’s military remained largely 
unquestioned.  Furthermore, there was little disagreement among American policymakers that the German 
officer corps as a whole was a critical font and welcoming home of German militarism. 
 For a recent study concerning images of the German armed forces in the United States, German 
political scientist Uwe Heuer reviewed a wide range of (primarily journalistic and scholarly) literature from the 
years 1942 to 1952 and concluded that Americans saw “Prussianism” in its purest form embodied in the person 
of the German officer and often still regarded the officer corps as a formal social group with unique 
characteristics.  Indicative of this perspective was the frequent use of the term “caste” to describe a closed, 
privileged, isolated, and yet powerful corps defined by a shared educational background, conservative outlook, 
and aristocratic roots.  “The expression ‘caste’,” notes Heuer, underscores “the—in the eyes of the beholder—
anachronistic and feudalistic organizational principle of the officer corps, pertaining to both its social 
composition and the resulting political and moral values and goals.”88   
 Not surprisingly, American officials frequently echoed arguments presented in the literature found in 
their local libraries and bookstores, with the sinister language of caste materializing periodically in policy 
discussions.  An early example, which also illustrates the fuzziness of American conceptions of the German 
officer corps, appeared in the first informal policy recommendations for Germany presented by Hull at the 1943 
Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference.  Here, the State Department suggested that “the military caste system in 
all its phases should be eliminated,”89 as if some formal classification structure still existed, complete with 
organizational regulations and promotional rules.  (Fortunately, this wording eventually disappeared in favor of 
more focused restrictions on military officers, a development that was perhaps due to improved understanding 
but may also have merely reflected the whims of a State Department editor.) 
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 Whether discussing the corps as a caste or a class, postwar planners normally brooded less over the 
nature of the group than over its potentially dangerous influence in postwar Germany.  Regarding professional 
officers, particularly the general staff, as integral to German militarism, critiques of the officer corps reflected 
traditional American concerns about a military operating unfettered by civilian constraints and emphasized the 
role of Germany’s officers as the proponents, theorists, strategists, and technicians of a militaristic philosophy 
devoted to German might and expansion.   
 “The German military class has proved itself to be a war-glorifying and peace-disturbing caste,” 
argued one State Department working paper on disarmament.90  Considering how to prevent German 
rearmament, another paper noted that the strongest argument for quarantining the class after the war was that 
the Allies “would be striking at the ideological roots of German militarism, thus cutting off at its source the 
German urge to rearm.”  It went on to discuss possible civilian control of a future German army, noting that 
“throughout recent German history control of the military budget has been . . . tightly held by the officer class.”  
Putting civilians in charge would prevent the officer class from controlling the army, including, significantly, its 
personnel policies.  Such a move, the paper suggested, would “strengthen the democratic elements in Germany” 
and “reduce correspondingly the strength of the autocratic, militaristic elements.”91   
 Military planners examined the problem of German officers even more closely and systematically.  
How to handle the officer class was just one of many problems facing the State Department and was no more 
urgent than any other.  By contrast, military planners realized that they would soon be forced to deal with 
literally thousands of officers who might be captured or fall into Allied hands when the Germans surrendered.  
Of necessity, therefore, they gave special consideration to the threat posed by the officer corps, no doubt also 
stimulated in part by the natural interest of military leaders in the future capabilities of their opponents.  
 During the fall of 1944, Colonel T. N. Grazebrook, head of the SHAEF operations staff’s Post-
Hostilities Planning Subsection, supervised the development of a strategy for handling German officers 
immediately following Germany’s capitulation.  Attendees at an early September meeting considered a 
preliminary staff study on the question and contributed to the production of a longer, more probing paper, 
circulated in late September, which served as the basis for still further discussions.  Reviewed by assorted 
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SHAEF personnel, the study continued to evolve, though its fundamentals remained largely unchanged.  Its 
recommendations eventually proved to be a point of some contention, but the basis on which they rested was 
apparently not widely disputed.92 
 Perhaps the fullest expression of SHAEF’s ideas regarding German officers thus appeared in the late 
September draft of the study, titled “Disposal of the German Military Caste.”  The situation it described was 
grim.  Noting that one of the principal objects of victory was to completely demilitarize Germany and eliminate 
German militarism, the study’s authors argued that existing plans for total disarmament, the disbandment of 
Germany’s armed forces, and the destruction of its “material war potential,” “would go no further than the 
superficial demilitarization of Germany.”  Untouched would be not only “the militaristic spirit” they believed 
was “inherent in the German nature,” but also “the military caste of professional and highly trained officers 
whose mental concept regards peace only as a period of preparation and training between wars.”  More 
frightening still, this caste not only possessed “the professional ability, knowledge and training to rebuild the 
Wehrmacht,” but would “also possess a burning desire to do so.”  It was not an exaggeration, they added, “to 
suppose that plans are already being laid for the reconstruction of the Wehrmacht after the conclusion of the 
present war.”93 
 From the perspective of the study’s authors, the Nazis were a passing phenomenon and the German 
officer corps a permanent concern.  “The Nazi party with all its ramifications is the obvious primary target of 
our security plans,” they explained, but it should be remembered that “the Nazi party would not have attained its 
power and position without the connivance and backing of the military clique, who saw in it an opportunity to 
achieve their military ambitions.”  Like a parasite invading and assuming control of a host body, after the Nazis 
were destroyed the “military clique” would “attach themselves to whatever political grouping, be it Catholic, 
Social Democrat or Communist which seems to offer the best medium for their constant theme, the militaristic 
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power of Germany.”  This meant that the Nazi party was the Allies’ immediate security concern, but “the 
military clique” would remain “the primary long term target.”94 
 Following was a brief recitation of the means by which Germany’s General Hans von Seeckt had 
secretly reconstituted the general staff and in other ways preserved Germany’s war-making capabilities in the 
early 1920s despite the prohibitions of the Treaty of Versailles.  Presuming that von Seeckt’s methods could not 
be repeated in the 1940s, the study’s authors were nevertheless certain that the Germans would conceive of 
some means to reestablish their general staff unless prevented from doing so.  Although the writers argued that 
not all German officers were potentially dangerous to future peace, their judgment remained severe.  “The 
General Staff Corps and the higher ranks of the officer corps of the three services, together form the hard centre 
of German militarism,” they concluded.  “From their ranks will arise, if it is permitted, the planners and 
commanders of the Wehrmacht of the future.”  Therefore, these officers could only be effectively “rendered 
impotent” by detaining them after surrender and eventually exiling them from Germany permanently.95 
 A reorganized, streamlined, and slightly altered version of the paper from early November clarified 
that the “military caste” could be divided into three categories: the generals, the general staff corps, and the 
professional officer corps.  Now revising SHAEF’s original estimation of the officer corps by suggesting that 
“every professional German officer inherits the militarist tradition and to that extent is potentially dangerous,” 
the study’s authors also conceded that cleansing German society of the entire officer corps would be impossible 
and they would therefore need to concentrate on its most dangerous members.96  More striking was their 
characterization of the general staff corps as the “high priesthood of the German cult of war,” which “like all 
hierarchies” was “exclusive, privileged, and immensely powerful” within the army and which would 
undoubtedly construct a new Wehrmacht if not thwarted.  The new study admitted that it would be difficult to 
prevent a repetition of the 1920s and concluded that the only reliable strategy would be to exterminate the entire 
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military caste.  If this were unacceptable, it seemed essential to develop some type of enduring control of the 
German General Staff Corps and potentially dangerous professional officers.97 
 One reviewer of the revised report subsequently wondered whether the scientific bent of modern 
warfare made civilian and military scientific staffs more important than the general staff and suggested that the 
control of scientific personnel, records, and equipment might more successfully inhibit a German military 
revival than would purging the German General Staff.  However, he did not question the basic advisability of 
acting against the general staff in some fashion.98   
 In fact, throughout American (and Allied) planning circles, both military and civilian, few doubted the 
dangers posed by Germany’s general staff or seriously questioned the need for its abolition.99  One of the more 
comprehensive and resounding indictments came from Sumner Welles, who, shortly after resigning his post as 
under secretary of state in late 1943, published a book discussing the foreign policy challenges facing the 
United States.  In the German General Staff he identified a sly, scheming body of men plotting world 
domination—men whose influence spanned nearly a century and who would not be stopped by mere defeat.  
Deflecting anticipated criticism that his emphasis on the general staff’s dominant position in German military 
and foreign policymaking over the past seventy-five years minimized other important forces, Welles readily 
acknowledged the role of additional factors, but insisted that “each of them has played its part only in so far as it 
was permitted to do so by the real master of the German race, namely, German militarism, personified in, and 
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channeled through, the German General Staff.”  Welles, furthermore, believed that the general staff not only 
controlled German foreign policy, but also influenced many domestic decisions.100  Wrote Welles:  
Throughout the past one hundred years, whether the rallying point for German patriotism was the 
venerable figure of William I, Bismarck, the superficial and spectacular William II, the Marshal 
President Hindenburg, or, in most recent times, Hitler himself, public opinion in this country has 
always been prone to take the figurehead as the reality.  It has overlooked the fact that German policy 
during the past eighty years has been inspired and directed, not by the Chief of State, but by the 
German General Staff.  It is this living, continuing, destructive force that must be extirpated if the 
German people are ever to make a constructive contribution to the stability of Europe, and if any 
organized international society is to be able to safeguard the security of free peoples in the years to 
come.101 
 
 In reality, the situation in Germany in the 1930s and early 1940s was substantially different than many 
Americans assumed.  Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Kurt von Schleicher certainly played 
active roles in making Hitler chancellor, but they and the rest of Germany’s professional officers were just a 
few of the players performing in a complex drama that brought the Nazis to power and destroyed the Weimar 
Republic.  And although the general staff and officer corps, like Hitler, desired a revision of the Treaty of 
Versailles and could rightfully be criticized for pushing German rearmament, advocating the complete 
militarization of German society, and supporting aggressive expansion,102 they did not necessarily seek the 
breadth or nature of gains the Nazis ultimately pursued.  More importantly, in early 1938 Hitler reduced the 
Wehrmacht to little more than a tool employed in the pursuit of National Socialist objectives.103  In the Third 
Reich, the boundaries between civil society and civilian leadership on one hand and the German military on the 
other had essentially disintegrated, but not because the general staff dominated the government or national 
policymaking.104   
 The widespread, often vitriolic, condemnation of the German General Staff and, to a lesser extent, the 
German officer corps, can perhaps only be fully understood by recognizing that the German military 
represented the antithesis of what Americans believed to be appropriate and safe.  Not only had the United 
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States twice faced the strategic intellect and tactical skill of the German General Staff in large-scale wars, but 
the idea of an experienced and driven general staff leading a military establishment that presumably dominated 
the German state contradicted basic American principles.  Since its founding, America’s democratic self-
identity had included a deep distrust of standing armies and professional soldiers as potential threats to 
democratic governance and individual liberties.  Fears of military power, moreover, resulted in constitutional 
provisions ensuring civilian control of the American armed forces, with primary authority lodged in the hands 
of the elected representatives of the American people and, in a separate branch of government, a civilian 
president serving as commander in chief.105  Commitment to democratic government and the principle of 
civilian control extended even to American military leaders, who during World War II periodically 
subordinated their own professional preferences to political considerations and presidential decisions.106  If 
SHAEF considered the German General Staff Corps to be the “high priesthood of the German cult of war,” 
Hilldring would later recall that General George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army, had in 1943 
reminded him that “we are both a member [sic] of a priesthood really, the sole purpose of which is to defend the 
republic.”107  Perceived German behavior thus violated the American ideal and could confirm long-standing 
fears of the consequences of insufficient civilian control of a nation’s armed forces.  During a period when their 
own society and economy were militarized to a degree never before realized, U.S. policymakers may have been 
especially inclined to stress the excessive influence of their enemy’s armed forces. 
 Identifying a similar distrust of a powerful general staff in the journalistic and scholarly literature of 
the period, Heuer theorizes that American respect for its achievements already in the nineteenth century, 
combined with the overwhelming success of the Wehrmacht at the start of World War II, led many wartime 
analysts to overestimate the political and military influence exercised by Germany’s military elites during the 
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interwar years.  The general staff had clearly substantially influenced German politics during World War I and 
apparently had successfully protected this position during peacetime as well.  Ignorance may also have played a 
role in American judgments, he suggests.  Aware of the general staff’s existence, but equipped with little 
concrete information about it during the war, Americans may have been quick to jump to conclusions.  If the 
Reichswehr had, in fact, retained a powerful position in the Weimar Republic, it was logical to assume that 
Hitler could not have assumed power without its consent.108  In fairness to American observers, it should also be 
noted that, on a strictly military level, condemnation of secret maneuverings of the general staff during the 
interwar period was not unwarranted. 
 Interestingly, in his review of publications from the 1942-1952 period, Heuer also points to evidence 
of two schools of thought regarding the German military’s role in the Third Reich from 1933 to 1939.  The first 
emphasized the dominance of the armed forces, with Hitler as their instrument, and, in its most extreme form 
“denied any fundamental boundary between the officer corps and the NSDAP [Nazi Party].”  According to this 
view, the military essentially adopted Nazism as a vehicle to perpetuate its traditional militarism.  The armed 
forces were principally responsible for the end of the Weimar Republic and, because of their leading position in 
the Third Reich, bore full responsibility for the events up to 1945.109  The second school acknowledged Hitler’s 
political control and stressed Nazi supremacy over the Wehrmacht, even while allocating the armed forces both 
substantial responsibility for ending the Weimar Republic and a key position within the Third Reich.  Here, the 
importance of Hitler’s naming himself supreme commander of the Wehrmacht in 1938 was unmistakable.  
Taken as a group, these writers described a Wehrmacht which encompassed a minority of devoted Nazis, a very 
small group of resisters, and a set of skeptics who preferred to wait and see what might happen, but a majority 
of men who were either wowed by Hitler’s early military successes or who remained indifferent to politics.110 
 Heuer’s evidence for a second school stressing the Wehrmacht’s acquiescence to Hitler’s will dates 
mostly from the immediate postwar period, however.  More significantly, wartime government reports and 
correspondence reveal few indications of second-school thinking within American policymaking circles, 
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whether of the civilian or military variety.  Postwar planners remained fixated on a threatening general staff 
responsible for breaking the shackles of Versailles.  They assumed that demobilized soldiers might be 
committed Nazis and recognized that some high-ranking officers endorsed Nazi ideas,111 but they seem to have 
spent very little time analyzing the exact relationship between the Wehrmacht and the Nazis.  The OSS’s 
assessment of Prussian militarism, which described the Third Reich as a totalitarian state with the Nazis firmly 
in control and the influence of traditional elements within the Wehrmacht greatly reduced, was one of the few 
documents that challenged typical thinking.  Occasionally, references suggest some confusion or uncertainty 
about the relationship, or hint at Nazi dominance and leadership, but these ideas were apparently seldom fleshed 
out systematically.  The best indication that American officials sensed that the general staff and officer corps, 
and their militarism, was not singularly decisive in German foreign and military policy—at least at present—
was the time they devoted to pondering how to handle Nazi personnel and organizations following the end of 
the war.112  Given that American policymakers rarely acknowledged Nazi domination of the Wehrmacht, it is no 
surprise that they also failed to consider what exactly “civilian control” might mean in a dictatorship where the 
men in charge, though theoretically civilians, were, in fact, rabid militarists. 
  
 The German People.  Writing in 1944, Austrian émigré Albert Lautenbach reminded his readers that 
“the term ‘militarism’ has today acquired a much more extended meaning than in the nineteenth century.”  
Where “originally it meant the claim of a limited military caste to exceptional privileges within state and 
society,” contemporary militarism “established on totalitarian patterns” involved the militarization of all of 
society.113  During the war, American policymakers clearly were not ready to discard completely the traditional 
idea of militarism described by Lautenbach.  But many recognized, too, that German militarism had progressed 
beyond this.  They acknowledged that Hitler had enlisted and disciplined his entire people for a campaign of 
military aggression and viewed this as an intensification of trends begun even before Hitler took command of 
the German nation. 
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 While developing the initial version of JCS 1067 in September 1944, McCloy wrote to two high-level 
U.S. Army officials requesting their views on who of Germany’s “military caste” should be arrested, with 
special attention to “the effect which the action might have breaking up the German military system.”114  In 
response, the army’s intelligence section provided McCloy with a memorandum addressing the problem of 
German officers.  Deciding how to handle German military personnel, its authors stated, involved two Allied 
objectives: protection against security threats and prevention of renewed German militarism and the 
concomitant threat of war.  In calling for detaining all officers until their actual guilt or dangerousness could be 
determined and any Nazi opponents could pass on what useful knowledge they possessed, the writers of the 
paper also spelled out their own understanding of German militarism.  The causes of the revival of German 
militarism in the 1930s were “much more deep-rooted than is popularly believed,” they stressed.  Neither 
Hitler’s “spell-binding oratory” nor the plotting of the Nazi Party, German industrialists, or the general staff was 
to blame.  In particular, history would not attribute repeated German military aggression to the influence and 
“inherent militarism” of the Junkers.  Instead, it would show that “the militarist class has been able to retain and 
constantly reassert this power and influence only because the nation as a whole has maintained the warlike and 
aggressive mentality since the days of Frederick the Great.”  Consequently, it would “be folly to assume that the 
German militarist tradition could be eradicated by simply eliminating the four thousand members of the General 
Staff Corps, or all officers above a certain rank, or all Prussian families with a ‘von,’ or any other arbitrary 
category of individuals.”  They would quickly be replaced by other Germans “as long as the urge to conquest 
survives in the popular mind.”  This meant, further, that “the emphasis must be on the preventive, and above all 
educational, measures applied to the population as a whole rather than on any quarantining action affecting any 
given segment of it” and that “no sweeping measures of arrest, banishment, or dispersal should be taken against 
any single category of German officers.”115 
 Significantly, their argument echoed ideas State Department officials had expressed roughly a year 
before.  In early September 1943, Roosevelt had sent Hull a clipping from the New York Times, asking for 
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comment.  In a letter to the editor, New York lawyer and former government advisor Gerard Swope had 
outlined his recommendations for a German policy.  His analysis included a classic attack on the “Prussian 
professional military caste” as “the seat of trouble in Europe for the last two hundred years.”  Describing a 
“small, tightly knit group of men” which included nearly all of Germany’s outstanding military leaders, Swope 
accused the clique of aspiring “to create a strong militant Germany and [to] make use of Prussian militarism, 
which would be their salvation.”  His prescriptions for the future thus included disrupting the military caste, 
forcing its members to emigrate, barring all former officers from service in the military of any German state, 
and withholding pensions from healthy former officers.116  
Hull passed on a copy of the letter to his staff and asked them to draft a response for the president.  
Although it is unclear whether a final version of their reply ever made its way to the White House, it went 
through several drafts and bore the imprint of key research staff personnel, as well as that of David Harris, head 
of the department’s Interdivisional Committee on Germany, who reworked an advanced draft.  In essence, State 
Department officials took the opportunity to prepare a paper outlining their thinking on a number of aspects of 
the German problem and, in so doing, put into writing their thoughts on the eradication of German militarism, 
noting in a draft cover letter that Swope’s proposals “do not go far enough.”117   
 Disrupting the “Prussian caste,” they argued, would hurt the German military overall, but would not 
wipe out the officer class, as it was no longer predominately Prussian.  Furthermore, “even if the entire officer 
class were broken up, German militarism would not be destroyed since the leaders have by no means been the 
sole custodians and disseminators of the militaristic spirit.”  Rather, the problem was broader. 
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German military achievements, associated in the German mind with the unity and greatness of the 
Reich, have been lauded from classroom, pulpit, and rostrum.  Militarism has been supported by and 
made the instrument of aggressive nationalism by ultra-nationalistic groups such as the landed nobility, 
the great industrialists, other business interests, and various pan-German and colonial societies.  
Consequently the militaristic spirit has become deeply embedded in the psychology and social 
institutions of the whole people.  It can be rooted out only by prolonged disarmament and by 
fundamental reforms in German economic and social relationships and in German education.118 
 
State Department officials went on to clarify that long-term disarmament and the banning of a German 
army “would be a much more certain and fundamental method of destroying aggressive German militarism” 
than would Swope’s suggested measures against German officers.  Exclusion from any German armed forces 
would not necessarily diminish the officers’ influence, pension restrictions could be evaded (and would mean 
little to men who were generally wealthy), and emigration plans for the officers would be impeded by “the 
improbability that other states will receive them.”  Devoid of an army, however, Germany would have no 
“means of aggression,” and, if carefully enforced, these restrictions would “weaken ingrained military habits 
through disuse” and free Germany’s youth from the “powerful and undesirable educational influence of 
universal military service.”  Also required were restraints on the power of German landowners and certain 
business groups who, often acting through nationalistic societies, supported the strengthening of Germany’s 
armed forces financially, politically, and through propaganda.  Peaceful values should be deliberately 
encouraged in place of militarism, preferably introduced by a “peacefully inclined government” nurtured by the 
United States.  “The fundamental way to destroy German militarism is to eliminate expansionist German 
nationalism,” they contended.  And an international security system ensuring the hopelessness of dreams of 
conquest would help to kill aggressive nationalism.  But Germany should not feel defenseless.  A minimum of 
economic security would help stave off a revival of military values, while “assurance to the German people of 
eventual equality among nations, through participation in peaceful world economic and political collaboration, 
would substantially contribute to replacing German militarism with a constructive national spirit.” 119 
 To State Department analysts, German militarism was unquestionably a widespread phenomenon.  Not 
exclusively linked to a certain class or profession of Germans, it involved admiration for German military 
achievements, a desire for national aggrandizement through expansion, and a willingness and ability to use 
force to achieve that objective.  Two other departmental officials later questioned whether cause and effect 
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could be so definitively determined in terms of nationalism producing militarism—“It may very well be the 
other way around”—but they nevertheless agreed that “militarism and nationalism are indistinguishably 
intermingled.”120  And both were philosophies permeating German society and institutions.  Diverse groups 
within Germany had preached the gospel and the multitudes had converted.  
 American policy planning documents and discussions would return to the themes of the State 
Department’s paper again and again.  Most importantly, for all their willingness to denounce German 
militarism, most American planners denied that this was a congenital German character flaw.121  Contemporary 
observers sometimes criticized a line of reasoning that claimed that militarism was an inherited and racially 
unique characteristic of the Germans, associating this viewpoint in particular with the widely disseminated ideas 
of former British government official Sir Robert Vansittart.  Yet Vansittart himself, while condemning the 
historical tendencies of the German people—“If Germans had had their way, there would have been a war every 
eight years for the last three-quarters of a century”—explicitly denied that they were militaristic by nature.122  
Instead, he offered a cultural explanation.  “The German nation,” he argued in 1943, “has long been 
systematically educated in militarism.”123  Like Vansittart, U.S. government policymakers saw German 
militarism as a learned attribute.   
 “The militaristic spirit which pervades the German people has been deliberately fostered by all 
educational institutions in Germany for many decades,” asserted the briefing book prepared by Treasury 
Department officials for Morgenthau and passed on to Roosevelt prior to 1944’s Quebec Conference.124   This 
process was explained in more colloquial terms for America’s invading troops.  “You may ask yourself how a 
guy who looks pretty much like one of us could believe and do all the things we know he believed and did,” the 
army’s Pocket Guide to Germany observed, then advised that, for his own protection, the American GI should 
not forget that the German soldier was “the victim of the greatest educational crime in the history of the world.”  
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More specifically, “from childhood, in all his schools, he has heard one teaching: that force, ruthlessness, and 
blind obedience to the Führer will carry him and the German people to a position of dominance over all other 
peoples of the world.  By hearing this doctrine constantly repeated throughout his formative years, he has come 
firmly to believe in it.”125  A State Department draft study put the problem in even broader terms: the German 
people had “long been indoctrinated with concepts prejudicial to international tranquility,” a process that had 
intensified significantly during the Third Reich.126  Among the concepts department officials identified as 
central to Nazi indoctrination were “racial megalomania and intolerance,” “the Nazi concept of history as the 
manifestation of Germany’s unique mission in the world,” “excessive and irrational nationalism and worship of 
Volk and state,” “over-emphasis on the Führer principle and authoritarian government,” and “militarism and the 
cult of force.”127  
Belief in a culturally and intellectually transmitted militarism rested on the perception that German 
militarism was not a new phenomenon.  It also carried the implication that most Germans were thoroughly 
imbued.  The Germans “through generations” had “been accustomed to militaristic ways,” observed Secretary 
of State Hull at a meeting in early 1943.  When a colleague suggested that the current war could not be 
attributed to Hitler, but that Hitler, instead, “was a product of Germany and the disease was deep,” Hull agreed, 
noting “that the Germans had allowed themselves to be led into this role so that one shouting agitator was able 
to stand seventy-five million people on their heads over night and have them ready to march the next 
morning.”128  According to the army’s Pocket Guide, it was “a matter of History that there is nothing new about 
German aggression or desire for conquest.”  Bismarck had set an example of the kind of leadership the people 
admired; they followed Hitler as they had followed Kaiser Wilhelm II and Bismarck.129  A more playful take on 
the situation came from SHAEF’s deputy chief of staff, British Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan.  In a note 
to Eisenhower’s chief of staff commenting on a draft of pre-surrender directive CCS 551, which called for the 
supreme commander in Germany to “restore normal conditions among the civilian population as soon as 
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possible,” Morgan quipped: “To the best of my imperfect recollection since about 1860 the normal condition of 
Germany has been one of intense preparation for war.  So what?”130 
 The Treasury Department received help in understanding the Germans from a number of émigrés 
brought in for consultation in late summer 1944.  In this context, European history professor Hans Kohn told 
Treasury policymakers that “the devil we are fighting is not Hitler, it is Bismarck.” While younger Germans 
were devoted to Hitler, the older folks might criticize his methods but approved of his objectives.131  Friedrich 
Wilhelm Foerster, a German-born education and philosophy professor and a prominent pacifist, offered a 
similar assessment.  Calling it dangerous to differentiate between good and bad Germans, as some Americans 
were wont to do, Foerster argued that there was, indeed, a good Germany, but it had succumbed to German 
propaganda and joined the gangsters.  According to the official memo of the meeting, Foerster explained that 
Treasury officials needed “to recognize that there is a terrible solidarity between the good and bad Germany.  
Nationalism has become the religion of Germany.  Prussianism is a combination of Potsdam and Weimar, it is 
Beethoven in the trenches.”132  A week later, the department’s magnum opus of German policy 
recommendations captured the spirit of these conversations in a section titled “German Militarism Cannot Be 
Destroyed By Destroying Nazism Alone.”  Here, the Treasury staff argued that the present regime was 
“essentially the culmination of the unchanging drive for German aggression.”  For “at least three generations,” 
German society had been dominated “by powerful forces fashioning the German state and nation into a machine 
for military conquest and self-aggrandizement.”  Bluntly put, the Nazi regime was “not an excrescence on an 
otherwise healthy society but an organic growth out of the German body politic.”  Moreover, “even before the 
Nazi regime seized power, the German nation had demonstrated an unequalled capacity to be seduced by a 
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militarist clique offering the promise of economic security and political domination in exchange for disciplined 
acceptance of its leadership.”  The achievement of the Nazis had been “to systematically debauch the passive 
German nation on an unprecedented scale and shape it into an organized and dehumanized military machine 
integrated by all the forces of modern technique and science.”133  
Given to Roosevelt, the Treasury’s briefing book in many respects affirmed the president’s own views.  
Though he publicly referred to German “war lords” imposing militarism on their “enslaved peoples,” he 
personally refused to limit his condemnation of the Germans to a band of Nazi criminals who had grabbed the 
reins of power.134  In late summer 1944, Roosevelt intimated to State Department official Robert Murphy that 
militarism had begun to permeate German society already around the turn of the twentieth century.135  In 
reprimanding Stimson for an excessively lenient SHAEF handbook at about the same time, the president 
indicted the German people more directly.  Every German should be made to realize that Germany had lost the 
war, Roosevelt argued, so that they would think twice about starting another one.  He later complained that too 
many people blamed only Germany’s Nazi leaders for recent events.  This view, he contended, was false.  “The 
German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a 
lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization.”136 
 A 1943 State Department research study more carefully cataloged the extent of Germany’s popular 
militarism.  Like the OSS analysts, it found support for “German Militarism and the Tradition of Armed 
Conquest” across the social spectrum.  The Junkers had been champions of German nationalism, guardians of 
German military tradition, and the bedrock of the German officer corps.  Sections of the “upper bourgeoisie,” 
most especially those in charge of heavy industries, had backed Germany’s conservative and often nationalistic 
parties and allegedly desired a strong Germany as a “bulwark against Bolshevism.”  Large portions of the lower 
middle classes had become discontented during the Depression, were afraid of communism, and therefore had 
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supported the Nazi Party.137  In May 1944, department officials similarly described past supporters of “ultra-
nationalism” and militarism as including “the Junkers, the military caste, the great industrialists, reactionary 
intellectuals, and the ultra-nationalist element of the bureaucracy.”138   
Particularly noteworthy on the crowded lists of advocates of militarism were German industrialists.  If 
Junkers and German officers were by far the most vilified and long-standing members of the club, industrialists 
drew their share of criticism.  Much like the Junkers, they had purportedly funded and disseminated militaristic 
propaganda and exerted political influence in favor of rebuilding Germany’s military strength.139  In considering 
which Germans might need to be excluded from influential public positions, therefore, State Department 
planners in 1944 pointed not only to assorted Nazis, Junkers, and officers, but also to “the highest stratum of the 
directing and managerial personnel in the industrial and financial organization of Germany.”  “This disablement 
of old dominant groups would alter the social basis for the government of Germany,” the planners suggested.  If 
they were not dislodged, there was less chance of creating a lasting democracy resistant to imperialism.140   
While Germany’s industrialists could be denounced for their social and political influence, their 
primary transgressions were, not surprisingly, financial and economic.  Germany’s autarkic policies, cartels, and 
heavy industry had enabled the nation’s desires, American officials maintained.141  Morgenthau, the U.S. 
government’s chief proponent of German deindustrialization, was unequivocal on this point.  Had heavy 
industry not equipped it, he believed, “the whole scheme of German aggression would have had to dissipate 
itself in empty mouthings and ridiculous parades.”  Hitler “must have remained a figure of fun if it had not been 
for Krupp and Thyssen and Hugenberg.”142  As in Japan, the Treasury Department’s briefing book explained, 
“the rapid evolution of a modern industrial system in Germany immeasurably strengthened the economic base 
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of German militarism without weakening the Prussian feudal ideology or its hold on German society.”143  
Although State Department planners consistently opposed Morgenthau’s calls for mine closures and the 
dismantling of heavy industrial operations, favoring a policy of future economic cooperation and integration 
over controls and coercion, they nevertheless agreed that German industry posed a problem.  “In the interest of 
eliminating the social and economic bases of recurrent militarism,” argued an important departmental policy 
paper from 1944, the “privileged position” of “the great financial and industrial monopolies” should be 
destroyed.144  How to prevent Germany’s economic elites from once more turning the country’s industries 
toward war remained the crux of the dispute. 145   
 If German society was filled with supporters of militarism, Morgenthau’s “ridiculous parades” and the 
reprehensible activities of German industrialists were just two pieces of evidence revealing a broad-based 
German militarism.  American policymakers had little trouble identifying the symptoms and consequences of 
militarism in Germany’s society, economy, and government, both historically and more recently.  Impossible to 
overlook was the German penchant for flags, uniforms, and marching—a fetish that had only intensified under 
Nazi rule.146  American officials criticized Germany’s patriotic and imperialistic associations, as well as its 
nationalistic political parties, and condemned the veterans organizations and paramilitary groups that had 
appeared in the wake of World War I and helped to destabilize the fledgling Weimar Republic.147  They 
denounced Alfred Hugenberg for the nationalistic propagandizing of his press network during the days of the 
republic.  Controlling the country’s largest filmmaking enterprise, he had also joined other motion picture 
entrepreneurs in using films “to glorify Germany at war and to celebrate Prussianism.”148  German publications, 
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motion pictures, and radio broadcasts, moreover, had become even more dangerous instruments in Nazi 
hands.149  Educational institutions had also clearly promoted militaristic ideas.  Outside of schools, German 
youth organizations, which were already politically active before the Nazis came to power, had eventually been 
subsumed in the Hitler Youth.  Prior to 1939, the State Department’s research staff explained, this organization 
had “succeeded in making youthful Germany war-minded by stressing the grievances and needs of Germany, 
the necessity for a strong military establishment, and the obligations of youth to state and party,” instilling 
ideals such as “racial pride, hero-worship, hatred of Germany’s enemies, the righteousness and inevitability of 
war, . . . and an intransigent nationalism.”  The “Hitler Youth of today,” they emphasized, “is completely 
mobilized for war service. . . .”150   
 Summarizing factors that had made Germany a threat to world security, State Department staffers 
concluded that Germany was a country of more than 60 million individuals who were “physically and mentally 
vigorous, long accustomed to social and military discipline, [and] highly skilled in industrial and military 
techniques.”  Germany’s armed forces had been “built around a corps of officers imbued with a strong military 
tradition and trained in advanced military techniques,” while the reintroduction of universal conscription had 
allowed its leaders to draw on the entire nation to “fill out the cadres of the war machine which had been 
planned in the course of twenty years [after World War I].”  In addition, the Third Reich’s unopposed 
centralized government now served as “the supreme instrument for shaping the will of the German people 
toward war and for coordinating the national manpower and economy in the preparation and prosecution of 
war.”151 
 In perceiving and criticizing a broad-based German militarism, American officials showed a greater 
uniformity of opinion than was common in more general wartime assessments of Germany.  Government 
postwar planners were, in fact, just a subset of the many Americans engaged in evaluating the Germans.  
Analyses of Nazism, the German people, and the problem posed by their aggressive state filled the programs of 
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conferences and the pages of books and magazines.  Was Germany’s aggressiveness an inborn German trait or a 
Nazi transgression?  Was Nazism an organic result of ideas long promoted by esteemed German philosophers 
and German traditions practiced for decades, even centuries?  Were the Nazis just a band of gangsters who had 
seized control of the government?  If so, were the German people miserable and oppressed?  Or had they 
learned to love their masters and enthusiastically support their program?152   
 Overall, American responses to these questions, within and outside of the government, were diverse 
and changing.  Though not exhausting the possible range of opinions, a common point of divergence concerned 
the German people and their relationship to Germany’s Nazi leaders.  Some observers argued that the Third 
Reich was an aberration in German history, with its National Socialist rulers a group of criminals whose first—
innocent and terrorized—victim had been the German people.  But others, often in the Vansittart camp, saw 
Nazism as a natural outgrowth of German history that drew on wide popular support for its racist, nationalistic, 
and foreign policy ideas due to their close correlation with common German desires, fears, and feelings of 
having been wronged.  Finding it difficult, in particular, to attribute the perceived excesses and barbarities of 
Nazism to a people so similar to themselves, the majority of Americans tended toward the first interpretation of 
Nazism.  This basic dichotomy in thinking was evident even in official planning circles, where Stimson was 
inclined to spare the German people from censure, while Morgenthau and Roosevelt refused to excuse the 
broader population from responsibility for the evils of Nazism.153 
 In considering German militarism specifically, however, the perspectives of American officials were 
more homogeneous.  They also conflicted to some extent with the views opinion polls attributed to the 
American people.  Whatever ideas regarding German militarism had been floating around in American society 
since the late nineteenth century, Americans during World War II did not necessarily blame the German people 
for the current hostilities—though their willingness to do so apparently increased as the war progressed.  In late 
1939, one opinion poll revealed that more than 66 percent of those surveyed believed “that the Germans were 
‘essentially peace-loving and kindly’ but unfortunately misled by their rulers.”  Another poll conducted 
regularly between February 1942 and May 1946 by the National Opinion Research Center asked those 
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interviewed to indicate their agreement with one of three statements: “(1) ‘The German people will always want 
to go to war and make themselves as powerful as possible,’ (2) ‘The German people may not like war, but they 
have shown that they are too easily led into war by powerful leaders,’ or (3) ‘The German people do not like 
war.  If they could have the same chance as people of other countries, they would become good citizens of the 
world.’”  Forty-two percent of poll respondents agreed with the third statement as of February 1942, though by 
July 1945, support for this idea had gradually decreased to 19 percent.  Moreover, in 1942, just 21 percent 
believed that the Germans always wanted to go to war; by mid-1945, this number had risen to 39 percent—a 
significant leap, but still low enough to suggest that this was not the dominant American viewpoint.154 
 American postwar planners were more willing to see the German people themselves as belligerent.  
The reason for this is difficult to decipher.  Many American elites had personal experience in Germany, which 
may have a played a role, as may the fact that scores of central European scholars had taken refuge in American 
universities, with a large number of American and émigré scholars eventually going to work for the wartime 
federal government.  Whatever the reason, even when policymakers were ready to believe that Nazism was 
primarily a disease of the Third Reich’s rulers, accusations of German militarism were not necessarily similarly 
confined.  Even Stimson saw a German people indoctrinated to favor military aggression.155  His concerns, and 
those of the State Department regarding the postwar treatment of Germany, resulted directly from worries that 
harshness would so aggravate German sensitivities that another war would follow. 156  The various government 
departments might bicker over which economic measures would most effectively prevent a third world war, but 
they all identified widespread German militarism as a problem.  Moreover, American officials did not need to 
assume that the German people enthusiastically supported the entire Nazi program, or hold the German people 
responsible for Hitler’s rise to power and subsequent actions, to accuse them of militarism.  In fact, detecting 
German militarism did not even require blaming the German people for the outbreak of World War II, though 
clearly many American policymakers did so. 157   
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 On the other hand, American officials also saw the German people as entangled in the net of German 
militarism.  The American conception of cultural conditioning rested on the idea that the German people had 
been led astray, though not solely by Nazi gangsters.  How the process worked, exactly, was not usually 
explained, and references to German indoctrination could be vague and inconsistent.  Certain was that, 
culminating in the calculated and pernicious Nazi propaganda program, government officials and teachers had 
used German schools to preach a nationalistic, militaristic agenda since at least 1919.158  More generally, 
American policymakers attributed Germany’s capitulation to militarism to the harmful influence of Prussia, 
named German military officers as the primary culprits, or pointed to the dangerous philosophies of Fichte, 
Hegel, and Treitschke.  They were also plainly convinced that associations, churches, and economic elites 
should shoulder blame as well.159  In sum, starting already long before the arrival of Hitler, the German people 
had been indoctrinated from “classroom, pulpit, and rostrum” with ideas of military glory, national calling, the 
centrality of the state, and the magnificence and rights of power.  American officials saw an intentionality in 
this development, without defining the precise relationship between the ideas and the society that preached 
them.  The implied assumption was that the process was self-sustaining.  Germans indoctrinated with 
militaristic ideas institutionalized this militarism in their cultural practices and in state and social institutions, 
which, in turn, perpetuated Germany’s “militaristic ways” through education and ritual and thereby 
indoctrinated the next generation.  The National Socialists, under the guiding hand of Hitler, had continued 
these efforts with fanatical purposefulness.160 
 Insufficiently explained was the exact relationship between Nazism and militarism.  American 
planners readily labeled the Nazis “militarists.”  Often, they discussed National Socialism as the most recent 
incarnation of German militarism; Nazis were the modern ambassadors of Prussianism.  Typical was a Treasury 
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Department study asking “How Defeated Germany Rose to Power” which, with reference to interwar 
rearmament, maintained that “it was only a change in degree, although an important one, and not a change in 
kind when Hitler finally took over in 1933 and Germany openly entered on the path to war.”161  In other words, 
as a British friend informed State Department advisor Myron Taylor, Hitler was merely a “vulgarization of 
Bismarck.”162   
 However, although they frequently suggested that Hitler was a natural product of Germany’s 
militaristic history, many American policymakers also clearly sensed a qualitative difference between 
traditional “Prussianism” and the values of the men currently in power.  Germans, some argued, could be both 
anti-Nazi and militaristic.  Supplying Washington with the names of anti-Nazi Germans for potential postwar 
appointments, several State Department officials formerly stationed in Germany emphasized this point.  One 
described anti-Nazi acquaintances who subscribed to the “ancient atheistic creed of racial superiority and world 
conquest” but “loathed the guttersnipes who were smart enough to produce a political leader and dominate the 
civilian part of the German machine.”163  Another wrote that “in general, nearly all members of the nobility in 
Germany, especially the landowners, however anti-Nazi they might be, would presumably wish the return of 
Germany’s greatness coupled with the resurrection of the German Army, and probably the monarchial system, 
and this would disqualify them [from holding positions of influence].”164  Contrary to standard assumptions, 
then, American policymakers did not necessarily equate Nazism and Prussian militarism.  The two might 
overlap, but were not the same.  Often, militarism joined racism, nationalism, the Führer principle, and other 
negative philosophies in the basket of Nazi ideology to be condemned.165  How the militarism of the Nazis 
compared with or related to that of the traditional “military caste” nevertheless remained largely unexamined.  
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Without specifically appraising or delineating the difference between Nazism and militarism, or describing their 
commonalities, policy documents and presidential speeches normally called for the elimination of both. 
 
Conclusions 
 From the day the United States entered World War II, American policymakers identified German 
militarism as a primary cause of the conflict.  Ensuring future peace, they agreed, demanded that this militarism 
be uprooted.  Yet, no policy for eradication could be developed successfully without an understanding of the 
nature of the problem, and here American views were more uncertain.  Was Prussia the primary menace?  Were 
professional officers a militaristic cancer in German society?  Or was there an even bigger problem?   
 Analyzing Germany from afar, American policymakers sifted through both competing and 
complementary ideas in attempting to make sense of the situation.  Over time, a synthetic view emerged which 
in many respects could subsume within it competing emphases.  Ultimately, American officials perceived a 
German militarism that was not something unique to the Third Reich, but a long-standing, culturally produced 
phenomenon embodied in an aggressive military machine, belligerent leaders, an industrial system customized 
for war production, and a society and culture marked by military aesthetics and shaped by military ideals that 
celebrated and upheld German military tradition, espoused the glories of war, and saw conquest as a national 
right.   
 This American assessment of German militarism was not always consistent or based on rigorous 
analysis.  But it would prove sufficiently coherent—and was shared by enough people—to produce agreement 
on most of the tasks that would eventually make up a social and cultural demilitarization program. 
  
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
“GAMBLING WITH THE VERY DESTINY OF CIVILIZATION”: 
POLICIES FOR OCCUPIED GERMANY 
  
 
Destroying the “militaristic spirit” of the German people “will of necessity be an arduous process,” 
Treasury Department officials argued in the briefing book they prepared at Secretary Morgenthau’s direction 
during the fall of 1944.  “For a long time to come,” they added, “it would be gambling with the very destiny of 
civilization to rely on an unproven capacity for self-regeneration in the face of [the Germans’] proven capacity 
for creating new weapons of destruction to be used in wars of aggression.”1  From the department’s perspective, 
these stark facts meant that neutralizing German industry and strengthening Germany’s neighbors should be key 
American objectives. 
While frequently more skeptical of the Germans than most federal policymakers, the Treasury 
Department’s staff nevertheless zeroed in on what was essentially the crux of the problem for many American 
officials planning for the occupation of Germany.  In short, the future attitude of the German people was of 
critical significance.  Along with their understanding of the origins and manifestations of German militarism, 
recognition of this fact guided policymakers in developing a demilitarization program.  If German militarism 
involved more than an imperialistic Wehrmacht and a hostile government, demilitarization efforts must as well.  
Indeed, the most troublesome aspect of German militarism was its pervasiveness in society and culture, a 
condition that shaped individual attitudes and perpetuated the problem institutionally.  Jackbooted troops and 
warehouses filled with guns only posed a threat if a nation believed in the glory, necessity, or inevitability of 
using them.  It was thus necessary not only to deprive the Germans of the means to make war, but also to 
eliminate their desire to do so and to destroy the influences that inspired and sustained that desire. 
In formulating a prescription for treating German militarism, a rough consensus thus emerged among 
American wartime planners.  Ultimately, they endeavored to “psychologically disarm” the Germans through a 
wide range of policies aimed at changing Germany society and culture.  Under the umbrella of this general 
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approach, concrete policy decisions and related regulations continued to reflect the varied assumptions and 
emphases of the policymakers involved—or, perhaps, in the face of inconsistencies and uncertainties, simply 
reflected a desire to eliminate all possible sources of evil.  Specific measures therefore sought to undercut the 
power of Prussian Junkers, to reduce the danger posed by military officers, to free German institutions, social 
practices, and material culture of the effects of militarizing influences, and to undo the militaristic 
indoctrination of the German people.2 
 
Identifying a Solution 
 In developing plans for Germany, American officials always kept one eye on the past.  Allied leaders 
had first attempted to destroy German militarism after World War I.  The Treaty of Versailles had 
“demilitarized” Germany by shackling its industries, closing its officers’ schools, abolishing its general staff, 
and substantially limiting the men and materiel of its armed forces.  Yet just 20 years later, Adolf Hitler was 
deploying a massive army equipped with the latest technology and backed by well-stocked arsenals. American 
analytical reports and committee discussions regularly invoked this splendid failure.  In considering how to 
prevent future German rearmament, one State Department study was explicit: “At the end of World War I the 
trunk and branches of German militarism were cut but the roots were allowed to remain.”3  This time the Allies 
meant to do better. 
Chief among American objectives, then, was the permanent eradication of German militarism leading 
to a lasting peace.  Some officials conceded that the war itself might rein in German militarism, at least in the 
short term,4 but few believed that defeat alone would prove to be an enduring solution.  If nothing else, their 
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knowledge of history made them wary.  Germany had lost World War I, its dead had numbered in the millions, 
and its defeat had led to revolution, inflation, social unrest, and political instability.  Yet the result had not been 
a hegemonic pacifism, but paramilitary activism, military ascendancy, and Hitler, all glued together with a 
“Stab-in-the-Back” legend denying military defeat and fueling an intense desire for revenge.  German “military 
tradition,” noted a draft of the State Department’s Swope response, “was sufficiently ingrained to survive the 
catastrophe of 1918.”5  Morgenthau offered a similar perspective in 1945, writing, “After 1918, it seemed 
impossible to the victors that the vanquished could take seriously the sort of rhetoric the Kaiser and their sages 
had dished out to them.  But an idea cannot be beaten by a battle. . . . An idea needs to be beaten by another 
idea, and their military defeat had given birth to no new ideas among the Germans.”6 
World War II had rained bombs and destruction on the German homeland and would surely result in a 
defeat more complete and devastating than the Germans of 1918 could ever have imagined.  Yet American 
leaders saw a people in Germany who not only retained certain cultural characteristics, but who were more 
thoroughly militarized than the generation that had lost the previous war.  “Inevitably the Germans will 
remember much more clearly how close they came to victory than how they came to be defeated,” asserted 
Morgenthau in 1945, projecting post-World War I experiences onto the residues of the most recent conflict.7  
Arguing against those who were urging the Allies to give the Germans a second chance to establish their own 
democracy, Welles contended that conditions this time would be even less favorable for such an initiative.  The 
youth of Germany, in particular, had been educated only by the Nazis, taught, among other things, ideals of 
domination.  This did not bode well for the rest of the world.  “These millions of Germans will be at the prime 
of their life during the next two decades.  They will be a controlling force . . . . Theirs will be a force of 
fanaticism and revenge.”8  A radical change in German attitudes and behavior was not presumed to be 
inevitable.    
                                                                                                                                                       
 
5
 David Harris to Mr. Notter, 13 Sep 43, NA, RG 59, Notter File, Entry 489, Box 79, F: S-Germany (Swope) & Welles. 
 
6
 Morgenthau, Germany is Our Problem, 111.  For Roosevelt’s similar views, see the radio chat cited in the opening to 
Chapter 2.  
 
7
 Ibid., 114. 
 
8
  Welles, The Time for Decision, 357-358.  For concerns about Germany’s indoctrinated youth, see also H-127, 8 Mar 44, 
attached to note from D[avid] H[arris], 11 Mar 44, NA, RG 59, Notter File, Entry 500, Box 154, F: H-Summaries 126-149. 
 
 86 
The challenge was thus a long-term one, and as much an intellectual as a physical one.  Laying out the 
issues in November 1944, a McCloy advisor reasoned that with some 70 million people, agricultural land, many 
natural resources, large—if damaged—industrial plants, research instincts, and organizing ability, Germany 
would soon have a high military potential again, unless all of the Germans were deported or wiped out, which 
were not practical options.  The problem, he argued, was not their military potential, “but the danger of the 
persistence or recurrence of the aggressive Nazi or military ideas.”  Negative actions, he added, would be 
insufficient.  Affirmative longer-term measures, such as education, an international security organization, and 
economic rehabilitation and interdependence with other areas, must be attempted, while the occupiers also acted 
as governmental authorities for some years.9  One SHAEF manual was more succinct: “By the terms of the 
peace settlement the Allies can suppress the physical ability to commit acts of aggression.  But no peace 
settlement can destroy the spirit of aggression.  That can be achieved only by long-term education.”10 
The State Department’s 1944 basic policy statement on “The Treatment of Germany” took a similar 
position.  Continuing control and coercion would be expensive and might disintegrate if the capabilities and will 
of the Allies did.  The least costly and best assurance of enduring security, therefore, “would be the German 
people’s repudiation of militaristic ambitions and their assimilation, as an equal partner, into a cooperative 
world society.”  The U.S., in other words, needed a policy that would both forestall German aggression and 
“pave the way the way for the German people in the course of time to join willingly in the common enterprises 
of peace.”11  Earlier, the department’s Interdivisional Committee on Germany had discussed how this might be 
achieved.  Defeat would lead to widespread disgust with the Nazi government and military catastrophe would 
“be a powerful lesson, supplementing that of 1918, in the consequences of ultra-nationalism, militarism and 
aggression,” its members agreed.  But defeat alone would not change German values.  They concluded, rather, 
that “a fundamental repudiation of that type of nationalistic mentality which reached its most extreme 
development in National Socialism” was as critical to preventing German aggression as were military and 
economic controls and called for an “attempt to bring about the psychological disarmament of the German 
                                                 
9
 G.H. Dorr Memorandum to Mr. McCloy, 10 Nov 44, NA, RG 107. 
 
10
 SHAEF, “Manual for the Control of German Information Services,” 16 Apr 45, NA, RG 218, Entry UD2, Box 78, F: CCS 
387 Germany (12-17-43) Bulky Package.  (Emphasis in original.) 
 
11
 PWC-141b, 5 Aug 44, FRUS, Conference at Quebec, 53-54. 
 
 87 
people as rapidly as possible through a carefully planned program of re-education” not only in schools but in 
German society at large.12 
Even Morgenthau did not dispute the value of seeking to change German attitudes.  His passionate 
advocacy for radically reducing German industrial capabilities rested in his belief that reeducating the Germans 
would, at worst, be impossible, and, at best, require a very long time.  In the meantime, they could not be trusted 
with the resources necessary to wage war.13  Here, his views were again similar to those of Roosevelt, who had 
chided his Joint Chiefs of Staff at one point for implying that a new, post-Nazi German state would contribute 
to peace in Europe immediately.  The president was convinced, instead, that “German philosophy cannot be 
changed by decree, law or military order,” but that “the change in German philosophy must be evolutionary and 
may take two generations.”  He cautioned, too, that “to assume otherwise [was] to assume, of necessity, a 
period of quiet followed by a third world war.”14 
In essence, a specific understanding of German militarism led American policymakers to the means 
with which to eradicate it.  If militarism was a learned condition, then it could be unlearned.  Deeply ingrained, 
it might take time to be fully eliminated and success could not be guaranteed.  But for lasting world security, the 
Americans saw few alternatives to a program of “psychological disarmament.”   
 
Constructing a Regulatory Framework 
Defeat, occupation, and the prosecution of war criminals were necessary first steps toward 
psychologically disarming the Germans.  Much as Roosevelt had urged when criticizing SHAEF’s draft 
handbook, U.S. officials were intent upon bringing home to the Germans that this time they had been soundly 
beaten.  While also averting a new “Stab-in-the-Back” legend and its potential consequences, this recognition of 
defeat—with the victors occupying all of Germany—would begin the reeducation process.  War, it should be 
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learned, did not pay.15  Beyond this, achieving American objectives would require a wide range of both positive 
and negative measures.16  Instilling new values championing peace and tolerance would be the ultimate goal.  
As Morgenthau and Roosevelt suggested, it was difficult, if not impossible, to force a change of philosophy via 
battlefield routs or laws and decrees.  An idea needed to be defeated by a new idea.  But this assignment was 
challenging.  In the meantime, deconstructive and preventative measures would be necessary as well, and more 
pressing.  Every influence in Germany’s social and cultural environment which nurtured militaristic tendencies 
had to be eliminated.  Hence even as Allied troops reached Germany’s borders, crossed the Rhine, and 
eventually moved into Württemberg and Baden in March and April of 1945, American planners were 
developing a series of rudimentary policies to accomplish this task.   
Perhaps surprisingly, American policymakers devoted the least amount of attention to Germany’s 
infamous Prussian Junkers.  In September 1944, State, War, and Treasury officials had all agreed that because 
the Junkers’ large estates provided an economic foundation for Germany’s military caste, they should be 
partitioned among tenants.17  But this apparently did not become an official component of the early occupation 
policy of the United States.  No iteration of JCS 1067, the interim directive for the post-surrender period, 
included a provision specifically calling for this action, although the most authoritative version from the spring 
of 1945 (and the de facto governing policy for the American Zone for several years) instructed Eisenhower to 
“direct the German authorities to utilize large-landed estates and public lands in a manner which will facilitate 
the accommodation and settlement of Germans and others or increase agricultural output.”18  On the other hand, 
when considering the removal of possible “militarists” from influential positions, SHAEF directives did 
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expressly call for careful scrutiny of members of large landholding families from Prussia and Germany’s other 
eastern territories.19 
Far more wide-reaching than policies pertaining specifically to the Junkers were those relating to 
Germany’s soldiers.  American planners had long accepted the necessity of disbanding the German General 
Staff and “rooting out” Germany’s military caste.20  In Washington, the influential September 1944 version of 
JCS 1067 manifested these concerns in ordering the arrest of all general staff corps officers not captured as 
prisoners of war, while promising further instructions as to their disposition and the treatment of other German 
officers.  Intent on weakening the social status of Germany’s military elites, JCS 1067 also prohibited the 
payment of military pensions except in cases of physical disability.21  The revised interim directive sent to 
Eisenhower in the spring of 1945 retained these instructions and, in addition, required the disbanding and 
demobilizing of Germany’s armed forces and paramilitary groups; the dissolution of the general staff, officer 
corps, reserve corps, and all military academies; and the exclusion of “supporters of militarism” from positions 
of authority and influence in Germany’s society and economy.  As an approved set of U.S. policies, JCS 1067 
also ultimately became what one observer described as “the party line for the U.S. element in SHAEF.”22  And 
already during the fall of 1944, SHAEF planners were busy devising explicit guidelines for military 
commanders to use prior to and immediately following Germany’s surrender.  Not surprisingly, then, revised 
SHAEF pre-surrender policies finalized in late 1944 stressed the Allies’ intent to eradicate militarism as well as 
Nazism, mandated the disbanding of the German armed forces, and required the dismissal of “all militarists and 
leading military figures” from government posts and other influential positions.23   
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 The American commitment to removing objectionable persons of all types from positions of influence 
in Germany spawned additional policymaking challenges.  Just as American planners often vaguely lumped 
together “Nazism and militarism” as forces to be eradicated, instructions relating to personnel arrests and 
removals typically referred jointly to “Nazis and Militarists.”  Here, however, a variety of Allied planning 
organizations at least attempted to define the universe of affected individuals.   
 As late as December 1944, a SHAEF official pointed out that the Supreme Headquarters staff had 
produced a variety of regulations for Allied invasion forces pertaining to Nazis and militarists without offering 
clear definitions or consistent and comprehensive classifications.24  In early 1945, responding to requests from 
military commanders in the field, SHAEF staffers finally made their first concerted attempt to define a 
“militarist.”  In identifying “Nazi and militarist” personnel slated for mandatory removal from key positions, 
their multi-page catalog of those who had wielded influence in the Third Reich included long-standing Nazi 
Party members, prominent business officials, key civil servants, high-level government administrators, and a 
host of officials from Nazi formations and Nazi-affiliated organizations.  Buried in the lengthy list was a 
subheading titled “Military Service,” which encompassed two groups: “Persons who have at any time been 
members of the German General Staff Corps” and “Persons who have been National Socialist Indoctrination 
Officers.”25  Going on to discuss those subject to discretionary removal, SHAEF officials called for removing 
from influential positions “persons likely to perpetuate the militaristic tradition of Germany.”  Here they alluded 
in vague terms to the aforementioned “militarists” (without specifying who among the multitudes, specifically, 
might be painted with this brush) and indicated that career military officers and “any persons who represent the 
Prussian Junker tradition” should also be scrutinized as potential militarists.  Admitting that the latter category 
was hard to define, they advised SHAEF occupation authorities to pay particular attention to any person who 
was apparently “a member of an aristocratic Prussian or East Prussian, Pomeranian, Silesian or Mecklenburg 
family, or of one which is the owner of extensive property in Prussia” and to any former members of any of the 
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“elite German University Student Corps” or “East Prussian or Silesian Landschaften [sic].”26  Issuing a 
subsequent directive specifying who should be disqualified from occupying “any post of authority or important 
governmental or civil position,” the U.S. Army’s 6th Army Group made the identification process even simpler, 
describing ineligible “militarists” as current or former members of the German General Staff Corps, National 
Socialist Indoctrination Officers, career military officers, and persons representing the “Prussian Junker 
tradition,” as explained in the SHAEF directive.27 
 A SHAEF manual on the control of German information services drafted about the same time similarly 
incorporated the SHAEF removal guidelines in a set of annexes, but also put forward more expansive ideas 
when discussing personnel appointments.  Emphasizing that Germany contained two enemies—Nazis and 
militarists—it argued that while the “obvious Nazi” could be recognized by his party affiliation, many less 
zealous Nazis and most militarists were harder to identify because they might be associated with nearly any 
political party or group.  They might also be non-partisan.  The manual suggested that “broadly speaking” 
information control officers could “assume that anyone who before 1933 actively supported any party 
advocating German nationalism and militarism is suspect and may be even more dangerous than many Nazi 
Party members.”28  The staff of Robert Murphy, the U.S. Political Advisor for Germany, drew similar 
conclusions in developing general guidance on personnel appointments.  Warning against appointing any 
former high-ranking officer or “militarist” (as defined in the SHAEF directive) to “any position in Government 
or private business,” they added that “as a general rule, industrialists, big businessmen, and large landholders 
must be considered suspect, as all these groups have supported either Nazism, militarism, or German 
nationalism, not only since 1933 but long before that date.”29 
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 How difficult it was to decide who should be considered a militarist (and the variety of possible 
answers to this question) was underscored by an exchange that occurred during a late April 1945 Informal 
Policy Committee on Germany meeting attended by Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton, Army Civil 
Affairs Division chief General John Hilldring, Undersecretary of the Navy Ralph Bard, Foreign Economic 
Administration head Leo Crowley, his colleague H.H. Fowler, and the Treasury Department’s Harold Glasser, 
J.B. Friedman, and D.W. Bell.  Assembled to hammer out final changes to the version of JSC 1067 that became 
the guiding policy of the U.S. occupation, the men considered a provision on denazification which specified that 
all active Nazi party members, “all active supporters of Nazism or militarism,” and any other individuals 
“hostile to Allied purposes” were to be removed or barred from public office and influential positions in the 
private sector and stated that Germans would fall into these categories if they had “held office or otherwise been 
active at any level from local to national in the party and its subordinate organizations, or in organizations 
which further militaristic doctrines,” “authorized or participated affirmatively in any Nazi crimes, racial 
persecutions, or discriminations,” “been avowed believers in Nazism or racial and militaristic creeds,” or 
“voluntarily given substantial moral and material support or political assistance of any kind to the Nazi Party or 
Nazi officials or leaders.”30 
 At the meeting, Bard opened the discussion by declaring that the provision under consideration began 
by specifying that any man who had been in the army was excluded, which meant “everybody, practically.”  
Clayton disagreed, prompting an exchange as to what, exactly, the provision did mean. 
Mr. Bard: It says, “All active supporters of Nazism or militarism.”  A soldier is a supporter. 
Gen. Hilldring: That is a stricter interpretation than we have put on it, Mr. Bard. 
 Mr. Bell: Everybody above the age of six. 
Mr. Clayton: Of course, those soldiers—just an ordinary private has no other choice; he has to serve.  
Many of them, I dare say, have served that would have liked very well not to. 
 Mr. Fowler: What you really mean are Fascists and supporters of Nazism. 
 Mr. Bell: You certainly mean SS Troops. 
Mr. Bard: I could interpret it that a soldier carrying a gun was a supporter of Nazism. 
Mr. Clayton: You could so construe it.  That may be, General, something that will come up early in its 
application. 
Gen. Hilldring: Yes.  This formula isn’t much different from what [Eisenhower’s] present 
denazification policy is, and I don’t think he will apply it that rigidly. 
Mr. Crowley: You’d think he is going to have so damn much business he isn’t going to get down to 
that right away. 
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 Gen. Hilldring: Not right away, but what Mr. Bard says is true. 
 Mr. Crowley: It will be back for revision before he gets down that far. 
 Mr. Clayton: You will have to cable right away. 
 Mr. Bell: Just about the same as you had in Italy. 
 Gen. Hilldring: Not as tight as that. 
 Mr. Friedman: They will do it, anyway, if they want to. 
Mr. Glasser: Militarism in that sense is really an ism, more of the doctrine of military organization.  
That is what is intended here, and that is the way the ism is usually interpreted.  I think a soldier in the 
Army is part of a military organization, is really a puppet of whatever militarism there may be in the 
community. 
Gen. Hilldring: I think he will interpret this as saying he won’t use Army officers and SS Troops.  But 
I think we could assume that under this language he could use others. 
Mr. Clayton: You will recall, General, if you get anything out of the discussion here as to what the 
intent is, and instruct him accordingly. 
Gen. Hilldring: If it is a question like that, cables will be coming back in the weeks and months ahead 
when he gets down to it.31  
 
In short, in the space of some 10 minutes, eight men offered at least three different ideas as to who might be 
considered a “supporter of militarism”: soldiers, civilians, or officers.32  Not surprisingly, the IPCOG officials 
expected Eisenhower to have many questions when called upon to actually enforce JCS 1067. 
 Overall, the work of American postwar planners revealed two coexisting convictions regarding 
militarists: one, that many Nazis were militarists and, two, that Germans could be militarists without being 
Nazis.  Presumably, when it came time for removals or arrests, each individual would be excluded or rounded 
up for their most egregious sin.  More concrete attempts at classification seldom went beyond segregating 
offenders based on such factors as profession, office, or background.  Traits, behaviors, or beliefs that militarists 
shared with Nazis or which set them apart from non-militarists went mostly unexamined.  Similarly, American 
officials left unanswered the question of how a subcategory of “militarists” could even exist in a nation of 
individuals who had been subject for decades to a deliberate program of militaristic instruction and cultural 
indoctrination.  SHAEF regulations seemed to focus primarily on those likely to “perpetuate the German 
militaristic tradition.”  Understandably, persons thought to be responsible for teaching, training, and organizing, 
such as military officers, might be considered militarists.  But policymakers had left little doubt that they 
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believed German militarism ran deeper than German elites.  Evidently Germans could be prone to militarism, 
supporters of militarism, brainwashed believers in militarism, and exemplars of militaristic qualities, and not 
officially be considered “militarists.”  Conversely, planners spoke regularly of seeking assistance during the 
occupation from untainted Germans—a strategy that assumed that certain Germans had not succumbed to the 
onslaught of militaristic ideology and training to which they had been subjected.  But American officials never 
attempted the daunting task of drawing more nuanced distinctions between “militarists,” Germans inclined 
toward militarism, and Germans who rejected militarism.33  American regulations stated that militarists must be 
kept from positions of influence.  Identifying these people would remain a challenge. 
 Despite the problems posed by the need to make personnel decisions on the basis of imprecise 
guidelines, the SHAEF directive from early 1945 provided invading forces with at least some direction when 
dealing with local German administrations.  It also gave military commanders a certain amount of latitude, 
permitting them to delay taking action where it might impede successful combat operations and allowing them 
to use German personnel to help demobilize German troops.34  Specifically designed as a pre-defeat directive, it 
nevertheless held sway until SHAEF dissolved and guidance modeled on the SHAEF directive but applicable 
only in the American Zone took effect in July 1945.35 
 Along with the formulation of personnel removal instructions, the development of policies for handling 
German officers immediately following Germany’s defeat became critical as the Wehrmacht was gradually 
pushed back in the field and began to disintegrate in late 1944 and early 1945.  As of September 1944, SHAEF 
planners had few guidelines for field commanders.36  Although EAC officials were discussing the subject, long-
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term tripartite policy for the post-hostilities period remained undecided.37  SHAEF planners could therefore only 
speculate as to what the ultimate course of action might be for dealing with Germany’s military caste, though 
they clearly had their own views on the subject.  Hoping that the general staff and other elements of the officer 
corps who could lay the groundwork for Germany’s military resurgence would be exiled, they recommended in 
November that these men be allowed to return home, secure in their ignorance of Allied plans for their eventual 
arrest, while SHAEF officials checked their records and monitored their whereabouts.  This approach would 
facilitate future detention and deportation en masse, but would also let Allied military commanders focus 
initially on the enormous and more immediately important task of capturing Nazis and other “blacklist 
personnel” and enable them to rely on German assistance in disarming and demobilizing millions of German 
soldiers.38   
 While most SHAEF officials consulted on the matter approved the recommended policy,39 one officer 
argued that exterminating or segregating the general staff corps might dampen German militarism immediately 
following the war, but was not a permanent solution.  Executions would create martyrs and exile would not get 
rid of powerful German military writings.  He suggested, instead, that the Allies find a way to discredit the 
general staff in the eyes of the German people, perhaps simply by emphasizing the miserable effects of 
Germany’s recent military disaster.40   
 More significantly, a Psychological Warfare Division official expressed his division’s strong 
objections.  Although he agreed that dangerous German officers should be exiled, he called for their immediate 
detention.  If action was delayed, he reasoned, Wehrmacht officers were likely to simply vanish or, permitted to 
operate freely in their posts, would cheat the Allies whenever possible.  A delaying policy, moreover, would 
“create indignation” in the United States and Britain and suspicion in Moscow.  “If the most dangerous 
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elements of the Wehrmacht remain at liberty and negotiate as responsible officers with the Allied command,” 
he argued, “the spectacle will give the impression that we have abandoned our policy of eradicating German 
militarism.”  The German people would draw this conclusion as well, thus nullifying reeducation efforts from 
the start.  Furthermore, his division believed that the need to prevent the general staff corps and other dangerous 
officers from acting was “greater and not less than the need to liquidate minor Nazi officials.”  Immediate arrest 
was therefore necessary.  German officers cooperating in disarming activities should be “forced to do so under 
some form of detention” and treated severely.  And these actions should be publicized.  On the other hand, 
although the division believed the Allies should demonstrate their strength, it did not advocate a deliberate 
campaign of humiliation and degradation.  Alluding to post-World War I anti-army sentiment, the official 
added, “If an anti-militarist swing of opinion should occur, we should have to consider carefully what use to 
make of it.”41   
 When to arrest and how to use German officers in demobilizing the Wehrmacht without threatening 
larger occupation objectives thus became a point of some contention between the Psychological Warfare 
Division and other SHAEF organizations.42  In the long run, the Psychological Warfare approach won out, 
perhaps encouraged in part by JCS 1067.  SHAEF post-hostilities policy, as embodied in an “Eclipse” 
memorandum, ordered the immediate arrest of all general staff corps officers not taken as prisoners of war, 
explaining that because the general staff was the primary proponent of Germany’s quest for world domination, 
this task was critically important.  The general staff, it added, could be destroyed by isolating its members, 
taking away their files to prevent study of the most recent conflict and planning for the next, carefully tracking 
key members (especially men between the ages of 25 and 35), and “fostering among former officers a 
conviction of irrevocable and final defeat and impotency in face of Allied power and exploiting all methods 
which will keep them from uniting on a common basis.” 43  A subsequent directive indicated that general 
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officers not needed for administering the German armed forces should be divested of their authority, forbidden 
to wear “decorations or other symbols of military achievement,” and “allotted to the various concentration areas 
containing German Forces,” where they were to be “maintained by the German Commander of the area on the 
same scale as the German Forces.”44   
 The specifics of the latter policy were in part a product of the arguments of a SHAEF counter-
intelligence staff determined to get rid of German militarism.  Calling for denying officers their symbols of rank 
and achievement, they had also urged that all “pomp and circumstance” be eliminated and the officers “reduced 
to the position of thoroughly defeated men.”  The Germans should not, counter-intelligence officials had 
stressed, be allowed to “strut about wearing distinguished insignia, medals, and acting in such a manner as to 
give the impression that the German Army is still alive.”45  Effective psychological disarmament thus required 
attention not only to the immediate disposition of German officers, but also to their specific treatment.  They 
were to recognize their own impotence.  Moreover, the image they presented— bearing authority to lead only at 
the discretion of the Allies and suffering internment with millions of other faceless German troops—would 
serve as a lesson for their enlisted men and the German people as a whole.   
 Similar considerations played into decisions regarding the demobilization of Germany’s armed forces.  
Allied officials remained acutely conscious of the aftermath of World War I, when defeated units of imperial 
soldiers had marched smartly back into Germany, weapons in hand, providing nutritious fodder for myths of 
civilian backstabbing.  Intent on preventing a recurrence of this delusional and dangerous thinking, SHAEF 
officials discussed whether marching troops home in battalions, unarmed, minus their senior officers, to arrive 
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“in a fairly bedraggled state,” would be less or more effective than sending them home “piece-meal by train.”  
Here, counter-intelligence officials contended that marching troops home, regardless of their overall 
appearance, would not only pose security risks, but would attract onlookers in each town they passed through, 
who would “endeavor to cheer the men on their way and supply them with food and flowers and endeavor to 
make their progress as much of a triumphal march as possible.”46  In the end, SHAEF regulations prohibited 
disbanded soldiers from marching home in “formed bodies.”47  Officials throughout Washington’s planning 
network also essentially endorsed this approach, approving a draft directive prepared by the American EAC 
delegation which emphasized the need to impress upon the Germans that their army was beaten.  Disbanded 
personnel, the directive stipulated, would “in no case be permitted to return to their homes in military 
formations or with arms, bands or displaying flags, banners or emblems of distinction.”48   
 American determination to teach the Germans a lesson on the perils of militarism also extended to 
regulating the conduct of American troops.  In early 1944, Emil Ludwig, a German-born, Swiss émigré 
historian and acquaintance of the president, drafted a set of 14 rules for occupation officers which he sent to the 
White House.  He also submitted a copy to the War Department, leading Hilldring’s Civil Affairs Division to 
take his rules under consideration.  Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson passed along yet another copy 
to McCloy, with a cover note remarking, “Ludwig, I believe, knows the German psychology.”  This 
psychology, according to Ludwig, required American occupation soldiers to be strict and forceful and to speak 
English.  “Don’t keep smiling,” he urged.  They should not shake hands or offer cigarettes to people they did 
not know well—“The Germans will respect you as long as they see in you a successor of a Gauleiter—who also 
never offered them his hand.”  American officers should distrust anyone who had not yet proven they were 
honest—“Then after some weeks, the Germans will realize that under your government, personality and 
character count higher than military grades.”  They should always wear a uniform, which, Ludwig explained, 
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“represents a symbol of authority to the Germans, who for three-hundred years have been governed by soldiers. 
. . .”  “The only way to get along with the Germans,” his fourteenth rule cautioned, “is to make them feel the 
hand of the master.”49 
 According to Ludwig, then, American occupation officers should in certain respects seek to become 
more like the Germans, in order to earn their obedience and respect.  This leitmotif, in fact, ran through a 
number of discussions dealing with the practical issues of the occupation.  Most notably, a draft SHAEF study 
dealing with the handling of German troops included an appendix assessing the possible role of psychological 
warfare in arousing a recognition of Germany’s absolute defeat, eliminating the soldiers’ esprit de corps, and 
destroying “the spirit of German militarism.”  Among other factors, the authors of the appendix stressed that 
“the display of Allied military might and the bearing of the occupation troops” would be critically important.  
“Correctness of behavior, military smartness, a show of discipline and efficiency and a certain degree of 
aloofness, are qualities which the German soldiers have always claimed to be more highly developed in the 
German Army than in any other armed force.”  Therefore, they would be “impressed in proportion as the Allied 
soldiers display these same qualities.”  Regardless of their “material situation,” the writers added, “German 
soldiers are not likely to be convinced of their military defeat if they find their victors lacking in the ‘soldierly 
virtues’ which they have hitherto believed to be the prerogative of the Herrenvolk.”  They went on to 
recommend that two conduct guides be prepared: one for German troops and one for Allied forces.50  A 
directive distributed by U.S. military authorities in March 1945 demanding improved professionalism and 
discipline on the part of American troops responsible for guarding and handling German prisoners of war 
reiterated many of these themes.  It also hinted at the difficulties involved in making U.S. soldiers “preserve a 
strict and impersonal attitude in their relations with prisoners of war” while “dressed in the proper uniform at all 
times” and behaving in a “military manner.”51   
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 Where many Americans were eager to demonstrate that democracies could defeat militaristic 
dictatorships, American military officials apparently were less certain that the more casual approach (whether 
intentional or not) of the U.S. military would do much to help the psychological disarmament process.  The 
Allies had triumphed as a superior military power, and only by acknowledging this would German troops admit 
defeat and abandon their own superiority complex and will to world conquest.  That forced submission to the 
commands of a conquering army might instead remind them of the rewards of military victory and therewith 
strengthen desires for maintaining exceptional military power was evidently not deemed a prohibitive side 
effect.  
 Instructions regarding the treatment of the entire German population contained a diluted version of this 
basic philosophy.  “The Germans, as a nation, hold the armed forces and all things military in deep respect,” 
SHAEF’s occupation handbook explained.  This meant that Allied personnel should preserve a “high standard 
of conduct and discipline.”  Soldiers should be “just, but firm” and “adopt an attitude of stern courtesy” when 
carrying out official business.  They were to “make it clear by words and attitude that immediate compliance 
with orders and instructions will be required and enforced.”  Additionally, SHAEF’s much-maligned non-
fraternization policy was designed to convince the Germans of their nation’s total defeat and their own role in 
bringing about the disaster.52  In effect, U.S. soldiers could use the militaristic inclinations of the Germans as a 
means of control and as an early step toward the achievement of longer-term American demilitarization 
objectives. 
 An environment rich with military symbolism and rituals provided other educational opportunities as 
well.  In early 1945, the military salute came under scrutiny when Britain’s counterpart to the USGCC 
circulated draft instructions on relations between Allied personnel and the German people that barred Allied 
soldiers from saluting German officers and officials, but compelled Germans to salute Allied officers and 
demanded that these salutes be returned.53  Several USGCC officials questioned the latter provision, as did the 
State Department’s Murphy, with one suggesting that exchanging salutes would “tend to maintain a military 
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atmosphere which we are attempting to destroy.”54  The British proposal spurred USGCC officials to comb 
through existing American and SHAEF regulations for guidance and prompted an exchange of correspondence 
between General Wickersham, head of the USGCC, and his British equivalent, Major General S.W. Kirby.  At 
issue were matters of legality (including the terms of the Geneva Convention), practicality (“If we require a 
German to salute, we must return it or technically he could never drop his hand”), and Allied objectives.55    
 The British, Kirby explained, intended “to break up the German military caste and to indicate that 
Wehrmacht behaviour in this war has forfeited all their rights to normal international courtesies.”  However, 
convinced that Germans must salute when working with Allied officers, the British also believed these salutes 
must be returned, lest Allied officers imitate the “undignified” behavior of the Nazis.56  (SHAEF’s military 
government handbook explicitly prohibited “rough, undignified or aggressive conduct” and the “insolent 
overbearance which has characterized Nazi leadership.”57)  Many within the USGCC preferred to get rid of all 
saluting.  German officers and officials “should not be entitled to the privilege of a military salutation,” 
Wickersham maintained, adding that not exchanging salutes “fits best with our mission of demilitarization of 
Germany and also with our position as conquerors.”58  Responding to Wickersham’s request for input, Major 
General R.W. Barker, assistant chief of staff of SHAEF’s personnel section, distinguished between salutes used 
as greetings and salutes used to acknowledge orders.  The former were “one of the perquisites of membership in 
the ‘Fraternity of Arms’”—a privilege that should be granted only to members “in good standing.”  “Clearly,” 
he wrote, “from our point of view, no member of the German armed forces will be in such standing” and it was 
therefore “highly inappropriate” to permit the use of salutes as a form of greeting.  Conversely, saluting to 
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acknowledge receipt of orders was simply standard military procedure.  “By requiring Germans of whatever 
rank to render the salute whenever given instructions by Allied officers, regardless of their military rank, we are 
impressing upon the Germans the fact of their defeat,” Barker reasoned.  “If we adopt that rule, then I think we 
should adhere to the usual military custom of returning a salute so given.”59 
 In May 1945, Barker’s staff prepared a directive covering “military courtesy” as a whole, for civilians 
as well as military personnel.  Here, “military courtesy” was defined “as the expression of consideration and 
deference accorded to a nation, to the national symbol of a nation, or to an individual by reason of his rank or 
position in the military service of such nation.”  These courtesies, the directive’s writers asserted, “were of far-
reaching significance.”  Saluting one’s own flag showed adherence to the principles and ideals the flag 
symbolized and to the nation devoted to them.  Alternatively, when a defeated German showed respect for an 
Allied flag, it demonstrated “his recognition of the authority of that nation, and his willingness or obligation to 
obey the valid and proper orders thereof.”  The directive went on to state that German military personnel were 
only to salute Allied officers to acknowledge orders, with their salutes to be returned.  German officers were 
otherwise simply to come to attention in the presence of Allied officers and German enlisted men were to do 
likewise in the presence of all Allied personnel, except when both were in motion outdoors.  German soldiers 
would be permitted to exchange salutes amongst themselves, though they might not use the Nazi greeting.  
German civilians, including policemen and fire officials, were not to salute.  In addition, the directive stipulated 
that all German men should come to attention and remove their hats when any Allied funeral procession or flag 
passed (and remove their hats when passing such a flag) or upon hearing the national anthem, or a similar song, 
of any Allied nation at ceremonies.  Similar conduct was expected when “flourishes, ruffles, march or other 
personal honors” were rendered for the Allies, but such honors for German officers were prohibited.  The 
Germans were also barred from displaying Nazi flags and other paraphernalia and from public playing or 
singing of the German national anthem, Nazi songs, and military music.60 
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 By the time SHAEF issued its instructions, other American officials had been discussing martial music 
and flags for some time.  Already in September 1944, the first JCS 1067 iteration specified that “no German 
military music, or German national or Nazi anthems shall be played or sung in public or before any groups or 
gatherings” and also prohibited the Germans from publicly displaying German national or Nazi flags, with both 
restrictions apparently first appearing in a Treasury Department revision of a working draft of the directive.  In 
a complementary measure, the interim directive prohibited all “German parades, military or political, civilian or 
sports,” a clause Morgenthau made sure to insert to meet Roosevelt’s expectations.  Discussing the fate of 
Germany with the Treasury Secretary in anticipation of the Quebec Conference, Roosevelt had explicitly stated 
that he considered three measures to be essential psychologically and symbolically.  The Germans should be 
denied aircraft and prevented from wearing uniforms and marching.  The last two items, he believed, would be 
the most effective means of driving home their defeat.61 
 In the meantime, Winant’s advisors had prepared a draft directive on military training which, in 
addition to outlawing all training, dealt with a range of other military-related activities they hoped to prohibit.  
The WSC, State Department, and JCS had all approved the directive for EAC submission, but only with the 
proviso that it be modified to include the JCS 1067 language prohibiting flags, music, and parades.62  Although 
Winant’s advisors revised their directive accordingly before submitting it to the EAC, they were not entirely 
pleased with the change, suggesting that songs dating from before the Nazi era might furnish “an emotional 
outlet for the German people” and later wondering if “it would be unrealistic to prohibit pre-Nazi German 
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national anthems.”  When the British proposed a modification prohibiting the “‘rendering in public of martial 
music,’” the Americans questioned whether the new phrasing might also be unrealistic “in view of the difficulty 
of defining the term ‘martial music.’”63   
 Despite its concerns about restrictions on German music, the U.S. EAC delegation  illustrated in its 
draft directive on military training the importance American officials placed both on concrete problems, such as 
preventing Germans from venerating their military past and learning to be good soldiers, and on symbolism and 
ritual.  Picking up on concerns long expressed in State Department planning documents, Winant’s advisors 
called for disbanding and outlawing all organizations with “military characteristics,” all veterans organizations 
or “other groups designed to carry on the German military tradition,” and any organizations providing—or 
likely to provide—military training, regardless of the organization’s purported function.  The directive defined 
military training as any activity “designed directly or indirectly to teach the theory, principles, technique or 
mechanics of war or to prepare the participants for any war activity.”64  In this rather sweeping definition, it 
implicitly acknowledged Germany’s past use of athletic clubs and youth organizations to circumvent the 
Versailles Treaty’s troop strength limitations.  Convinced of the significant role “military paraphernalia” played 
in developing military systems,65 the advisors also called for Allied commanders to “prohibit the adoption or 
use by any organization or individual, of distinctive military uniforms, insignia, flags, banners or tokens, or of 
distinctive military salutes, gestures, or greetings.”66  That the powerful psychological impact of such 
“paraphernalia” was also on the minds of Winant’s men is suggested by the draft directive on German troop 
demobilization which was working its way through the approval process about the same time.67   
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 In the end, the draft directive on military training did not receive tripartite approval before hostilities 
ended, nor did SHAEF issue its own military training law.68  However, regulations already in place by that time 
met many of its objectives.  SHAEF’s military occupation handbook, for example, warned against the dangers 
potentially posed by “sporting clubs, old comrades’ associations, ex-officers’ unions” and similar groups, 
prohibited all forms of military training, and stipulated that local Allied commanders supervising German 
troops might allow “route marches and physical training” but should not let them become “opportunities for 
military display.”  Similarly, officials could manipulate SHAEF’s Military Government Ordinance No. 1, 
“Crimes and Offences,” to prosecute destructive organizations, unauthorized parades and military formations, 
and the “provocative display of German and Nazi flags and emblems.”69 
 A more problematic issue for postwar planners involved the wearing of uniforms.  American officials 
generally shared Emil Ludwig’s view that uniforms historically had served as symbols of authority for 
Germans.  Moreover, the dominant visual imagery of the Third Reich included brown-bedecked Nazi leaders, 
gray-clothed military officers, and rows of men and boys uniformed in brown, black, and gray and ornamented 
with assorted badges, medals, cords, and decorative emblems.  Cognizant of the harmful role paramilitary 
groups had played in Germany during the interwar years, State Department planners had early on expressed a 
desire to prohibit organizations that adopted such military trappings as salutes, uniforms, insignia, and 
marching.70  Winant’s advisors had focused on the service these and similar groups, along with their 
accouterments, performed in providing unofficial military training and the foundations of a strong military 
system.  In calling for a ban on the wearing of uniforms, Roosevelt, meanwhile, linked his decision to a 
personalized analysis of German history.  In September 1944, Murphy recounted a recent conversation with the 
president in which Roosevelt had talked of studying in Germany as a child.  The president recalled that he had 
become “fond of the German people as they were in the 1890’s—their music and love of liberty, and the 
absence of militarism.”  At that time, he told Murphy, no one wore uniforms; “even the railroad station masters 
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would wear civilian clothes, with only a uniform cap.”  Four years later, he had returned “and found a great 
change in this respect—the students had started wearing uniforms and were marching in formation.  Militarism 
took the ascendancy from then on.”  Whether or not his youthful memories were accurate, Roosevelt, like others 
in the early 1940s, associated German uniform-wearing with German militarism.71 
 The president’s call for outlawing uniforms led Treasury Department personnel to insert an appropriate 
ban in a version of the Morgenthau Plan, while also adding a clause barring the wearing of medals and insignia 
of rank or branch of service.  But they had some concerns.  “The uniform is going to be troublesome,” noted 
Harry Dexter White, “because probably five million people have nothing else to wear.”  Treasury officials 
ultimately concluded that “if you treat it as a uniform—so they don’t wear the whole thing,” the ban was 
probably enforceable.  And enforceability was the key.  The German émigré advisors the department had 
brought in had stressed the importance of not introducing measures that could not be enforced.72  McCloy, on 
the other hand, questioned both halves of the provision, indicating that “he didn’t see why soldiers who had 
fought in the war should be deprived of wearing ribbons if they wanted to.”  More to the point, in light of his 
position as a War Department official planning on his commanders’ behalf, he thought the requirement would 
be “impossible to administer, and should be left to the discretion of the officers on the ground.”73  In a later draft 
of their plan, Treasury officials dropped the reference to insignia and medals, but retained a clause prohibiting 
the wearing of military or quasi-military uniforms.  The president was pleased, quickly searching out the 
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provision when given a copy by the Treasury Secretary.74  But the September 1944 version of JCS 1067, while 
honoring Roosevelt’s wishes in denying the Germans aircraft and banning parades, did not mention uniforms.75  
Nor did its absence apparently prevent the president from approving the directive. 
 SHAEF officials in England not surprisingly drew conclusions similar to those voiced in Washington 
regarding German uniforms.  Recognizing the severe shortage of civilian clothing in Germany, military 
policymakers did not prohibit the wearing of uniforms and permitted soldiers being released to keep one full 
uniform.  Although they considered it “highly undesirable” that discharged troops retain their uniforms 
permanently, they conceded that administrative challenges were too great to permit a withdrawal sometime in 
the future.  Official policy for disbanding the German armed forces did, however, require the removal of all 
insignia and badges of rank before troops might go home.76  The SHAEF military government handbook also 
noted that “the deliberate and provocative display of Nazi emblems” would be forbidden by proclamation, but 
cautioned that this was “a matter which must be handled with care and discretion” since “extreme measures” 
would “only give such emblems a new and romantic value as symbols of resistance to the occupying forces.”77   
 When it came to German emblems and insignia, however, extant instructions were not always explicit 
enough for military officers encountering unfamiliar items in the field, and SHAEF’s general policies had to be 
clarified in response to specific inquiries.  In the chaotic days of May 1945, for instance, SHAEF received a 
cable from Germany’s Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel. Certain British troops were ordering the removal of 
“Hoheitsabzeichens” from Wehrmacht uniforms.  Should he expect an order applicable to the entire Wehrmacht 
or was this—in the words of one rough translation—“the whim of a few local Commanding Officers of the 
British”?  The resulting flurry of cables on the subject showed SHAEF officials attempting to decide what 
factors needed to be considered in responding.  One SHAEF officer explained that the Hoheitsabzeichen was 
the “combination of eagle and swastika” that was part of all German orders and decorations without a swastika.  
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Another jotted a note to a colleague pointing out that “the Germans use daggers or dirks (Dolch) which they 
class as decorations” and recommending that these be confiscated as weapons.78  In late May, Eisenhower 
finally determined that “Hoheitsabzeichen, Kokade and any insignia, emblem, decoration or medal of Nazi 
nature” should not be worn, while “medals and decorations awarded for merit or long service” might be worn, 
so long as “all Nazi emblems, e.g., Hakenkreuz [swastika]” were “obliterated or removed.”79   
 If American planners paid careful attention to the emblems and insignia worn by ordinary Germans, 
they also could not overlook the symbolism of physical objects on a grander scale.  Reworking a draft JCS 1067 
clause calling for occupation officials to protect works of art and related items, Treasury Department planners 
added a provision directing that “all archives, monuments and museums of Nazi inception, or which are devoted 
to the perpetuation of German militarism shall be seized, closed and their properties held pending further 
instructions.”80  Moreover, they were not the only people concerned about the possible negative influences of 
German material culture.  In early 1945, Admiral H.M. Burroughs wrote to Eisenhower concerning the World 
War I German Naval War Memorial at the entrance to Kiel Bay.  He described the memorial as a stone structure 
reminiscent of a ship with a tomb of an Unknown Soldier located underground in an area whose walls contained 
German ship names and depictions of naval scenes.  Someone had pointed out, Burroughs reported, that the 
monument could not be viewed as an important cultural or historical object “unless the pictures in the 
underground portion depicting British ships being sunk right and left by German ships rated as such” and that if 
the Allies were “to stamp out the German military spirit, records such as these must be obliterated.”  The 
admiral agreed with this perspective, but wanted to avoid desecrating the tomb.  As a compromise, he 
recommended that the Unknown Soldier “be re-buried in some convenient cemetery with full religious 
ceremony, but NO military ceremony” and that the monument be destroyed.81   
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 Burroughs’ letter prompted one SHAEF official to observe that war memorials might have a 
“mischievous psychological and political effect as rallying points of German military sentiment.”  But he also 
pointed to the proper conduct of the Germans with respect to U.S. and British cemeteries in France and Belgium 
and expected a “similar correctitude” on the part of the Allies.  If some memorials had a “potentially 
mischievous character,” this was a risk they should accept.82  Another SHAEF officer responded by noting that 
there were World War I memorials throughout the country and it would be best to wait for measured, tripartite 
action concerning them.83 
 Ultimately, SHAEF policy made no mention of militaristic monuments, but did call for closing all 
museums, primarily to protect their contents, with re-openings to be determined by military government 
officials.84  On the other hand, with minor modifications, the JCS 1067 phrase pertaining to monuments and 
museums survived in all subsequent iterations of the directive.85 
 In discussing German museums, one SHAEF official had pointed out that German Heimat [local] 
museums could not be re-opened until experts modified their exhibits.  Museums, after all, served an 
educational function and “these museums might be a valuable instrument for counteracting the misuse of 
historical teaching in Germany during the last 15 years.”86  Indeed, from the American perspective, museums 
represented just one component of a vast German educational machinery (which also included schools, the 
media, and public entertainment) that would need to be, first, silenced, then redirected.  Particularly critical 
were German educational institutions.  Not only did they need to be cleansed of militaristic teaching, but they 
could help to ensure the success of a future democratic government.  American officials firmly believed that 
democracies were not likely to start wars, and most also realized that constructive political parties, effective 
governing institutions, and free elections required informed and committed democratic citizens.  Schools could 
reeducate the German people to become such a citizenry.87 
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 In their earliest policy discussions, State Department planners acknowledged the necessity of a 
fundamental transformation of the German outlook, but initially shied away from considering measures aimed 
at textbooks, teachers, or any type of institutional control, instead talking of education in general terms and 
hoping that a recognition of guilt, just treatment by the Allies, and guaranteed basic rights in a future 
constitution would foster a change in German attitudes.88  Over time, however, their thinking changed.  And 
U.S. policy studies began to ponder how best to replace German personnel and change the substance and 
teaching priorities of German education.  During the spring of 1944, the department’s Interdivisional 
Committee on Germany gave the issue particular attention, concluding that German schools should be barred 
from teaching “Nazi concepts of race, history, militarism, the Fuehrer principle, and comparable ideas” and that 
“active National Socialists” should be removed from school administrative and teaching staffs.  In the long 
term, successful eradication of old doctrines would require their replacement with “a constructive set of beliefs 
and objectives based on the best elements of the German tradition and offering to the German people hope for 
the future.”  A key goal, then, was “a German school system reflecting a democratic outlook in which a 
humanitarian and international point of view supersedes the current ultra-nationalism.”  Yet the committee 
members insisted that this could not be achieved through foreign control of schools or via new curricula drafted 
by outsiders.  Rather, they believed changes would be effective only if designed and carried out by the Germans 
themselves, under Allied supervision.89 
 As scholars have often noted, no substantive long-range policy for German education emerged from 
Washington’s planning organizations before the war ended.90  At the same time, SHAEF education officials 
could not operate without a program for the short term.  Accordingly, the ill-fated original version of SHAEF’s 
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handbook took a first stab at outlining a policy, calling for eliminating National Socialist influences among 
teachers and in teaching materials, but also pressing for a speedy re-opening of schools and expecting to rely 
heavily on anti-Nazi Germans to do much of the work.  It assumed, further, that enough Weimar era texts would 
be on hand to replace unusable publications and that, where necessary, teachers could operate without 
textbooks.  The Germans themselves would vet school textbooks, supported by occupation officials, and draft 
new ones.  Nazi-tainted works, meanwhile, would still be available in libraries, “where new learning materials 
would expose their deceit.”  SHAEF officials also “condemned book-burning as too reminiscent of the practices 
of the Third Reich.”91   
 By contrast, the educational instructions incorporated in the revised December 1944 handbook 
included a larger number of negative measures.  Stressing the importance of indirect control and utilizing 
acceptable German educators wherever possible, its authors nevertheless emphasized that the objective of 
military government was to take over the Germans schools and purge them of Nazi and militaristic influences.92  
All institutions would therefore be closed until satisfactorily cleansed of offensive textbooks and tainted 
personnel.  Teachers were to remove from their lessons, among other themes, anything that “glorifies 
militarism, expounds the practice of war or of mobilization and preparation for war, whether in the scientific, 
economic or industrial fields, or the study of military geography” and would be “immediately dismissed and 
punished” if they failed to do so.  “Physical training,” moreover, was not to be “expanded to, or retained at, a 
point where it becomes equivalent to para-military training.”  Occupation authorities were to discharge all 
officials and instructors considered “active Nazis, ardent Nazi sympathizers or militarists.”  Black, white, and 
gray categories of teachers described in the handbook largely correlated to the degree of their involvement with 
Nazism, although the gray list also specifically included “persons who in their public speeches or writings have 
actively and voluntarily propagated National Socialism, militarism, or racialism.”  The handbook went on to 
order the confiscation of all schoolbooks and teaching materials “reflecting a Nazi or militaristic outlook,” but 
specified that “books in public libraries and the libraries of universities and reference books in the libraries of 
other institutions of higher education will not be removed, impounded, or destroyed.”  In addition, it called for 
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disbanding all Nazi youth organizations and indicated that no new youth groups might be established without 
the supreme commander’s consent.93 
 While some scholars have linked the harsher tone of the new handbook to Morgenthau’s influence, 
James Tent has helpfully pointed to new information available to the handbook’s writers during the fall of 1944.  
In particular, he notes, they now recognized that almost all textbooks showed some Nazi influence and had 
discovered that few Weimar texts were available in Germany.  In addition, they had learned of the difficulties 
confronted in occupied Italy when U.S. officials tried to re-open schools and had to operate without adequate 
textbook supplies.  The USGCC staff was thus evaluating copies of Weimar texts and arranging for re-printing 
of selected works.  And German schools would remain closed until further notice.94   
 Regardless of their intent to be accommodating and hands-off, American officials had to reconcile 
themselves to the idea of democratizing the Germans using removals and controls and demilitarizing them by 
way of orders that had to be obeyed.  Similar harmful inevitabilities would color American attempts to clean up 
Germany’s information and entertainment services and redirect them to encourage more peaceful German 
attitudes.  American policymakers agreed that the German press, cinema, and other “opinion-forming agencies 
and organizations” must be controlled in some fashion, with the State Department’s Interdivisional Committee 
on Germany suggesting that themes to be banned might include “the glory of war, the rearmament of Germany, 
[and] imperial expansion.”  Department officials were nevertheless also convinced that a delicate balance had to 
be maintained to enable “the free play of opinion which should prove an effective prophylaxis against the 
discredited Nazi ideology.”  The ICG cautioned, too, that foreign control should be as unobtrusive as possible 
and that where feasible anti-Nazi Germans should be consulted and utilized.95  At one point, the ICG argued 
against undertaking a “systematic effort to indoctrinate the German people,” believing that accurate and freely 
circulating information and “the renewal of untrammeled cultural activity” should serve as the primary means 
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of reeducation.  During the fall of 1945, however, the WSC and JCS approved as agreed U.S. policy an EAC 
draft directive on the “Control of Public Information in Germany” which included in its list of objectives 
“convincing the German people of their total defeat by the United Nations and of the futility of future wars of 
aggression” and “conducting counter-propaganda to destroy the attitudes created under the propaganda program 
of the Nazi party.”  It also permitted the zonal commanders, in the absence of tripartite policy direction, to 
“determine the general character and content of books, news material, editorials, feature articles and 
photographs and entertainment, which will be approved for publication, broadcasting or exhibition” and “the 
source and general character of cinema films which will be approved for exhibition.”96 
 SHAEF, meanwhile, was laying the groundwork for any policies the Allies would choose to implement 
later.  Objectives listed by SHAEF officials prescribing information control measures for occupied Germany 
included helping to eliminate Nazism and militarism, averting the “dissemination of doctrines and propaganda 
of the nature dictated by the Nazi Party,” and convincing the Germans of their total defeat.  Military 
Government Law Number 191 therefore demanded that all publishing, printing, and film production activities 
cease, shut down all radio stations and wire services, and closed all cinemas, theaters, and other entertainment 
venues.  In addition, Ordinance Number 1 barred the “distribution, circulation, and sale” of periodicals and 
books preaching Nazi doctrines.  A thick SHAEF manual divided the anticipated work of information control 
officers into three phases.  Closures and prohibitions formed the heart of Phase One.  Phase Two would include 
investigating local conditions, seeking out politically reliable and qualified Germans for assistance, and using 
Allied newspapers and radio broadcasts as the Germans’ primary information source.  During Phase Three, to 
begin when SHAEF directed, Allied information control authorities would supervise and scrutinize the efforts 
of carefully screened, specially licensed Germans.  Militarists as well as Nazis were to be excluded from 
positions of authority and influence.  Reeducation could ultimately be achieved only by the Germans 
themselves, reasoned the manual, but “those few Germans willing and able to do it” could not be successful 
unless the Allies gave them access to German information sources and denied the same to persons still imbued 
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with the “spirit of aggression.”  “It lies with us, through the fact of victory,” the manual explained, “to place the 
control of opinion-forming instruments where we will.”97   
 
Conclusions 
 “The Washington bureaucratic maze in World War II was not conducive to developing consistent or 
logical plans for the Occupation, and all facets of national policy, including the notion of reeducation, suffered 
accordingly,” James Tent has noted in embarking on his study of American treatment of the German 
educational system.  To some extent, his assessment, shared by many contemporary and subsequent observers, 
is supported by an examination of American discussions and planning for the elimination of German militarism.  
When the guns cooled in May 1945, American military government officers in Germany carried a set of 
SHAEF directives and handbooks that described the Allies’ overall short-term objectives for the occupation of 
Germany and contained specific instructions for beginning the work of eradicating German militarism.  What 
the occupation would look like after SHAEF dissolved, however, was still not entirely clear.  The main 
statement of U.S. post-surrender policy, JCS 1067, laid out broad principles, but few particulars.  Furthermore, 
State Department officials remained committed to developing joint programs for all of Germany, intending to 
work with the British, the Soviets, and, since the Yalta Conference decision to divide Germany into four 
occupation zones instead of three, the French.  But the work of the EAC was bogged down and when the Allied 
Control Council would begin its duties was not yet known. 
 On the other hand, by the time Germany surrendered, American officials had agreed that German 
militarism should be uprooted and had established the general principles that would govern the pursuit of that 
goal.  German militarism, they had decided, should be attacked on all fronts, including in the critical social and 
cultural arena, where symbolic practices, museums, school textbooks, and newspapers were just a few of the 
many aspects of German life that required attention.  Careful handling of German troops would be critical as 
well, with the attitudes and conduct of the Americans implementing the U.S. program to be specially tailored to 
further Allied goals in this regard.  The exact means and methods of best achieving American objectives 
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remained uncertain in some cases and the seeming impracticality of some measures raised doubts as to whether 
they would ever be undertaken.  But the framework was in place and would not be substantially altered in the 
years to come. 
 The chosen approach of the United States was not without its ironies and paradoxes.   Convincing the 
Germans of their utter defeat, maintaining control, and ensuring the security of occupation troops meant 
exploiting the militaristic inclinations that made Germans respect assertive authority, obey when commanded, 
and defer to men in uniforms.  While hopeful of exorcising German militarism, the Americans adopted many 
policies that would demand and expect complete obedience, rather than discussion.  In making plans for 
Germany, they clearly recognized certain puzzles: Was dismembering Prussia more or less likely to produce 
future German aggression?  Would demanding too much of the Germans provoke resentment and revanchism?  
However, in other instances, the inherent complexities and challenges of their task seemed to go unnoticed.  
Demilitarization meant revoking officer privileges and discouraging reverential treatment of ceremonial flags, 
military music, and men in uniforms.  Yet German men were to remove their caps and stand at attention when 
Allied flags passed, show respect for American military anthems, and comply with orders issued by uniformed 
officials.  To the military victor went the spoils.  Contradictions were thus built into the demilitarization effort 
from the start, not least because the U.S. occupation was a military operation.  The Americans may have 
assumed that the design of the uniform or the color of the flag would be more important than its essence: form 
being more important than function.  And given the perceived link between German militarism and German 
nationalism, this optimistic assumption was perhaps not unfounded.  But given their understanding of the 
Germans, contemporaries might also have viewed such a notion as playing with fire.  The line between 
eliminating and reinforcing German militarism might be a fine one. 
 In retrospect, the reach of wartime planners at times appears excessive, even comical.  But American 
policymakers and their Allied counterparts were plainly frustrated and angry.  They had no reason to assume 
that the Germans and their “militaristic tendencies” would change, regardless of the carnage left by the war.  
Thus, to call some of these measures “draconian,” as one scholar recently did, is to miss the point.98  At heart, 
they were not about punishment.  They were about prevention.  And American officials were motivated less by 
vindictiveness than by exasperation and determination.  Their knowledge of conditions in Germany was 
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incomplete and occasionally simply wrong.  They worried about introducing policies that could not be enforced 
and agreed to certain measures that no doubt fell into that category.  They adopted certain tactics that were 
extreme.  Their choices, they knew, would be resented by many Germans.  Yet there was a clear logic to their 
decisions based on a sometimes vague and undeveloped, but not unsophisticated, conception of how societies 
and cultures change, one that considered not only political movements and powerful military, societal, and 
political leaders, but also ordinary people, the influences that shaped them, and the world they helped to create.
  
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
MILITARISTS IN THEIR MIDST 
 
 
Reporting on a small gathering of young people from Stuttgart who were interested in reviving the 
German youth movement, an American officer in June 1945 recounted the remarks of “an ex-soldier in his 
twenties [who] spoke for the young soldiers.”  “Militarism must be destroyed,” the veteran had argued, “but you 
can’t destroy it by denouncing returning soldiers as ‘Schweinehunde.’”  Soldiers, he had added, “are often less 
militarist than civilians.”1  Just who had denounced returning soldiers as swine was not discussed in the report.  
The young man may have heard this accusation himself, misinterpreted less offensive comments, or listened to 
stories told by others.  Whatever their stimulus, his remarks reveal clear frustration at what he perceived to be 
unfair epithets aimed at soldiers in the immediate aftermath of the war.  They also allude to the host of problems 
associated with any effort to rid militarists of their influence in Germany. 
At the close of World War II, all returning German soldiers walked into an environment where 
American officials from Military Governor General Dwight D. Eisenhower to Colonel William Dawson, 
Württemberg-Baden’s top officer, to local military government functionaries were stressing that the United 
States was committed to eliminating German militarism and curtailing the influence of militarists.2  And those 
dispensing accusations and calling passionately for change sometimes included the neighbors of returning 
soldiers as well.  But along with plans and pleas for change came a difficult question: what or who, exactly, was 
a militarist?   
Although American wartime policymakers had variously criticized industrialists, teachers, and media 
barons as perpetuators of German militarism, the earliest U.S. occupation regulations governing dismissals and 
hiring centered largely on a far smaller set of individuals perceived to be particularly dangerous, namely, former 
military officers.  On the other hand, those eventually charged with implementing the regulations generally 
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believed that they could not simply equate officers and militarists.  Some pointed to people this presumed 
correlation left out.  Many preferred to assess the individual, rather than the group; in fact, military government 
officers, German personnel administrators, and university admissions committees usually acted on this 
preference.  In certain instances, they even intentionally sought out former soldiers for vacant positions, 
appreciating the veterans’ untainted political histories or proven disciplined conduct. 
Significantly, the anti-militarist rhetoric and exclusionary policies of the immediate postwar period 
helped encourage the German people to reflect on the history and legacy of their now disbanded Wehrmacht.  
At the same time, the Americans were deliberately pressing the Germans to look at their formerly much 
esteemed soldiers in a different light by holding up the highest military leaders of the Third Reich as ranking 
among its most egregious and contemptible militarists.  But German attitudes toward their soldiers, their former 
armed forces, and their country’s military past refused to settle into stable, predictable, or uniform patterns.  If 
the meaning of the word “militarist” remained obscure, German views of German soldiers remained variable 
and varied. 
Meanwhile, the Americans’ decision to radically overhaul their denazification program in early 1946 
led to a substantial change in the official definition of the term “militarist,” one that emphasized attitudes, goals, 
and activities as determining factors, rather than just professions or positions, but one that also alluded to 
abusive behavior and criminality.  More nearly reflecting the original views of Washington’s policymakers, a 
new law describing those to be penalized as militarists set the stage for an analysis of German contributions to 
the outbreak of war in 1939 that looked beyond those wearing officer’s braid.  In theory, the Germans would 
now police their society for militarists of all shapes and sizes.  In practice, their efforts left much to be desired.  
Militarists were bad, all Germans agreed.  When actively sought, however, they could seldom be found. 
 
Removals and Restrictions 
The American commitment to eradicating militaristic influences in German society prompted U.S. 
policymakers to issue directives at the very beginning of the occupation that demanded the removal and 
exclusion of militarists from jobs where they could shape the views of their fellow citizens.  Carrying out these 
directives was a challenge for both American military government officers and the German administrators 
charged with helping them, however.  Moreover, although their efforts did inspire potentially valuable 
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conversations regarding the threat former career officers might pose to a democratic Germany, the overall 
results were mixed.  For returning soldiers, meanwhile, both the regulations and contemporary discussions 
concerning the detrimental influence of militarists in German society could bring real material consequences, 
directly impacting their employment and educational opportunities.  Still, even as some veterans felt the sting of 
discrimination, others reaped the blessings of wartime service spent far from home and the lure of local politics.   
 
Laying the Groundwork  
For American military government [MG] officers, a critical early task in Germany involved removing 
Nazis and militarists from positions of influence and appointing clean replacements, a task they undertook with 
varying degrees of thoroughness and zeal.  Where there was hesitancy it usually resulted from a particularly 
vexing aspect of the job: the challenge of keeping cities and towns running when SHAEF removal criteria made 
many competent individuals ineligible to hold influential posts.  Furthermore, during the earliest months of the 
occupation, MG officers had to enforce a range of directives containing different interpretations of what 
constituted a removal-worthy Nazi.  With individuals deemed unacceptable one day, acceptable the next, and 
perhaps unacceptable again under yet another new policy, early removal efforts caused anxiety for the Germans 
and could exasperate their occupiers as well.3  
The key directive for dealing with militarists in Württemberg-Baden appeared in late March 1945, 
when the U.S. Army’s 6th Army Group distributed “new, firm instructions” on removals designed to clear up 
any confusion generated by less specific SHAEF guidelines issued earlier.  According to the directive, 
militarists to be removed or excluded from positions of influence included all persons who had ever been 
members of the German General Staff Corps, National Socialist Indoctrination Officers, career officers of the 
Wehrmacht or its predecessors, and anyone who “represent[ed] the Prussian Junker tradition”—the latter 
candidly admitted to be hard to define, though the army group pulled language from SHAEF’s instructions to 
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help with this task.  In particular, aristocratic families from Germany’s eastern territories, property ownership in 
Prussia, or membership in “elite German University Students Corps” were to arouse suspicion.4 
A new U.S. Army directive took effect when SHAEF was dissolved in mid July 1945.5  Theoretically 
somewhat broader, it reminded that U.S. policy called for removing from public office and important positions 
in “quasi-public and private enterprises” any more-than-nominal Nazi Party members and “all active supporters 
of Nazism or militarism and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes.”  This meant any Germans who had 
held office or been active at any level of the party “or in affiliated organizations which further militaristic 
doctrines” or who had “authorized or participated affirmatively in” Nazi crimes or persecutions, “been avowed 
believers in Nazism or racial and militaristic creeds,” or voluntarily given “substantial” moral, material, or 
political assistance to the party or its leaders.  Now well-worn mandatory and discretionary removal lists 
nevertheless narrowed these rather sweeping criteria.  All present and former members of the German General 
Staff again found their place on the mandatory removals list alongside National Socialist Indoctrination Officers 
and any post-January 1933 members of the Wehrmacht High Command and the high commands of its 
subordinate arms.  Career officers and persons who smelled of Prussian Junkerdom fell on the discretionary 
removal list, though the directive also suggested that, even if membership in the categories listed was only a 
“danger sign” and did not ensure that individuals were “hostile to Allied purposes,” it was best to remove or 
avoid appointing them unless better candidates were unavailable.6   
Auxiliary instructions specified where incriminating information might be found on the six-page 
questionnaires (Fragebogen) the Americans distributed to Germans to ferret out undesirables.  These helpfully 
noted, for example, that “the family names of ‘Junkers’ almost invariably have the prefix ‘von’ or ‘zu’” and that 
holding more than 250 hectares of land in Prussia should be considered suspicious.  Because Junkers typically 
grew potatoes and “the Reich . . . traditionally subsidized the ‘Junker’ class by paying inflated prices for 
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industrial alcohol distilled from the potato crop,” Fragebogen reviewers were also to keep an eye out for any 
distilleries included on lists of estate buildings.  In a type of cross-referencing, a military academy education, a 
career as an officer, and service with the German General Staff were also to be considered possible evidence of 
“Junkerism.”7 
While the July directive addressed primarily public positions and large businesses, an August 
supplement broadened the removal pool to influential public figures in general, including those in the 
professions.  Military Government Law No. 8, issued in late September in response to fiery criticism in the 
American press regarding the state of denazification, called for even small retail enterprises to cleanse their 
shops, permitting party members to be employed only as common labor.8  But those affected might now submit 
an appeal to a German review board appointed by the local mayor.  If an individual could persuade the board 
that he or she had not been actively involved in Nazi party activities or those of its affiliate organizations and 
MG officials approved the board’s decision, the person might return to his or her position.9 
Given these guidelines, it seems clear that during the spring and early summer of 1945 MG officers in 
the territory that became Württemberg-Baden would have had very little work to do when it came to removing 
militarists from positions of influence or rejecting their applications for employment.  The vast majority of 
general staff officers, National Socialist Indoctrination Officers, career soldiers, and former university students 
were either locked up in prisoner of war enclosures or confined to civilian internment camps as individuals 
falling into “automatic arrest” categories or named on Allied blacklists.  Similarly, the number of Prussian 
aristocrats or individuals who had any connection to Germany’s eastern territories, while perhaps higher than 
before the Soviet Union counterattacked, could not have been great in southwest Germany.  At that point, 
Fragebogen in Württemberg-Baden would likely have revealed a set of university educated businessmen and 
civil servants; disabled or retired career soldiers who had transitioned into civil service, industry, or banking 
jobs; some elderly pensioners; and perhaps the odd noble.  And at least a portion of those who strictly met the 
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“militarist” criteria could be stamped with equally, if not more, damaging accusations of Nazism as well.  Over 
the course of the summer, however, a more complex situation developed.   
  
Return of the First German Troops 
Some 16 to 17 million German men served in the Wehrmacht during World War II,10 and at war’s end, 
nearly eight million found themselves in American custody either in Europe or the United States.11  Several 
years passed before the U.S. released all of the Germans in its hands, and its allies retained many of their 
prisoners even longer, usually employing them on reconstruction projects at home.  A worrisome portion 
remained in Soviet custody into the mid 1950s, and even the Americans held high-ranking German officers well 
into 1947.12  But food shortages in Europe almost immediately spurred an accelerated release program for most 
of the soldiers detained by the U.S.   
A series of disbandment directives called for first freeing priority labor categories such as coal miners 
and agricultural workers, then women, and, fast on their heels, men over fifty.  But U.S. Army officials also 
often ignored the stipulated categories, eager to divest themselves of responsibility for POWs they were having 
difficulty feeding.  By early June, the 12th Army Group was releasing roughly 30,000 men a day, while the U.S. 
Third Army had discharged more than 500,000 by June 8.  In late June, SHAEF permitted a general discharge 
of German soldiers not included in automatic arrest categories13 and the number of men in U.S. custody 
subsequently diminished rapidly.  By mid July 1946, the U.S. had released 98 percent of the men in its hands, 
with more than 3.2 million discharged into the American Zone.14  Summer 1945 thus saw the beginning of what 
would prove over the next several years to be at least a regular, if not always heavy, stream of returning 
soldiers.  
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For many of these men, returning home was traumatic.  Shaken by the collapse of an ideology they had 
embraced to a greater or lesser degree, confronted with a German Reich that lay in ruins both physically and 
spiritually, and facing the challenge of reconstructing lives that for years had centered on little else but winning 
a now-lost war or even on survival itself,15 they also often encountered material conditions that prevented them 
from working through any barrage of emotions the end of the war might have provoked.  For some, their 
primary concern was locating family members.  Many had to find housing and clothing.  Nearly all needed 
work. 
To make matters worse, they could not count on widespread concern for their emotional challenges, 
fears, or material needs.  Depending upon where their homeward journey took them, many met only 
indifference.  American policymakers were no doubt delighted to learn that the experiences of most were quite 
different from those of their predecessors from World War I.  “Unlike 1919,” noted American journalist Julian 
Bach in early 1946, “the returning German soldier has been greeted, not as ‘hero’ with flowers thrown in his 
path as he marched home under his own banners and officers, but as an ‘unfortunate fool’ as he comes 
straggling in off a train in a half-destroyed station.”16  Former military government officer Robert Wolfe 
similarly remembered seeing a “truckload of German Landser [privates] being unceremoniously discharged in 
the Heidelberg Kornmarkt.”  For these men, he recalled, “there were no welcoming bands and speeches, no 
family members, and womenfolk were conspicuously absent.”17   
The quagmire of warfare in the trenches of France had kept the First World War at arm’s length from 
most Germans, leading them to venerate front soldiers as heroes or “heralds of a new age” during the interwar 
period.18  World War II, by contrast, had destroyed the line between the front and the home front, bringing war 
home in the form of relentless bombing, invasion, and occupation, with countless civilian deaths eliminating 
any claims soldiers might have had to knowledge, insight, or heroism born of special suffering.  Psychologically 
and emotionally battered and reeling from the disintegration of Germany’s power, the neighbors of returning 
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soldiers also had their own relatives to track down, living quarters to locate or rebuild, and food and clothing to 
procure.  In addition, the needs of displaced persons and an incoming surge of expellees were already 
overtaxing the resources of local administrations.  In some communities that had advance notice, veteran 
homecomings prompted public speeches, the offering of small gifts, and informational assistance.  But such 
initiatives were localized.19  And only in mid 1946 did German officials begin to pull together an infrastructure 
of release and transition camps equipped to handle the requirements of returning POWs.20   
If official reactions to returning soldiers varied, German opinions regarding the earliest returnees did as 
well.  In July 1945, one American observed that all of the Stuttgarters he had interviewed agreed on just one 
point: “The simple German soldier is not responsible for the defeat.  The German government, or fate, put the 
soldier before an impossible task.  He fought valiantly, but necessarily failed.”21  In a similar vein, American 
personnel stationed in Karlsruhe reported in August 1945 that the “higher ranking officers of the German Army 
fall daily into deeper discredit,” but that “no strong feeling against militarism has been observed, and the 
German soldier is still regarded as a hero.”22  After speaking with a diverse group of Heidelberg veterans, 
another MG officer agreed that few had complained about poor treatment by civilians.  Yet he also described a 
40-year-old who after six years of service found it “quite disheartening to come back and be ‘a nobody’ while 
having been ‘everything’ to [German civilians] during the war.”  Frustration at being a “nobody,” the American 
contended, was now “ever present in most discussions with returned [prisoners of war].”23  Other Germans 
seemed to blame even lowly returning soldiers for their misery.  Bach reported that Germans in Württemberg 
had “sheared the army leaders of most of their ‘glory,’” but suggested, too, that “even many common soldiers 
are finding that their risks have not gained them preferred treatment from their civilian neighbors.  What some 
Germans call an ‘anti-militaristic trend’ is reflected in the fact that returning draftees, not simply regulars, 
complain that they are looked upon by some of their neighbors as ‘militarists.’”  Reserve officers, he noted, 
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“complain of particular discrimination.”24  Wolfe, on the other hand, later viewed the indifferent reception given 
to soldiers in Heidelberg as evidence that “they were now looked on as enablers, if not the perpetrators, of Nazi 
terror and atrocities.”25   
 
German Land and City Administrations 
Shortly after the war ended, then, two processes collided in Württemberg-Baden.  Even as soldiers 
began appearing and searching for work, German officials operating under the steady pressure of American MG 
officers were dismissing government personnel and seeking replacements.  Depending upon a veteran’s location 
and personal history, this confluence of events could work to his advantage or disadvantage. 
Past Nazi Party membership and related organizational transgressions led to the vast majority of 
personnel removals.26  But both German administrators making recommendations and MG officers making final 
decisions sometimes singled out militarists as well.  In September 1945, for example, American officials 
dismissed an employee from the Württemberg Interior Ministry’s filing office as a “militarist” because he had 
been a professional soldier from 1921 to 1933—and thus was a “a member of the ‘First One Hundred 
Thousand’ ‘Reichswehr’ around which Hitler built the German Army”—and had been recalled to service in 
1938.27   
At the same time, officials looking around at literally thousands of posts left vacant by the removals 
faced an even more daunting task than identifying unacceptable personnel.  Where to find qualified men with 
unsoiled records to fill them?  Here an interesting phenomenon emerged.  While American regulations 
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explicitly excluded many Nazi Party members from government service,28 most German officers fell into the 
“discretionary” employment group.  Furthermore, until 1944 soldiers had been prohibited from joining the Nazi 
party and their Fragebogen therefore looked relatively clean.  Entering the German civil service, moreover, was 
a perfectly respectable career move for former soldiers and one retired officers had made often in the past.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, some military government and German officials began recruiting returning 
soldiers to fill emptying German administrations.29  “In general little or no Nazism is found in those who have 
been in the Wehrmacht for 5 or 6 years,” Landkreis Karlsruhe’s MG detachment confidently reported in late 
August 1945.  “Although usually inexperienced in governmental affairs they are well-disciplined, learn quickly 
and carry out military government orders with alacrity.”30  Colleagues responsible for Karlsruhe agreed, adding, 
“Most positions of inferior responsibilities can be filled with such men.”31  In late July 1945, MG officers 
similarly reported that their difficulties locating suitable personnel in Landkreis Aalen had led them “to resort to 
discharged German Army officers for the recruitment of Burgermeisters [mayors].”32    
In recent decades, some historians have criticized American occupation officials for their tendency to 
exclude left-leaning individuals from responsible posts in favor of more conservative types who were both more 
experienced and more like themselves.33  One former German soldier similarly hinted at this partiality in 1948 
in commenting that “Army minded American officials” preferred German military officers to “genuine 
progressive minded democrats.”34  Yet even in mid 1945, the methods chosen to address personnel deficits drew 
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complaints from some Germans.  Historian Jörg Echternkamp has pointed to the affinity for National Socialism 
many Germans—unlike the Americans in Karlsruhe—attributed to Wehrmacht soldiers in the immediate 
aftermath of the war and noted that personnel administrators flooded with applications from “clean” 
professional soldiers greeted them with some suspicion, particularly since it had been shown that in most 
offices, the percentage of party members among former military men who had become civil servants was 
greater than among their colleagues who had not been professional soldiers.35  But for some Germans, whether 
due to personal convictions or uneasiness regarding American expectations, a soldier’s military pedigree was 
equally or even more worrisome.  The appointment of former career soldiers to public positions thus stimulated 
both criticism from the German people and discussions among city administrators regarding the suitability of 
specific individuals and entire categories of men for such posts.   
In late July 1945, for instance, Franz Eberhard, the head of Karlsruhe’s Rüppurr-Gartenstadt district, 
formally complained about the recent decision of city education officials to replace the provisional 
superintendent of the Rüppurr Volkschule (elementary school).  The previous head was a former socialist who 
had been forced to join the Nazi Party in 1942, Eberhard explained.  His replacement had never joined the party, 
but he had left the military in 1919 as a lieutenant, volunteered for the new Wehrmacht in 1936, and ended up 
as the Stadtkommandant (city commander) of Colmar, France, in 1940, while a captain, and as 
Stadtkommandant of Lemberg (today Lviv, Ukraine) in 1942-1943, with the rank of major.  Eberhard 
maintained that the man’s voluntary reporting and his success in the military proved that he was an adherent of 
militarism, a “militarism that stood completely under the influence of the NSDAP [Nazi Party].”  However, 
Eberhard was more interested in the larger political considerations of the case than in the two individuals.  In 
particular, he argued that  
the decision of a new school administration, which nevertheless has the task of appointing teachers to 
supervising positions who will be, and must be, given the job of eliminating even the thought of 
militarism from the heads of adolescent youth, demands an exacting examination of the past activities 
of the proposed teacher if the city school authorities do not want to fall under the suspicion that they 
are themselves still stuck in the old ways. 
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He asked that city officials verify his information and contended that it was the duty and responsibility of every 
devout socialist to forcefully intervene or they would risk losing, again, everything the Nazis had previously 
taken away.36 
More generally, American counterintelligence personnel operating in Karlsruhe in late summer 1945 
reported the “popular feeling” that the return of former officers might “make possible the reestablishment of the 
military clique, since junior officers, such as those now being released, greatly influenced the political life of 
Germany, after World War No. I.”  As an example, the Germans pointed to discriminatory measures applied to 
civilian doctors who were party members but not to former military doctors. 37  In early November 1945, 
members of the works councils of various enterprises in the city endorsed a resolution addressing soldiers 
directly.  “In the employment in responsible posts of former professional soldiers who voluntarily entered the 
Wehrmacht after the [Nazi] seizure of power in 1933, the assembly sees an endangering of the political situation 
and a glorification of Prussian militarism,” read the statement approved by nearly 250 works council delegates.  
“Therefore the full assembly of factory council members demands the immediate cleansing of businesses and 
offices from these camouflaged pests.”38  The following August, a letter sent to Heidelberg’s Rhein-Neckar-
Zeitung and subsequently forwarded to MG officials expressed surprise “that the professional soldiers whose 
job was killing are slowly but steadily settling down to a sedate career in the civil service instead of spending a 
few years cleaning up debris first.”  The letter, noted the Americans, was “considered typical of the attitude of a 
large part of the Heidelberg population.”39 
Some German government officials and administrators shared the concerns of these public critics.  
City leaders in Ulm strongly opposed the appointment of former officers to influential positions, even though 
American denazification initiatives were decimating the city’s governing apparatus.  When lord mayor 
(Oberbürgermeister) Robert Scholl reported to his advisory council in August 1945 that the Americans did not 
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object to former active officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) assuming positions with state, city, or 
community administrations, so long as they had not been party members, the news elicited vocal criticism.  
Supported by his council, Scholl even went so far as to write a letter to MG officials, with a copy to 
Württemberg’s Interior Ministry, stating that using these individuals in Ulm would be hazardous.  Officers were 
“far more dangerous than harmless party members,” contended council member Hermann Wild, a gymnasium 
teacher appointed supervisor of schools in Ulm by the Americans and a future leading member of the classical 
liberal Democratic People’s Party (DVP).  The Americans were going to accomplish the exact opposite of their 
goal of eliminating “Prussian militarism, root and branch,” he argued, for the officers would again gather in 
positions of authority and then would have the opportunity to eat away at the state from within.40 
Other German authorities were less inclined to dismiss former officers out of hand, but remained 
suspicious.  In Stuttgart, city officials wondered whether they should put a former lieutenant colonel in charge 
of the city’s sports activities, particularly since the position entailed working with the city’s youth, though they 
eventually did so after receiving the blessing of local MG officials.41  On the other hand, they did not endorse 
the applications of all former soldiers.  In one instance, they rejected as a “militarist” a 45-year-old former 
colonel and holder of the Knight’s Cross who had applied for a city post.42  Heidelberg city administrators, 
meanwhile, told a MG official in late 1945 that they refused employment to anyone “who volunteered for 
military service during peace time or who held military positions.” A local trade union steward examined all 
other applications to assess the applicant’s baseline suitability for a city job prior to further consideration by a 
particular office or by city council officials.43   
In early 1946, the president of North Baden circulated new rules to his department heads regarding the 
hiring of Angestellten and Beamten (tenured and untenured civil servants) that similarly provided specific 
guidance on the issue.  Required to complete a Fragebogen, each job applicant was also to supply witnesses, if 
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needed, and additional information, if requested.  Excluded from appointments altogether were not only Nazi 
activists, but those whose manner suggested a “militaristic attitude.”  Former active officers and NCOs were 
therefore always to be hired only on a three-month trial basis, even when their Fragebogen and any follow-up 
evidence suggested that they were unobjectionable.  Their attitude would subsequently be scrutinized and, if 
deemed acceptable, they would be officially employed at the end of the probationary period.44   
Speaking to members of Stuttgart’s various Military Government Law No. 8 review and appeals 
boards in late 1945, Stuttgart’s lord mayor Arnulf Klett noted that the questions “How should officers be 
handled?  Are they militarists? Or are they not militarists?” kept arising.  Alluding to three different cases MG 
officials were still considering, he admitted that the overarching question of who was a militarist was still 
unresolved.  Citing his own experiences and conversations with the Americans, Klett suggested that each case 
had to be evaluated on it own merits.  “One cannot simply say that because someone was in the military, he is a 
militarist, or when he has reached this or that rank, he is a militarist.”  Klett nevertheless did advise the board 
members that the higher the rank, the more it would be appropriate to judge carefully and not retain or employ a 
man too readily.45   
In the end, caution was clearly the word of the day.  Land and city officials greeted requests for 
employment from military men warily, although they did not always reject them even at a point when American 
calls for the eradication of German militarism were at their peak.  Evidence suggests, too, that concerns 
regarding former officers did not immediately subside.  In November 1946, for example, the administration 
department of Stuttgart’s city council discussed the “demilitarization” of the city’s administration, in which 
former high-ranking military personnel occupied several important posts.  As explained by an American report 
on the meeting, “a German Colonel, administrative head of the municipal hospital in Bad Cannstatt was 
suspended, and the city council decided to thoroughly investigate all similar cases involving former high 
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ranking army officers.”46  Interestingly, as part of this effort they followed up on the case of the man appointed 
to head Stuttgart’s sports office and learned from the city official tasked with the investigation that the man had 
generally received acceptable reviews.  The president of the Landessportverband (state sports association), for 
instance, had expressed satisfaction with the man’s performance—although he had also pointed out that his staff 
had repeatedly complained about the former lieutenant colonel’s “officer’s tone” and noted that during 
disagreements the man had frequently stressed, “I was an officer.”47  Stuttgart officials let the man keep his job.  
Perhaps most intriguing was the case of Ulm.  During the second half of 1946, MG officials 
monitoring local opinion and activities for OMGUS’s Information Control Division regularly reported on 
conversations and incidents relating to “militarists,” former officers, and assorted reactionaries in the 
community.  The frequency of these references may simply be evidence of bias, or particular interest, on the 
part of the reporting official (though it is worth noting that more than one was involved).48  But it seems likely 
that the number of former officers in the community and the city’s reputation as a postwar stronghold of Nazism 
also played a role.  American officials and local politicians may have been especially alert to signs of danger 
and may also have been reacting to activities and attitudes that were legitimate causes of concern.49 
According to these American reports, for example, some local officials continued to worry about the 
possible repercussions of former soldiers assuming city leadership positions.  In July 1946, MG intelligence 
officer Herbert van der Berg recalled a recent conversation with Dr. Paul Mayer, the city’s Social Democratic 
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assistant mayor.  “He fears many of the one time regular Army officers and E[nlisted] M[en] will slip into the 
city administration, just as they did in 1918,” wrote the van der Berg.  Referring to the several hundred thousand 
former professional officers and NCOs who were “politically clean,” Mayer worried “that reactionary groups 
might make use of a goodly number of these men, and thereby gain power for themselves.”  He had explained   
that he often receives letters from these officers which still show their arrogant tone, when they are 
requesting jobs.  Not all of them have lost their superiority complex.  [In o]ne of the letters which he 
received an applicant appealed and said: “I have done my duty to my country for more than 11 years 
and have received many decorations so that I can now expect decent treatment from my government, 
which should offer me a job that suits me.” 
 
Mayer believed that these men were “more dangerous for Germany than the ordinary PGs [party members] – 
that Nazism was the result of militarism,” van der Berg reported.50 
The mayoral election in Ulm in early fall 1946 also shed light on the sensitivity of the issue.  In early 
August, van der Berg noted that 30 applications for the position of lord mayor had already been received.  The 
letters would not be opened for another week, he pointed out, but it was “generally known in Ulm that the 
majority of the applicants are former high officers or other militarists.”51  Of the 116 total applicants, van der 
Berg later confirmed, “it was found that many . . . were former militarists.”52  Nevertheless, one of the final four 
candidates considered by the city council (which was to make the final choice) was a Dr. Liebl, a Baden-born 
engineer who was “a former civilian administrator with the Wehrmacht, who held the equivalent rank of Lt. 
Col[onel],” and who was one of two candidates backed by the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 
members of the council.53  After each candidate spoke to the council in mid September, van der Berg reported 
that Dr. Liebl had “tried in vain to convince the members . . . that he was not a militarist.”  Communist Party 
(KPD) representative Georg Siegwarth later informed the American that both the SPD and KPD strongly 
opposed the man’s election.  “Liebl,” he added, “was a former engineer Lt. Col. in the Wehrmacht.  He still 
behaves like a Prussian officer.  He said in his brief speech . . . that to him ‘Nothing is impossible.’”  
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Ultimately, in an election that proved controversial for reasons having nothing to do with Liebl, the CDU 
members threw their weight behind the unaffiliated incumbent Scholl and he remained in office.54 
More curious was a January 1947 vote choosing a certain Rudi Haussmann as the city’s new police 
director.  Elected by a 20-16 vote, Haussmann was a Social Democrat and former public prosecutor for Ulm’s 
denazification tribunal.  Interestingly, however, a U.S. intelligence report noted that not only did most people 
consider the 35-year-old Haussmann too young for the position, but he was “known to be a militarist,” having 
been in the Wehrmacht from 1935 to 1945 and earned the rank of captain.55  In this instance, all of the CDU’s 
votes went against Haussmann, as did Scholl’s.  He was, therefore, elected largely on the strength of SPD and 
DVP votes, suggesting that party considerations rather than concerns about reactionary influences were 
decisive.  And in fact, the council was riven with conflict at the time, with Scholl standing squarely at the 
center, accused of incompetence, snuggling up to former Nazis, and, in a specific charge, of re-employing two 
former police officers in lesser positions but with their old wages who, according to van der Berg, had been 
dismissed “on charges of having been active militarists.”56 
In hindsight, it seems likely that party politics influenced both elections far more than any fears 
regarding the future impact of military elements in Ulm.  But some city leaders clearly worried about the 
possible machinations of former officers.  Moreover, both elections suggest that, at the very least, accusations of 
militarism could, like charges of Nazism, be used as political tools, and political tools are seldom considered 
worth wielding unless backed by real political or public concerns. 
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German Police Services 
The January 1947 election in Ulm points to another personnel question that similarly became entangled 
in discussions concerning the relationship between militarism and former Wehrmacht officers: namely, the 
composition of local police forces.  The deep involvement of German policemen in the Nazi system of terror, as 
well as the military appearance and training that had allowed them to be easily converted into fighting forces, 
made the overhaul of the police a top priority for the United States.  Remarkably, however, the Americans 
erected no special employment restrictions in this regard, relying only on their ubiquitous removal and hiring 
regulations.  The Germans, on the other hand, were somewhat more cautious. 
In a special survey conducted some nine months after the occupation began, MG officials made a point 
of collecting information regarding the employment policies of Württemberg-Baden’s police forces with respect 
to former officers.  At that time, they learned that Stuttgart city officials had dismissed approximately 850 of 
900 policemen and were scrambling to replace them.  Of 500 new recruits, just six were former officers, U.S. 
investigator William Stevens recorded, although “quite a number” of professional NCOs had also been hired.  
To prevent former career officers “with Nazi ideologies” from joining the police, the city had set up a school to 
screen applicants.  “An entrance examination consisting of political essays, discussions etc. has been prepared,” 
Stevens explained.  “In addition talks and instructions of reliable anti-Nazis and police experts follow.”  He 
noted that Land officials had created a similar system for the Land police.57   
Stevens also pointed out that, according to everyone he had spoken with, the largest number of 
applicants for the police forces were NCOs and regular army officers, including many captains and majors who 
were ready to begin as “simple policemen.”  But they had trouble getting hired.  He explained:    
In spite of the fact that MG authorities did not object of [sic] employing of regular Army men for the 
police, the German authorities took it upon themselves to reject officers and typical Army NCO’s for 
the reason of preventing militarists from entering the German police.  The basic idea of the men in 
charge at city as well as on land level is to keep all those out of the administration who are under the 
suspicion of being militarists or Nazis.  But all people asked agree that due to the fast denazification 
they have been forced to take quick action in replacing many Pg’s.  This way they could not give most 
of the new policemen a thorough screening and schooling as it would have been necessary.  The 
percentage of ‘Nazi-But-Non-Pg’s’ and militarists in the police force is being carefully estimated as to 
be approx. 15%.  Now, where the first run is over, a thorough investigation and schooling will prevent 
Nazis or obvious militarists from entering the German police.58 
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From neighboring North Baden, MG officer Claude Picard reported that officials were not only 
subjecting new police employees to the general restrictions circumscribing all Land-level administrative hiring, 
but were also completely excluding certain categories of men, including former active officers holding the rank 
of colonel or higher and former police officers who had voluntarily left the police force for the Wehrmacht—
though not necessarily those who had been sent to the Wehrmacht as part of a police formation.  Any others 
were carefully examined for possible militaristic leanings, considering such factors as their family and the 
company they kept.  According to Picard, the “German Chief of Police” had intended to turn away all former 
regular army officers and NCOs, but could not.  On one hand, he explained, “several American Public Safety 
Officers demanded the employment of former regular army officers in the police force” and, on the other, an 
American-issued directive on the creation of border patrols had stated that former army personnel were 
“desirable for disciplinary reasons” and, once this patrol had been established, “the personnel was transferred to 
the regular civilian police.”  Two men on the force were thus American-appointed former professional officers 
new to the police, while the remaining officers had transferred from the police to the Wehrmacht and were, like 
the “considerable number” of NCOs on staff, now being closely watched for militaristic tendencies.59 
Picard also described the situation in Heidelberg, where city officials reported that they checked the 
background of each applicant and accepted only those not “politically compromised.”  He noted that since early 
April 1945 the city police force had hired 29 former regular officers and 49 former professional NCOs for a 
force that had a “normal complement of approximately three hundred men (uniformed police).”  Sixteen of the 
men were “former police men who were taken over by the Wehrmacht in 1935” and 13 had joined the military 
in 1937.  One third had lost limbs and was now working for the criminal police or police administration.  The 
city’s police director, Picard stated, had assured him that none of the former professional soldiers were “ardent 
militarists.”  But Picard also appended comments to his report that backed up his assertion that “old time 
democratic police officials, trade union officials and some part of the civilian population” believed that there 
were too many professional soldiers in the police.  “In their minds,” he explained, “a professional soldier, even 
when disabled, always remains a militarist.”  They had argued that “the same militaristic spirit which used to 
prevail in the German police is again noticeable today” and called for banning the further employment of 
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former regular army officers and NCOs.  Concerns about creeping reaction in the form of “wolves in lamb-
skins” provided the common theme of the appended materials.60 
Although they never set limits on the hiring of former military officers, OMGUS’s Public Safety 
Branch officials continued to keep an eye on the composition of German police forces, motivated in part by 
questions raised in quadripartite discussions in Berlin.61  And Wehrmacht veterans continued to comprise a 
substantial portion of the men employed after 1945, though the number of former commissioned officers 
remained relatively small.  Thus, as of March 1946, Württemberg-Baden administrators indicated that 268—or 
3.8 percent—of a total of 6,844 police officers of all types were ex-officers, including among them three 
lieutenant colonels.62  By November, Land police officials were reporting that they employed 2,528 men, 
including 281 NCOs, 52 commissioned officers below the rank of major, and three with a higher rank.63  At the 
time, Württemberg-Baden’s urban police departments employed 4,836 men, 23 percent of whom had served in 
the Wehrmacht both before and during the war, though a “considerable part” of these had been drafted prior to 
the war’s beginning and were therefore not former professional soldiers.  The 23 percent included 1,039 NCOs, 
97 officers below the rank of major, and seven officers with the rank of major or above.  Those who had served 
only during the war included 943 NCOs, 80 officers below the rank of major, and two with the rank of major or 
above.64 
Drafting a report for a U.S. Senate committee in late 1946, OMGUS Armed Forces Division officials 
noted that former officers comprised 2.4 percent of all police personnel in the U.S. Zone.  “This percentage is 
not considered excessive,” they added.65  The early comments out of Heidelberg nevertheless suggest that not 
all Germans were happy with the composition of their local police forces, and MG officials continued to hear 
sporadic grumbling regarding the situation.  “Many people complain about the fact that so many former 
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professional soldiers are now employed in the Land police,” noted a report from Landkreis Mosbach in late 
1946.  “Complaints are most frequent about the arrogant manner of these men.”66  “Many people residing in the 
Heidelberg area are discussing, with interest, the influx of many former German army officers into leading 
positions in the [Land police],” a mid-June 1948 intelligence report similarly observed.  Ordinary policemen 
were protesting that they were “once more being subjected to the sneering, supercilious superior attitude that the 
German officer traditionally affected in treating subordinates.”  In addition, the report stated, “Comment has 
been made that this situation was certainly not the objective of the Occupation Forces but was instead a plan 
formulated by the former army officers to become a unified group.”67   
Other Germans were somewhat more measured in their thinking when it came to the police.  In late 
1946, Stuttgart police authorities informed U.S. counterintelligence officials of news—or rumors—circulating 
to the effect that all police Beamten in the Soviet Zone’s Brandenburg had been let go as “militarists” if they 
had been NCOs or held a higher rank.  Stuttgart’s police officials and citizens, both, had responded to this 
information either with sharp criticism or with a smile, the authorities noted.  In general, they added, people 
were saying that being a militarist did not necessarily have anything to do with one’s rank—there were 
militarists in civilian clothes who wanted to fight to the death; there were militarists who because of an 
insufficient number of positions or thanks to their intellectual limitations only rose to become intimidating lance 
corporals; and there were also officers who were not militarists.68 
 
Other Employment 
Regardless of any uncertainties concerning the scope of the term “militarist,” former professional 
soldiers were clearly more likely than others to be accused and penalized as militarists when seeking public 
employment.  Much to their frustration, they might face similar problems in other venues as well, compounding 
the already substantial challenge of locating much-needed work.  In the end, however, these experiences tended 
to be localized and did not prevent even most former professional officers from eventually finding at least some 
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kind of employment, if perhaps not a position they considered to be in keeping with their pre-war social 
standing.  
Almost all former soldiers needed to make a living, yet a variety of obstacles could stand in the way of 
their ability to do so.  Young conscripts had no former positions to fall back on.  A contemporary law gave 
others the right to return to their old jobs, and some firms held positions open for absent employees, but the law 
did not always ensure job security.69  “The extreme dislocation of industrial life as well as the general invalidity 
of Nazi law have combined to make this ‘right’ a dead letter,” Heidelberg MG officers reported in August 
1945.70  Allied bombing had destroyed industries, and some veterans had formerly lived in areas now lost to 
Germany.  In some rural communities and small towns, returnees discovered that there were no open positions.  
If labor shortages in agriculture and mining meant others quickly found themselves in the fields or mines, there 
were far fewer jobs for skilled blue-collar or white-collar workers given the silent factories and suspension of 
normal commerce.  And a tangle of red tape slowed those who sought to relocate in hopes of finding 
employment.  Individuals living in cities could readily find rubble-clearing work, but many middle-class 
veterans were not interested in manual labor of that sort and got their hands dirty only when driven into the 
streets by desperation.71 
A number of former soldiers coped with the problem by seeking out new military opportunities.  
Expectations of a future conflict between the United States and Soviet Union combined with rumors of 
American recruitment led some young men to volunteer—unsuccessfully—to serve in the U.S. Army.  “I have 
done enough for my Fatherland, and never got any thanks,” one told a MG officer in Stuttgart, then admitted 
that “his real reason for wanting to enlist was that he had nothing to go back to in civilian life.”  In view of a 
poor family situation and little hope of decent employment, he preferred “some excitements,” even at the risk of 
his life, to “dull physical labor.”72  Others saw the American military as a path to a good income and sufficient 
food and housing.  “I have no use for the damned Amis,” proclaimed one volunteer, explaining that “ethics and 
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morals don’t fill empty stomachs.”  “We might even have the chance to take our revenge on those Russian 
‘Schweinehunde’,” his friend argued.  To stem the tide of German volunteers, the U.S. Army recruiting office in 
Heidelberg finally put up a sign in July 1946 reading “For American Nationals Only.”73  But if the American 
military categorically rejected Germans, the French were less fussy, welcoming disaffected or discouraged 
veterans into its famed foreign legion and enlisting large numbers from among the POWs in its custody as well.  
In 1946, Germans made up some 60 percent of the legion’s 22,000 members, and the French were still 
recruiting.74 
Former professional officers might have certain advantages in pursuing a foreign legion career, but 
elsewhere they encountered special challenges.  Now denied a military career, they might also have few civilian 
skills to market—a problem particularly acute for longer-serving professional officers and NCOs.75  To address 
the employment problems of all former soldiers, some communities eventually began offering specialized 
training classes.  In June 1946, for example, courses in the skilled construction trades and for radio technicians 
were up and running in Landkreis Ludwigsburg.76   
Outright discrimination also compounded the troubles of at least some veterans.  The frequency with 
which this occurred is hard to gauge; that it happened is not in doubt.77  Some employers treated former soldiers 
as scapegoats for all that had recently gone wrong in Germany, others acted on long-standing prejudices against 
military men, and still others worried about American opinion.  Bach, for example, met one veteran who, 
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rejected in his attempt to get his old job back, had complained to his former employer that Germany’s soldiers 
had been fighting for six years and had “come home to get nothing.”  The employer had responded with little 
sympathy, Bach reported, telling the veteran that that was exactly the problem: “‘You’ve been fighting and 
that’s what we’re all suffering for now.’”78  On a broader plain, former professional officers found it difficult to 
get jobs in some union-controlled industries, as the relationship between the military and German socialists had 
traditionally been a hostile one.  While leaders of the SPD and the German Federation of Trade Unions spoke of 
the military without rancor and eventually established reasonable relations with soldier organizations, the 
situation at the local level could be another matter entirely.  The publishing and metal workers’ unions, among 
others, greeted former officers with undisguised animosity.  Bad wartime experiences, unpleasant memories of 
the Weimar years, and concerns about competition led them to refuse admission requests, a stance that persisted 
into the early 1950s.79 
American and Allied regulations played a role as well.  Denazification directives in the U.S. Zone 
could lead to rejections, depending upon how local MG authorities and Germans in private enterprise chose to 
interpret and implement them.  And in early 1946, the Allied Control Council erected certain barriers to the 
teaching profession.  Calling for the creation of training programs to combat severe teacher shortages, the 
council limited admission to those who were “capable of educating youth in a democratic spirit,” which, it 
stipulated, meant excluding certain types of people, including former Wehrmacht officers.80  In doing this, it 
might be noted, they had the implicit or explicit support of some Germans.  In June 1946, for example, the 
superintendent of schools for Landkreis Ulm told Ulm’s van der Berg that “a large percentage” of his teachers 
were former officers and “that these men just did not have enough heart for their pupils, that they still acted like 
officers, although they are out of uniform.”81  Similarly, the Allied perspective appeared eminently reasonable 
to Ulm’s Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung.  Conceding that “a large portion of German officers were less officers 
by calling than by command,” a short opinion piece nevertheless reminded the paper’s readers of Hitler’s 
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reception of thousands of young officer candidates following the completion of their military training.  “These 
young men, who were already infected with the poison of Nazism and militarism while in the Hitler Youth, 
experienced the high point of their young lives in the handshake of their Führer.”  Tens of thousands then went 
on to senselessly die a “hero’s death” for their leader.  And now, the paper suggested provocatively, some 
wanted to “put the fox in charge of the henhouse.”82   
Predictably, obstacles to decent employment drew protests from those affected.  One 61-year-old 
retired colonel pleaded with Minister-Präsident Reinhold Maier to intercede with private and public sector 
employers to help older former officers locate and secure decent jobs.83  Treated well, former career soldiers 
could greatly assist in Germany’s reconstruction efforts, treated poorly or disparaged, they would “go other 
ways,” argued another veteran in an essay sent to Württemberg-Baden officials.  These men wanted to work, he 
explained, but not only with the “shovel and hoe” (although he clarified that they “naturally” wanted to do their 
part for reconstruction in this fashion, too).  They desired to serve in positions that were important for the new 
state.  “Why, for example, should a former officer, who for years secured supplies for a division or army—that 
is, for 15,000 or 150,000 men—under the most difficult circumstances, not become the head of the 
Wirtschaftsamt [Commercial Office]of a city?” he asked.  Soldiers had not only worn uniforms and drilled, they 
had learned valuable skills that could be used in civilian jobs with little additional training.84  Visiting 
Heidenheim MG officials in late 1945, one former officer was less polite, complaining “that he was unable to 
obtain a position commensurate with his training and education and that all he was accepted for was in a 
common laborer’s job.”  According to the Americans, he had then gone on to the threaten   
that unless Military Government approved the appointment of former professional Army Officers in 
leading professional and executive positions, serious consequences are bound to follow.  The educated 
Officer, he added, demanded a chance to use his qualifications and talents and unless this chance is 
given him, he will become the core of a dangerous opposition.  Before resigning himself to the fate of 
a common laborer, he will put up a ‘fight’ using his military skills and experiences to defeat the 
purposes of Military Government.85 
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As this example suggests, a drop in economic or social position might be especially painful, and 
especially humiliating, for former officers who had attained such lofty heights on the status ladder of the Third 
Reich.  Yet it also highlights a related issue—the fact that the officers’ own sense of entitlement sometimes not 
only led them to see special suffering (their own) where it did not exist, but also to voice unreasonable demands 
or use a tone of voice unlikely to generate much sympathy.  In truth, countless veterans were coping with a 
distressing deterioration in their material circumstances and social status.86  And other Germans, too, were 
having trouble locating acceptable jobs.87 Meeting difficulties finding employment or, worse, refusing proffered 
work opportunities did not necessarily mean one was being uniquely mistreated.  Nor was unwarranted 
prejudice always the cause of cool treatment from neighbors.  An air of entitlement hardly made sense in a 
postwar German society characterized by physical devastation, economic uncertainties, political helplessness, 
and evolving social hierarchies.   
Ultimately, former officers ended up in a wide range of jobs and careers, including those which earlier 
would have been regarded as inappropriate to their status, establishing new lives in the civilian world as 
toolmakers, journalists, traveling salesmen, miners, carpenters, and insurance agents.  Far from putting up a 
fight, most were effectively, if sometimes unhappily, integrated into the new German economy.88 
 
Education 
If concerns about militarism played into public and private hiring decisions, they also affected the 
functioning of German institutions of higher learning.  On one hand, they influenced university admissions 
decisions.  On the other, the large number of former soldiers eventually admitted sometimes raised 
apprehensions among German and American observers and added to the headaches of U.S. military government 
officials. 
By June 1946, seven institutions of higher learning were operating in Württemberg-Baden.  Already in 
August 1945, Heidelberg University had begun offering refresher courses for medical students recently released 
from the Wehrmacht (chiefly to help cope with a worrisome public health situation) and university-wide 
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instruction started in early 1946.  Hohenheim Agricultural College opened its doors in December 1945; 
Stuttgart Institute of Technology, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, and Stuttgart’s Academy of Music in 
February 1946; and Stuttgart’s Academy of Plastic Arts and the Mannheim College of Commerce in summer 
1946.  In granting permission for the schools to resume operations, American authorities required the removal 
of Nazis and militarists from staff positions, prohibited potentially dangerous student organizations, and 
restricted what might be taught, particularly with respect to science and technology.  The Stuttgart Institute of 
Technology, for instance, shifted its focus from projects associated with the war effort toward research related 
to low cost housing.89 
As expected, the institutions received a torrent of applications from potential students eager to resume 
their interrupted studies or launch academic careers delayed by Wehrmacht service.  For former officers who 
wanted to do more than clear rubble or manufacture tools, a university education was a coveted necessity.  But 
gaining admission could be tough.  Even before the war began, school administrators had begun restricting 
admissions, and postwar conditions made this even more essential.90  Destroyed facilities, buildings occupied 
by U.S. troops, housing shortages, and faculties decimated by waves of denazification all limited the ability of 
schools to accept students.91  When MG officials took the first steps to reopen Heidelberg University, they also 
worried that students would collect in the area under the guise of studying but instead conspire against the 
occupation forces.92  Although more than 8,000 students applied for admittance to Heidelberg, MG officials 
therefore set an enrollment ceiling of 3,000.  Stuttgart Institute of Technology similarly could accept only 3,000 
of 5,000 applicants.93  Even then, most institutions in Württemberg-Baden were overcrowded; in mid 1946, the 
student population was more than double that of 1939 (see Appendix A).   
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In addition to the sheer number of applicants and normal concerns about past academic training and 
intellectual promise, however, an applicant’s personal history could affect his prospects.  Applicants with a 
documented Nazi past were, of course, especially vulnerable to rejection, but they were not alone.  Many young 
men likely to consider a university education mandatory for a successful future were the same middle and upper 
class young men who had previously sought out professional military careers.  During the Weimar Republic, 
such students had proved to be an insidious, reactionary influence and were thus regarded with caution by 
German and American officials during the occupation.  Furthermore, lower-ranking Wehrmacht officers were 
both publicly associated with German military traditions and frequently imbued to a greater or lesser extent with 
National Socialist ideas.94  One or more of these factors might hurt their chances for admission.   
Early on, American officials took an interest in the admissions process, but essentially left it in German 
hands, believing, too, that the reopening of schools should not wait for MG clearance of all students.  The first 
detailed directive concerning institutions of higher education, issued in late fall 1945, instructed German 
authorities to set admissions standards and gave MG university officers assigned to oversee operations at the 
schools responsibility for ensuring that the Germans admitted no one who was “seriously compromised with the 
Nazi party or otherwise unsuitable for university studies.”  American admissions requirements thus remained 
rather vague, a state of affairs that had certain consequences.  As James Tent points out, “since Nazis and 
‘militarists’ were the primary targets, strict interpretation could exclude former military officers, especially 
career officers.” 95  And there were certainly German officials who had reservations about at least some former 
officers.  Dr. Karl Schmid, the “Acting Land Director of Württemberg for Culture, Education and Art” (who 
was himself about to be removed from his position), suggested to several MG officers in late August 1945 that 
if young soldiers and officers were barred from educational institutions, they might “in their dismay at the chaos 
in their land, . . . become bitter destructionists or nihilists.”  But there were also students he would exclude.  As 
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an example, one American reported, Schmid “described a young German major with ‘Ritterkreuz’ [Knight’s 
Cross] at his throat.  This young major, accustomed to being a strong leader and to a position of importance in 
the German army, would be a malcontent in a German university under American supervision and would very 
likely form subversive cells.”96 
Under this early system, Heidelberg University required all applicants to fill out a Fragebogen, draft a 
narrative personal history, and describe the goals of their education.  A student-faculty committee selected by 
the institution’s rector then evaluated the submissions, considering both the academic and political suitability of 
the applicant.  Those subject to mandatory removal were barred from admission; other former career officers 
might only be admitted after a special examination of each case.97  Heidelberg officials then forwarded all 
decisions to the responsible MG university officer for review.   
The late issuance of the U.S. regulations, combined with the fact that American university officers 
each had jurisdiction over several schools, were overburdened with work, and were often young and 
inexperienced, resulted in both the American officers and the institutions acting with a fair degree of 
independence in interpreting and implementing the regulations on school reopenings.98  But the Americans 
eventually tightened admissions requirements in March 1946, setting percentage limits on the admission of 
former Nazi party members.  And when a new denazification law took effect in the U.S. Zone shortly thereafter, 
decisions of the German denazification tribunals also influenced admission determinations.  Former officers 
were still not singled out for special treatment in any U.S. regulations as former officers.  Yet new directives 
barring from acceptance those who had been “more than nominal participants in, or supporters of, National 
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Socialism or militarism,” but who had not yet been evaluated by a tribunal, clearly offered both German and 
American evaluators a justification for refusing admittance to former officers at least temporarily.99 
Despite a variety of concerns, Württemberg-Baden’s educational institutions ultimately enrolled a 
relatively large number of former officers.  According to statistics compiled in August 1946 regarding 3,167 
Heidelberg students, regular army officers comprised .7 percent of those in the institution’s Medicine Faculty 
(school), .7 percent of the Philosophy Faculty, 1.1 percent of those in Mathematics and Science, 2.7 percent of 
those in Theology, and 3.7 percent of those in Law.  The percentage of reserve officers varied from 6.4 percent 
in Medicine to 30.3 percent in Law, with the other three faculties reporting enrollments in the 10 to 13 percent 
range.100  A June 1946 MG report stated that former officers made up 28.5 percent of the Karlsruhe Institute of 
Technology student body, accounting for no less than 35.8 percent of the 905 males enrolled there.101  Similarly, 
in early 1947, Stuttgart Institute of Technology reported that 23 percent of its students had been officers,102 
while a mid 1948 MG study showed some 658 of 4,270 students at the school, or 14 percent, were former 
second lieutenants.103 
Even after admittance, former officers could not be entirely certain they would see their studies 
through to completion, however.  The combination of persistent American concerns regarding Nazis and 
militarists and the initial hands-off admissions policies eventually produced a messy situation in Württemberg-
Baden.  When MG officials in early 1946 finally examined the files of those students originally admitted to 
Heidelberg, they ended up rejecting several hundred as unacceptable.104  And among the many chosen for 
dismissal were career military officers whose application materials revealed no trace of organized Nazi 
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activities.  Thrust back outside the doors of the institution, these men were given the right to appeal their cases, 
and at least some compiled exculpatory evidence.  But there was no guarantee they would be readmitted.105  
Altogether, those “ex-matriculated” included 174 who fell into the “discretionary adverse” recommendation 
category (as opposed to the “mandatory” dismissal category).  Of these, 121 petitioned for reinstatement, with 
82 eventually approved.106 
Though it is hard to assess how typical the case might be, a closer look at one case is instructive for the 
light it sheds on German and American decision-making processes and how they could impact individuals.  In 
this instance, a former major ex-matriculated by the Americans from the study of law had enlisted in the 
Reichswehr in 1931 at the age of nineteen, participated in the campaigns in France and the Soviet Union, 
assisted in the occupation of France and, briefly, Poland, and helped to defend the Rhine in 1945, picking up an 
Iron Cross First Class and a number of other citations along the way.  This history, apparently, had not 
prevented Heidelberg screeners from admitting him to the university.  Once dismissed by the Americans, he 
spent some 18 months seeking reinstatement.  His repeated verbal and written appeals to the university’s 
administration emphasized his disabled veteran status, his need to develop a new career in order to care for his 
wife and two children, and the “not affected” clean bill of health he had received recently from the local 
denazification tribunal.  His pleas said very little about his choice of a military career or his wartime activities.  
The leaders of the Law Faculty, meanwhile, expressed some concern for the man’s plight, but also considered 
other cases to be more compelling.  Additionally, they wondered whether MG authorities would approve his 
reinstatement.  At one point, a Heidelberg official recalled that when the university rector had brought another 
former major to the attention of the responsible MG officer, asking that the man be granted special admission 
outside the bounds of the enrollment ceiling, the American had argued that the applications of such former 
officers were less urgent than others and had to be viewed as a lower priority.  He had further expressed his 
“astonishment” that the rector had brought him this petition when there certainly were more pressing requests at 
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hand.  Ultimately, however, both the school and the current university officer permitted the major’s readmission 
during the fall of 1947.107 
In making their cases for reinstatement, this former major and his colleagues were doing so at a time 
when both local MG officials and the entire U.S. military government were coming under fire for their allegedly 
lax policies with respect to German universities.  Locally, loud criticism came from American 
counterintelligence officer Daniel Penham, whom MG education officials—perhaps wrongly—viewed as 
something of a loose cannon.108  In a February 1946 report, Penham actually called for the university to be 
closed until it could be cleaned up.  Highlighting the checkered pasts of certain faculty members, citing 
evidence of enduring Nazi attitudes, and railing against the current administration’s unwillingness to cooperate 
in addressing these problems, Penham also argued that “the student body, both German and foreign is rife with 
Nazi and militarist elements.”  Among others, he specifically singled out Wehrmacht veterans for 
condemnation: 
It is known that former officers among the medical students listen to the Internal Surgery seated 
together in the upper tier of the auditorium, thus forming in everyone’s eyes an officers clique.  Many 
former officers are seen walking about the campus in almost complete uniform with shining boots and 
medals, lacking in some cases only insignia of rank.  The great majority of the students in the upper 
semesters in the medical school is composed of former non-coms and officers who were studying at 
Heidelberg under the former “ASTP” program, the Studenten Kompanien, military formations of 
persons who were permitted to pursue their studies in medicine at the expense of the Wehrmacht.  In 
each unit, there was a National Socialist Fuehrungs Offizier [Indoctrination Officer], . . . No attempt 
has been made to have these dangerous elements removed until very recently, when the Rector and 
Dean were informed by CIC of their presence.109 
 
Penham’s report, moreover, surfaced just as the American press was launching an assault on German 
universities.  Following a January 1946 episode at the University of Erlangen in Bavaria, where students had 
disrupted a speech by German Pastor Martin Niemoeller attributing collective responsibility for the Nazis and 
the horrors of the past decade to the German people, the New York Times published a succession of articles 
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painting German universities as hotbeds of Nazism, nationalism, and militarism.110  “Young men [at Erlangen], 
many of whom still wear worn bits of army uniforms, talk excitedly of a ‘revival’ of Germany and of a 
‘soldiers’ party’ that will wrest political leadership from the old men who now hold it,” wrote Drew Middleton, 
a correspondent who never shied away from stirring up controversy.  “There is no great enthusiasm for a 
democratic Germany among the students, and almost no idea of the workings of a free society,” he added.  
“This is understandable in view of the age of most of the students. . . . But what is frightening is that they think 
of the Government only as a vehicle for creating a new strong Germany.”111   
Although they attracted less attention from American journalists, students from institutions in 
Württemberg-Baden also made their presence felt.  At a Stuttgart performance of the early nineteenth-century 
play Woyzzek—described by Penham as “a protest against the militaristic tendencies of Germany in those 
times”—students pelted the actors with potatoes.  In Ulm, they disrupted a commemoration service for the 
victims of fascism.112  With their colleagues elsewhere, they also elicited expressions of concern and censure in 
the local papers.  Social Democrat Johannes Weisser, an Ulm city councilman and editor of the Schwäbische 
Donau-Zeitung, worried about the impact current students might have in the future when they assumed leading 
positions in the nation’s administrative, economic, and cultural life.113  His co-editor Kurt Fried called for 
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former soldiers to hunker down and learn, and to stick to their studies until they were finished.  “The only 
possible result of such excesses [at the universities] can be that the universities will again be closed,” he 
warned.  “Who would be served by that?  Only those who, just as they senselessly destroyed bridges and 
factories, want to destroy our whole people [Volk] only because they may no longer ‘lead’ it.”  Forced to 
abandon dreams of military leadership, these men sought instead the doctoral cap.  But for them it was not 
about serious work in service of scholarship, but rather about status and external glory.  There was, he 
maintained, no room for such men at the new universities.114   
In the Stuttgarter Zeitung, a severely disabled veteran took a different tone in urging his former 
comrades to change their ways lest the universities be closed and this much-needed intellectual guidance lost.  
He asked older, more level-headed veterans and fellow students to show their younger colleagues, with 
gentleness and understanding, that “the Fatherland could not be served with troublemaking and demonstrations, 
but through the desire for truth and objective scholarship” that would lead them all “from the false teachings 
and pseudo-science of the past” back to the “old greats of the German spirit [Geist].”  But he also referred to the 
resistance mounted by students at the University of Munich during the war.  The universities, he argued, were 
not shelters of militarism and Nazism, but sites of intellectual reconstruction and the healing of the German 
character.  Eliminating these types of incidents could best be achieved through “kindness, instruction, and 
human understanding,” rather than by throwing students out of school.115 
While institutions in Württemberg-Baden did not draw the degree of public scrutiny experienced by 
their Bavarian counterparts, they did feel the ramifications of American concerns in 1946 and 1947.  New 
investigations led to the removal of additional teaching personnel due to Nazi leanings and other past 
indiscretions.116  In addition, in late May 1946 U.S. Military Governor General Joseph T. McNarney called 
Württemberg-Baden MG officials directly to discuss the issue of “militaristic tendencies” among university 
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students.  These tendencies, a Land education officer, Richard Banks, later told zonal education officials, had 
apparently been “evidenced more by a scornful attitude toward democratic practices and principles of school 
administration than it had in overt militaristic action.”  But the general had “instructed that prompt and vigorous 
action with reference to each student be taken” and criticized as “not sufficiently vigorous” the current practice 
of dismissing students at the end of the term, rather than immediately.117  To reassure McNarney and Clay 
regarding the status of students found “undesirable for being militarists or for other reasons,” zonal officials 
subsequently requested information on the number of students dismissed from various institutions for reasons 
other than academic ones.  Württemberg-Baden officials accordingly reported that while the two institutes of 
technology had dismissed no students, Heidelberg had ex-matriculated 376 students, second in the zone only to 
the University of Frankfurt.118  In June 1946, Banks also directed authorities in Württemberg-Baden to review 
all student dossiers once more, this time in light of the newest regulations.119 
Though the eye of the storm had passed, concerns did not dissipate entirely after these high profile 
events.  As late as 1948, Americans officials were still expressing unease about the presence of former officers 
at German universities.  Writing in the journal Commentary in May, Haverford College assistant professor J. 
Glenn Gray, recently returned from service as an education officer in Bavaria, outlined some of the challenges 
he perceived in reeducation initiatives at German universities.  The politically incriminated individuals and 
questionable officers who had sought his help in gaining admission to the University of Munich could not be 
reeducated by excluding them from further study, Gray argued.  But he also believed it was “obviously unwise 
and unjust to admit large numbers of them . . . unwise because their collective weight might well choke the 
growth of a more liberal spirit there; unjust because they would be taking places away from unincriminated 
students.”  Former professional officers he saw as “more dangerous” than the others.  Rarely politically tainted, 
they had been “robbed of a career that most of them chose voluntarily in the 30’s” and now wanted to prepare 
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for “some profession which will save them from physical labor.”  However, in addition to questioning their 
intelligence, Gray believed that their many years in the military made them “even less likely to be won for 
democratic ways than the young ex-Nazis” and suggested that “informed German opinion” would contend that 
“many of the young Nazi leaders now believe that they followed false gods,” but most “professional officers 
regard the present merely as a waiting period of uncertain duration until they can resume their former careers.”  
Added Gray, “This element obviously requires the closest watch, to make certain that they gain little influence 
in public life.”120 
Notably, even the former officers’ fellow students did not always appreciate their presence in the 
universities, with discharged privates critical of their former superiors’ unofficial devotion to National 
Socialism and worried about their potentially negative effect within the academy and in influential future 
careers.121  In August 1947, the Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (Socialist German Students League) 
actually passed a resolution demanding that no former active officers be permitted to study so long as there 
were other students still being denied admission, reasoning that professional officers had originally had no plans 
to study.122   
Responding to criticism of their conduct and to accusations of militarism, former officers not only 
cited their politically untainted pasts, but also condemned blanket categorizing and warned against souring their 
attitudes and driving them into opposition.123  Outsiders also came to the defense of the men.  “Can you 
reproach a soldier with having done his duty, and having as a good soldier been promoted officer?” asked 
Theodor Bäuerle, Württemberg-Baden’s Deputy Minister of Culture, in a late November 1945 letter to Land 
MG officials criticizing the many dismissals and exclusions provoked by U.S. policies.  The hopes and ideals of 
returning soldiers, which had been spoiled by “mendacious propaganda,” were now “completely shattered,” and 
they wanted “to shape for themselves a new philosophy, to return to civilian life, to learn a profession, to do 
excellent work and to collaborate in reconstructing their country.”  But their Fragebogen prevented this.  As a 
result, he suggested, “a whole generation is driven into nihilism and despair,” something that posed “an 
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immense danger for the inner peace and the future of the whole nation” as well as a threat to the security of the 
Americans.124  Culture Minister Theodor Heuss echoed these thoughts and argued, further, that the “soldierly 
honor” of young veterans should not be injured.  “The fact that one was promoted due to his competence in war 
must not be used as an obstruction in his professional or political life,” the minister asserted.  “This would be 
completely wrong psychologically and would only keep alive a secret ‘militaristic’ spirit.”125  A writer in 
Karlsruhe’s Badische Neueste Nachrichten came to a similar conclusion in 1947, contending that young men 
whose educational background had led to an officer’s promotion during the war should not now be penalized 
for this.126   
How much of a threat these former officers actually represented is difficult to assess.  Penham 
certainly was not the only one who denounced their conduct.  “You can really say that the reaction is hiding in 
the universities,” commented one German veteran.  Writing to an émigré who had taught in an American 
“democratization” school for German POWs that he had attended, the writer described watching former officers 
walking to the University of Frankfurt in the morning.  “Because of the many officers’ boots, one often thinks 
one is standing along the route to a war academy,” he suggested, then charged that the men acted “democratic” 
in order to be admitted to the university.  “Otherwise they are not at all embarrassed to speak about democracy 
in the same way that they think about it, that is, derogatorily,” he explained.  “It is astonishing how that can 
occur without protest, in part in public discussions.”127   
Reporting on his experiences sitting in on classes at Heidelberg University in 1946 and 1947, Wolfe 
remembered that conversations with veterans about their mutual war experiences had two “recurring themes.”  
One was their argument that Wolfe—who had seen frontline service—“had fought against civilized enemies 
who surrendered when they knew they were beaten,” unlike the Soviets.  The second was their claim that U.S. 
soldiers and their leaders had only won the war due to a superiority of resources rather than military skill.  “My 
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memory may be playing me false,” said Wolfe, “but the phrase that lingers is that Eisenhower and his generals 
did not possess ‘a drop of oil from the head of Frederick the Great.’”  He had countered their arguments, he 
added, but did not take offense, still remembering their rather unceremonious return.128  On the other hand, 
Wolfe said nothing of Penham’s “officer’s clique” in shiny jackboots.  Instead, he recalled being “conspicuous 
in an American officer’s uniform.”  Many of his classmates wore uniforms, too, only they were dyed.  His was 
“snug.”  Theirs were not.129   
Contemporary MG reports conveyed concern, but sounded no outright alarms regarding former 
officers at institutions in Württemberg-Baden.  The writer of a May 1946 report on the Stuttgart Institute of 
Technology, for example, indicated that most students—including the 4 percent who were former professional 
officers and the large number of former reserve officers—were “worried much more about their own personal 
future than . . . the political future of Germany.”  Economic problems were a key concern, wrapped up as they 
were with potential job opportunities after graduation.  Geopolitical questions concerning the fate of the Ruhr or 
the agricultural eastern territories were thus reduced, in part, to practical worries.  Offering no particular 
warning related to the observation, the investigator concluded that most students were right of center on the 
political spectrum.  There was only a “tiny leftist minority,” which tended to be more politically interested.  He 
noted, too, that one of his contacts was a 29-year-old first-year student and former first lieutenant who was 
presently organizing a visit to the school by Culture Minister Heuss, a DVP politician.  The young man had 
“expressed the fear of many officers that sooner or later they might be dismissed from school.”  He was already 
old, he had pointed out, and “not too prosperous,” and “the prospect that he might be merely wasting his time 
and money without being permitted to finish his studies worrie[d] him greatly.” This fear, he had added, was 
“shared by all ex-officers.”130 
In late November 1946, one of Heidelberg’s student leaders spoke of two kinds of students at his 
university.  One group was politically interested, motivated, and beginning to feel responsible for public 
concerns.  The second group was “disappointed” and not interested in the many initiatives underway in 
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Germany; some “unbridled nationalism” still “smoldered” among its members, he believed.  These young men, 
he charged, were waiting for something that would descend from above to make them happy—perhaps a new 
leader—and lived off their resentment about many things, from fuel shortages to the occupation authorities, 
blaming everything negative on “democracy.”131   
A report produced by Württemberg-Baden’s MG education officials six months later reached a similar, 
if marginally more benevolent, conclusion, in describing three “uncertain categories” of university students.  
The first, probably smallest, group was “fully conscious of the responsible part they must assume in the life of 
the community” after finishing.  They recognized the challenges of the age, but were determined to rise above 
the material privations and “spiritual confusion” and to “help in the development of a new German culture.”  
The second, probably largest, group viewed the current material situation as “hopeless” and could not believe 
that they had contributed to their own unhappy circumstances.  They coasted along, willing to be led by outside 
influences, and were not inclined to worry about their future responsibilities.  Rather, they remained fixated on 
finishing their studies and making a living.  The third group of students had descended from the second.  
Embittered by their present hardships, they had “a tendency to be cynical about American democracy because 
every American soldier has not been a shining light of the democratic ideal.”  They might truly detest National 
Socialism, but as idealists, were dissatisfied with the beginnings of democracy in Germany. 132   
Significantly, both the Heidelberg student and the MG report agreed that veterans did not 
automatically fall into any of the categories.  Rather, students in the most promising group might have tainted 
political records.  They may, in fact, have been Hitler Youth leaders or former army officers.133 
 
Militarists at Nuremberg 
Even as American military government officers and German officials were attempting to identify and 
negate the influence of militarists locally, Allied authorities were attacking the problem on a much bigger stage.  
In words and documents, through photographs and film, they were presenting the former leaders of the Third 
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Reich to the German people and to the world as unscrupulous men who had launched an illegal war of 
aggression and committed a multitude of heinous crimes in waging it to a disastrous end.  In pursuing this 
course, the Americans hoped not only to mete out warranted justice, but also to devalue the standing of 
Germany’s military leaders and illuminate the evils of German militarism by exposing Germany’s culpability 
for World War II.  The proceedings of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and, to a lesser extent, 
other war crimes trials would provide a valuable opportunity for reeducation.  Seeing Germany’s leading 
militarists called to account, the Americans believed, would help to immunize the German people from the 
deleterious influence of any successors.134 
 
The Trial 
Allied officials had begun discussing the need to bring German war criminals to justice already early in 
the war, though what that should entail and who, exactly, should be judged remained contentious questions.  
Another key issue was that of definition.  During extended international negotiations, some officials called for 
limiting the term “war crimes” to its traditional meaning, namely, specific acts committed by soldiers during 
hostilities that violated the laws and customs of war.  Others lobbied for a broader interpretation, one that 
encompassed, for example, the instigating of a war of aggression and offenses committed by German leaders 
against their own people prior to the start of the war—although this approach raised the difficult question of 
whether individuals could be prosecuted for actions that contemporary laws had not outlawed as crimes.135 
In the end, the Americans adopted a number of procedures.  American military courts tried cases 
involving more traditional war crimes, particularly offenses committed against American soldiers, and cases 
involving concentration camp personnel and those accused of other mass atrocities.  German courts eventually 
became involved in trying cases covering offenses committed by Germans against other Germans after 1933.136  
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Meanwhile, the trial with the highest profile—and greatest reeducative value—was that held in Nuremberg 
from November 1945 to September 1946. 
In an agreement signed in London in August 1945, the Allies agreed on a format for the trial, with an 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) staffed by judges from the four major powers to hear cases against both 
individuals and organizations.  Allied prosecutors would eventually indict 22 individuals and six organizations 
on four different counts.  The latter included: 1) involvement in a “Common Plan or Conspiracy” to carry out 
the other crimes—a charge the judges ultimately limited to the planning of aggressive war; 2) “Crimes Against 
Peace,” defined as the “planning, preparation, initiation and waging of wars of aggression, which were also 
wars in violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances”; 3) “War Crimes,” in the traditional sense 
of the word; and 4) “Crimes Against Humanity,” encompassing crimes associated with German concentration 
camps and other atrocities.137   
Significantly, the drafters of the London Agreement—at the urging of the Americans, in particular—
accepted the revolutionary premise that waging an aggressive war was, in fact, a crime.  Neither the charter 
establishing the IMT nor the subsequent indictment defined the term “aggressive war,” nor was there any 
existing basis for the term in international law.  But those behind the agreement contended that international law 
evolved over time and pointed to the Covenant of the League of Nations from 1919 and the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact of 1928 as examples of international agreements from the interwar period that reflected and revealed 
changing attitudes.  By 1939, argued the agreement’s defenders, most civilized people believed that starting an 
aggressive war was morally wrong to the point of being criminal and deserving punishment.  In issuing their 
verdicts, the Nuremberg judges would likewise tend to focus on violations of existing agreements and treaties in 
assessing the guilt or innocence of the various defendants, although, as historian Bradley Smith has observed, 
most international documents of this sort contained no stated sanctions for violations committed by signatories.  
As a whole, the Allied approach to charges of conspiracy and crimes against peace made instigating an 
aggressive war the punishable responsibility of not just military men, but of all of the Third Reich’s highest 
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leaders.  The IMT thus indicted all 22 defendants on conspiracy charges and 16 for crimes against peace.  
German planning for and launching of an aggressive war became a focal point of the trial.138  
In naming defendants, the Allies counted the “General Staff and High Command” among their six 
allegedly criminal organizations and included four career military officers among the 22 indicted individuals.  
Specifically, Allied prosecutors accused Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, chief of the Wehrmacht High Command 
(OKW) beginning in 1938, of working closely with Hitler in developing Germany’s war plans and, later, of 
signing off on some of the more egregious orders permitting and even encouraging military atrocities.  Most 
significantly, Keitel had authorized the infamous Kommissarbefehl, ordering the immediate killing of Soviet 
political commissars captured by the Wehrmacht.  Generaloberst Alfred Jodl faced similar accusations, having 
been involved in detailed planning for various invasions, as well as in issuing the Kommissarbefehl and other 
problematic orders in his capacity as chief of operations of the OKW.  Admiral Erich Raeder, commanding 
admiral of the German fleet and chief of the Naval High Command until he retired in 1943, was attacked for 
expanding the German navy in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, involvement in German war planning, 
passing on Hitler’s “commando order” calling for execution without trial of captured commandos, and 
authorization of unrestricted submarine warfare.  Prosecutors also laid responsibility for the latter offense at the 
feet of Admiral Karl Dönitz, commander of the German navy’s submarine arm until replacing Raeder as chief 
of the Naval High Command in 1943 and, in April 1945, succeeding Hitler as head of the Third Reich.  
Accusing Dönitz of sanctioning a policy of refusing to rescue, and even killing, survivors of ships sunk by 
German submarines, Allied officials also cited his 1943 recommendation that concentration camp labor be used 
in German shipyards.  Field Marshal Hermann Goering also fell under the military rubric in his capacity as a 
Luftwaffe officer.  His notoriety and value to the tribunal were nevertheless derived much more from his 
economic and political contributions to the Third Reich, as he was the only surviving member of the highest 
ranks of Nazi leadership.139 
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For more than nine months, then, Allied prosecutors aired the dirty laundry of the Third Reich, while 
German defense attorneys presented mitigating and exculpatory evidence and identified holes in the 
prosecution’s arguments.  In the end, the court found eight defendants guilty of conspiracy and 12 guilty of 
crimes against peace.  It convicted Dönitz on counts two and three, sentencing him to 10 years in prison, and 
Raeder on counts one, two, and three, sentencing him to life imprisonment.  Both Keitel and Jodl were declared 
guilty on all counts and condemned to death by hanging.140 
But the Allied judges decided against labeling Germany’s “General Staff and High Command” a 
criminal organization.  This decision had less to do with the past actions of the Wehrmacht’s leaders than with 
more technical issues, however.  For one thing, the group was small (approximately 130 officers), which meant 
individual trials would be feasible and a blanket decision was unnecessary.  Second and more importantly, the 
group existed as a coherent body only in the IMT’s indictment.  “Whatever the conduct of the men in question,” 
observes Smith, “to hold them liable for membership in a nonexistent organization was too much for the 
Tribunal.”141  Evidence showed that the tasks and operational methods of the Wehrmacht High Command and 
related staffs were much like those of any other army.  Examining this “pattern of activities” did not lead to the 
conclusion that an organization or group existed, the judges explained; rather, the officers in question were “an 
aggregation of military men” who happened to hold high-ranking positions at a certain time.142   
Yet the judges also explicitly refused to condone the behavior of these men.  Prosecutors had presented 
“clear and convincing” evidence of their participation in “planning and waging aggressive war, and in 
committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.”  The officers had been “responsible in large measure for 
the miseries and suffering that have fallen on millions of men, women, and children” and were “a disgrace to 
the honourable profession of arms.”  Without their assistance, “the aggressive ambitions of Hitler and his fellow 
Nazis would have been academic and sterile.”  While not a group according to the terms of the IMT charter, 
they were “certainly a ruthless military caste,” the judges contended, adding that “contemporary German 
militarism flourished briefly with its recent ally, National Socialism, as well as or better than it had in the 
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generations of the past.”  In conclusion, the court recommended that the men be tried individually so that the 
criminals among them could be identified and punished.143 
 
The Response 
However one evaluated the trial’s outcome, one thing was certain: it directed a bright light on the Third 
Reich.  Dredging up multitudes of documents for public scrutiny and stringing out detailed testimony regarding 
the actions and beliefs of key military and civilian leaders, it did not disappoint the U.S. Information Control 
Division officials who in early November 1945 had suggested that the trial would give the German people an 
opportunity “to learn the truth about the character, policies and consequences of German Nazism and 
militarism.”  With the “true history” of the Third Reich before them, MG authorities hoped the Germans would 
“identify themselves with the prosecution.”144   
U.S. officials did not leave this effect entirely to chance, however.  “It was felt essential to make it 
difficult for German ears and eyes not to hear and see the convincing evidence presented to them,” Clay later 
explained.  Military government radio broadcasts and publications regularly covered the trial, as did the 
American-licensed German media sources.145  To facilitate the desired coverage, the Americans allowed 
German reporters into the courtroom, made trial documents available to them, and provided most newspapers 
and magazines with special additional paper allotments.146  They also monitored the German newspapers.  Thus 
a January 1946 “scrutiny report” on the Stuttgarter Zeitung noted that the paper had devoted roughly 15 percent 
of each issue during the past month to the trial, with “good coverage and prominent, lively headings.”147  A 
March issue of the Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung was criticized for assigning a meager 6 percent of its space to 
Nuremberg,148 while a May report complimented the Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung on a recent Nuremberg page, 
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commenting that the headline “The German way to war” gave an indication of its contents.  The Heidelberg 
paper, the reviewer added, had earlier been one of the worst papers for trial reporting but had since become one 
of the best, a development he attributed to advice received from MG press control officers.149 
For nearly a year, then, Württemberg-Baden’s major papers closely followed the proceedings.  Editors 
interspersed articles describing the trial and first person reactions to the process with inch upon inch of reprinted 
prosecutorial accusations and verbatim testimony from witnesses and defendants detailing Wehrmacht 
operations and high level government discussions.  Headlines proclaimed “General Staff for War Already in 
1923,” “Keitel Confirms the Systematic Preparation for War,” “Shootings and Political Measures: Jodl Claims 
to be an Honorable Man,” and “‘The Generals are Responsible.’”150  Ultimately, press coverage all over 
Germany revealed a Wehrmacht quite different from the nobly heroic fighting forces lauded by the Nazis and 
celebrated by many Germans right up until the end of the war.  In this version, German soldiers became 
exploiters, plunderers, issuers of criminal orders, and murderers.  Germany’s recent struggle for existence 
(Schicksalskampf), moreover, became a war of aggression systematically planned and secretly prepared for—
even as Hitler lectured the world on his desire for peace—and an internationally recognized crime that 
Germany’s generals had endorsed and enabled.151  Denouncing the defendants, the licensed press also 
sometimes explicitly underscored the value of the trial.  Analyzing the contents of the Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung 
and Mannheimer Morgen, historian Birgit Pape notes that both stressed the fundamental importance of the 
proceedings for an appraisal of Germany’s past, as well as for Germany’s future, and generally viewed the 
Allied approach as justifiable (berechtigt).  For both papers, Pape concludes, the deeper meaning of Nuremberg 
lay in hopes for a new legal order in the world.152 
Not surprisingly, the trial provoked indignation, anger, excuses, and arguments from former officers 
that effectively echoed the major claims of Nuremberg’s military defendants.  Germany’s soldiers had sworn an 
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oath of loyalty to Hitler, were bound to obedience, and had thus simply done their duty.  They had not fomented 
war, but rather warned against it.  They had not endorsed the regime’s agenda, participated in its crimes, or been 
capable of escaping the coercion of the Gestapo to extract themselves from service to criminals.  Furthermore, 
they believed the trial itself was an outrage, introducing new legal principles for the sole purpose of handing out 
punishment to former enemies.  Ongoing war crimes trials in American military courts, proceedings in German 
venues and foreign countries, and several high profile trials later conducted at Nuremberg by the Americans, all 
of which convicted additional high-ranking officers of war crimes, only amplified the tendency of Germany’s 
former military elites to see themselves as unjustly accused, unfairly persecuted, and wrongly defamed.  Even 
as they questioned the legitimacy of the legal proceedings, however, they would also increasingly latch onto the 
IMT’s acquittal of the “General Staff and High Command” as evidence of their innocent and honorable 
behavior, conveniently overlooking or ignoring the court’s explicit condemnation of the Wehrmacht’s 
conduct.153 
Many other Germans were far less aroused by the proceedings.  Contemporary observers, in fact, 
pointed to a wide range of responses.  Writing with typically bold strokes, New York Times reporter Raymond 
Daniell suggested in December 1945 that German reporters attending the trial “might as well be reporting a 
second-rate boxing bout for the music page for all the reader interest they are getting.”  In Frankfurt, he 
continued, it was “very noticeable that in restaurants newspaper readers fold their papers so that they can ignore 
the unpleasant reminders from Nuremberg.”154  Many Germans were just too obsessed with their own needs to 
ponder the Nuremberg process, a German writer suggested in the Stuttgarter Zeitung in February 1946.  In 
addition to these individuals, she divided her disinterested fellow citizens into three main groups: those who 
blithely assumed the criminals would be properly punished—just as they had always assumed Hitler would do 
the right thing; those who argued that they could not believe anything any more after being so badly lied to and 
let down; and those who complained that they had heard enough about atrocities and crimes—they had not 
known their leaders were such robbers and murderers and, even if they had, they could not have done anything 
about it.  But she also pointed to those who were more engaged: the indignant military cadres and a large group 
of people who objected to a long, highly publicized trial that would allow the defendants to strut before the 
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public once again, preferring that the men instead be quickly disposed of by shipping them off to Siberia for 
forced labor, hanging them from lampposts, or making them do reconstruction work under labor camp 
conditions.  Only a very small set of persons comprehended the true significance of the proceedings the writer 
asserted, adding that “a political system of such danger must be brought before the eyes of all the world in all its 
details, from the story of its founding to its downfall, as a deterrent for all political and military criminals of the 
future.”155   
Not all Germans ignored the moral component of the proceedings, but they also did not always draw 
conclusions welcomed by the Americans.  Some thought Nuremberg might atone for the sins of all of the 
German people in the eyes of the world.156  Observers also identified a strong tendency among Germans to 
happily blame their Nazi leaders for their  country’s recent conduct.  The attitude of many, wrote Daniell, was 
“very much like that of the legendary Russian family in a troika pursued by wolves who tossed their babies out 
behind them to appease the hungry animals.”157  One German who was a teenager in Bavaria at the time later 
recalled that once the war was over everyone in his village “wanted to believe that no one had been for it.  And 
no one had admitted they knew about the Holocaust, or at least not its magnitude.”  As a result, the trial had 
been “received with relief.”  “Here they sat in the dock—fat Hermann Goering, rigid General Keitel, crazy 
Rudolf Hess, and all the others.  They had done it.  Good riddance.  We are innocent.  Let’s go on with our 
lives.”158   
If interest in the proceedings varied, the verdicts caused a stir.  “Wherever a radio could be found, one 
could see a group of people gathered around listening in tense silence. . . . Many downtown administration 
offices stopped work completely,” wrote Herbert van der Berg from Ulm.159  Heidelberg’s Rhein-Neckar-
                                                 
155
 Erika Neuhäuser, “Das deutsche Volk und Nürnberg,” SZ, 2 Feb 46. 
 
156
 Bach, America’s Germany, 256-257. 
 
157
 Daniell, “‘So What?’ Say the Germans of Nuremberg.”  See also Bach, America’s Germany, 256. 
 
158
 Bernat Rosner and Frederic C. Tubach, An Uncommon Friendship: From Opposite Sides of the Holocaust (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001), 169-170. 
 
159
 Herbert van der Berg to Chief, Information Control Division, 1 Oct 46, NA, RG 260, OMGUS, OMGWB, Box 89, F: 
350.2 Political Movements, Organizations, and Activities Ulm 1946 [3]. 
 
 164 
Zeitung put out a special edition and “all over town people could be seen reading as they went along,” reported 
a local MG officer. “Here and there groups formed to discuss the pros and cons.”160   
While many Germans concluded that the judgments were generally fair, they also sometimes disagreed 
strongly with individual decisions.  Tasked with compiling German opinions, MG officials identified an array 
of perspectives.  Some of those interviewed appraised the operations of the tribunal as a whole.  “The most 
important thing established at Nuremberg is that wars are to be outlawed in the future,” a Karlsruhe streetcar 
conductor asserted, expressing a view shared by others as well.  One attorney saw an international court that 
made aggressive war illegal as “a sign of hope for world peace.”  But other Germans complained that the Allies 
were hardly in a position to pass judgment.  “I was a soldier myself,” said one Karlsruhe businessman.  “All our 
acts are termed crimes, but what the partisans did in the East and at other fronts, no mention is made of this at 
Nuremberg nor in the press.”  “But how about the air attacks on open German cities, where hundreds of 
thousands of innocent women and children lost their lives?” asked a “craftsman” who also cited the rapes and 
robberies that had occurred when French soldiers occupied Karlsruhe.  “If one wants to judge someone else, one 
has to be clean himself.”161   
Meanwhile, a forum in Ulm sponsored by Radio Stuttgart and attended by more than 1,000 people 
degenerated into what van der Berg termed a “circus.”  Several members of the crowd first “jeered” a featured 
speaker who condemned Jodl and Keitel for having prolonged a lost war and Foreign Minister Joachim von 
Ribbentrop for plotting the use of force to regain lost German territories.  And many later loudly cheered lord 
mayor Scholl when, in a “mildly worded” speech, he suggested that judges from neutral countries should also 
have participated.  When the floor opened for discussion, a local member of the KPD stated that he had been 
jailed in both the “second Reich” and Third Reich and expected to be jailed in the “Fourth Reich.”  “Truth is 
always on the side of the victorious nations, they are the ones who can do no wrong,” he argued.  “In my 
opinion,” he added, “the war mongers, such as Churchill and Truman are equally as guilty and should have just 
as ruthlessly been punished as our men.”  The crowd, van der Berg reported, had immediately “burst out in loud 
cheering, in agreement with what had been said” and the forum chairman was forced to stop the man from 
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speaking.  A later commentator questioned Allied use of German POWs as “slave laborers,” which provoked 
disruptive “abusive cat calls” from the crowd, as did other similar questions.  “One thing is certain,” wrote van 
der Berg in conclusion, “the whole affair carried a pro Nazi tune, and when leaving the forum one definitely had 
the impression that Ulm is still a Nazi Hochburg [stronghold].”162 
Opinions regarding the specific verdicts were also mixed.  The news that the tribunal had not declared 
the general staff to be a criminal organization reportedly received a “joyful reception of welcome in Ulm and 
Heidenheim.”163  The mayor of Pforzheim viewed this decision “with suspicion” given the convictions of Jodl 
and Keitel, but expressed the opinion “that to have termed the General staff guilty collectively would have been 
wrong.”  One Karlsruhe merchant referenced the general staff verdict with the comment “I consider all the 
militarists criminal,” while a Karlsruhe “Communist civic official” also openly disagreed with the judgment.  
“He claims that this is decisive in the attempt to stamp out militarism and imperialism,” reported a local MG 
official.164  American officials in Stuttgart similarly indicated that the general staff decision was “under attack, 
mostly from the extreme left.”165 
A common reaction to the Raeder and Dönitz verdicts, meanwhile, was the charge that they were too 
lenient.  Many in Heidelberg suggested the sentences should have been reversed.  The Keitel and Jodl 
judgments were still more controversial.  Widespread was the view that the two had been unfairly sentenced, 
punished simply for doing their duty for the Fatherland, although others suggested that the men were receiving 
their due.166 
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Most interesting was criticism variously articulated by both those who approved the Jodl and Keitel 
verdicts and those who condemned them.  The men, it was argued, should at least be shot rather than hanged.  
Two “outstanding scientists and university professors” from Karlsruhe, a local MG officer explained, “agree in 
the contention that the two ‘soldiers’ sentenced to death should be granted a soldiers death.”167  A local member 
of the SPD—“an ex-soldier who lost an arm”—considered the Keitel and Jodl sentences to be “awfully hard,” 
wrote an American in Stuttgart.  “He believes they obeyed orders, they deserve an honorable death, if to be 
given capital punishment.”168  Heidelberg officials reported to the local MG office that even many among the 
working classes, especially veterans, thought that Jodl and Keitel deserved to be shot, as was appropriate for 
soldiers.169  Here, too, a baroness with two commanding generals as brothers had voiced indignation that men 
such as Jodl and Keitel were treated the same as the Nazi propagandist Julius Streicher.  “The soldiers should at 
least have been sentenced to die by firing squad.”170  Conversely, those quite content to let the men hang 
reportedly included “socialists, communists and anti-Fascists” in Mannheim who had been persecuted by the 
Nazis; the SPD secretary in Heidelberg who argued that because “they had not acted chivalrously they did not 
serve a soldier’s death”; and a former general staff officer from Stuttgart who believed that the two “did not 
deserve another death.”  To Karl Grathwohl, DVP Chairman in Heidelberg, the lesson to be derived from this 
line of argument was clear.  Reported a local MG official, “The majority of Germans are, as he believes, in 
favour of a soldiers death for the condemned generals; this attitude shows how little the people have forsworn 
militarism.”171 
 
Germans and the Wehrmacht 
In their various initiatives to reduce the influence of militarists in German society, the Americans were 
not ready to label all soldiers or even all officers “militarists.”  But they did want to see a change in German 
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attitudes toward their own soldiers.  The military profession and military leaders should no longer be elevated 
and glorified.  This meant ending instinctive deference to highly-decorated military uniforms, branding the 
Wehrmacht’s top leaders war-mongers and criminals, and, through these and other measures, reducing the 
standing of soldiers in German society and the automatic respect they frequently demanded and elicited.  
German reactions to the Nuremberg trial, however, hint at the complexity of the relationship between the 
German people and their now disbanded military in the aftermath of the war.  Many Germans readily agreed 
that militarists should be denied influence in German society.  And those responsible for dismissals and hiring 
made certain choices designed to achieve this goal.  But despite both this readiness to condemn militarists and a 
tendency to link the terms “militarist” and “military” in some fashion, the Germans had diverse, evolving, and 
sometimes conflicted views regarding the Wehrmacht.  And despite often sharing a rhetoric of anti-militarism 
with the Americans, the opinions the Germans expressed concerning their own soldiers were not always quite 
what their occupiers wished they were. 
Recently, historian Frank Biess has shed new light on German views of their country’s recent military 
past and on the relationship between the Germans and their veterans by considering how communal narratives 
regarding returning soldiers evolved in the immediate postwar years.  During the first year or two of occupation, 
he argues, public discussions of returning POWs differentiated between individual soldiers in terms of guilt and 
responsibility for the crimes of National Socialism and Germany’s defeat, leaving room for perpetrators, 
bystanders, and collaborators, as well as victims.  Yet this trend rather rapidly gave way to “a ubiquitous 
discourse of German victimization,” according to which former POWs were innocent victims whose present 
suffering bore no relationship to any past German aggression or crimes.  Moreover, by the mid 1950s, he 
concludes, soldiers returning from Soviet captivity had evolved into the protagonists of “redemptive narratives,” 
their allegiance to “transhistorical and essentially German values” such as “Christianity, Heimat, [and] German 
culture” having enabled them to survive Soviet totalitarianism, with these values now “to serve as moral 
guideposts for the process of postwar reconstruction.”172 
Analyzing German newspapers from the immediate postwar period, historian Jörg Echternkamp has 
reached a complementary conclusion.  Coverage of war crimes trials illuminated the criminal activities of the 
Wehrmacht as well as its close ties to the National Socialist regime, he notes.  The war itself, moreover, was 
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unveiled as a criminal war of aggression with the Wehrmacht generals backing and controlling Germany’s 
rearmament behind the scenes.  Yet even as criticism rained down upon the nation’s former military elites for 
these failings and their destructive and unnecessarily deadly prolongation of the war, at least some Germans 
resisted condemning German military tradition out of hand, lamenting that the Wehrmacht’s relationship with 
National Socialism had eroded the honor of the German military and thus marked a regrettable end to 
Germany’s glorious military past.  Some commentators also stressed that the average German soldier had 
retained his honor.  There was no shame in defeat, they maintained, treating the character and purpose of the 
German soldier during the recent war as comparable to that of a long line of honorable soldiers.  The fact that 
Germany’s “true soldiers,” who comprised a majority, had failed to act against their despicable Nazi comrades 
could be explained both by the efficacy of Nazi propaganda and surveillance and by the praiseworthy discipline 
of Germany’s soldiers.  They had been apolitical men who obediently did their duty, as expected.  The majority 
of Germany’s troops, it could therefore also be argued, had been the badly misused victims of Germany’s Nazi 
leaders and their military toadies.173   
As Echternkamp shows, Theodor Heuss advanced many of these ideas in the pages of the Rhein-
Neckar-Zeitung, as perhaps might be expected from the minister who also pleaded with MG authorities on 
behalf of young former officers.  This type of thinking was evident in other newspapers in Württemberg-Baden 
as well.  If any military men were to be excluded from exoneration and sympathy, they were NCOs, whom 
former subordinates denigrated for their arrogance and abusiveness, and high-ranking German officers, 
criticized for their concessions to Hitler and responsibility for Germany’s destruction.174  But even attacks on 
Germany’s military leaders were not universal or without gradations.  Ulm’s Kurt Fried was among those who 
stressed that not all professional officers should be attacked and excluded as militarists.  Some were quite ready 
to settle into civilian life and to help with reconstruction, and they should be welcomed in this arena.  Officers, 
he argued, should be evaluated individually.  Those “who as troop officers did their—occasionally in the literal 
sense of the word, damned—duty might expect that this will be respected.”  They should be treated differently 
than those who had mistreated their subordinates, blown up bridges, or committed war crimes.  And both groups 
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should be handled differently than those who had held influential positions in the higher reaches of the 
Wehrmacht and thereby “actively supported the lunatic conquest policies of Hitler.”175   
The ambivalent views of the Germans regarding militarists, their former soldiers, and their country’s 
military past did not go unnoticed by the Americans in OMGUS’s Information Control Division.  In an attempt 
to determine to what extent “militaristic tendencies” still existed in Germany, they initiated a multi-phase study 
in mid 1947 that began by asking “leading Germans” in all four zones to draft short definitions of the term 
“militarism.”  This initial exercise, observed the report eventually prepared by information control officials, 
“revealed a strong tendency on the part of Germans to differentiate between militarism—which was universally 
condemned—and soldierliness (Soldatentum), for which the majority expressed anything from tolerance to 
admiration.”  The Americans pointed out, too, that because “no respondent was inclined to classify himself as a 
militarist, it was necessary to penetrate beyond surface protestations to determine actual convictions and 
underlying prejudices.”  In interviews subsequently conducted with some 200 church leaders, businessmen, 
educators, politicians, and other “opinion leaders,” the Americans thus posed a series of questions aimed at 
digging deeper, asking about the value of military training, the role of militarism in German history, the threat 
militarism posed to democratic governance, the desirability of reconstituting a German military, the reasons the 
pacifist movement had failed during the Weimar era, and the most recent demilitarization efforts being carried 
out by the Germans.176  The results of these interviews showed clear trends in German thinking regarding 
militarists and the role of the military in German society, but also brought to light a multiplicity of opinions.  
Both are worth looking at more closely.   
Two-thirds of the respondents, for example, indicated that they could not support any type of military 
education for Germany’s youth because of the substantial threat of a rebirth of militarism.  Most of those 
interviewed, reported the Americans, seemed to agree with a Bavarian official who had argued “that, even 
though a period of military training could inculcate the soldierly virtues of love of order, cleanliness, discipline, 
respect for duty, and a sense of group feeling, he preferred that such characteristics be developed by other, less 
dangerous, methods.”  Other interviewees, however, had endorsed military training as a valuable way of 
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instilling “discipline, order, and respect for society” in children, while some “more violent critics” saw no 
advantages to such education and protested that it fostered blind obedience.  Opinion leaders in Berlin were 
most likely to support this type of training, the report suggested, while those in south Germany, especially 
Bavaria, “were more inclined to condemn all soldierly training as Prussian militarism.”177 
Appraisals of Germany’s past were similarly varied, the Americans observed.  The idea “that German 
history had been dominated by a spirit of militarism and controlled by militaristic rulers” was endorsed by 
“leaders of all major political parties and by outstanding educators, journalists, and public officials.”  But there 
were differences of emphasis.  If KPD and SPD respondents often “regarded the ‘industrial barons of the 
Rhineland and Silesia in the first ranks’ of war agitators,” the more typical response, particularly from 
Bavarians, was to stress the “specifically Prussian nature of militarism.”  Sometimes voicing nuanced opinions 
concerning historical figures such as Frederick the Great, Bismarck, and Wilhelm II,  the interviewees regarded 
Hitler as “the arch militarist – ‘the prototype of the most dangerous, chauvinistic militarism’ and the ‘absolute 
exponent and final culmination of a development’ in this direction.”  Beyond this, the Americans reported, war 
guilt was “charged chiefly to the nazis and the general staff,” although many agreed with the remark of one 
person who had contended “that ‘differentiation among the chief militarists is impossible; National Socialists, 
generals, and industrialists are all children of the militaristic-aggressive-arrogant spirit.’”178  
Asked whether “former military figures of acceptable reputation could be useful to a new German 
democracy,” those interviewed were “divided.”  Some drew a distinction between “old-line generals”—with 
their “chivalry and regard for professional honor”—and “political generals.”  Others thought making such 
distinctions was “unrealistic.”  Noted the Americans, “Leftist opinion as a whole was that, even though there 
might be a theoretical difference, in practice all generals were the same: they were militarists who regarded 
military aims above every other consideration.”  The “majority viewpoint,” the Americans added, was that 
“even though old-line generals may be less dangerous politically, . . . they and the nazi generals are equally 
militaristic.” Given these views, moreover, it was “not surprising” that the respondents almost unanimously 
agreed that “former generals should not be allowed to fill important positions in democratic Germany,” 
rejecting the men “either because of their war guilt, the threat of renascent militarism to democracy, or because 
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of the narrowness of their military education.”  Only a few had called for evaluating each man individually.  
One Bavarian official had asserted, moreover, that if the German people were asked to choose between a 
popular general and a civilian in a presidential election, they would elect the general.  But he had also suggested 
that “because of fear of the occupying powers . . . no party would dare nominate a general now.”179   
Finally, nearly all of the opinion leaders had contended that a country could “maintain its honor 
without an army.”  On the other hand, more than half thought that a country “probably could not long maintain 
its independence without an army.”  They wished it were otherwise, but believed that the current international 
situation made “some sort of German military force essential to national existence”—though it would need to be 
“democratic and non-aggressive in character.”  The Americans also reported, however, that a “substantial 
minority” strongly opposed reconstituting a German military “on the grounds of both fear and hope: fear of 
returning power to the hands of the former ruling class and fear of a revival of German militarism and the 
consequent danger to democracy and peace; hope that an international police force . . . will render such national 
armies unnecessary and obsolete.”180 
In assessing the results of these and other findings, the Americans saw much to praise.  First and 
foremost, they concluded that “among German leaders militarism, i.e., the enthusiastic dedication to the 
principle of armed force in settling international disputes, is at a low ebb.”  Conceding that some respondents 
may have been reacting to the fact that militarism was currently “unpopular,” they argued that the German 
answers nevertheless had shown that most “sincerely reject[ed] a philosophy which glorifies a martial spirit.”  
However, the Americans also maintained that the unanimous opposition to “what might be called the excesses 
of militarism” did not necessarily signify anything, since most people were always against “what is regarded as 
the excesses of a system.”181  
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Looking more closely, then, they reported approvingly that about half of those interviewed seemed 
cognizant of the fact “that to give the devil one finger means to give him the whole arm, and for that reason they 
reject military activities in post-Hitler Germany altogether” and “appear[ed] to be aware of the complex nature 
of the problem,” with an “anti-militaristic approach” that was “both intelligent and enthusiastic.”  But the views 
of the reminder led the Americans to suggest that militarism was “far from dead in Germany.”  They explained: 
Military education, military training, a new army, though rarely advocated without reservation, are not 
infrequently advocated as the lesser evil, the greater evil being domestic unrest, national 
defenselessness, the threat from the East.  And it must be remembered that in the 1930’s the conviction 
that Hitler and rearmament were the lesser evil was more important in bringing the nazis to power than 
the relatively small number of political fanatics. 
There is another reason emerging from the interviews why even those who—no doubt with 
sincerity—profess distaste for the excesses of militarism would be a poor bulwark against it.  Their 
approach to militarism is surprisingly limited; they do not see it as a problem tied up with all other 
social and political, even cultural, questions in Germany.  Thus, they reveal that they cannot be 
regarded as being well equipped to combat an evil whose true nature, i.e., its close interrelation with all 
other German problems, they fail to recognize.182 
 
Still, the Americans concluded that these German leaders appeared to be far less militaristic than the 
German people in general.  A 1946 survey had shown, for instance, that 39 percent of Germans believed that 
“education of youth should be based on military principles,” 31 percent “considered the Treaty of Versailles the 
source of World War II,” 45 percent thought Germany “should have an army to defend herself against 
aggression from other European nations,” and just 45 percent believed the Allied decision to deny Germany an 
army was justified.  The Americans thus considered the views of Germany’s leaders to be a very hopeful sign, 
but also intimated that Germany’s future path would ultimately depend greatly upon what happened in other 
areas of German life.183 
Significantly, in reaching these conclusions, the Americans were also taking into account comments 
they had gleaned from German leaders regarding yet another effort explicitly aimed at demilitarizing German 
society.  In 1946, MG officials had turned over to the Germans primary responsibility for the denazification and 
demilitarization of German society as they pertained to individuals.  And it was here, as much as anywhere, that 
the German people were showing both the limits of their critique of the Wehrmacht and an unwillingness to 
                                                                                                                                                       
in wall decorations, the report writer noted, “but there was also the inevitable photograph showing the present mayor in 
uniform.”  William J. Sailer to Chief, Information Control Division, 4 Jun 46, NA, RG 260, OMGUS, OMGWB, Box 88, F: 
350.2 Political Movements, Organizations, and Activities Stuttgart 1946 [2].  
 
182
 “German Militarism: A Study of Militaristic Tendencies in Germany,” 10. 
 
183
 Ibid. 
 
 173 
engage the related problem of militarism to the extent that the Americans clearly thought desirable and that the 
Germans’ often ready condemnation of the phenomenon would seem to have warranted. 
 
The Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism 
The earliest American and German removal and hiring actions clearly associated militarists and 
soldiers.  This may be explained partly by the fact that some suspected militarists were also obviously Nazis and 
their perceived militarism thus a mere footnote to a Fragebogen cluttered with incriminating membership dates.  
Semantic influences and historical stereotypes no doubt encouraged the tendency as well.  But the driving force 
was likely the narrow interpretation supplied by U.S. regulations.  Most harried German and American 
authorities would have had little desire to expand the scope of removals or rejections beyond the circle specified 
by law.  The twists and turns of American denazification efforts, however, soon forced MG officials and their 
German counterparts to sit down and ponder anew what, exactly, made someone a militarist and who, exactly, 
should be labeled as such.   
By mid autumn 1945, almost no one was happy with the American denazification program.  
Württemberg-Baden’s highest officials were only a few among many Germans who openly criticized its far-
reaching effects, condemning as arbitrary and reminiscent of Nazi practices an approach that based removals on 
organizational memberships and career achievements rather than on individual assessments; stressing that the 
host of dismissals was incapacitating the German economy and schools, obstructing the ability of German 
administrations to govern, and hindering the creation of a strong democracy built on the rule of law; and 
warning of possible unrest and the likely resurgent appeal of National Socialism with so many so negatively 
affected.  Many MG officers were dissatisfied as well and seeking a way to both strengthen Germany’s 
administrative apparatus and avoid impeding—or appearing to impede—the reconstruction of Germany’s 
economy.  In time, the Americans decided that turning over responsibility for denazification to the Germans 
themselves offered the best hope of addressing the most pressing problems.184 
Accordingly, in late 1945 and early 1946, MG officials worked with German leaders to develop an 
entirely new approach to denazification and demilitarization that assigned the Germans primary responsibility 
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for implementation and replaced category-based decisions with individualized appraisals of both Nazis and 
militarists.  The fundamental tone of the undertaking also changed, with an emphasis on removal and exclusion 
from German society replaced by a focus on evaluation and punishment.  The latter now not only targeted those 
who had committed criminal offenses during the Third Reich, but also those who had supported the Nazi 
movement without engaging in clearly illegal activities.185  As one MG official scribbled on his copy of the 
applicable law during a briefing, the new initiative “fixe[d] individual responsibility and impose[d] punishment 
in proportion to the individuals responsibility for and participation in Nazi activities.”186  To the satisfaction of 
the Germans, moreover, with punishment came also the possibility of rehabilitation and reinstatement. 
Procedurally, the new German Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism required 
every German to fill out a questionnaire which a government-appointed prosecutor subsequently used either to 
exempt a person from further obligations or to assign the person to one of five categories: major offender, 
offender (activist, militarist, profiteer), lesser offender (probationer), follower, or exonerated person.  A local 
tribunal (Spruchkammer) of non-Nazi Germans then considered each case and made a final classification, 
subject to appeal.  Throughout the process, the onus was upon the accused to disprove the initial charges.  Those 
charged as major offenders and offenders, meanwhile, could only work in positions of “ordinary labor” until the 
tribunal decided their cases.187   
In handing out verdicts, the tribunals also assessed penalties within a framework specified by the law.  
Thus, major offenders had to serve two to 10 years in a labor camp, lost their property permanently, forfeited 
voting and party membership rights, were denied all public pension claims, faced possible housing restrictions, 
and were barred from participating in many business or professional activities for at least 10 years.  Offenders 
faced similar penalties, though they could be sentenced only to a maximum of five years in a labor camp (or, 
alternatively, were conscripted for community work), might have only part of their property confiscated, and 
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were kept from business and professional activities for up to five years.  Lesser offenders were subject to two or 
three years of probation, during which time their work options were severely restricted, they were required to 
make payments to a reparations fund, and they might receive reduced pensions.  Followers had to pay fines and 
faced potential employment penalties.188 
In general, the substance and evolution of the negotiations that produced this new system are outside 
the scope of this study and are covered more than adequately elsewhere.189  The elements of the legislation 
aimed explicitly at militarists have received much less attention, however.  Hardly emerging as an exceptionally 
divisive point in either internal conversations or American-German discussions, the question of who should be 
targeted in this respect was nevertheless also not one that had an obvious or easy answer.  What is more, the 
new law ultimately introduced a transformed definition of what constituted a “militarist,” theoretically 
increasing the number of individuals who might be charged with this offense and evidencing a variety of 
preconceptions, concerns, resentments, and, perhaps, a new understanding of militarism that explicitly took note 
of its most recent manifestation in the Third Reich.  The deliberations that produced this transformation and the 
ways in which the new definition was applied therefore warrant more careful analysis. 
 
Drafting the Law 
Responding to the widespread desire for change in the American approach to denazification, Clay in 
late November 1945 formed a Denazification Policy Board (DPB) and tasked it with evaluating the status of 
denazification in the U.S. Zone and devising a new program that would give the Germans “as much 
responsibility as possible.”190  The Germans, meanwhile, were moving forward independently.  American 
officials never authorized a denazification plan the Bavarians drafted of their own accord, but, in early 
December, Clay encouraged the minister-presidents of the three American-occupied German states (Bavaria, 
Hesse, and Württemberg-Baden) to prepare a joint plan under the auspices of the Länderrat, a council charged 
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with helping to coordinate policy and activities in the U.S. Zone.  In response, the Germans formed an ad hoc 
committee and agreed to use the Bavarian draft plan as a starting point for discussion.191 
Much like existing American regulations, the Bavarian document took a minimalist approach to the 
issue of militarists.  Categorizing political offenders into four categories ranging from “criminally or otherwise 
politically especially severely incriminated” to “follower,” the draft worried primarily about National Socialist 
attitudes, memberships, and leadership functions in doing so.  The only exception came in prescribing an 
automatic initial assignment to the “politically severely incriminated” category for general staff officers active 
after 1935 and for “members of the Wehrmacht and Reichsarbeitsdienst [RAD, or Reich Labor Service], 
regardless of rank, who misused the power of their position (Dienstgewalt) to obtain personal benefits or to 
bully their subordinates.”  Thus, aside from general staff officers and any militarists dressed in Nazi uniforms, 
the Bavarians considered only aberrant soldiers to be politically suspect.192   
Württemberg-Baden’s ministerial directors were mostly satisfied with this approach.  After reviewing 
the draft, they suggested only that general staff officers should not be automatically assigned to the “politically 
severely incriminated” category but should instead be classified among those who could also possibly be 
assigned to the “politically less incriminated” category.193   
Officials from Hesse, however, arrived at the first ad hoc committee meeting in late December 1945 
with a very different proposal.  Emphasizing that the totality of a person’s actual conduct, not formal 
memberships, should determine a person’s “political responsibility,” Hesse’s draft law described five types of 
particularly responsible people.  Laying out these categories in general terms, an opening section stated that, 
among many others, “activists” included those who championed militarism after Germany had surrendered, 
“profiteers” included those who had benefited from war or rearmament, “political offenders” included those 
who had promoted the goals of militarism or benefited from them, and “followers” included those who had 
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supported fascism and militarism “simply through membership.”  But it also singled out specifically as 
“militarists” anyone “who sought to orient all of national life toward a policy of military force or who advocated 
or was responsible for the domination, exploitation, or deportation of foreign peoples.”194  This definition was 
consistent with a related explanatory document, in which the Hessians argued that in using the term “militarist,” 
“the soldierly” (das Soldatische) should not be rejected lock, stock, and barrel.  Rather, “the ruthless 
subordination of all of public and private life” to considerations of a policy of force was more important.  “The 
good soldier need not be a militarist,” they maintained, “while, conversely, many a civilian, especially many a 
banker, absolutely was a militarist.”195    
Interestingly, the Hessians effectively backtracked from this broad conception in describing those 
individuals who, according to their plan, would be required to register with German authorities as militarists.  
Here, they slid into language more familiar to those well-versed in U.S. regulations, citing anyone who had 
been active in the armed forces holding a rank of colonel or higher; staff officers who had served as members of 
the general staff after 1935; “anyone who, without being compelled by official duty, was a member of the 
Organization Todt, with an officer’s rank”; anyone professionally active in the RAD holding an officer’s rank; 
and all National Socialist Indoctrination Officers.  Since these men would be given the opportunity to refute 
their formal assignment to the “militarist” group before a German tribunal, the Hessians also described for the 
tribunals the types of individuals who, in particular, should be declared militarists.  These included “anyone 
who treated foreign civilians or POWs in a way contrary to international law in either Germany or the occupied 
territories”; “anyone responsible for excesses, plundering, or deportations, even in combating resistance 
movements”; “anyone who, as a commander, was responsible for the destruction of cities and the countryside in 
Germany after the invasion”; “anyone who ordered that youth under the age of 18 or the Volkssturm should be 
used in combat”; “anyone who ordered the bombing of residences”; and, as the Bavarians had first proposed, 
Wehrmacht and RAD members who misused their positions.196 
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Not ready to brand all soldiers militarists, the Hessians thus helpfully attempted to explain what 
exactly it was that made a person a militarist.  Yet the characteristics they described were unusual.  American 
occupation policies had consistently embodied the assumption that there were Nazis who were militarists, but 
also militarists who were not Nazis, including, especially, German military officers.  Similarly, they recognized 
that Germany had its share of war criminals, but counted only a portion of Germany’s officers among them.  
German officials and journalists frequently acted and argued according to these assumptions as well.  The 
drafters of this proposed law, however, put something quite different forward.  Alluding to a rather traditional 
view of militarism in suggesting that, in general, militarists desired to bring all of German life into line with a 
policy of military force, they apparently did not believe this type of thinking needed to be considered in 
determining who, in particular, would be declared militarists.  Instead, the principal distinguishing attributes of 
a militarist were, at best, deviant or morally repugnant forms of soldierly behavior, and, at worst, criminal 
conduct.  The reason for this is difficult to pin down, although the context in which the proposal was formulated 
may offer some clues.  
In recent decades, historians have stressed the degree to which Germany’s military leaders bought into 
the ideological assumptions of the Nazi regime, launching and waging a war that was, in its fundamental 
essence, a criminal war of racial extermination.  With this as a backdrop, historian Manfred Messerschmidt has 
analyzed the “new face” of German militarism during the Third Reich and cited as its identifying characteristics 
the “inclusion of the whole ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ [people’s community] in the war preparations” and “the 
grounding of the state’s authority on two armed ‘pillars,’ the Nazi Party with its armed forces on one side and 
the Wehrmacht on the other.”197  The German military thus became a functionary of the Nazi state, with Hitler 
controlling all military policy.  Through these developments, Messerschmidt maintains, older forms of 
militarism were systematically combined and radicalized to the point of criminality.  He goes on to explain that 
for the militarism of the Nazi state and its Wehrmacht the conduct of the war in southeastern and eastern Europe 
became symptomatic.  An existing German tendency to discount international law in the interests of waging a 
successful war reached a new level of conviction; laws were now subordinate to Hitler’s desires.  The territories 
controlled by the Wehrmacht became the focal point of a war of worldviews where law did not exist and 
“militarism manifested itself as a criminal phenomenon.”  The war here was distinguished by Germany’s 
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occupation methods, with distorted views of the enemy and the power of Hitler’s orders making systematic 
murder and mass destruction fundamental—and justifiable—war goals.  This new German militarism, 
Messerschmidt observes, “held moral concepts, traditions, and legal convictions to be disposable based on 
decisions of the Führer.”198 
Notably, already in late 1945, Allied prosecutors at Nuremberg were beginning to make these linkages 
in unveiling Germany’s highest-profile militarists as obedient war criminals.  German newspapers, moreover, 
were not only reporting on the trial, but circulating unvarnished accounts of other court proceedings that painted 
a dark picture of the recent conduct of Germany’s military elites.  It seems likely, therefore, that German 
officials, while hardly positing updated theoretical interpretations of German militarism, were nevertheless 
perceiving Germany’s traditional military leaders and their actions in a new way and translating those insights 
into concrete regulations.  The Nuremberg proceedings also offered German leaders a clear picture of Allied 
complaints against the German General Staff and High Command, something they perhaps believed they could 
not ignore in crafting a new law targeting militarists.  Then, too, as one later observer suggested, the “militarist” 
category of the law offered the Germans a means of corralling for examination allegedly apolitical military men 
for a political accounting, “as many soldiers explicitly or implicitly filled with national socialist ideas were 
militarists.”199   
Significantly, however, by classifying as militarists only those who had held responsible military or 
political positions and/or whose activities were deviant or criminal, the Hessians also effectively safeguarded 
the greater part of the once fully mobilized Volksgemeinschaft from charges of militarism.  Whether 
intentionally or not, their legislation spared good soldiers from censure and ignored many individuals who may 
have contributed to the persistent seeping of military practices and values into German society and culture and 
to the nation’s steady push toward war before 1939, not to mention the crowds, both literal and figurative, who 
had wildly cheered the Wehrmacht’s early prowess in World War II. 
After considering both this Hessian draft and the Bavarian document, the Länderrat’s ad hoc 
committee chose the former as the basis for further talks.  A revised version of the draft law that emerged from 
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these initial conversations, with its provisions on militarists intact, was also later discussed at a meeting of the 
ministers of justice of the U.S. Zone.  On this occasion, participating American officials also obtained a copy, 
which they circulated widely within OMGUS during the days that followed.200 
In the meantime, German officials continued to debate the merits of the revised draft.  In Württemberg-
Baden, its provisions generated an assortment of external and internal comments.  Among the letters received 
by state officials, for instance, was one sent from Landkreis Pforzheim by former Major General Erich von 
Falkenhayn.201  Referencing a recent newspaper article on the law, the general tried to refute what he perceived 
as attacks upon his profession.  If, in using the term “militarists,” one meant men who wanted to subdue other 
people using force of arms and to rule internally with the sword, then one would need to look somewhere other 
than the German officer corps to find them, the general argued.  Germany’s officers had done their duty and 
focused on winning the war as deliberately apolitical instruments of the legally established government.  It was 
“unjust” and “not democratic” to defame and punish them as militarists for this.  Even more unjust was singling 
out a group of officers according to their rank or professional activities.  Either all professional soldiers were 
militarists—including Allied soldiers—or this was limited to exceptional individual cases.  One should expect, 
Falkenhayn suggested in conclusion, that German officials would show more understanding for the men who 
had done nothing more than do their duty for the Fatherland and their fellow Germans during the past two 
wars.202  A retired colonel in Mannheim likewise fumed with frustration at the treatment of loyal professional 
soldiers.  Complaining that there was no obvious definition for the term militarist—he cited a variety he had 
come across—he sought to deflect criticism by contending that reserve soldiers had also been involved in war 
planning and activities and that their ranks probably included a greater number of “virulent militarists.”203    
By including colonels in its collection of presumed militarists, the proposed law contained a definition 
of “militarists” that was even broader than that subscribed to by American and British soldiers, protested yet 
another letter writer, who then argued vigorously for excluding most Wehrmacht Beamten (civilian officials) 
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and technical experts from the pool.  His own proposed categories intimated that the key defining criteria should 
be whether a person had helped to plan for the war, had held political or military authority and responsibility for 
issuing orders, and/or had been involved in criminal activities, whether in the form of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, or contributions to Germany’s destruction.  With this as a standard, he was quite ready to 
consign German generals, general staff officers, and high-ranking Wehrmacht Beamten, doctors, and judges to 
the ranks of the militarists.204 
On the other hand, several comments from official circles stressed ideas rather than professional 
groupings.  A memo committed to Württemberg-Baden’s files argued that the definition of militarist should not 
be expanded beyond the bounds of existing Allied declarations.  In recent months, the writer contended, the 
Americans and British had pointed out that it was not possible to penalize, persecute, or describe as criminal all 
or even certain groups of professional soldiers due only to their occupation, rank, or specific function.  
“Military” did not equal “militarist,” he stressed.  Teachers, editors, politicians, and others could, on the basis of 
their work, be identified as militarists.  In point of fact, only two types of people could logically be described as 
militarists, he argued.  They included “anyone who preaches the use of military force (war) solely for the 
purpose of conquest or who orders the deployment of the military power of a state for this goal” or “anyone 
who carries over to the whole state, or parts of the state—for example, the civil administration or economic life 
or political life—manners [Formen] and institutions specific to and necessary only for military service.”  In 
both cases, he added, it was a matter not of military, but of political activities.205  A high-level government 
advisor likewise questioned the “schematic” categorizing of colonels and staff officers, citing another view of 
militarists that saw as the heart of the matter whether someone believed that military force should be regarded 
as the only meaningful factor in relations between nations.206 
Württemberg-Baden’s principal decision makers, however, did little to alter the existing draft’s 
language.  When the Länderrat’s ad hoc committee reassembled in early January, the Land’s representative 
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brought along a revamped draft law that nevertheless contained few changes in its stipulations regarding 
militarists.  It merely dropped colonels from consideration, with the relevant phrase now covering only “anyone 
who was active in the Wehrmacht in the rank of a general after 1935 or in a superior rank.”207   
Although the committee’s subsequent discussion of new draft laws developed by each of the three 
states resulted in yet another draft, the Germans largely stuck to the original Hessian ideas regarding militarists.  
The second clause in the opening remarks was amended to condemn not only anyone who advocated or was 
responsible for the domination of foreign nations, but also those “who for this purpose promoted armament.”  
References to persons who had deployed juveniles and the Volkssturm were deleted, while those censured for 
abusing their authority now also included members of the Organization Todt and the Transport Group Speer.  
The German officials also adopted the Württemberg-Baden revisions regarding general officers and went on to 
modify the clause covering the general staff, narrowing the pool of those affected to encompass only “staff 
officers who after the 4th of February 1938 as general staff officers belonged to the leading staff of the armed 
forces (Wehrmacht)” or the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, army, air force, or navy.208   
Even as the Germans were refining their stance, OMGUS officials were criticizing the earlier draft on 
multiple counts.  Only a few people could be accused of having attempted to bring all of German national life 
into line with a policy of military force, argued one civilian official.  The definition therefore undercut U.S. 
policy goals.209  A militarist was not necessarily “anyone ‘responsible for dominating, exploiting, and deporting 
other peoples,’” the chief of the Disarmament Branch of OMGUS’s Armed Forces Division protested and 
suggested that the references to colonels and higher-ranking officers and to any staff officers who were 
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members of the general staff after 1935 did “not adequately cover the field.”210  The head of the Government 
Affairs Division of Bavaria’s Land office argued that “the militarist tradition of the German General Staff has 
been constant since the days of Scharnhorst and Clausewitz” and that he saw “no change of character or 
intentions . . . as concerns members of the imperial general staff responsible for World War I, the general staff 
officers guilty of illegal rearmament during the Republic, and the members of the general staff of Hitler who 
plotted the present war.”  He thus believed the law should target anyone who had ever been a member of the 
general staff.211  Another official was less certain that “all those holding the rank of colonel or superior rank 
should be deemed militarists,” although he was ready to defer to the views of the Armed Forces Division on 
this.  He questioned, however, the clauses targeting those who had sent juveniles and the Volkssturm into 
combat, ordered the bombing of residential areas, or bullied their subordinates.  The bombings might be “a very 
nasty thing” and abusive army officers “might be bad actors,” but he was not sure punishing these people was 
one of the American denazification and demilitarization goals.212  
On the other hand, Dr. Karl Lowenstein, an émigré law professor working for OMGUS’s Legal 
Division, believed certain groups were missing, including editors of military journals and “leading members of 
the officers organizations which consistently propagated militarism even though they did not hold the rank of 
colonel.”213  Major Fritz Oppenheimer, another émigré working in the same division who, like Lowenstein, was 
involved in talks with the Germans regarding the law, questioned their overall approach.  Comfortable with the 
“basic policies” and “general structure” of the German draft, he criticized its amalgamation of “elements of 
purification, reparation and punishment.”  Criminal punishment, he asserted, should be left to regular courts.  
“The emphasis upon criminal aspects is particularly apparent in the definition of the category of militarist,” he 
added, “which as it stands is almost equivalent to war criminal.”  Conversely, he thought that the Germans gave 
“insufficient attention” to “those who represent the militarist tradition in the generally accepted use of the term, 
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i.e. persons who aim at the primate [sic] of the military over the civil power, who subject the entire policy of the 
country to military considerations, who regard war as a normal and permissible means of foreign policy, and 
who advocate or glorify military aggression and conquest.”214 
The American Denazification Policy Board was also busy formulating its own proposal.  A draft 
document circulated in December 1945 by its working committee had contained no clauses specifically aimed 
at militarists, but the board was still gathering comments.215  And at least two OMGUS memoranda dealt with 
the issue directly. 
One complained that the United States had done little to date to remove and exclude militarists, 
observing that the Americans were currently targeting numerous “professional militarists” but taking no similar 
precautions with respect to “many of the most ardent, active and culpable of the German militarists” who were 
not in the regular army.  To support his interpretation, the writer pointed to past experiences with the Stahlhelm, 
which had been “created and supported by Hugenberg and other German industrialists and militaristic-minded 
Germans.”  Some Germans had noticed this shortcoming of U.S. policy, he reported, and were arguing that 
“German militarists are far more dangerous and equally if not more guilty than the Nazis.”  The writer thus 
called for sanctions against and mandatory removals for anyone who had “actively advocated, supported or 
voluntarily given substantial moral or material support or political assistance of any kind to the employment or 
threat of employment of aggressive war as an instrument of national policy.”216 
The second memorandum agreed that militarists should be included in a program that would “exclude 
[them] from public life and deprive them of any economic base from which they might exercise influence in the 
community.”  But it also underscored what all contemporary German and American discussions relating to the 
issue, taken as a whole, make patently clear.  The question “What is a militarist?” presented almost 
insurmountable problems.  Much like a dog chasing its tail, the writer explained, 
The easiest answer is to say that all ex-regular officers of the German Armed Forces and all 
ex-officials of the many German militaristic societies are ‘militarists’.  But when such a broad 
definition carries with it the severe penalties and disabilities under discussion, doubt arises as to 
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whether in justice, all ex-regular army officers should be subjected thereto.  Nor does any distinction 
based upon rank have very much sense.  What distinguishes a ‘militarist’ is particular attitudes and 
beliefs and the question is whether all ex-regular officers of the German Armed Forces shared them.  
There is reluctance in reaching this conclusion, because there is no unanimity of opinion as to the 
attitudes and beliefs which make up a ‘militarist.’  This makes it very difficult to provide, as in the case 
of Nazis, that the penalties and disabilities shall be imposed only after a quasi-judicial hearing and 
judgment that a particular individual was a ‘militarist.’  It is difficult to see what the concrete issues at 
such a trial would be.  For the same reason, it would not produce a satisfactory result to throw the 
problem of definition and individual application into the hands of the German authorities, especially 
since what we would consider to be manifestations of militarism might in their opinion merely reflect 
deep feelings of patriotism. 
We can say, however, that it is preferable, in order to eliminate militarism, to err on the side 
of stringency and subject all ex-regular Army officers to the penalties and disabilities proposed for 
active Nazis.  It is feared, however, that to do so would meet with the opposition of the German people 
as a whole.  It would be most unwise to make the military men, as a group, the objects of widespread 
sympathy.  To take the position, however, that no further action is necessary in addition to what has 
already been done may fail to accomplish the objectives of allied policy. 
 
The writer ultimately called for subjecting all ex-regular officers to “certain sanctions not as severe as those 
proposed for active Nazis” and prescribed these, as well, for anyone who had been an officer holder or 
“otherwise active” at any level in “any organization which furthered militaristic doctrines,” including such 
groups as the Stahlhelm, Free Corps, and German National People’s Party.217  
In mid January 1946, the DPB released a final report outlining a proposed denazification program that 
also addressed militarists.  Indicating it would treat these individuals similar to “leading and active Nazis,” the 
board also argued against including an “unduly large group as militarists” by, for instance, requiring all former 
German officers to register.  “The problem of defining a ‘militarist,’” it added, “would create issues of fact 
before the Tribunals of almost insoluble difficulty.”  Moreover, such an extensive program “would probably not 
find ready acceptance either among the Germans or by United States public opinion.”  In an attached illustrative 
denazification plan, the board left the question of who might presumptively be considered “active militarists” 
unanswered.  Its description of persons tribunals should classify as militarists, however, differed considerably 
from that found in German documents.  Not surprisingly, given trends in American thinking in recent years, 
OMGUS officials were far less concerned about deportations and plunder, the destruction of German cities, and 
the abuse of subordinates than about German attitudes toward war and plans for world conquest.  Their 
militarists thus included all persons who “represent the German military tradition” or who had “by word or deed 
. . . glorified war or militarism”; “advocated geo-political ideas or theories”; “advocated the Germanization of 
                                                 
217
 Untitled, n.d., NA, RG 260, U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations, Military Directorate [hereafter DMIL], Box 
427, F: DMIL/C/(45)(46). 
 
 186 
Eastern Europe, including incorporation of the Baltic states into Germany”; “organized or participated in the 
organization of military training for youth prior to 1935”; or been “active at any level from local to national in 
any organization which furthered militaristic doctrines.”218 
At an early February meeting, the Americans presented a more detailed version of their plan to the 
Germans which the Germans subsequently worked to incorporate into their own draft.  During the days that 
followed, the two parties wove together their differing conceptions of what distinguished a militarist and also 
expanded and refined a list of presumptive militarists.  In part, the Americans’ insistence that the new German 
law be compatible with the Allied Control Council’s recently issued Directive No. 24, which contained the 
usual lists of categories of individuals to be removed or excluded from positions of influence, shaped the latter 
project.  This demand distressed the Germans, who were eager to replace arbitrary categories with individual 
evaluations and thus return many people to their former positions in the interests of administrative efficiency 
and out of concerns for the stability of German democracy.  They were upset, in particular, by the number of 
individuals who would be affected.  Interestingly, however, the new law’s listing of presumptive militarists 
actually encompassed a wider array of people than the directive.219 
In the end, the draft finished in mid February included among its major offenders anyone who treated 
foreigners or prisoners of war in ways that violated international law, those “responsible for excesses, 
plundering, deportations, and other acts of violence,” individuals “active in leading positions” of militaristic 
organizations, and “persons who otherwise gave major political, economic, propagandistic or other support to 
the National Socialist tyranny.”  Its general definition of “militarists” retained the Germans’ over-arching 
characterization, with its references to redirecting the life of the nation toward a policy of force, dominating 
foreign peoples, and promoting armament for these purposes.  In terms of specific activities, however, it now 
targeted as militarists not only those who abused their positions, ordered the bombing of residences, or were 
responsible for destruction in Germany after the invasion, but also “anyone who, by word or deed, fostered 
militaristic doctrines or programs, or was active in any organization (except the Wehrmacht) engaged in such 
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activities” and “anyone who before 1935 organized or participated in the organization of the systematic training 
of youth for war.”220   
A lengthy appendix to the law resurrected, in modified form, the standard lists of positions, ranks, and 
memberships that marked individuals as politically suspect, but now grouped them into “Class I” and “Class II.”  
Public prosecutors were to automatically charge the former as major offenders and the latter as offenders.  Here, 
the various presumptive categories made their appearance.  Under the heading “The German Armed Forces and 
Militarists,” those assigned to Class I included high-level National Socialist Indoctrination Officers, all general 
staff officers “who were attached, since 4 February 1938, to the Wehrmachtsführungsstab (Executive Staff of 
the Armed Forces)” of the high commands of the Wehrmacht, Army, Navy, and Air Force, “chiefs and deputies 
of military and civilian administrations in countries and territories formerly occupied by Germany,” and “all 
former officers of Freicorps ‘Schwarze Reichswehr.’”  Class II encompassed former National Socialist 
Indoctrination Officers and general staff officers active after February 4, 1938, who did not fall in Class I, high 
level occupation officials (civilian and military), military commandants and their deputies in cities and towns, 
officials of the Raw Materials Trading Company, high-ranking officers of the Organization Todt and Transport 
Group Speer, all executive officials and members of the training staffs of war academies and officer schools, 
“all professors, lecturers and writers in the field of military science since 1933,” all members of the “Schwarze 
Reichswehr” and members of the Free Corps who joined the party but who were not included in Class I, and, 
finally, all regular officers of the Wehrmacht “including the rank of Major General or equivalent rank provided 
they reached this rank after the 1st of June 1936” as well as all “professional officials of the Armed Forces down 
to the rank of Oberst (colonel).”221  
As a whole, therefore, the proposed law particularly singled out military officers and, to a lesser extent, 
government officials as the most likely militarists.  Leaving the door open for convictions of teachers and 
authors, its detailed lists also effectively established certain boundaries for the pool of potentially culpable 
militarists.  Notably absent were any references to Prussian Junkers.  Meanwhile, the distinguishing 
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characteristics of a militarist included a mixture of activities and beliefs conceived of in relatively traditional 
terms and conduct that was morally questionable or criminal. 
Draft law in hand, the German negotiators now sought the official endorsement of their respective 
governments—an assignment that proved particularly difficult in Württemberg-Baden.  Although the Land’s 
leaders were not happy with existing U.S. policies, they also had not been enthusiastic about preparing a 
German law, especially considering that any German plans had to be established within constraints set by the 
Americans.222  Essentially incapable of resisting pressure emanating from the other states, not to mention the 
Americans, and concluding that securing German control over denazification was key, they had grudgingly 
cooperated, striving to push through their own ideas in the process.  Above all, they had pressed for former 
party members to be evaluated on an individual basis.  They desired a judicial hearing for each, called for an 
end to interment based strictly on formal charges, and wanted a temporary reinstatement of dismissed officials 
until their cases could be considered.  The revisions provoked by the wide-reaching Directive No. 24—with 
removals to occur prior to tribunal decisions—were therefore especially disturbing to them.  At one of three 
cabinet meetings held to evaluate the newest draft, Minister-Präsident Reinhold Maier also expressed doubts 
about the law’s overall approach, arguing, by way of example, that militarists could not be caught using the 
method provided.  “The greatest militarist of our time, the corporal Hitler, would not be caught either,” he 
added.  Disappointed with the law’s final composition, the cabinet nevertheless eventually felt compelled to 
endorse it.223 
With all parties agreed, if with gritted teeth, to the major contours of the legislation, they put the 
finishing touches on it in late February.  Primarily a matter of simplifying the text and improving the language, 
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those doing the revising also discarded the reference to persons who had ordered the bombing of residences.224  
The reason for this is not clear.   The Americans may simply have decided, as one had remarked before, that 
these individuals did not really qualify as militarists.  But they may also have desired to minimize the Germans’ 
ability to defend themselves by pointing to comparable Allied actions—a tactic employed relatively 
successfully by the naval defendants at Nuremberg.  In the end, all parties signed the final version of the law on 
March 5, 1946.225  
 
Implementing the Law 
If both American officials and German observers recognized that during the early months of the 
occupation concerns about militarists had generally taken a backseat to worries about Nazis,226 Ulm’s Weisser 
was among the Germans pleased that “the finger [could] be put on the militarists now.”227  But even the 
Germans who midwived the legislation appreciated its weaknesses.  When at a November 1946 meeting of the 
Länderrat’s denazification subcommittee a MG officer asked whether it would be possible to clarify the term 
“militarist,” he was told that despite considering this problem at length, the law’s creators had been unable to 
come up with a comprehensive definition.228  Those charged with carrying out the law likewise acknowledged 
the challenges it presented.229   
In view of the problems associated with the law from the start, the chances of it  achieving its 
objectives would seem to have been modest at best.  The question thus becomes: What role did the law’s 
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provisions regarding militarists actually play in the work of the German tribunals?  Or, more specifically, how 
much did concerns about militarism affect appraisals of a person’s guilt as a Nazi?  And how often did tribunals 
convict individuals as militarists even when they were not judged to be Nazis?   
Conclusive answers to these questions are difficult to develop.  Even apart from the immense volume 
of Spruchkammer records, the extant case files vary greatly in size and do not always disclose the reasoning 
behind final decisions.  While some are thick with petitions from the accused and letters of supportive 
testimony—the infamous Persilscheine—from friends and acquaintances, others include only the most basic 
paperwork or lack key documentation.  In addition, various amnesties eventually approved by the Americans—
for individuals born after 1918, for low-income followers, and for returning POWs—frequently truncated 
proceedings and generally reduced the need for a thorough investigation and detailed verdict.  Thus, the 
available record of charges, responses, defensive testimony, and decision-making can be sketchy and is almost 
always incomplete.  On the other hand, a review of more than 100 tribunal decisions dealing with individuals of 
a variety of ages, genders, and occupations, including a large number of teachers and former soldiers, did hint at 
certain patterns. (See Appendix C for a description of the records and selection criteria.) 
 
German Civilians.230  All of the individuals included in a sampling of some 60 case files addressing 
German civilians had been members of the Nazi party or one of its associated organizations.  Not unexpectedly, 
in these instances the past Nazi-related activities of the defendants drew the greatest amount of scrutiny from 
German tribunals.  When and why had they joined the party?  Did their neighbors or professional colleagues 
believe they had actively promoted National Socialist ideas or displayed enthusiasm for the party in speech, 
action, or dress?  How had they treated Jews?  Had they pressed others to join the party?  Did they benefit from 
their party membership in any way?   
Here the opinions of the accused regarding the Jews were understandably of concern to both the 
defendants and German denazification officials.  Conversely, most of the extant documentation revealed very 
little interest in any other tenets of National Socialist thought, including the defendants’ views on war or the 
military.  Only occasionally would a supporting statement argue that a defendant was against the war or had 
insisted, out loud, to others, that it was a disaster or hopeless.  This approach was typical even for the many 
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persons ultimately convicted as followers.  While the law stated that, in general, a follower was anyone “who 
was not more than a nominal participant or an insignificant supporter of National Socialism and who did not 
manifest himself as a Militarist,” no one apparently worried much about manifestations of militarism—a narrow 
approach likely encouraged by the law’s Nazi-centered supplementary clauses (see Appendix B). 
On the whole, this focus on Nazi activities also held true for some twenty educators—ranging from 
elementary school teachers to university professors to sports instructors—who, theoretically, might very well 
have “formulated or disseminated militaristic doctrines or programs,” been active outside the Wehrmacht in 
organizations that promoted militaristic ideas, or “organized or participated in the organization of the systematic 
training of youth for war” before 1935.  The files revealed no particular interest on the part of German 
officials—nor any particular defense offered by the educators—regarding what exactly had been taught during 
the 1930s, other than to confirm that the defendants had not taught the political or weltanschauliche 
(worldview) ideas of the Nazis.  Clearly, National Socialist ideas could have included twisted interpretations of 
past German history, poisonous views of neighboring peoples, and skewed assessments of current geopolitical 
circumstances that may also have passed for militaristic.  But no one seemed to dig very deeply, or very 
specifically, on this count.  Instead, the tribunals typically accepted the assurances of acquaintances, colleagues, 
and parents of former students that a particular person had not promoted Nazi ideas. 
Instructive in this regard is the case of one elementary school teacher who was in his mid forties at the 
end of the war.  A party candidate since 1938, a member of the Nazi welfare organization, and a soldier who 
had emerged from more than five years in the Wehrmacht as an NCO, Hermann R. had joined the Deutscher 
Luftsportverband (DLV, or German Air Sports League) in 1934 and, after it was forcibly incorporated into the 
Nationalsozialistische Fliegerkorps (NSFK, or National Socialist Flying Corps), was appointed, in 1938, to a 
middling rank in the new organization.  At one point, he took a two-year leave of absence from teaching—as 
requested by others—to focus on his NSFK duties, which involved supervising a local working group devoted 
to building model airplanes to fly in national and international competitions.231    
Taken as whole, Hermann R.’s personal history raises certain suspicions as to whether he met the 
March law’s stipulations regarding militarists.  For one thing, both the DLV and NSFK were established, in 
part, to further German capabilities and interest in aviation.  During the interwar years, the country’s military 
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leaders had actively supported the sports flying activities these organizations promoted, particularly gliding, 
which sharpened flying skills and generated useful data for the German military aircraft industry.  In addition, 
the DLV had helped to train both active and future Luftwaffe personnel at a time when the Versailles Treaty 
restricted the size of Germany’s air force.  In fact, whether civilian flying enthusiasts or military pilots, the 
league’s members had worn the same uniforms.232  During the occupation, moreover, U.S. regulations 
prohibited both model airplane flying and gliding as militaristic sports.233   
The bulk of the paperwork in Hermann R.’s file nevertheless centered on his relationship to the party, 
how he came to be on staff with the NSFK, and whether he had been in any way politically engaged while 
working for the organization.  The accused and his defenders argued repeatedly that he was a gifted technician 
and his technical skills alone were put to use.  Hermann R. was politically passive, had entered both flying 
organizations unwillingly, and had achieved his rank based on the success of his model builders in competition; 
he had no authority over any unit of men.  One former comrade did suggest—in a letter that deflected nearly 
every accusation that might be devised to paint the teacher as an active Nazi—that Hermann R. had condemned 
the war from the start and even in the successful early days repeatedly expressed his dislike of the National 
Socialists and their power politics in both domestic and foreign arenas.  No one said much of anything about 
what Hermann R. taught in school.  Without preparing a written decision explaining its action, the responsible 
Spruchkammer eventually assigned the teacher to the ranks of the followers.234 
Like Hermann R., many of the younger men described in the files had seen military service.  Among 
them were some who had been NCOs or lieutenants or who had achieved higher ranks by war’s end.  Aside 
from several who simply disappeared, most of these men were rather quickly excused from further tribunal 
investigation by the various amnesties (which applied when there was nothing to suggest that the person should 
be charged as anything more than a follower).  Tribunals pronounced nearly all of the rest to be followers.  Here 
again, those individuals German officials scrutinized in any detail apparently faced few questions regarding the 
issue of militarism, despite the fact that a number were teachers destined for German classrooms and despite the 
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tendency of some Germans to equate officers and militarists.  The law’s presumptive labeling of only high-
ranking officers may have contributed to the latter seeming inconsistency.  However, even possible questions 
regarding the treatment of subordinates—seemingly logical ones, given the criticism that appeared periodically 
in German newspapers regarding the abusive behavior of NCOs—remained unaddressed in almost all cases. 
Distinctive in this respect was the file pertaining to the Stuttgart Institute of Technology’s Professor 
Karl R.  Employed at the institution since 1928 and dean of the Faculty of Natural Sciences and Supplementary 
Subjects from 1938 until his dismissal in January 1946, the professor had been a member of the party from 1933 
to 1939 and of the SA-Reserve from 1933 to 1937.  A veteran of World War I, he had served in the Wehrmacht 
from 1939 to 1943, emerging with the reserve officer rank of major.  Unlike most veterans, Professor R. dealt 
with his wartime experiences directly in his missives to Stuttgart tribunal officials, arguing that he had 
prevented “arbitrary action by my troops,” personally appealed to military court judges to treat his men 
leniently, and earned the animosity of many other officers because he had successfully “achieved the utmost for 
the accused.”  A former subordinate confirmed that the professor always “had a heart for the soldiers,” treating 
them humanely, as individuals.  Another letter asserted that he had “never concealed his complete rejection of 
war, nor his pessimistic attitude with regard to the likely outcome of this one.”  Professor R. had pointed out 
“the insanity of the war and the disaster of the situation” so bluntly within the officer corps that he had put 
himself in danger, added his lawyer.235   
On another front, Professor R. defended his activities as “honorary counselor for settlement and 
diminishing of unemployment” with the SA-Reserve.  He had joined the organization, he explained, to be able 
to continue work he had already started in dealing with these social problems and, indeed, had created a 
technical Lehrsturm (training group) that undertook useful projects in his area of interest, construction.  
Members of the group had discussed technical topics and had held training workshops for workers while also 
improving the living situations of the latter by helping them to build “their own little houses.”  Forming this 
group had been part of the professor’s effort to do everything he could, “in spite of much enmity,” to “free the 
men from the senseless marching, the playing at soldiers and the parades.”  When the nature of the SA’s work 
changed in the late 1930s, stated Professor R., he had left the organization.236 
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It seems plausible that the professor’s various letters and the sheaf of supportive testimony from 
colleagues and acquaintances persuaded the responsible tribunal that whatever hints of militarism were evident 
in his biography had been effectively explained away.  In any event, the Stuttgart officials who declared him a 
follower centered their analysis on the level of political engagement he had shown in his SA activities and 
whether or not he had obtained unique advantages—in particular, promotions at the university—due to his party 
membership, or whether he had disadvantaged anyone else based on political criteria.  Left unexamined, by 
both sides, was the nature of Professor R.’s scholarship and teaching during the Third Reich.237  According to 
one MG official, for instance, prior to the Americans’ arrival the work of the Stuttgart Institute of Technology 
“had been largely concentrated in fields of interest to the German war potential.”238   
A similar lack of attention to the big picture issues that were in many ways of greatest concern to the 
Americans can be seen in the case of a high-level Stuttgart sports official.  Kurt Rupp had headed the city’s 
sports office beginning in 1928, joined the party in 1933, and in 1936 accepted the position of Gausportwart 
(regional sports manager) for Württemberg within the Nazi mass sports organization, the  
Nationalsozialistischer Reichsbund für Leibesübungen.  In explaining his personal history to Stuttgart 
denazification officials, Rupp argued that he had joined the party simply to arm himself against the demands of 
other Nazi organizations and was otherwise politically passive.  Emphasizing that his work had always been of 
a purely technical nature, he pointed with pride to his role in advising other officials on the construction of new 
sports venues and asserted that, as of 1928, there were no major sporting events in Stuttgart that he had not 
organized and carried out, including helping with the much publicized 1933 rendition of the Deutsche Turnfest 
(German Sports Festival).  In filling out his questionnaire, Rupp stressed, unasked, that he had for 12 years been 
decidedly hostile “toward the solely militaristic conception of sports and disastrous handling of the gymnastics 
and sport clubs by the Nazis” and, in a lengthy treatise of defense and explanation drafted later, commented 
regarding the organizations under his jurisdiction that “premilitary training was for us, thank God, forbidden.”  
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Yet he never followed up on these provocative statements.  Instead he saved the bulk of a great deal of 
typescript for raging against the Nazis’ brutal interference with the existing sports management system: shutting 
down independent clubs, confiscating their fields and buildings, replacing existing officials with party loyalists 
who knew nothing about sports, allowing youth to train other youth under the auspices of the Hitler Youth 
organization with a “disastrous effect on mass sports and competitive sports,” and demanding that sports 
officials build new facilities to accommodate the needs of the SS.  He had never been a National Socialist, Rupp 
insisted, adding that after what he had experienced, this was impossible.  Similarly, he noted, “I am 
militaristically fully unincriminated and was never in my life a soldier because of extremely bad eyesight.”239 
Notably missing here was any acknowledgement that Hitler, the Nazis, and others outside the party 
had promoted physical education and athletic competition in general—and not just the paramilitary activities of 
the Hitler Youth—as necessary to strengthening in German youth the mental and physical abilities needed for 
combat.  Similarly, the Nazis’ handling of the 1933 Deutsche Turnfest apparently drew Rupp’s ire more for the 
money they had denied the original organizers and the changes they had made in arrangements for suppliers and 
the like than for the fact that the Nazis had turned the event into a nationalistic party spectacle at which 
traditional Wehrturnen (military sports) assumed new prominence.  According to a festival publication, for 
example, a new contest featuring squads of young men competing in the hammer throw, obstacle course, and air 
gun shooting had conveyed the “certainty” that these youths were “ready and willing to fight [wehrwillig und 
wehrhaft].”  The responsible German tribunal nevertheless confirmed Rupp’s political passivity and declared 
him a follower.240 
If in most cases, the issue of militarism received rather short shrift, one relatively high profile Stuttgart 
case involved a defendant charged primarily as a militarist, and not solely due to his past military service.241  
Under scrutiny was Dr. Trudbert Riesterer, managing director of the Stuttgart branch of the Deutsche Bank 
from 1935 until 1939.  Never a party member, he had belonged to several Nazi organizations, including the 
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NSFK, into which he had been transferred automatically due to his existing membership in the DLV.  A pilot in 
World War I, he had served in the Wehrmacht from 1939 to 1945 as a reserve officer, participating in training 
exercises during the mid 1930s and emerging from the war with the recently attained rank of lieutenant colonel.   
Viewing the banker’s personal history, a local public prosecutor determined that Riesterer should 
automatically be assigned to Class II, in light of his professional position, but also pointed to evidence that the 
banker was a militarist.  A report from the bank indicated that during the 1930s, Riesterer had attempted to 
evade requests to join the party by emphasizing his military interests, while an investigation had ascertained that 
he was a zealous promoter of his firm’s sports program and premilitary training in small caliber shooting.  The 
banker’s five years of service in the Führerhauptquartier (FHQ, or Führer’s Headquarters) seemed to prove that 
he had been viewed as politically reliable.  And he had allegedly propagandized for National Socialism and 
militarism via letters from the FHQ to his bank’s staff and to leading Nazis in his neighborhood and firm.242 
Claiming that professional competitors were behind any accusations against him, Riesterer adamantly 
denied the charges.  He had joined his bank’s sports club because he had always been a sportsman, but he had 
exercised no influence over its activities.  The club itself had provided no premilitary training—in fact, only 
three employees were young enough where that would have even made sense.  The shooting section, he 
advised, was founded before he arrived and at the instigation of disabled veterans who were mostly unable to 
participate in other athletic activities.  A letter from a former club staffer confirmed that the director had been a 
simple member who participated more often in gymnastics and track and field exercises than in shooting 
practice.243 
As for his military service, Riesterer explained that he had taken part in reserve exercises in the 1930s, 
just as all reserve officers had, but had actually skipped them in 1938 and 1939 citing his overwhelming 
professional obligations.  Called into service in August 1939, he had eventually flown on 12 missions as an 
observation officer (Beobachtungsoffizier) before being ordered, after roughly a year, to the FHQ.  There, he 
had served in a section that collected and compiled reports regarding weather and air conditions and forwarded 
them to higher levels.  Just a tiny group in an organization of thousands, its staff had not been entitled to wear 
armbands identifying them as members of the FHQ and had gone only rarely, as part of a large party, to dinner 
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in the actual headquarters with Hitler.  So far as he knew, his political reliability was never considered in 
choosing him for what was, essentially, a military position.  Furthermore, his political unreliability had resulted 
in his not receiving promotions befitting his years of service. 
To deflect charges that he was a militarist, Riesterer repeatedly stressed that he had recommended that 
two acquaintances not allow their sons to pursue careers in the officer corps.  In confirming this, one of the 
acquaintances quoted liberally from a detailed letter Riesterer had written to his own wife (which she had read 
to the man) in which the banker advised against choosing an engineer-officer career with the argument that in 
the military only rank mattered, not skills or intelligence.  For a talented, spirited young man, being required to 
submit to a superior officer simply because he was a superior officer, even if he was less accomplished, could 
be extremely difficult and painful, Riesterer had maintained.  A man also could not move to a different job if he 
was dissatisfied.  “Before every achievement, my reverence,” Riesterer had written, “but never before someone 
who through the passage of time has earned one star more.  And in the military there is always someone there 
who has one star more!”  Such comments suggest that Riesterer, a successful businessman, was less anti-
military out of principle than unhappy with the constraints placed on him by the rigidity and hierarchy of a 
military institution run by unaccomplished career soldiers.  In any event, Riesterer ultimately argued that 
extended service in the military, even in the FHQ, did not mean he had been either politically reliable or a 
militarist.244 
His denazification tribunal concurred.  Its members agreed that, although Riesterer had managed 
Deutsche Bank’s Stuttgart branch, he was not responsible for the bank’s overall policy of supporting the regime 
during the 1930s and thus his own actions should be decisive.  Working their way through the original charges, 
they noted that the firm’s sports club was founded in the late 1920s not due to any desire to promote Wehrsport, 
but because a bank merger produced a large enough staff to warrant such a move.  There was no evidence that 
Riesterer had influenced its subsequent operations or taken an excessive interest in military-related sports.  They 
repeated his arguments regarding his wartime service record, indicated there was no overwhelming proof that he 
had propagandized in his letters (they had no copies), and outlined the ways in which he had resisted Nazi 
influences in his bank.  As to the fact that Riesterer “sought a certain connection with the Wehrmacht after 
1935,” they concluded that a man in his position had probably had no other choice at that time.  Alluding to a 
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point the banker himself had made earlier, they added that during those years, many men saw the Wehrmacht as 
a type of counterweight to the National Socialists, without necessarily pursuing the goal of directing all of the 
life of the German people toward a policy of militaristic force or the domination of foreign peoples and the like.  
These men, they asserted, could not have realized that the generals were on their way to selling themselves to 
the Hitler regime.  The tribunal declared Riesterer “not incriminated” (nicht belastet).245 
   
Elite Professional Officers.  If German civilians were unlikely to be questioned regarding past 
activities or attitudes that might have been considered militaristic, German military officers were a very 
different story.  Public opinion and official policies both regarded these men with a great deal of suspicion.  
Notably, however, their fate at the hands of German tribunals proved to be not all that different from that of 
their civilian neighbors.   
Although the March 1946 law required most general staff officers to be presumptively assigned to one 
of the top two groups, German denazification officials did not always know quite what to do with them.  In 
Karlsruhe, for example, plans called for more than 100 of these officers held in a nearby internment camp to be 
processed by two local tribunals.  As an American inspector explained the problem, however, most of the 
officers were former first and second lieutenants.  Technically they fell within the categories listed in the law, 
but the responsible prosecutor “did not know how to prepare his charges” because he had “little chance to place 
those officers under article 8,” the section dealing with militarists.246  Perhaps not surprisingly, then, these 
proceedings turned out to be rather perfunctory.  In June 1947, for example, a MG officer described the trial of 
a 34-year-old major who had been a general staff officer from 1943 to 1945.  “In his defense respondent said his 
functions were non political, he condemned and criticized the destruction made to Germany by her own troops, 
he regretted very much that the conspiracy against Hitler in 1944 had not succeeded.”  The former soldier 
“regarded himself as not falling under the law,” the German prosecutor had agreed, and the tribunal, “without 
drawing for consultation,” had determined that the proceeding should be “quashed.”  Its explanation was that 
“as in numerous similar cases the incrimination of the respondent is only a matter of form.”  Three subsequent 
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cases involving men in their thirties had produced comparable results.  All three, wrote the American, “claimed 
that they did not fall under the Law by presenting numerous certificates, supposed to prove their unpolitical 
background, their non party membership and their kindness toward war prisoners.”  The prosecutor had agreed 
that they did not fall under the law and the tribunal had quashed each of the proceedings.  “All four cases,” 
noted the American, “were tried within 20 minutes.”247 
Cases dealing with former high-ranking officers could be more involved, but had similar outcomes.  In 
early 1948, for instance, another German tribunal tried a group of former general staff officers that included 11 
generals, five colonels, four lieutenant colonels, and three majors and declared 19 of the 21 officers to be 
formally addressed by the law, by virtue of their past positions, but materially not incriminated.  Those 
convicted—one as a follower and one as an offender—had both been members of the Nazi party and related 
organizations.248  Similarly, of a set of 13 generals and two colonels tried by Stuttgart tribunals, all were 
determined to be not incriminated save for one general and one colonel whose cases were dropped under 
amnesties.  Cited as a follower by the public prosecutor, the latter was the only officer of the 15 who had been a 
party member.249 
To obtain these favorable judgments, the former officers provided the tribunals with personal 
narratives and supporting documentation that relied on tropes being developed by Wehrmacht veterans in war 
crimes trials and in other contexts as well.250  But they also adhered closely to the terms of the law, taking 
seriously its requirement that they refute the charges leveled against them.   
Usually presumptively assigned to the categories of major offender or offender, the men strove above 
all to counter suspicions of having supported the Nazi dictatorship.  Virtually all therefore contended that they 
had never liked the Nazis nor promoted National Socialism.  In fact, they had done their utmost to keep Nazi 
influences out of the Wehrmacht, resenting and resisting party interference with Wehrmacht operations and 
combating Nazi attempts to spread National Socialist ideas among their troops.   
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But the former officers also could not ignore charges of militarism.  And here they typically stuck 
closely to the script handed to them by the law.  In particular, the law encouraged a profusion of testimony 
verifying how well the men had treated their subordinates.  These Wehrmacht officers, the paperwork 
confirmed, were capable, decent, model officers who handled their troops with fatherly consideration, listened 
to their concerns, and carefully protected their welfare, even to the point of challenging or rejecting orders that 
would have required unnecessary or excessive loss of life.  In return, they had earned the admiration and 
affection of their men.  A former tank division liaison officer captured the essence of these arguments in 
describing the former chief of staff of the 57th Panzer Corps.  The officer, he wrote, was not “an impersonal or 
completely obstinate and heartless militarist who classifies everything according to epaulets and stars, but a man 
in the truest sense of the word, by whom all found complete acceptance, without regard to rank, who was decent 
and had character.  He had a good word for everyone and cared for the members of his staff in a fatherly way.  
Everyone could express themselves to him and he improved things and helped where he could.”251 
Those who had served outside of Germany during the war also made clear that they had obeyed all 
international laws in their dealings with POWs and local populations.  In France, Holland, Belgium, Norway, 
Italy, Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, Ukraine, and Russia, they had avoided unnecessary requisitions, attempted to 
minimize the effects of warfare on civilians, listened to and tried to address the concerns of the locals, and were 
sometimes praised by these people for their conduct.  In addition, the officers had acted forcefully to prevent 
plundering, rape, and other excesses by their troops and had severely punished offenders.  One former general 
received praise for often sharing with their Russian owners the farmhouses that he needed for quarters—even 
though the houses were very small.252  Despite orders to the contrary, another had always had friendly relations 
with “reputable Greek families” who had admired him as a “just, understanding, and good soldier.”253  One of 
this general’s former subordinates also testified that in the area of Ukraine where the man’s divisional staff 
quarters were located, “promenade concerts” had been held that were very popular with the civilian population.  
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The locals had also had the opportunity to regularly attend productions of the “front theater” and ballets 
performed by Ukrainian dancers.254 
Explicit references to the law’s other indicators of militarism were more sporadic.  Some officers 
simply declared that they had never been active in militaristic organizations, disseminated militaristic ideas in 
text or speech, trained youth outside of the Wehrmacht, or abused their positions to obtain special benefits.  
Some pointed to specific actions they had taken to protect or prevent the destruction of German towns and cities 
in the final days of the war.  Many explained the nature of the military posts they had held during the 1930s, 
variously emphasizing the technical nature of their work, their lack of authority, their involuntary assignment to 
certain positions due solely to their personal capabilities, and, in a few cases, their ignorance of Hitler’s true 
intentions.  And some submitted evidence showing that they had at one point or another during the war 
criticized Hitler’s military leadership or argued that the situation was hopeless.   
Focused comments regarding the proper role of a military in a state, the meaning and purpose of war, 
or their pre-1939 views of Hitler’s military and foreign policies were uncommon.  In explaining their reasons 
for joining the military, several attempted to dispel suspicions that they had coveted military prestige and 
reverenced the use of force.  One former general explained, for example, that he had entered the Reichswehr in 
1921 in part because he had an interest in educational activities and enjoyed living with soldiers from all 
classes, but also because his family could not afford expensive training for a profession.  An officer’s career at 
that time had little glamour, he stressed, and the chances of promotion in the Reichswehr were not particularly 
good.255   
Most who advanced views regarding the use of the German armed forces merely stated that they had 
never championed a politics of force.  Only a handful dealt with this issue in more than a bland statement of 
denial.  Unusual here was a general who submitted two Persilscheine on the subject.  One testified to the 
general’s conviction in 1939 that the Reich’s aggressive politics were not backed by a technically prepared 
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Wehrmacht, but were, rather, a form of “diplomatic smoke and mirrors” and that “Germany and the world 
would be helped the most if war was impeded and peace served.”256  The second reported that the general had 
been pleased that the Sudeten crisis had not led to war, “which he saw as a misfortune for the whole world,” and 
that he had been uneasy at the time because he saw in Hitler’s foreign policy “a constant provocation to the 
other powers.”257   
But the few men who discussed their earlier perspectives on war or rearmament more typically simply 
maintained or implied that they had been interested in defending Germany, not in attacking others.  The 
lengthiest explanation of this sort came from a former Luftwaffe general.  A pilot in World War I and a 
“passionate flyer,” as a civilian, after the war, he had responded affirmatively to the German Air Ministry’s 
request in 1935 that he help to create the new Luftwaffe.  He did so, he explained, because he viewed the 
German armed forces not as a political establishment but rather as “a supra-party instrument for the protection 
of the people and state, as in every land.”  No one could have foreseen then how the Wehrmacht would be 
misused for a war of aggression.  Refuting possible charges of militarism, the general went on to argue that 
“only a crazy person or criminal could advocate a politics of force and desire a war for whose victorious 
waging, despite rearmament, all prerequisites were missing.”  As far as anyone could judge back in the 1930s, a 
war of aggression would have terrible consequences for Germany.  That “a state would voluntarily burden itself 
with responsibility for a new world war and expose itself to defamation in the whole world” appeared to be out 
of the question.  No one could have known or guessed that “an irresponsible state leadership would, in spite of 
this, in a few years plunge our country into a war.”258 
In this regard, the defense offered by one Stuttgart general was an exception that underscored the rule.  
Generalmajor Erich Dommenget had served as air attaché at the German embassy in Spain during the Spanish 
Civil War, an assignment he attributed to language skills he had acquired while living in Chile in the early 
1930s.  Intent on disproving suspicions of Nazi favor, the general built his defense on a narrative of resistance 
and consequent disadvantage.  He had, he argued, protested this appointment to Spain in part because he 
disagreed with German activities there.  This also had led him to submit reports to Berlin that exceeded the 
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bounds of his authority by commenting not only on military but also on political developments.  He had, he 
explained, urged a withdrawal of German troops and called for bringing England in to mediate the whole affair 
because he saw in the conflict the “dynamite for a new world war” that would endanger Germany.  From that 
point on, he insisted, his military career had ground to a halt.  He was replaced, given lesser posts, granted little 
respect, forced to wait eight years for a promotion from colonel to general, and endured mental pain and 
physical illness as a result.  Dommenget’s case, then, rested on the argument that he had suffered for his peace-
loving views.  Both his own letters and those submitted by others on his behalf thus detailed and stressed his 
opposition to the Nazi regime’s foreign policy as well as his own anti-war stance.259 
Despite his purported suffering during the Third Reich, Dommenget remained a committed and proud 
officer, however, grumbling about earned medals he had not received and about his ruined career.  In the end, 
too, he relied on the language of soldierly service to the Fatherland to explain his conduct.260  And in this he was 
not unique.  Rare was the officer who did not put himself forward as a loyal servant of Germany.  “I was 
certainly no friend of war,” one fifty-eight-year-old former infantry general told a tribunal.  But, he added, 
“When it comes to a war, every soldier must fulfill his duty. . . . He owes that to his people and his Fatherland.  
This I also did and nothing more.”261  He and his colleagues were apolitical men focusing their military skills on 
the needs at hand.  “I was a career soldier, but not a ‘militarist,’” more than one wrote on the questionnaire he 
gave to the local prosecutor.262    
A thorough investigation of the accuracy of the information presented to the responsible tribunals by 
these former officers is beyond the scope of this study.  However, a more careful look at several cases did reveal 
something about how the tribunals handled the issue of militarism when dealing with former officers.  Among 
the officers evaluated, for example, was a Colonel Hermann Teske.  A general staff officer from 1939 to 1944, 
he had served as an adjutant at an army sport school during the early 1930s and as a transportation officer in 
Galicia, Ukraine, Finland, and White Russia during the war.  Testimony confirmed that he had never had any 
connection with the National Socialist regime, had never supported the conquest and domination of foreign 
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peoples, and had acted caringly toward the inhabitants of occupied areas.  He had not attempted to influence 
soldiers under him politically, but was, rather, “a dutiful soldier and officer and always a role model to his 
officers, NCOs, and troops.”  Accepting this information as a refutation of any possible incrimination, the 
responsible tribunal also indicated that articles Teske had written in the 1930s were “of a technical nature” and 
did not propagandize Nazi ideas.263 
Whether the tribunal had ever actually seen Teske’s writings—or their titles—seems doubtful.  If it 
had, its conclusions were astounding.  For a glance at just two of Teske’s works suggests that he was far from 
an apolitical technician.  In a 1936 booklet titled Vormilitärische Schulerziehung (Pre-military School 
Education), for instance, Teske offered philosophical guidance and practical advice aimed at helping teachers 
fulfill the mission he outlined for them in the text’s opening paragraphs: Germany’s youth had to learn to fight.  
Efforts toward this end were also needed at home and in the Hitler Youth, but schools were to “create the 
intellectual preconditions for fighting.”  In chapters bearing titles like “Pre-soldierly Character Education” and 
“School Preparation for Soldierly Proficiency,” Teske laid out how they might do this, discussing such topics as 
how to encourage enthusiasm for military service and how to use even studies of the natural sciences to instill 
proper values.  For example, by emphasizing that with the dying away of all natural things came regeneration, 
teachers might lay the groundwork for a soldier’s later willingness to die (Todesbereitschaft).264 
If his teacher’s manual could be passed off as a technical instructional guide, a second text contained 
far fewer practical bits of advice and a much thicker layering of Nazi jargon.  First published in 1939, Wir 
Marschieren für Grossdeutschland (We March for Greater Germany) recounted events in Germany during the 
period between the Anschluss and the invasion of the rump of Czechoslovakia.  Praising Hitler for his peaceful 
acquisition of the Sudetenland, Teske nevertheless attributed this foreign policy victory to Hitler’s policy of 
strength, which had led to achievements that would have been impossible for the broken and defeated Germany 
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of 1918, stabbed in the back by its civilian leaders.  The conviction that both Austria and the Sudetenland 
rightfully belonged to a greater Germany was made abundantly clear.  Moreover, Teske’s praise of Hitler 
climaxed in a chapter describing the Führer’s visit to the teary-eyed, grateful Germans in the former lands of 
Czechoslovakia.  The overall tone and political bent of the text, meanwhile, were indicated already in its 
foreword.  The goal of the book, Teske wrote, was to describe the contributions of the “greater German soldier 
of every character” to the “liberation” of the Sudetenland.  “Carried along by the almost superhuman willpower 
of the Führer,” he gushed, “during this historic summer every soldierly thinking person helped to prepare for 
and realize this feat of the Führer’s, whether he was a commander or a rifleman, whether he worked as a laborer 
on the West Front or was drafted as a militiaman, whether he did his part as a border guard or as a Free Corps 
fighter.”  Teske ended by asserting that “every page and every line” of the book would speak “the fundamental 
tone of the melody of this summer: the thanks to the Führer.”  The title page identified Teske as a captain in the 
general staff.265 
In another instance, German officials considered the case of General der Infanterie Walter Buhle.  Like 
many high-ranking German officers, Buhle had served in World War I and continued his career in the 
Reichswehr.  Among the many posts he had held, the two most suspect were a stint from December 1938 to 
February 1942 as chief of the Organization Department of the general staff and his position from February 1942 
to January 1945 as chief of the army staff with the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW), representing the army’s 
interests with respect to organizational and armament questions.  In light of this history, the pertinent German 
prosecutor charged that Buhle had provided “extraordinary support” to the Nazi regime, per the terms of the 
law, and mentioned, in particular, Buhle’s work in the Organization Department, where he had helped to arm 
the German military in such a fashion that it was capable of launching an aggressive war.   
In response, Buhle argued that the rearming of the Reich was already completed when he assumed his 
post in 1939.  Within the OKW, he had served mostly as a liaison and advisor, with no responsibility or right to 
issue his own orders.  Buhle added, too, that he had been against a policy of force, worked to counter this, 
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resisted prolonging the war by protesting the arming of the Volkssturm, and impeded Hitler’s scorched earth 
policy.  He had also not advocated the domination of foreign peoples—this was not part of his scope of work, 
he explained, and he had not dealt with it.  He, like other general staff officers, had sought to rearm Germany as 
a matter of defense.266   
Interestingly, the tribunal concluded that, even if all of this was true, Buhle had, objectively viewed, 
met the terms of the law in giving “extraordinary support” to the National Socialist dictatorship.  However, it 
also contended that the operative question was whether Buhle had intended (Willensentschluss) to support Nazi 
tyranny.  Extensive testimony indicating, among other things, that the general had not endorsed Nazi ideas, had 
battled against the spreading influence of the National Socialists and SS, and had attempted to counter Hitler’s 
destructive impulses at the end of the war proved that Buhle had not had this intent, the tribunal decided.  For 
Buhle, “as an old soldier,” what mattered was simply to use German arms effectively and to help them to 
victory.  This determination meant, too, the tribunal added, that there was also no evidence to support a charge 
of militarism.  It thus declared Buhle not incriminated.267 
What might actually be considered worthy of punishment under the law’s militarist provisions was 
shown in a decision handed down by the tribunal that evaluated the case of Generaloberst der Waffen-SS Paul 
Hausser.  Eventually judged an offender, Hausser had a lengthy, gleaming Nazi resume to justify this decision.  
In listing the elements of the law on which it had based this verdict, however, the tribunal also referred to the 
clause regarding those “who had attempted to bring the life of the German people in line with a policy of 
militaristic force.”  As grounds for this, it noted that Hausser had been active outside the Wehrmacht in an 
organization that promoted militaristic ideas, namely, he had held high-level leadership posts in the Stahlhelm 
and SA-Reserve.  Bolstering this assertion, too, was Hausser’s own evidence confirming that he had been the 
creator and first soldier of the Waffen-SS and that his name was “inextinguishably tied to the good reputation of 
the Waffen-SS.”268 
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In contrast to the personal narratives of innocence and innocuousness constructed by these former 
officers, historian Wolfram Wette has recently offered a blunt assessment of the militarism of the Third Reich’s 
career officers: both Germany’s National Socialist leaders and its military elites “shared the belief that great 
political questions are always ultimately decided by war and the force of arms.”  As a result, Wette writes, “one 
can speak of a shared conviction that was fundamentally militaristic in nature.”  Suggesting that “issues of 
national defense” were at best a “superficial rationalization” in their “ideology of war,” Wette observes that “the 
expansion of Germany’s boundaries was a given in this kind of thinking, and the potential goals of war—such 
as achieving hegemony in Europe, building an empire, making Germany a great power or even a world 
power—were debated solely in terms of their practical feasibility.”269  Research from recent decades describing 
the Wehrmacht’s extensive involvement in the crimes of the Third Reich likewise casts doubt on the 
truthfulness of these narrated biographies.270 
Significantly, however, even though the tribunals were composed of often left-leaning non-Nazis and 
anti-Nazis, these bodies refused to convict Germany’s former elite officers as militarists even where the facts of 
the case might well have led them to such a decision.  To their credit, they resisted any temptation to judge the 
men strictly on the basis of their profession, rank, or position, looking instead for specific offenses revealed 
through investigation and testimony.  Yet evidence of an officer’s past conduct was surely hard to come by, 
particularly if he had spent much of his time in foreign countries.  The tribunals thus had to rely heavily on 
documentation provided by the defendants themselves, often in the form of sworn declarations from former 
subordinates and colleagues who, arguably, had good reasons of their own to disseminate rose-colored pictures 
of the Wehrmacht.  Here, differentiating between truths, half-truths, and lies was undoubtedly difficult and 
evaluating a person’s past thinking and attitudes must have been challenging, if not impossible.  On the other 
hand, the “myth of the clean Wehrmacht” was also taking firm hold in German society271—perhaps reinforced 
by the tribunal proceedings and verdicts themselves—and some Germans clearly still clung to traditional ideas 
regarding soldierly honor and notions of the inherent righteousness of soldierly obedience and performance of 
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duty.  Given the problem of evidence, these philosophical trends, and the Germans’ lack of enthusiasm for 
denazification activities by the late 1940s,272 it is perhaps not surprising that, in most cases, the written 
decisions of tribunal officials did little more than regurgitate the claims of the defendants.  
In effect, the tribunals authenticated the self-portraits proffered by the accused which depicted 
Wehrmacht officers as apolitical soldiers minding their own military business, caring for their troops, providing 
technical instruction to young men, doing their soldierly duty, and attempting to mitigate any suffering 
experienced by civilians in combat and occupied areas.  What the objectives of all of their military efforts had 
been, or how it had come to this, was seldom discussed.  And where these questions arose, there was an easy 
answer: Hitler and the Nazis, for whom the Wehrmacht’s leaders had had no use—and whom they had 
vigilantly tried to keep out of military matters—had, to the surprise of most of the men ready to defend the 
Fatherland, led the nation into a war of aggression which it was not prepared to fight and should have avoided.  
Far from condemning Germany’s military elites as militarists or as Hitler’s willing instruments in an aggressive 
war, the tribunals agreed that there was a difference between a skilled, obedient soldier and a debased militarist 
or war criminal and confirmed the virtue of the vast majority of former professional officers.273 
   
Final Results.  While it is impossible today to determine whether any of the uncensured individuals 
described above should rightfully be considered militarists, even a cursory look at their case files suggests that 
several met the specific criteria laid out in the law or had contributed to the perpetuation of German militarism 
in ways condemned by the Americans.  In practice, however, concerns about militarism exerted very little 
influence on the process of charging, evaluating, and exonerating or convicting these Germans.  
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The results of this sampling, moreover, are consistent with evidence from other areas of Württemberg-
Baden and the American Zone as a whole.  “Regarding the liberation from militarism, one hears nothing at all 
any more,” complained Ulm’s Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung in September 1947 in discussing the March 1946 
law.274  The president of a Heidelberg peace organization similarly told a MG official that he had actually 
written a letter to Württemberg-Baden’s denazification minister asking about the lack of verdicts against 
militarists.  He had received no reply.  “To the same extent that high military personages were convicted for war 
crimes so should actions which led to war be punished by denazification tribunals,” the man had explained to 
the American.  Conceding that “the psychological moment for this” had passed, he nevertheless believed that 
“even if it takes place after ten years the question of war guilt should be finally decided by German courts.”  A 
Heidelberg tribunal member belonging to the DVP confirmed that he also knew of no convictions of 
militarists—with the reason his own tribunal had issued no such verdicts perhaps explained in part by the views 
of militarism expressed by the man himself.  “Most soldiers merely did what they considered to be their duty,” 
he told a MG interviewer.  Although he thought German rearmament had violated the Versailles Treaty, the 
man also argued that “the propagandists and militarists certainly found much in the behavior of the victorious 
powers which they could exploit for their own purpose” and suggested that “in the future a few thousands [sic] 
war agitators must disappear in order that millions of innocent people may not give their valuable lives in 
another war.”275  On a larger scale, the Americans’ early 1948 report on German militarism indicated that 
“virtually none” of the several hundred leading Germans interviewed knew of any convictions of militarists, 
even though they were “almost unanimous in believing that such convictions would be just,” agreeing that it 
was “at least as important to punish militarists as it [was] to convict National Socialists.”276 
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Given this apparently solid support in influential quarters for punishing militarists, how can the 
tribunal results be explained?  As with denazification, a partial explanation almost certainly lies in the German 
desire to get German governing, social, and economic institutions back on track and moving forward with 
rebuilding.  But the issue of militarism had other dimensions as well.  The uncertain definition of a militarist, 
along with a rather narrow interpretation of who should, presumptively, be considered one, was problematic.  
The law’s drafters were not entirely sure who should be deemed a militarist, but Spruchkammer officials were 
somehow supposed to recognize them anyway.  In addition, proving motivation or documenting past assertions 
could be troublesome, particularly when dealing with well-traveled military men.   
But the Germans also seemed unwilling to explore the issue of militarism in all of its possible 
permutations.  American policymakers took for granted the deep-rooted penetration of all of German society 
and culture with military priorities, ideals, and goals, at least after 1933, if not before.  Above all, therefore, 
American concerns centered on the cause of the war.  Fundamentally, German militarists were those who 
prepared for and instigated wars that the Americans did not want to fight.  Conversely, German defendants, 
prosecutors, and tribunal officials—and arguably the drafters of the March law itself—viewed militarism 
differently or simply ignored or avoided considering this larger perspective.277  When it came to evaluating a 
person’s past for evidence of militaristic attitudes or activism, they paid much less attention to what had 
happened before the war than to what had happened during it.   
Pushing the provisions of the law to their widest possible extent would likely have meant punishing an 
impossible number of persons.  But the fact that the militaristic character of many German institutions and 
German attitudes had evolved over decades, occasionally even centuries, perhaps complicated matters, too.  
Some Germans were incapable of appraising the weaknesses of their own culture.278  Furthermore, to censure 
someone as a militarist because of their admiration for the Wehrmacht, their enthusiasm for rearmament, their 
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cries for a renunciation of the Treaty of Versailles or reclamation of Polish territory, their involvement in 
producing strong capable soldiers through sport, their scholarly arguments invigorating calls for the return of 
Alsace-Lorraine, or even their technical contributions to a successful attack on Poland or France could well 
have meant condemning oneself.  And to criticize German institutions, practices, and attitudes was also to admit 
past failings and to acknowledge at least partial responsibility for the war and thus Germany’s own destruction 
and suffering, rather than resting comfortably with the idea that the recent war had been solely—as many 
Germans were quick to label it—“Hitler’s war.”279  The wide-ranging support given to this endeavor, piece by 
piece, in small actions, in sometimes subtle ways, even if only through indifference or a simple commitment to 
doing one’s job well without questioning, challenging, or admitting the larger consequences, remained mostly 
unexamined and uncondemned. 
  
Militarists and German Society: Concluding Thoughts 
German militarists were a problem and needed to be weeded out of positions of influence in German 
society.  This was a fundamental American belief heading into the occupation of Germany.  But militarists were 
difficult to identify.  Washington policymakers had frequently implied that the vast majority of Germans had 
militaristic tendencies.  Postwar planners, more realistically, cited as militarists especially those who had 
promoted, prepared for, launched, and directed Germany’s most recent war of aggression.  They pointed to 
Wehrmacht elites, but also to industrialists, educators, and media barons.  In the end, however, U.S. regulations 
called for culling out just a limited number of people, with early policies offering a relatively narrow 
interpretation of the term “militarist,” focusing especially on German officers and Prussian Junkers.  And even 
some of these were excused.   
The Americans were not alone in their struggles.  Government officials in North Baden treated all 
former professional officers and NCOs as potential militarists until proven otherwise, even as Stuttgart’s mayor 
cautioned that militarism did not necessarily follow rank.  A retired colonel in Pforzheim pointed to reserve 
officers.  A Heidelberg Spruchkammer member told MG interviewers that “after the treaty of Versailles the 
bankers, industrialists and Junkers were the most ardent militarists” and it was “they who again mobilized the 
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old generals and other officers.”280  A Land official weighing denazification legislation pointed to editors and 
teachers.  A medical doctor in nearby Bavaria, meanwhile, told MG authorities that a militarist was “the red[-
stripe]-trowsered, gold-braided, medal-jingling, and monocled general who recklessly rushes ‘his human 
materiel’ to their deaths to achieve a tactical goal to satisfy his own ambition,” as well as the arrogant NCO and 
the “enraged elementary school teacher” who demanded an impossible mission of his men to earn a promotion 
and Knight’s Cross.  But it was also the mother who in “proud teariness” announced the death of her only—or 
fifth or last—son “for Führer, Volk, and Fatherland,” the person who said there was no such thing as an 
impossible command, one who sang “Wir werden weiter marschieren, wenn alles in Scherben fällt” (“we will 
keep marching, even when everything falls apart”), and the man who “fears his officer more than the loving 
God.”281  
While political preferences often determined individual beliefs about militarists, with those who leaned 
to the right generally more sympathetic to military officers, they did not always make a person’s stance 
predictable.  Thus, Ulm’s Hermann Wild, a DVP member, could worry about the influence of former officers in 
his city’s administration just as much as the Social Democratic assistant mayor and the Communist city 
councilor.  Personal experiences during the Weimar era or in the Wehrmacht might do more to shape views of 
officers and ideas of what constituted a militarist than any political beliefs. 
Still, when it came to “demilitarization” measures, former officers bore the brunt of the accusations 
and criticism.  Whether American or German, the eyes of decision makers seeking to exclude militarists were 
likely to fall first on career military officers.  Former officers sometimes hurt their own cause with unreasonable 
demands and a pronounced sense of entitlement, but this alone did not determine their treatment.  Notably, 
particularly in the arenas of public administration and policing, German officials could be more reluctant to hire 
former officers than the Americans were, though it is not always clear whether this reluctance resulted from 
genuine worries about militarism, was a residue of old tensions from the Weimar era, or arose out of concern 
that the Americans would veto their choices.  Beyond this, even when the March 1946 law broadened the 
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official description of a militarist, its implementation was bounded by presumptive categories that focused 
especially on military positions and activities. 
On the whole, German attitudes toward the Wehrmacht and its former officers were far from uniform, 
consistent, and immutable, however.  Common soldiers, despite sometimes perceiving themselves to be the 
object of persecution, were rather quickly absolved of any responsibility for the war and its horrors.  Instead, 
former professional officers, and, above all, the Wehrmacht’s leaders, endured the most pointed accusations.  
But while some Germans remained unfailingly critical of the men who had worn officer’s braid, others steadily 
defended them, and still others tried to distinguish between blameworthy and honorable conduct.  Jodl and 
Keitel were just good soldiers obeying orders, contended some.  And even those inclined to condemn the two as 
war criminals were not always ready to allow an officer’s soldierly honor to be disgraced by an unworthy 
method of execution.  Denazification tribunals, moreover, were quite willing to dismiss even high-ranking 
generals without censure, so long as the testimony of their advocates confirmed that they conformed to the 
picture of the honorable German officer—disdainful of Nazism, innocent of war crimes, and viewed with 
respect and affection by his troops.  Capable, loyal soldiers were neither criminals nor militarists. 
Significantly, although asked to deal with it directly, German Spruchkammern paid very little attention 
to the issue of militarism as conceptualized by the Americans in pressing their demilitarization agenda.  Holding 
the potential to encourage self-critical appraisal of German cultural practices and individual contributions to the 
onset of World War II, the March 1946 law stimulated neither.  For both defendants and tribunals, true 
militarists were primarily only those who had abused their underlings and fought the war dishonorably, even 
criminally, at the side of the Nazis, perhaps helping to destroy Germany in the process.  And the denazification 
tribunals did not identify many of these. 
In the future, “militarists” would continue to be universally condemned, the activities of former 
military officers would be closely watched, and agitating for war would be taboo.  But the impact of American-
inspired exclusionary and punitive measures on the German people themselves was very limited.  
Demilitarization efforts included a large dose of rhetoric and discussion, some action, and, clearly, genuine 
concern and good intentions on the part of individuals on both sides.  At most, however, some lower-ranking 
career officers and NCOs were temporarily prevented from molding the thinking of others through their work 
and some of Germany’s highest-ranking officers would be kept out of influential positions in German society 
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permanently.  When push came to shove, few Germans were ready to judge their neighbor—whether a simple 
soldier, an officer, a government official, or a teacher—too severely.  Asked to identify, exclude, and punish the 
militarists in their midst, the Germans for the most part declined.
  
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
CARRYING THE IRON CROSS: THE AMERICANS, THE ALLIES, 
AND THE GERMAN OFFICER CORPS 
 
 
“At first I moved around freely for weeks and was treated decently by the Americans (as long as they 
could use me),” wrote former Generalleutnant Hans von Donat in a September 1948 letter describing his 
immediate postwar experiences.  In June 1945, he had been “suddenly, unexpectedly arrested” and delivered to 
a prisoner of war camp in Ochsenfurt, then moved to Moosburg, Neu-Ulm, Augsburg, and Garmisch.  “The 
treatment,” he complained, “was horrific and insulting as well as grueling.”  He had “almost starved to death 
and endured many severe illnesses” until finally, in June 1947, he was released and went to live with his elderly 
mother in Stuttgart.  But his situation had remained difficult.  Explained Donat: 
I was incapable of working and then came down with a succession of other illnesses: jaundice, 
influenza, cystitis, inflammation of the gall bladder, and such.  Because of this, I have remained 
incapable of working up to now and am badly off because of it.  The currency reform [of June 1948] 
completely ruined me.  I reside, penniless and roofless after the loss of my lovely residence, as a poor 
man with my old mother.  With a lot of trouble, I have finally succeeded in obtaining the small 80DM 
monthly social security pension with which you are familiar. . . . It is simply horrific, how our dear 
Volksgenossen abandon us.  The misery has now reached its upper limits.  We can only survive by 
selling one piece after the other of our possessions.  That can only continue for a few more months.  
And all of this, even though I have been denazified and declared “not incriminated”—thus completely 
blameless and baseless [schuld- und grundlos].  It is simply horrific.1 
 
Written by one of several thousand officers held for two years or more by the Americans, Donat’s 
account points to a feature of occupied Germany that is often overlooked: the temporary empty spaces in 
German society.  Until 1947, Germany’s leadership topography lacked not only former high-level Nazi 
officials, but also the majority of their military counterparts, men who, arguably, had generated more respect in 
certain nationalist and reactionary circles than their sometimes disdained civilian counterparts.  Former high-
ranking officers, moreover, were conspicuous in the earliest German discussions of “militarists” and 
“militarism” not because of any particularly shrewd or unpopular opinions they offered, but because they were 
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absent.  They might submit an occasional missive of complaint or advice to German officials or Allied 
occupation authorities, but they were as a rule not part of any public dialogue.     
Donat’s letter also paints a picture other former elite officers would have recognized.  At the end of 
World War II, the German officer corps was too large and too strained by the demands of war to be in any real 
sense homogenous, yet Donat’s background and postwar experiences were not unique.  Trained in the Kaiser’s 
army and a veteran of the Weimar Republic’s 100,000-man Reichswehr, Donat had served in a range of military 
capacities during the war, found himself unceremoniously deposited into an American prisoner of war enclosure 
at its conclusion, and waited impatiently for his release in a variety of American camps.  Unhappy with his 
personal circumstances after finally achieving his freedom, he was typical, too, of men who churned with 
bitterness at their allegedly unjust treatment at the hands of the Allies and their German partners.  Eventually, he 
would join fellow veterans in an insistent campaign to reverse the effects of Allied measures directed especially 
at Germany’s high-ranking officers. 
In recent decades, scholars have investigated the postwar experiences of men like Donat and other 
former officers and examined how they were successfully reintegrated into German society and a new 
democratic state.  They have also studied these men within the complicated framework of issues relating to 
German rearmament and the reconstitution of a German military during the 1950s.2  Outside of the arenas of 
Cold War diplomacy and rearmament negotiations, however, historians have asked many fewer questions about 
Allied thinking concerning Germany’s former officers immediately after the war.  Yet a closer look at 
quadripartite discussions in the late 1940s regarding the fate of these soldiers helps to explain both why the 
Allies detained them for as long as they did—thus incurring a great deal of resentment and criticism—and why, 
after years of vilifying the German officer corps as a virus infecting the German body politic with militarism, 
the Americans ultimately subjected former officers to so few long-term restrictions. 
Overall, the Allies shared a commitment to demilitarization, in the sense of abolishing the Wehrmacht, 
negating the influence of soldiers in German society, and reducing their opportunities and ability to plan future 
wars.  But this did not lead to easy decisions regarding the treatment of former officers.  In fact, negotiations 
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pertaining to Germany’s interned military elites dragged on for many months after May 1945, and what to do 
with Germany’s former officers remained a point of sometimes heated contention virtually until the Allied 
Control Council collapsed in the spring of 1948, with the four Allied governments vacillating on the question of 
whether or not the Wehrmacht’s high-ranking officers should be permanently interned and, if so, where, and 
disagreeing on whether or not, or to what extent, former officers should be allowed to serve in Germany’s 
police forces or attend German universities.  
Throughout, American officials repeatedly voiced their commitment to reducing the social standing of 
German officers and eliminating their ability to prepare for another war.  But the fruits of this resolve varied, 
ranging from a relatively relaxed attitude toward the activities of most former officers to a steady stubbornness 
when it came to the payment of long-service pensions.  American policies also changed in noticeable ways over 
time, with their flaws and unanticipated byproducts sometimes working to undermine the main objectives of the 
occupation. 
 
Captivity 
For most of the Wehrmacht’s elite officers, the frantic activity associated with defeat and capitulation 
rather rapidly gave way to several years of comparatively idle captivity.  Classified by the Allies as Germany’s 
leading militarists, the men were rounded up and put behind barbed wire where they would pose no danger to 
the occupying forces and could not influence their neighbors or make plans for a new war.  Humiliated, 
isolated, and facing an uncertain future, Germany’s general officers and general staff officers had no choice but 
to wait while the Allies decided their fate.  For some like Donat, these experiences both heightened their sense 
of special suffering and substantially shaped their views of the Allies.  Others ultimately made their peace with 
their former enemies and set about disseminating their own interpretation of the recent conflict—effectively 
undercutting the Allies’ stated objectives in the process. 
For Germany’s officer corps, the waning months of World War II were its most taxing and exhausting.  
Multiple fronts disintegrated into rapid retreat and last-ditch efforts to fend off the Allies, senior officers 
worried about soldiers and civilians falling into Soviet hands, and Hitler’s centralized government crumbled.  
Official surrender brought chaos, ignorance of conditions in other parts of Germany, uncertainty regarding the 
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future, and submission to enemy commanders.3  As capitulation became reality, at least a few officers 
contemplated ways to outwit the Allies and spirit away weapons for future use.  Others chose a different course 
and moved about in full uniform for weeks after May 8, helping to demobilize German troops as ordered by the 
Allies.4   
In this context, more than one German officer was taken aback by the lack of respect shown to him by 
American officers.  The cold greeting General der Kavallerie Siegfried Westphal received when first summoned 
by the U.S. Seventh Army was etched deeply into his memory.  “Their officers entered the room we were 
waiting in, distinctly disrespectfully,” he remembered later, “both hands deeply buried in their pants pockets, as 
if they were glued there, without returning our salute, their partly martial, partly tormented gaze turned away 
while they spoke with us.”5  Generalmajor Rudolf-Christoff Baron von Gersdorff recalled being invited with his 
own commander—whom he compared in rank to General George Patton—to the tent of an American division 
commander.  The American had offered them a drink, commiserated regarding their fate, and was generally 
extremely amiable.  When the Germans entered and left, however, he had not stirred from his position, relaxing 
in a field chair with his feet on a table.  In his memoirs, Gersdorff reported that he had a laughed about the 
situation at the time and later attributed the American’s behavior to the fact that he was a reserve officer who 
had had no intent to offend, but was simply behaving as he was used to behaving in civilian life.  Gersdorff 
nevertheless saw fit to add that during the war he had often seen the Germans receive captured French and 
Russian generals with full military honors and according to established rules of military courtesy.6 
In time, the discourteous Americans locked up all of Germany’s officers.  While they began releasing 
lower-ranking officers who were not members of the general staff almost immediately,7 the Wehrmacht’s elites 
met a different fate, as SHAEF’s April 1945 directive on internment called for detaining all general officers and 
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all army general staff officers and their navy and air force equivalents.  In demanding the automatic arrest of 
general staff officers amidst a throng of Germans of questionable political stripes, SHAEF specified that the 
detention of these military men was intended “not so much to punish them for misdeeds” as to prevent them 
from planning another war or plotting against the occupiers.  The officers were therefore not to be interned with 
other security suspects or given the same treatment if it could be avoided.8 
SHAEF’s blanket directive, combined with the language barrier, occasionally led to mistakes that took 
months to resolve.  Pharmacists, paymasters, and doctors were among those rounded up with the general staff 
officers, thanks to official titles containing the prefix Stab- (staff), as in Stabsapotheker, Stabszahlmeister, or 
Stabsarzt.9  The directive’s reach, moreover, was wide, encompassing all former as well as current general staff 
corps members.10  Britain’s General Frederick Morgan, SHAEF’s deputy chief of staff, had specifically lobbied 
for the latter provision in April 1945, commenting: “Once a member of the German General Staff, always a 
member.  And with the more senior surviving members there is always the danger of them being used as 
figureheads.  Witness the case of Hindenburg.”  He had added, too, that it was “of interest that we over-ran 
Field Marshal Von Mackensen yesterday or the day before.”11  Whether this observation was meant to underline 
the urgency of a decision on the matter or to cite the elderly officer as a potential danger is unclear.  It does, 
however, hint at the potential absurdity of the arrest policy, for the dangers posed by a 95-year-old Franco-
Prussian War veteran who had first joined the German General Staff in 1891 would seem to have been slight.  
Nevertheless, as one interned general later noted, “the entire upper stratum of German military life found itself 
behind barbed wire; even generals at the age of 82, who had retired from active service long before 1933.”12 
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Life in American captivity, meanwhile, was an unwelcome new experience for the elite officers.  Early 
on, the combined effects of a severe food shortage in Europe and the enormous quantity of POWs in American 
custody negatively affected their care, with hatred, disdain, and indifference on the part of U.S. camp 
commandants and guards also sometimes contributing to their suffering.13  In addition, the Americans 
periodically shifted officers from one camp to another, transporting them to interrogation centers for 
questioning, sending them to Nuremberg to testify in war crimes trials, or simply moving them from enclosure 
to enclosure in keeping with changing logistical decisions.  Gersdorff recalled that during his 31 months of 
captivity he spent time in no less than 15 different camps and prisons.14  Modes of transport, moreover, varied 
greatly.15  In early fall 1945, officers moved from a camp in France to a camp in Germany were herded into 
cattle cars, some without windows, some partially filled with manure, and spent nine days in transit, with all of 
the doors locked at night.  One general afterward complained of harassment from military police en route and 
reported that the Americans had used rifle butts to hurry along officers who climbed into the cars too slowly.  
Another “shook with sobs” as he later told “how an American private had ripped off his iron cross in front of an 
unprotesting American officer.”  To this German general, an American major later commented, “this meant 
more than if he had been physically tortured for hours.”16 
Varying from facility to facility, officers’ accommodations could be extremely primitive, even 
degrading, and included temporary outdoor compounds, rough barracks built for war plant workers, and, with 
special purpose on the part of the Allies, former concentration camps such as Dachau.17  In October 1945, 
according to the report of an American master sergeant employed by the U.S. Army’s Historical Section, 10 
percent of the officers held temporarily at Neustadt were sleeping on the floor and three generals “had been shot 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
13
 Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation, 291-296; Meyer, “Zur Situation der deutschen militärischen Führungsschicht,” 
605; James F. Tent, “Food Shortages in Germany and Europe,” in Eisenhower and the German POWs: Facts Against 
Falsehood, ed. Günter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 101-109; 
Kenneth W. Hechler, “The Enemy Side of the Hill: The 1945 Background on Interrogation of German Commanders,” in 
Detwiler, World War II German Military Studies, 23-24, 135-139, 162-163. 
 
14
 Gersdorff, Soldat im Untergang, 188.  See also Westphal, Erinnerungen, 351-384; Hans von Donat to Herr Oberstleutnant 
i.G. a.D. R., 23 Sep 48, BA-MA N571 No. 506. 
 
15
 Westphal, Erinnerungen, 354-355. 
 
16
 Hechler, “The Enemy Side of the Hill,” 162-164. 
 
17
 Searle, Wehrmacht Generals, 27; Toppe, “The Story of a Project,” 12; Meyer, “Zur Situation der deutschen militärischen 
Führungsschicht,” 604; Hechler, “The Enemy Side of the Hill,” 144-145, 163. 
 
 221 
[at?—KJN], for reaching through the wire fence to gather weeds they might smoke as tobacco.”  At Hersfeld, 
“twenty to thirty PWs were quartered in one room in triple decker beds, with enough room between the beds for 
a man to go through sideways.”  The master sergeant found “even more striking . . . the camp order that every 
PW must run . . . to the latrine at night and the instructions to guards to shoot freely ‘to give them a hard 
time.’”18  When in late November 1945 the Americans delivered several hundred officers to a former munitions 
plant facility at Allendorf, near Marburg, the camp comprised 17 one-story stone barracks with tar paper roofs.  
Former Generalmajor Alfred Toppe later reported that during the first winter at the facility 
the heating problem was just barely solved by small deliveries of firewood which, at the most, 
provided some warmth once a day for from two to three hours.  The food was very tasty but not at all 
in sufficient quantity.  Consequently inmates had to get as much rest as possible if they wanted to 
conserve their strength.  Medical care was rendered in the camp itself by captured medical officers who 
were hampered in their efforts by a lack of medicines, dressing, and other supplies. . . . None of the 
inmates had any means of communicating with their next of kin. . . .   They were not permitted to send 
or receive any mail.19   
 
By contrast, in early fall 1945 the Seventh Army Interrogation Center was “honeycombed with 
corruption,” but the generals there were, according to one American visitor, “reasonably happy with the rest of 
their treatment, their food, and the fact they could get home occasionally.”20  Conditions also eventually 
improved for most other officers, while still leaving much to be desired, at least from their perspective.  At 
Allendorf, for example, the internees received American clothing, increased rations, and the right to send mail, 
though only one letter and one postcard per month.21  
Captivity could be psychologically as well as physically jarring, especially for men used to issuing 
orders.  U.S. soldiers stripped former officers of watches and other valuables, sometimes derided them, and 
might threaten them with violence during interrogations.22  “It has to be borne in mind that nearly all of these 
generals and general staff officers had either held positions of command—in some instances for many years—
or had served as senior advisors and assistants of their military commanders,” Toppe argued, in discussing how 
different officers responded to their confinement: some developing a “form of psychosis,” others serving as a 
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source of strength to their fellow internees.  “The sudden termination of an independent job of great 
responsibility as well as the loss of their personal freedom constituted a blow of such magnitude, that it could 
not fail to produce a certain reaction.”23 
Miserable conditions, a sense of humiliation, and anger at their American captors could be 
compounded by anxieties concerning families outside of the camp.24  Toppe also pointed to yet another problem 
associated with captivity, namely, the condition of Germany.  “For five and one-half years the German soldier 
had fought in good faith for his fatherland,” Toppe reminded.  
Now it was dismembered and bleeding from many wounds, helplessly exposed to an unknown fate.  
The propaganda that was expounded in the newspapers and on their radio seemed to justify the worst 
fears.  Malicious and dishonest elements proclaimed themselves the rightful representatives of the 
German people, and had the impunity of trying to impress on everybody a feeling of collective guilt.  
All those circumstances were indeed disheartening, and could lead to symptoms of mental 
depression.25 
 
For men in a profession traditionally characterized by an ethos of national service, sitting on the sidelines was 
hard enough;26 watching Germany evolve in an unwelcome direction made it that much more difficult for some. 
Whether the officers interned at Allendorf spent much time contemplating the suffering of the laborers 
who had previously occupied their barracks, or brooded over the fate of those displaced, starved, frozen, 
demeaned, orphaned, or executed as a consequence of their military operations, Toppe does not say.  Major 
Ulrich de Maiziere, held captive by the British, later indicated that at least some officers were forced to ponder 
their culpability for the carnage left by the Third Reich as a result of the initial Nuremberg war crimes trial, if 
not before.27  But on the whole, evidence suggests former German officers were not particularly inclined to 
rigorously evaluate their own pasts.28 
By contrast, American interrogators were very interested in learning more about the officers’ wartime 
activities, asking about their military decisions and about their relations with the Nazi regime.29  Some were 
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concerned about other issues as well.  Gersdorff remembered that his interrogators were “astonishingly well 
informed” about each person interviewed and knew about his own resistance activities.30  Yet they were not 
especially curious about either the German resistance or military matters.  “Mainly, they took pains to clarify 
the historical background of political developments in Germany,” he recalled.  “The question thus turned up 
again and again, whether one was a Prussian or even a Prussian Junker.”  Apparently, he added, “the Prussians 
and Prussian Junkers were more dangerous in their eyes than the Nazis themselves.”31 
If those interned shared many experiences, camp life was not always harmonious.  What an officer had 
to endure might be determined in part by how his views of the past compared with those of the dominant faction 
in his camp, which might be strongly Nazi or centered around men who held in contempt those who had been 
associated with the resistance.  Petty arguments, stealing, disagreements over the Nuremberg trials, and 
criticism (sometimes accompanied by threats) of fellow internees’ actions in the field or their conduct following 
the July 20, 1944, attempt on Hitler’s life could all disrupt communal life and illuminate or deepen existing rifts 
within the officers corps.32   
A unique relationship with their occupiers also quickly set apart a group of former officers who agreed 
to assist the Americans in drafting historical accounts of the Wehrmacht’s wartime activities.  Already during 
the summer of 1945, U.S. Army historians preparing a history of the European war had solicited information 
from senior German officers regarding operations on the Western Front, and useful early returns eventually led 
to the creation of a full-scale program.33  Evidently putting aside previous concerns about facilitating the 
intellectual endeavors of accused militarists, the Americans by June 1946 had recruited an impressive group of 
several hundred Wehrmacht officers, including the former chief of the German General Staff, Generaloberst 
Franz Halder, and two recipients of the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds, Germany’s 
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highest military honor.  The Americans seemed to take great pleasure in having the latter in custody, Gersdorff 
noted later, quipping: “They collected highly decorated German soldiers like other people collect postage 
stamps.”34 
Choosing to participate in the program could be a difficult decision, and some of the former colleagues 
of the men involved resented their cooperation with the enemy.35  According to Gersdorff, he and others 
ultimately decided that working for the Americans represented their only chance to contribute to the writing of 
the history of World War II.36  Military historian James Wood offers a somewhat less charitable view of their 
efforts—which, for some, extended into the early stages of the Cold War and through the 1950s—arguing that 
they “stemmed from the continuance of strongly anticommunist views . . . and a desire to overcome the 
tarnished reputation of the Wehrmacht, which the authors sought to disassociate from German leader Adolf 
Hitler, Nazism, and the SS.”  Cooperating with the United States, he writes, “facilitated their success in 
producing a significant, influential, and arguably self-serving view of the war.”37 
If present-day historians have pointed to the long-term achievements of these interned officers, their 
short-term gains were impressive as well.  The new “Operational History (German) Section” eventually found a 
home at Allendorf, with a shuffling of internees ensuring that only those engaged in writing were housed there.  
Eager to obtain information regarding German strategy and operations and convinced that the former officers 
would be cooperative, forthcoming, and productive only if treated well, U.S. Army Historical Section personnel 
intentionally handled the men with respect, did favors for them, and upgraded their living conditions.38  Special 
privileges included relaxed mail restrictions, the right to receive visitors, guarded weekly excursions outside the 
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camp, and 14-day leaves.  For officers who passed through the camp, the deluxe accommodations could serve 
as an incentive to write slowly.39   
Appreciating the improved treatment, some German officers—perhaps predictably under the 
circumstances—also approved of the Americans with whom they worked.  Gersdorff pointed out that among the 
many U.S. officers he had come across after the war, he had encountered the “best type” at Allendorf.  The 
“frictionless and almost friendly collaboration” that characterized the work there, he noted, resulted above all 
from the fact that the Americans were “without exception . . . excellent soldiers and gentlemen” characterized 
by correct behavior, broad education, and amiability.  “Some of them,” he added, “were active soldiers who had 
been educated at West Point and could have come out of guard regiments of the British or Prussian army.”40  
Complimenting a captain who had helped to administer the program and address German complaints, Toppe 
similarly described the man as “an exponent and shining example of the American officers’ corps whose 
professional outlook and moral code were like our own.”41  While comparisons with Prussian and Wehrmacht 
soldiers may have pleased some Americans, others certainly would have shuddered at the association.  Official 
U.S. policy, after all, presumed an elemental difference between the German officer corps and its American 
counterpart, a presumption reflected in the very fact that the former were interned.  German officers (and some 
Americans, as well) missed this point, chose to overlook it, or simply dismissed it as invalid—a position 
encapsulated in an aphorism making the rounds of the POW camps: “A militarist is a professional soldier who 
has lost a war.”42  
In addition to the sympathetic Americans overseeing the program at Allendorf, the interned German 
officers had certain advocates at USFET, the headquarters of U.S. Forces, European Theater, which operated 
the internment camps.  In April 1946, USFET officials prepared a staff study proposing that many of the general 
staff officers be released.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff recently had agreed to the release of all Germans in 
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“automatic arrest” categories not indicted at Nuremberg.43  Since prosecutors had not indicted the entire general 
staff corps, USFET officials suggested that the remainder should be let go.  They supported this proposal, 
further, by arguing that demilitarization in Germany had progressed to such an extent that there were no security 
objections to impede the move.  The interned officers, moreover, were highly capable men whose abilities were 
needed in Germany, but “sterilized by internment.”  At the same time, their minds were being “poisoned against 
the occupying Power by an apparent injustice.”44 
OMGUS officials shot down this idea, however.  The staff of OMGUS’s Armed Forces Division 
maintained that the general staff officers were, of course, not a current security threat, but rather a future one, 
due to their training and skills.  Colonel H. G. Sheen, head of OMGUS’s counterintelligence operations, was 
even more emphatic.  The general staff had kept alive “German military tradition” even before Nazism came 
along.  Its continued interest in and study of military matters had helped Germany maintain a skilled 
Reichswehr and staff the Wehrmacht’s highly competent officer corps.  Arrest, he stressed, now prevented 
general staff officers from circulating in German society and exercising “such influence as their education and 
previous prestige would naturally command.”  They were indeed capable men, but their capabilities lay in the 
area of military affairs and were “not those which are most needed in Germany today.”  In fact, he argued, their 
abilities were “today the very thing which, under the Potsdam Agreement and the general aims of the 
occupation, we are trying to prevent from being exercised.”  Therefore, the longer these were “sterilized,” the 
better the chances for a successful occupation would be.  Far from worrying about “poisoning” their minds, he 
believed that the “alienation of this small group cannot be considered any more harmful than many Military 
Government regulations or even the acts of American occupying forces toward producing an unfavorable 
mental attitude on the part of a much larger element of the population.”  After all, he added, “it can hardly be 
expected that the Germans will be pleased with all of the necessary directives of the occupying powers.”  To 
release the unindicted general staff officers was essentially to ignore the lessons of history and to court danger.  
The chairman of OMGUS’s Intelligence Coordinating Committee, meanwhile, suggested that implementing the 
staff study “would result in serious and widespread political repercussions in the United States and other 
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countries.”  The OMGUS organizations also reminded that quadripartite talks were still underway concerning 
Germany’s general staff officers and urged that the U.S. not act unilaterally, but instead wait until the Allies as a 
group had decided what to do with the men.45 
In addition to forming a bridge between the Americans who had physical control of Germany’s former 
officers and the men involved in deciding their fate within the Allied Control Authority, the OMGUS responses 
draw attention to an irony of the evolving—or conflicted—U.S. position regarding Germany’s former military 
elites.  SHAEF instructions had insisted that general staff officers should be not only taken into preventative 
custody, but also denied access to their files, in order to deter any study of the recent war and any planning for a 
future one.46  A year later, many MG officials were clearly still worried that these elite officers might become 
the organizers and brains of a future German army.  Yet because of the U.S. Army history program, a sizeable 
number of the presumed militarists in American captivity were actually being invited to become students of the 
last war and would eventually turn into advisors for the next one.  The Allendorf initiative thus sheds at least 
some doubt on American professions of a commitment to containing the threat posed by former German 
officers, although prolonged captivity and close monitoring can be cited as expressions of continuing concern.   
Appraising the internment program as a whole, historians have picked up on de Maiziere’s observation 
that German officers deepened their personal relationships and established new networks while in the camps,47 
developments which actually worked against Allied efforts to prevent veterans from setting up subversive 
organizations or making contacts for dubious purposes after their release.  In addition, scholars have noted that 
humiliating treatment, confinement of uncertain duration, and sometimes dreadful living conditions in the 
camps stimulated hostile feelings toward the Allies which later complicated efforts to secure the former 
officers’ support for German rearmament.  Viewed retrospectively, both are valid criticisms of Allied measures; 
yet they consider events through the lens of later events—the founding of soldiers’ organizations and right-
leaning political coalitions and the rearmament initiatives of the early 1950s.  In 1945 and 1946, by contrast, 
U.S. officials were not necessarily troubled by in-camp networking.  Nor were all of them worried about 
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provoking German resentment.  There were no plans to rearm Germany.  In addition, for at least a year after the 
end of the war, there was no guarantee that the interned officers would ever be released, in which case any 
bonding or bitterness fostered by the camps would be of little importance. 
 
The Allies and the Fate of the Officer Corps 
For many months, then, Germany’s former elite officers remained in limbo and chafing at their lengthy 
internment and uncertain status while American administrators and quadripartite committees considered their 
future.  Here, Allied perceptions of the German officer corps as a vital force in perpetuating German militarism 
again directly affected their fate.  The passing months also eventually brought relief, however.  For they saw a 
gradual evolution of Allied policy proposals that ultimately worked to the former officers’ advantage, slowly 
improving their prospects for the future and finally resulting in the outright release of all but a comparatively 
small number of them still in Soviet captivity or convicted of war crimes. 
 
American Recommendations for Controlling Germany’s Military Elites 
In late spring 1945, SHAEF officials had dutifully issued instructions to round up Germany’s military 
elites for internment.  Yet at the time no one really knew what would eventually become of the men.  No Allied 
government had announced an official opinion on the subject and a quadripartite control authority was still 
being organized.48  The earliest months of the occupation therefore saw the preparation of a number of 
proposals for handling the officers.   
Certain SHAEF planners, for instance, identified “an unprecedented opportunity of utterly destroying 
the root of German militarism – the German General Staff Corps – and of neutralizing the potential danger of 
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the General Officers of the German Army” and advocated exiling and imprisoning them for life.49  Some of 
their colleagues argued that this tactic would be unacceptable to the British and American governments.50  And, 
in the end, SHAEF officials conceded that the decision was not theirs to make anyway, but a quadripartite 
matter.51 
In the meantime, American military authorities had begun to discuss Germany’s officers as a 
variegated collection of men warranting different kinds of treatment.  A late June 1945 study produced by the 
staff of the USGCC’s Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)52 departed noticeably from many ideas then in 
circulation.  In typical fashion, the JIC staff first dissected Germany’s history, tracking the influence of former 
military officers in multiple facets of German life during the Weimar Republic.  Free Corps radicalism, early 
conversion to Nazism by some, destabilization of the republican government, and unwavering commitment to 
re-establishing a large German army which would help them to reclaim their own status were among the more 
damaging achievements attributed to officers who had emerged from World War I “humiliated and embittered,” 
threatened by social and political forces inimical to their own interests, and often forced into “pursuits that did 
not carry with them the dignity to which these men, as officers, were accustomed.”53   
Significant was the report’s partial reliance—to the point of lifting entire phrases—on the October 
1943 study on Prussian militarism Herbert Marcuse and Felix Gilbert had written for the Office of Strategic 
Services.54  The JIC staff’s appraisal of the officer corps was thus comparatively nuanced, tracing the gradual 
decline of “Prussian noble” influence within the German armed forces during the Third Reich and the related 
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broadening social base of the officer corps and more Nazified outlook of many of the younger officers.  Most 
startling was the penultimate paragraph of the report’s historical section.  “The success of the Nazis in all three 
services is evident,” it observed.   
Incidents where officers and men alike fought with a fanaticism almost comparable to that of the 
Japanese are numerous.  Blinded by Nazi propaganda, they carried on long after their cause was 
hopelessly lost.  In the late stages of the war they built mobile courts in true SS style to try and execute 
stragglers on the spot.  All this took place while the traditional Prussian noble was forced to stand by 
and watch the German war machine, Prussia and Germany being pulverized.  The failure of the attempt 
to assassinate Hitler in the summer of 1944 weakened his position still more, and he was unable to 
engineer any activity that could have brought the war to a quicker end. 
 
In addition to acquitting Prussian nobles of Nazi sentiments, this rather remarkable assessment introduced a 
Prussian Junker who was not only no longer a contemptible, all-powerful influence, but who had ended the war 
as a bewildered bystander to Germany’s glorious collapse into death and destruction.55 
In keeping with this evaluation, the JIC staff argued that the officer corps comprised three types of 
men: reserve officers, traditional Prussian nobles “whose position already has been weakened by events,” and 
younger officers “likely to have been profoundly influenced by the Nazi party.”  The last group was particularly 
worrisome as “Nazi characteristics added to those of the Prussian tradition” would likely “intensify the lack of 
scruples in the fanatical pursuit of objectives.”  And it was the latter two groups who elicited the most concern: 
“These officers know only the art of war.  Their prestige will be broken, and at best they can only become a 
dissatisfied and potentially dangerous element in Germany.”56  
Ultimately, the JIC staff concluded that “the entire German officer corps, by training, disposition, and 
ability, is characterized by leadership qualities which can most seriously jeopardize the total demilitarization of 
Germany.”  However, the JIC staff also contended that German officers had “qualities which must be available 
to Germany if Germany is ever to be rehabilitated and reorganized along democratic lines,” adding that “much, 
therefore, depends on background and ability to fit into a normal society.”  The officer’s “usefulness in re-
building Germany” had to be “balanced against security.”  The JIC staff accordingly divided regular and reserve 
officers into five general categories and recommended specific measures for each.  It supported exile for general 
staff officers and control measures for all other officers, including fingerprinting, weekly or monthly reporting 
to Allied authorities, and the obligation to remain in Germany.  Key criteria for differentiating between 
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categories were whether an individual had less or more than five years experience as a civilian employee and 
whether the Allies had banned his former work.57  Thus, rather than relying exclusively on arbitrary categories 
of rank to separate “the sheep from the goats,” as the report’s writers once put it, they offered a rather practical 
approach that asked whether an officer might reasonably be expected to be satisfied as a civilian employee in a 
job that did not threaten world peace. 
While the JIC report apparently exerted little direct impact on U.S. policy,58 the USGCC’s Army 
(Ground) Division circulated a more influential staff study a month later.  Like their JIC counterparts, the 
study’s authors differentiated between types of German officers, though their methodology was different and 
their assumptions more traditional.  Specifically, they proposed development of “a sound, simple method” to 
decide who might be dangerous, a task made difficult by the fact that dangerous officers were “scattered 
throughout the German services” and posed a threat not because of their positions but because of their “personal 
potentialities.”  To meet this challenge, the study’s authors presented a “set of ‘specifications’” to use in placing 
each individual.59   
Despite a desire to evaluate each case on it own merits, the study’s authors went on to describe two 
groups defined partially by rank.  “Group I” encompassed officers 
considered to be the most potentially dangerous for the next 15 years in that they are the men who if 
not controlled, are so imbued with German militarism that they will plot and plan for the re-
establishment of German military power and who have the capabilities of putting such plans into 
effect.  They will be the choosers of future leaders, the planners of future strategy, the teachers of 
future tactics, and the potential commanders.  They are the officers of all ages who have been the most 
successful in their age groups and who therefore enjoy the most prestige.  These officers are to be 
found in all components and all services. 
 
In particular, this meant all generals and general staff officers, their air force and navy equivalents, and “Other 
Officers of Marked Potential Danger.”  The latter category included the “most active and promising officers” in 
the German military who would have been indoctrinated early into German military tradition “usually as a 
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result of birth and position” and would generally have had “military training since early youth.”  Their activities 
prior to September 1939 would constitute “a valuable indication,” while their wartime “assignments, rapidity of 
promotion, decorations, and other indications of zeal and of outstanding performance in their age groups” 
would give evidence of their promise.  Age or rank would not be determinative, the study’s authors cautioned, 
though many would be between 25 and 35 years old.60   
Alternatively, Group II comprised officers whose “military capabilities and tendencies” made them 
potentially dangerous, but less so than those in Group I.  Here, the report writers pointed to career officers, 
including pensioners; mid-rank officers and above who had served on army staffs “at Wehrkreis, army or higher 
headquarters” level or in similar positions in the air force or navy “unless, after investigation, they are 
determined not to be potentially dangerous;” and other officers whom zone commanders thought should be 
controlled in some fashion.61 
Considering disposition, the authors discussed three alternatives: establishing groups or colonies of 
officers in isolated locations outside of Germany (“exile of the ‘St. Helena’ nature”); dispersing the officers, 
either as individuals or in groups, and monitoring them carefully in territory under Allied control; or permitting 
the officers to remain in Germany, but subject to severe restrictions and careful surveillance.  Although SHAEF 
officials had for months promoted the idea of exile, the Army (Ground) Division staffers dismissed not only the 
idea of exile but that of dispersal as well.62   
Exile, they argued, would successfully cut the officers off from any accomplices, but the immense 
“political difficulties” involved in making the necessary arrangements raised doubts about the plan’s feasibility.  
They wondered whether the western powers would commit to such a long range policy and worried that the 
case of the officers would become a “cause celebre” in Allied countries.  The situation, they suggested, might 
actually hurt the whole demilitarization program.  Removing “the outstanding figures of German militarism” 
might also enable American isolationists to press for the reduction or “untimely withdrawal” of Allied 
occupation forces with the argument that Germany had been made militarily harmless.  As importantly, exile 
would “almost inevitably” make the officers “heroes and martyrs” in German eyes.  “Just as Napoleon at St. 
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Helena came to be, for France, a symbol of her vanished glory and the focal point of hopes for future greatness, 
so might the hope of all Germany be turned to these men ‘suffering martyrdom for their loyal service to the 
Reich.’”  Moreover, if the Allies later changed their policy, “the Germans would have won a political and moral 
victory.”63 
The writers of the study concluded that the disadvantages of exile also applied to the idea of dispersal, 
though to a lesser extent.  Less likely to create martyrs, the policy also probably conflicted with present 
immigration laws, at least in the United States.  The authors speculated, further, that the program would 
gradually break down in the face of “the political and social assaults to be expected” and that it would be “most 
difficult” to prevent the officers’ eventual return to Germany.64 
Given this thinking, the staff recommended that Group I, “the ‘elite’ of the militarists” be held in 
Germany, but forbidden to leave the country, change their domicile without permission, hold elective or 
appointed office, or assume positions “on the public payroll . . . above that of laborer.”  Additionally, they 
should be compelled to report periodically to local occupation officials, with their homes subject to 
unannounced searches, their communications censored, their activities closely monitored, and their occupations 
approved by military government authorities—a provision designed to prevent officers from securing jobs with 
“the larger firms” that would enable them “to build up covertly military staffs, conduct research or otherwise 
prepare for a military resurgence in Germany.”  Officers falling in Group II might also return home, where they 
would be closely monitored, forbidden to hold public office, limited in their occupational options, and required 
to report regularly to local military government officials. 65  Provided these restrictions received extensive 
publicity, the study’s authors believed Allied public opinion would be happy to “solv[e] German problems in 
Germany rather than distributing them all over the world” and that the plan would afford “a fitting disposition” 
of the officers “before the eyes of other Germans.”  The plan also had the best chance of “withstanding assault 
by proponents of a softer policy” because it would not be as visible and did not “lend itself to attack on moral 
and social grounds.”  The writers concluded by suggesting that the Allies not release Group I officers until the 
Wehrmacht’s demobilization had been “essentially completed,” while the more numerous Group II members 
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still in custody might be let go in the course of the demobilization program to help ease demands on food and 
housing.66 
Circulated within the USGCC, the study met with certain objections.  Most significantly, officials from 
the Office of the Director of Intelligence cited an insufficient supply of surveillance personnel and argued that 
clandestine activities would be “inevitable.”  The German officers would be able to track new scientific and 
technical developments and, after U.S. troops withdrew in a few years, would be able to carry out their secret 
plans.  “It is a trait of German character to pay homage to a military clique,” the intelligence staff maintained.  
“Their memories are short when it comes to defeats suffered and they can readily be expected to fall into line 
behind any powerful minority which typifies a rebirth of the military spirit.”  Conversely, removing these 
potential leaders would greatly reduce the possibility of a revival of German militarism.  Intelligence officials 
therefore called for “banishment of the St. Helena type.”  Officers should be permitted to take their families 
along, but should not be released until age 70, with no officer released before 1960.67 
Taking a considerably different tack, the staff of the Office of the Director of Political Affairs—
consistent with an approach to denazification that put the needs of reconstruction ahead of demands for a 
thorough cleansing of Nazis—argued that potentially dangerous men with no useful occupation would 
undoubtedly “attempt subrosa propagation of militarism” and undermine Allied control or that of a new German 
government.  A “program of rehabilitation to useful pursuits” should thus accompany restrictions “to provide an 
insurance policy for the period following Allied military occupation.”  Legal Division director Charles Fahy, 
meanwhile, wanted to ensure that, per American policies stated in JCS 1067 and the Potsdam agreement, plans 
for the general staff were intended to accomplish the Allied goal of permanently eliminating German militarism 
and not “as a punishment for acts committed during the war.”  Officers who had “committed offences against 
the laws of war” he assumed would be “tried and punished in due course.”68   
While agreeing to incorporate a reference to a rehabilitation program, the director of the Army 
(Ground) Division countered the Intelligence Division’s objections by asserting that the proposed control 
system would make any clandestine activities “innocuous.”  He suggested, too, that economic and political 
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changes made during the occupation would reduce the security threat the officers posed after the Americans 
left.69 
In the end, this staff study came to serve as the starting point for embryonic American talks with the 
other occupation powers regarding German officers.  In early September, the United States submitted a 
streamlined version of its recommendations to the Allied Control Authority’s Military Directorate for 
quadripartite consideration.70    
 
A Quadripartite Policy for Potentially Dangerous Officers 
American staffers expected that they would more easily get their allies to agree to a policy of strict 
control and surveillance than to one of exile or dispersal.71  But they were wrong.  As the American delegate 
later reported, during the Military Directorate’s first discussion of the U.S. proposal, the British, French, and 
Soviets voiced “a strong objection” to potentially dangerous officers being held in Germany.  The British 
instead recommended that all generals and admirals, all general staff officers (from the army, navy, and air 
force), and “any other officers who, as a result of investigation are militarily dangerous in any way” be held 
outside of Germany for “a number of years.”  The Soviets and French had “welcomed” this initiative.72   
Despite the original U.S. position, Clay subsequently told the American delegate that he would be 
willing to consider and to forward to Washington “a sane and practicable” exile plan.73  And for the next few 
months, the directorate pursued just this course, attempting to refine categories, define treatment, and determine 
what an exile program might look like in practical terms.  In these negotiations, U.S. delegates stressed that 
isolation of the officers should be a preventative, not punitive action.  The directorate should devise only those 
control measures necessary to avert a resurgence of militarism and should not recommend punishments.  Thus, 
for example, the individuals affected should be able to bring their wives and children along, and their standard 
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of living should not be below that of average workers in their country of residence.  Penalties for war crimes 
would be meted out elsewhere and would take precedence over or modify any exile program.74  Clay himself 
evidently questioned this emphasis at one point.  “I fear we are being a little too conservative,” he commented 
to an American negotiator, adding that he was “not worried about such a careful distinction between control and 
punishment.”75  Whether the delegate managed to convince Clay that the difference was important or U.S. 
officials simply proceeded without his explicit endorsement is not clear.  American MG officers nevertheless 
continued to make the distinction.   
On the whole, Clay’s willingness to consider a feasible exile plan for some of Germany’s officers was 
in line with the thinking of the State Department and Secretary of State James Byrnes, who also told Clay’s 
political advisor that any restrictions on other former officers who remained in Germany and any rehabilitation 
efforts should ultimately produce “a stable situation” that could be maintained by a future German 
government.76  But some U.S. officials in Germany were more skeptical of the tenor of current Allied plans.  In 
a paper describing a system for controlling “persons qualified to rebuild Germany’s military capacity” who did 
not fall in arrest categories, including not just military officers but also members of aircraft crews, Germans 
with doctorates in technical and scientific fields, those who had assisted Germany’s guided missile program, 
and “more than nominal Nazis,” OMGUS Public Safety Division officials resurrected the arguments of the 
original Army (Ground) Division study regarding the political obstacles confronting an exile policy.  Desiring 
efficacious control measures that were also “reasonable, just and realistic,” they proposed that the most 
dangerous officers be prohibited from voting or holding public office; excluded from all employment other than 
“ordinary labor”; permitted to entertain no more than five persons in their homes at one time; required to submit 
periodic reports on their activities; and subject to a curfew, mail censorship, residence and travel restrictions, 
and regular visits from monitors.77 
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Clay’s political advisor, State Department official Robert Murphy, no doubt thought even the Public 
Safety Division went too far.  Contributing to a broader contemporary debate concerning the impact of 
denazification on the German economy, Murphy maintained that measures to control Germany’s war-making 
capacity “should be as simple and inexpensive of energy as will be compatible with effectiveness.”  He 
advocated “undertak[ing] no controls not readily defensible as absolutely essential, as economically 
enforceable, and as compatible with peacetime justice.”  Among other things, he thus advised that general staff 
officers continue to be held “pending further study,” but that “no special restrictions” be placed on other former 
officers, save possibly exclusion from police forces.78 
In late October 1945, a Military Directorate subcommittee wrapped up two months of work by 
agreeing to a concrete plan for handling potentially dangerous Germans.79  Containing more categories than the 
original American staff study, the subcommittee’s proposal also relied more on rank and position as 
determining factors.  Category I thus encompassed primarily high-ranking officers, including the German 
General Staff, all general officers, and officers who had commanded a division or something equivalent.  
Included, too, were officers who had served in the Air Ministry and “all officers known to be, or who may later 
be known as particularly dangerous, in particular the principal officers of the Intelligence Services.”  Because 
the directorate had temporarily been assigned responsibility for also deciding the fate of members of Germany’s 
paramilitary organizations (it would be divested of this soon thereafter) Category I also contained high-ranking 
officers from the SS, Hitler Youth, and other paramilitary groups.  Assigned to Category II were mid-level 
paramilitary organization officers.  Category III included “all regular officers of Land, Air and Naval Forces not 
affected by the measures in Category I” and, unless they were deemed “not particularly dangerous,” “all reserve 
officers who have served at any time, with the rank of Major or above on the General Staffs of the Wehrkreis, 
of the Army or above” and their equivalents in the navy and air force, as well as air force Beamten (civilian 
officials), officers and NCOs of air crews, and low-ranking officers and high-ranking NCOs of paramilitary 
organizations.  All officers and air force Beamten not assigned to another category who had “served at any time 
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since 1936, except in the case of persons recognized as innocuous through age or incapacity,” would fall into 
Category IV, along with “regular NCOs of the Land, Air and Naval Forces, considered particularly dangerous” 
and low-ranking paramilitary NCOs.80 
The study also proposed four types of treatment.  Persons assigned to Category I would be exiled for 
“an indefinite period” and permitted to return to Germany only when they turned 70 and then only after 1960.  
The men would live in isolated locations under guard, but in places where they could do “productive work,” 
with their living conditions—including not only clothing and housing, but medical attention, religious activities, 
and recreation—“on a footing equivalent to that of the average working man of the detaining power.”  Their 
“principal occupation” was to be “manual labor” and they might not teach or write books.  However, their wives 
and minor children would be allowed to accompany them, with the latter given the chance to receive a 
democratic education.  Men in Category II would be interned inside Germany.  Individuals assigned to 
Categories III and IV could face restraints such as the loss of voting rights, limits on freedom of movement, and 
reporting requirements.  In addition, they would be barred from occupying important public positions, serving 
as teachers or professors, organizing any clubs, societies, or associations, or becoming members of any of those 
groups.81 
The subcommittee’s final product, therefore, envisioned an extensive, relatively severe set of measures 
reaching deep into the officer corps and, beyond this, to non-commissioned officers.  Realistic in its recognition 
that the Wehrmacht’s senior ranks would not have a monopoly on a desire for revenge, or even on military 
skills, the breadth of the measures was nonetheless extraordinary.  Certain to require watchful eyes in nearly 
every sizeable German community, the challenges and costs of implementation and enforcement would have 
been enormous.  Moreover, its impact on the attitudes of those affected, and probably many of their neighbors 
as well, could hardly have been positive.  Remarkable, too, is the fact that Allied military officers were actively 
involved in formulating such a plan for their German counterparts.82  It is impossible to know if exasperation, 
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fear, a desire for revenge, or the weight of public opinion most influenced their decisions—most likely some 
combination of all four—but the depth of feeling on the part of at least some Allied officers six months after the 
war’s end seems obvious.  If there was any additional evidence needed that German officers were no longer 
considered members in good standing of a “fraternity of arms,” this document fulfills that purpose. 
In the months that followed, however, its tough and expansive provisions were rapidly watered down.  
In late October, Major General Robert Harper, head of the Armed Forces Division of OMGUS (the USGCC’s 
successor) sent information to Clay regarding the exile plan likely to be approved by the directorate, so that 
Clay might discuss it with officials in Washington.  In doing so, Harper also reported that the British delegate 
had now informed him informally that he did not think his government would endorse the principle of exile.  
Harper added, nevertheless, that “it appears desirable to us to go ahead with this program.”83   
Washington’s policymakers—most likely the JCS, above all—had different ideas.84  Clay therefore 
subsequently instructed American officials in Berlin to seek quadripartite agreement on interning the most 
dangerous Germans in Germany.85  In mid November, the American Military Directorate delegate accordingly 
announced that the United States would not exile “those persons for whom it was responsible,” although the 
other powers might do so if they wished.86  But the British were now backing away from their earlier position, 
and, by late December, the French were as well.87   
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With exile now mostly off the table, the directorate approved a revised paper in mid January 1946 
containing just two disposition categories, both subject to annual review by the Allied Control Authority 
(ACA).  In this, the usual high-ranking officers were joined in Category I by “all officers of the rank of 
Lieutenant Colonel and above who served in the Naval, Army and Air High Commands, and are considered by 
Zone Commanders to be particularly dangerous.”  Category II included all Wehrmacht officers not expressly 
determined to be harmless by zone commanders; air force Beamten; NCOs of all branches “considered 
particularly dangerous”; and “members of German air crews and all technical NCO members of ground crews if 
considered dangerous.”  Notably, it listed in both categories “individuals of the former German Armed 
Forces”—presumably not just officers—whom the ACA or zone commanders considered to be dangerous.88 
The revised paper called for all Category I personnel to be “interned inside or outside Germany at the 
discretion of the Power concerned” in special camps “isolated from the population, surrounded by barbed wire, 
and guarded by armed guards.”  Seventy remained the age of release and the other conditions laid out in the 
exile plan also remained substantially the same, although the new proposal stated that “democratic education” 
would be made available to internees and left policies regarding family visits or joint residence to the holding 
power.  Among other measures, Category II personnel faced the usual restrictions on voting, political activity, 
organizing, teaching, and movement.  Their property was to be subject to seizure or supervision “or otherwise 
being taken into control” by the ACA, with property transactions forbidden unless authorized by the Allies.  In 
addition, Category II men were to be prohibited from “engaging, by way of employment or otherwise, in any 
policy making or supervisory capacity in any private or corporate industrial, commercial or financial business, 
or Governmental establishment involving authority over more than ten persons.”89 
Before this paper’s future could be resolved, however, plans for the German officer corps were sent 
spinning into a rather different trajectory.  Naval Directorate delegates objected in varying degrees to the 
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proposal’s blanket categories,90 but the real impetus for fundamental changes came from elsewhere.  
Conversations underway in the American Zone regarding the handling of “Nazis and militarists” now collided 
with the Military Directorate’s deliberations.  Specifically, Clay instructed the U.S. delegate not to approve any 
paper that required internment of an individual without a trial and asked American officials to prepare a new 
proposal based on the March 1946 denazification law, which represented official U.S. policy on the subject.91 
Accordingly, the Americans in early April submitted a plan to the Military Directorate that not only 
drew on the template of past directorate proposals, but also integrated ideas pulled from the denazification law.  
The first paragraph described the Allies’ intent in familiar terms—“to prevent a resurgence of German 
militarism and to control the potentially dangerous personnel of the former German Armed Forces”—but went 
on to state that the zone commanders would assign individuals to classes based on individual investigation, with 
each assignment subject to rebuttal.  The zone commanders were also to set up or designate tribunals to 
consider these cases and were to establish the operational principles and procedures of the tribunals.92  In other 
words, as Fahy informed Clay approvingly, the U.S. could use the denazification tribunals being created in its 
zone to assist in classifying military officers.93 
The new American plan both narrowed and expanded the categories of individuals cited in the 
directorate’s most recent proposal so that they were effectively identical to the Class I and Class II categories 
defined in the “German Armed Forces and Militarists” section of the March 1946 law’s appendix (see Appendix 
B).  The sole change of substance was a provision adding any Wehrmacht members whom zone commanders, 
or, in the case of Class I, the ACC, thought to be particularly dangerous.  As in past Military Directorate 
proposals, Class I members would be subject to a range of restrictions and barred from preaching, teaching, or 
becoming an author, editor, or radio commentator for at least a decade.  Instead of long-term internment, 
however, Class I personnel now faced the possibility of assignment to a labor camp for two to 10 years “in 
order to perform reparations and reconstruction work.”  In addition, aside from what was needed for a “bare 
existence,” their property would be confiscated for reparations purposes.  Similarly, persons in Class II might be 
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interned in a labor camp for up to five years.  “In appropriate cases,” zone commanders could demand “lesser 
measures for control of domicile, occupation, censorship” and other restrictions such as loss of voting rights, 
membership constraints, and limitations on employment. 94 
Rather suddenly, then, American officials merged long-discussed measures aimed at isolating 
dangerous military personnel with zonal denazification legislation that was about to transform the meaning of 
“denazification” from a program of removal and societal cleansing into a means of punishment and personal 
rehabilitation.  Hence the new U.S. plan ensured the evaluation of each case on its own merits, and in this 
regard was an improvement over the essentially arbitrary categorizing of previous proposals, but it also 
effectively demolished the distinction between preventing behavior that threatened Allied security and 
punishing German officers for past activities.  To be sure, the line between deterrence and retribution, as the 
Allies conceived of it, had always been thin.  Periodic statements underlining the preventative nature of 
contemplated measures perhaps hinted at Allied recognition of this—or at least recognition of the potentially 
ambiguous appearance and effect of the measures.  Furthermore, German officers sitting behind barbed wire 
could hardly have been expected to appreciate the niceties of the distinction between restraint and retribution.  
Yet in the fall of 1945, the western Allies, at least, had remained mindful of the difference in quadripartite 
talks.95  References to democratic education, recreational activities, and living accommodations for officer 
families spoke to this, as did the fact that, although potentially harsh, virtually all measures discussed could 
legitimately be justified as having surveillance and control functions. 
By spring 1946, however, the situation had apparently changed.  For one thing, OMGUS officials 
tasked with developing a new denazification program were insistent that any effort to control dangerous 
German personnel be coordinated with their plans.  Individual screening also made the assessing of penalties 
more acceptable.96  In addition, the influence of staff members who thought it necessary to punish Nazis and 
militarists for their past activities and beliefs, whether criminal or not, was in all probability felt here as well as 
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in the denazification arena.97  Clearly, too, even Clay had not always worried about the distinction between 
prevention and punishment.  But some MG officials also seem simply to have lost sight of their original ideas. 
In any event, by late April 1946, even as some of his OMGUS colleagues were fending off the USFET 
proposal to release certain general staff officers by stressing the importance of controlling potentially dangerous 
officers,98 Colonel Frank Emery, Jr., deputy director of OMGUS’s Armed Forces Division, was contemplating 
how to secure Allied approval of the new American plan.  The other Military Directorate delegates had been 
somewhat perplexed by the sudden appearance of a completely revamped U.S. plan and had insisted on 
continuing to revise the directorate’s existing proposal.99  Comparing the two papers, Emery recommended that 
the American delegate accept the original plan provided it contained language ensuring an individual 
investigation and possibility of rebuttal for each person, as well as a reduction in the internment period from a 
maximum of fifteen years (upon which the other powers had recently agreed) to a maximum of ten years.  
Additionally, he suggested that the Americans try to modify the Category II stipulations to eliminate the 
property seizure paragraph and restore voting privileges.  In his remarks, Emery noted that although the original 
paper provided “punitive measures (internment) for a certain group of individuals and control measures for the 
larger group of less potentially dangerous ones,” the American initiative was “punitive only” and its proposed 
measures generally “more stringent.”  He did not seem overly concerned by this detail, however.100 
In the end, the American negotiators essentially obtained what Emery had asked for, though the paper 
approved by the directorate retained the categories originally defined in the directorate’s January draft, as well 
as its provisions for handling former officers.  Overall, the proposal had evolved to a point where, depending 
upon its interpretation, the conditions of internment might be either reasonably generous or relatively grim.  
Family visits or joint internment were left to the zone commander’s discretion and living conditions 
                                                 
97
 Lutz Niethammer attributes this conviction especially to OMGUS’s Legal Division.  And in developing the U.S. Zone’s 
denazification program, the Legal Division’s staff sought to ensure that any plans for controlling militarists were consistent 
with the new program and expected that the Armed Forces and Internal Affairs and Communications Divisions would “look 
primarily to us for guidance in ironing out the points of conflict.”  Niethammer, Entnazifizierung in Bayern, 300-305; Philip 
Elman, Memorandum for Mr. Fahy, 16 Jan 46, NA, RG 260, OMGUS, Civil Administration Division, Box 454, F: 
Denazification Policy Board. 
 
98
 Thos. B. Whitted, Jr., to C/S, and attachments, 20 Apr 45, NA, RG 260. 
 
99
 DMIL/M(46)11 Revise, 17 Apr 46, NA, RG 260, DMIL, Box 424, F: DMIL/M(46) 1-30. 
 
100
 Frank E. Emery, Jr., to C/S, OMGUS, 23 Apr 46, NA, RG 260, Executive Office, Adjutant General’s Office, Box 799, F: 
German General Staff Corps. 
 
 244 
approximating those of an average German working man had become living conditions “to be not above those” 
of a working man.  But promises of religious activities and democratic education remained, “useful physical 
labor” had become “useful work,” and there were no references to labor camps or reparations. 101 
The new American stance nevertheless continued to affect Allied deliberations.  Sent to the Internal 
Affairs and Communications (IAC) Directorate as the Military Directorate’s final offering, the proposal’s key 
ideas were incorporated into a larger draft directive covering “The Arrest and Punishment of War Criminals, 
Nazis and Militarists, and the Internment, Control and Surveillance of Potentially Dangerous Germans.”  
Consistent with its collage of a title, the new document bore distinct signs of glue.  The new draft closely 
followed the U.S. Zone’s March 1946 law, mandating placement of individuals into five groups, listing 
sanctions pulled directly from the existing law, and attaching the ubiquitous lists of personnel who required 
careful scrutiny.  Pasted into this basic framework were bits and pieces of language from the Military 
Directorate.  A new entry in the “major offenders” category referenced “any member of the High Command of 
the German Armed Forces,” while “militarists” now included persons “whose past training and activities” the 
zone commanders believed had “contributed towards the promotion of militarism” and considered “likely to 
endanger Allied purposes.”  Former soldiers received explicit mention in the discussion of possible “lesser 
offenders,” and, in a strange semantic twist, a “follower” might now also be any veteran who the zone 
commander thought “liable by his qualification to endanger allied purposes.”102 
Discussing sanctions, the directive cited as its goals both the exclusion of Nazis and militarists and 
reparations for damage caused.  Sanctions for followers and lesser offenders now included possible reporting 
requirements and travel restrictions, offenders could be interned up to fifteen years “in order to perform 
reparation and reconstruction work,” and  major offenders were to be “imprisoned, or interned” up to fifteen 
years.”103  General instructions in the appendix stated that the individuals specified there would, because of their 
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positions and their alleged crimes, be carefully investigated and, if appropriate, must be brought to trial and 
“punished if found guilty.”104 
At the beginning of the directive, the IAC Directorate listed three objectives: punishing “war criminals, 
Nazis, Militarists, and industrialists who encouraged and supported the Nazi Regime,” achieving the “complete 
and lasting destruction of Nazism and Militarism by imprisoning and restricting the activities of important 
participants or adherents to these creeds,” and “the internment of Germans, who, though not guilty of specific 
crimes are considered to be dangerous to Allied purposes, and the control and surveillance of others considered 
potentially dangerous.”  It stressed, as well, that a “distinction should be made between imprisonment of war 
criminals and similar offenders for criminal conduct and internment of potentially dangerous persons who may 
be confined because their freedom would constitute a danger to the Allied Cause.”105  However, the net effect of 
creating a basket directive intended to nab every possible threat and punish every offender was to blur the 
distinction between deterrence and retribution and to bury beneath a mound of Nazis and criminals the 
“dangerous” officers the Military Directorate had been discussing for a year. 
Just this weakness drew the attention of the French delegate to the Coordinating Committee shortly 
after it had tentatively approved the IAC Directorate’s proposal in September 1946.  Under the new directive, 
individuals should be subject to measures either for personal crimes or because they were potentially dangerous, 
he observed, but the IAC Directorate text “presented continual confusion between the guilty person and the 
person not guilty but potentially dangerous.”  He therefore proposed amendments emphasizing that tribunals 
should take action against three types of people: “War criminals, persons who had taken part in the planning 
and execution of guilty enterprises, and persons dangerous to Allied objectives.”106  But by this time the other 
delegates were eager to issue a directive that already had quadripartite approval, particularly since the recent 
Nuremberg trial decision would make instructions for handling the many persons it covered that much more 
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critical.  The French eventually conceded the importance of moving quickly and decided that questions of 
interpretation could be decided by consulting committee minutes.  Accordingly, Control Council Directive No. 
38 took effect on October 14, 1946.107   
The Americans took action to apply the new directive almost immediately.  With the directive giving 
zone commanders wide latitude in establishing tribunals to classify and try any possible offenders, specifying 
only that zonal laws be in “general conformity with the principles” of the directive, an OMGUS official on 
October 19, 1946, informed the directors of the various Land MG offices that in the U.S. Zone the March 1946 
law was “an implementation of Control Council Directive No. 38.”108  
During the course of months of Allied deliberations, American pressure in many ways had helped to 
produce a more reasonable policy toward former German officers, even as it eased their long-term situation.  
Evaluating each case on its own merits and granting each individual the right to respond to any decision was 
undoubtedly a more just method of handling former officers than was segregating or restricting them based on 
rank or position.  In fact, it might be argued that the idea of isolating the elites of Germany’s officer corps—not 
to mention the logic that led to the development of this policy—had been inherently flawed from the start.  In 
any case, for German officers, there would now be no lengthy internment or reporting requirements without 
individual investigations which, in the U.S. Zone, would be conducted primarily by the officers’ fellow 
Germans rather than by their former enemies. 
On the other hand, both the methodology selected for handling former officers in the American Zone 
and the directive itself were problematic.  Using the March 1946 law to implement Directive No. 38, the United 
States could shunt “the ‘elite’ of the militarists” into the existing denazification apparatus.  A reasonable choice 
from the perspective of expediency, efficiency, and uniformity, it nevertheless also meant that former officers 
would be appraised according to the same criteria applied to everyone else.  In the U.S. Zone, there was 
therefore virtually no chance that former officers would be pronounced security threats—rather than judged to 
have been militarists or Nazis during the Third Reich—and subjected to pertinent controls and restraints.  
Tribunals assessed sanctions based on past behavior and personal character, not on possible future conduct.  
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And while theoretically certain sanctions could keep individuals out of influential positions or locked up 
temporarily, generally their location, movements, and relationships would not be affected.  Equally important, 
the American system turned the assessment process over to the officers’ fellow citizens, who ultimately showed 
little interest in sanctioning their country’s former military elites.109 
Noteworthy, too, were the psychological and interpretive byproducts of this decision.  Former officers 
in the U.S. Zone would have been “denazified” even without Directive No. 38.  But the composition of the 
directive did tend to obscure the primary grounds for continuing Allied concerns about military officers.  If only 
in its use of the terms “trial” and “guilt,” the overall smell conveyed was one of immorality, if not criminality.  
Furthermore, denazification operations in the zone were becoming an arena of punishment and penance.  In an 
environment where Allied courts were also attacking German officers as war criminals, it was an easy step for 
ex-officers to claim that former professional soldiers, as an undifferentiated group, were being painted with 
guilt for any number of German sins and treated as criminals simply by virtue of their former profession.110  
Complaints would also later arise when tribunal exoneration did not relieve them of other Allied security 
measures they viewed as punitive. 
There had always been those within American circles who opposed any type of extended internment or 
segregation for Germany’s officers.  And, in some respects, Directive No. 38 was right in keeping with early 
U.S. proposals recommending treatment based on more than rank and allowing for rehabilitation.  But it 
resulted only in sending officers into a denazification machine staffed by civilians which essentially cleaned 
people off and spit them out again.  In doing so, it did not really address the concerns expressed repeatedly by 
American officials regarding the war-planning and war-making talents and desires of Germany’s military elites.  
In helping to develop the new Allied directive after crafting its own zonal denazification legislation, the United 
States effectively abandoned its early insistence on not confusing punishment with security and, more 
significantly, simultaneously dropped its original plans to closely control and monitor the activities of all high-
ranking and influential former German officers.  Punitive treatment of ex-officers may have been a fitting 
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response to the Wehrmacht’s recent wartime conduct, but there is little indication that this realization figured 
into Allied decision-making or that the Americans even gave the shift in philosophy any meaningful attention.  
The operative influences were apparently a loss of policy memory or commitment over time, the need for 
uniformity and efficiency in zonal operations, and the influence of OMGUS personnel who advocated 
punishment for former Nazis and militarists for their past activities regardless of any actual crimes they may 
have committed, perhaps accompanied by a weakening fear of German military potential.  The overarching 
American approach to dealing with the “hard centre of German militarism,” however, had changed perceptibly 
by 1947. 
 
The Push for More Restrictions 
Although it was in many ways little more than an add-on to denazification in the U.S. Zone, Directive 
No. 38’s impact on former German officers was not insignificant.  Mostly relieved of the threat of long-term 
confinement, they were also conceded the right to defend themselves.  In addition, the directive ultimately 
functioned as something of a shield, which the Americans and the British wielded regularly during the months 
that followed, protecting former officers from the yoke of further restrictions on their activities. 
After the new directive was issued, the French and the Soviets immediately began pushing for more 
restraints on veterans.  The French, in fact, had been asking for limits on the employment of former officers in 
Germany’s fire services and police forces for a number of months.111  In Allied negotiations, these initiatives 
now became a key focus of their efforts to control Germany’s ex-officers.  In this, moreover, they usually had 
the full support of the Soviets, who frequently pressed for even more stringent measures.   
French and Soviet arguments generally fell into certain patterns.  The majority of former German 
officers, they asserted, did not fall under the provisions of either ACC Directive No. 24 or ACC Directive No. 
38.  The former was about denazification.  The latter covered the arrest and punishment of war criminals, Nazis, 
and militarists, while limiting the activities of certain military men.  But the French and Soviets were interested 
in demilitarization, not denazification.  Practical security measures were still lacking, they insisted.  And here it 
was critical to keep former German officers out of organizations which, as the French once put it, “by their 
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structures, their discipline, their cohesion, their uniforms, and in certain measure, their armament, resemble 
military formations and would be capable of supplying ultimately the framework for an eventual 
remilitarization.”  The French and Soviets were not ready to ignore the lessons of Germany’s post-Versailles 
defiance.112   
Similar concerns shaped their views regarding restrictions on the admission of former officers to 
institutions of higher learning.  Statistics from the summer of 1946 showed a total of 29,265 students enrolled in 
German institutions in the U.S. Zone, 19.1 percent of whom were former officers.  The British and French 
reported, respectively, 23,183 students with 23.8 percent ex-officers and 7,645 students with 16.5 percent ex-
officers.  Indicating that reserve officers (only) constituted just 3.1 percent of the 8,823 students in their zone, 
the Soviets vehemently condemned the number of former officers in German institutions and proposed that no 
former regular officers be admitted and that former reserve officers be enrolled only with special permission.  
The present situation went against the overriding principles of the occupation, namely demilitarization and 
democratization, the Soviets maintained, and represented a “significant war potential.”  Not against integrating 
former officers into civilian positions, they believed military men should nevertheless be denied university 
educations that would enable them to become leaders in agriculture, science, and particularly in the “economic 
field.”  Justifying his stance, one Soviet official observed “that German officers were more militaristic in 
character than officers of other nations, and the world had suffered for it.”113 
The French stressed the risks involved in not limiting their fields of study.  One French representative, 
for example, suggested that former officers should be barred from studying subjects that prepared students “for 
the higher sections of administrative work, for political science, law, teaching, historical studies, and such 
sciences as mathematics, physics, chemistry, ballistics, optics, and electricity.”  Conversely, they should be 
allowed to pursue fields of study such as “architecture, town planning, agronomics, rivers and forestry, 
medicine, dentistry, vet surgery, and commercial business.”  In these careers, they would pose less of a danger, 
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but might still contribute to Germany’s reconstruction.114  “I would feel very annoyed if I could see any officer 
studying mechanics or ballistics,” explained another French delegate.  “But I would not feel very annoyed [if] I 
would see such an officer studying, for instance, botany.”115 
The United States adopted a markedly different position.  In internal communications, particularly 
early in the occupation, some OMGUS officials expressed a willingness to limit ex-officer activities.  But they 
also stressed, for example, that the fire departments in the U.S. Zone had been demilitarized to such an extent—
in appearance, training, and hierarchy, as well as employee composition—that additional restrictions were 
unnecessary.116  And, overall, official U.S. policy statements were far less flexible than these internal 
exchanges.  American delegates to the various Allied deliberative bodies repeatedly insisted that existing 
legislation was sufficient to control Germany’s ex-officers and seemed determined to negotiate quadripartite 
policies compatible with those already in place in their zone or to adopt none at all.  Initially, they affirmed the 
sufficiency of ACC Directive No. 24 and related legislation—including the March 1946 law—which covered 
employment removals and restrictions.117  Later they cited Directive No. 38.  In discussion after discussion, 
American officials—more often than not with British support—refused to negotiate any comprehensive 
prohibition or limitation on the admission of former officers to Germany’s fire services, police forces, or 
universities.   
Interestingly, the United States stuck to this position even though internally at least a few American 
officials were also raising questions about possible weaknesses in current regulations.  By using the March 1946 
law to implement Directive No. 38, the U.S. had effectively discarded the restraints once envisioned for lower-
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ranking officers and those not likely to be convicted as major offenders or offenders.118  Writing to a MG 
colleague in late December 1946, Colonel W. W. Holler, deputy director of OMGUS’s Armed Forces Division, 
pointed out that the March law was not the same as the new directive.  His division was against imprisonment 
as a sanction for soldiers, he reported, but was convinced nonetheless that the activities of professional soldiers 
“whose former position, training, and experience provide them with the ability to plan and to carry into effect a 
resurgence of German militarism” had to be controlled.  To ensure that they could be “accounted for” and 
“prevented from planning or from instructing others in the art of war,” the division believed that “certain 
checks” on these men were essential.”119     
That the U.S. was not being particularly vigilant in this regard was suggested by correspondence 
exchanged within OMGUS during the spring of 1947.  In late March, Holler requested information from 
OMGUS’s Internal Affairs staff regarding the outcome of denazification tribunal proceedings involving former 
Wehrmacht members, asking specifically for the number of individuals initially charged in each category; the 
results of proceedings involving those assigned to each group, i.e., how each individual was ultimately 
classified; and the sanctions imposed on those not exonerated.  American delegates in Allied meetings regularly 
argued that existing legislation adequately controlled former soldiers, Holler noted, and he wanted this 
information “that we may assure ourselves that this is indeed the case.”  In response, Internal Affairs reported 
that German denazification authorities were not required to compile the desired information.  This reply elicited 
a second request, this time from Armed Forces Division director Harper, who in a number of quadripartite 
meetings had advocated letting Directive No. 38 do its job.  “As the German Officer Corps comprises a 
comparatively small group within the scope of Directive No. 38,” he declared, “and further that they, above all 
others, are best qualified through education, training, and experience to plan and to execute a resurgence of 
militarism, it appears desirable to have some record as to where they are and what they are doing.  Information 
is again requested if it would not be possible to provide the data desired.”  The division’s inquiries, in fact, led 
OMGUS Public Safety officials to pull together a proposal for a registration system that would track the place 
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of residence and current employer of each former officer in the U.S. Zone, although their internal 
communications hint at a certain amount of annoyance relating to the task.120   
In short, while the French and Soviets were reporting that former officers in their respective zones 
were required to check in with authorities regularly,121 the Americans were not even sure where each of their 
former officers lived, much less what each was doing for a living.  New general statistics soon arrived from the 
denazification tribunals, but the United States never introduced additional registration procedures.  The 
activities of former officers instead apparently fell only under the jurisdiction of U.S. counterintelligence 
officials conducting surveillance of the Germans generally, usually in the form of telephone and mail 
monitoring.122 
The Americans nevertheless continued to resist French and Soviet initiatives to tighten Allied 
restrictions, believing that their own approach would achieve the best results in the long term.  Defending their 
refusal to limit the number of former officers in German police and fire services, the Americans argued that 
introducing new legislation would lead to confusion and that to discriminate broadly against former officers 
would be counterproductive.  “If we publish too many directives about the former members of the Wehrmacht,” 
explained one U.S. representative, “we unnecessarily antagonize them and drive their activities into illegal 
channels.”  The Americans also began to stress that it was undemocratic to sanction members of a specific 
group collectively without a fair trial for each; it went against U.S. policy.  Overall, they contended, it was 
important to continue to study the impact of Directive No. 38, to investigate individual appointments to police 
and fire departments conscientiously, and to maintain careful surveillance of former German officers as part of 
a general vigilance against a resurgence of German militarism, but additional controls were both unnecessary 
and undesirable at present.123 
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Their concerns in rejecting restrictions on university admissions for former officers were similar.  
Preventing ex-officers from obtaining an education risked creating a group of resentful men,124 the Americans 
argued, while permitting them to learn offered a way to channel their intelligence and abilities into healthier 
pursuits.  It was better to allow former officers “to be converted into useful citizens through education,” one 
American maintained, “than to generally leave them out on the streets.”  The U.S. shared the goals of its allies; 
the principal bone of contention was how to accomplish them.125  And as far as the Americans were concerned, 
existing legislation was sufficient to control admissions and adequate to ensure that those who showed signs of 
militarism or Nazism would be expelled.  Blanket restrictions on former officers who were not Nazis were, 
conversely, a bad idea.126  At one point in late 1946, an American delegate reminded his Coordinating 
Committee colleagues that Directive No. 38 did not classify all former officers as militarists.  To bar their 
admission to universities thus essentially meant reversing the committee’s own position.127  Individualized 
assessments rooted in the directive’s categories became a foundational principle of the American stance.128 
By late fall 1947, the United States was nevertheless feeling some pressure concerning what was 
proving to be a fairly controversial issue.129  Heated exchanges between U.S. and Soviet representatives hinted 
at broader tensions between the two national delegations.  However, in a December 1947 Coordinating 
Committee meeting U.S. Deputy Military Governor Major General George Hays found himself opposing all of 
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his erstwhile allies.  The British generally agreed that existing measures effectively kept undesirables out of 
German police departments, fire services, and institutions of higher learning.  But they also tended to be more 
flexible in trying to reach common ground with their allies, at least in terms of defining the letter of the law, if 
not always in planning for its implementation.130  Along with the French and Soviets, they now endorsed a 
proposal that would limit to 3 percent the percentage of former regular officers allowed to be officers in police, 
fire, public transit, and similar organizations, with a cap on the percentage of officers among the total strength 
of each organization set at 1.5 percent.  The men would also be barred from “technical studies leading to highly 
specialized scientific careers.”131   
Both percentage ceilings, even Hays had to admit, were higher than the current percentages of former 
officers employed in the U.S. Zone, at least by the rail system and police forces.  Still, he refused to budge.  
Existing laws were sufficient, if enforced, and further restrictions would “infringe on zone commanders’ 
prerogatives.”  The Americans were enforcing the laws and would continue to do so.  Besides, he had received 
no reports of problems to date.  The British quickly accepted the American position and the French cautiously 
agreed to drop any mention of percentages if the four powers would agree to enforce them anyway.  But an 
overall agreement remained elusive and the Coordinating Committee sent the matter up to the Control Council 
itself for resolution.132 
In this forum, Clay sought a compromise by calling for both removing percentage restrictions and 
strengthening the proposal’s language—instructing zone commanders to limit the activity of former soldiers, 
especially officers, in various potentially dangerous organizations and to restrict their numbers in any particular 
activity to preclude their gaining control.  He also suggested that the ACC arrange inspections to enforce these 
objectives.  Responding to the Soviet military governor’s complaint that his proposal was too broad and 
deprived the directive of its meaning, Clay granted that his version was less precise.  But he thought the council 
was “defeating its own purpose” in setting an “arbitrary limit” on ex-officer employment in these organizations.  
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He agreed that the activities of officers should be restricted and their numbers monitored, but he also “pointed 
out that long-term legislation was being proposed and he doubted very much if an anti-militarist spirit could be 
created in Germany by making outcasts, over a long period of time, of those of its ex-officers who were not 
necessarily militarists in spirit.  Such measures were almost certain to drive them to conspiracy and 
sabotage.”133  Shortly thereafter, the four powers signed off on Clay’s recommendations and agreed to require 
the submission of periodic reports on the percentage of ex-regular officers employed in the various 
organizations of concern.134  
Yet ultimately the point was moot, for the entire Allied Control Authority was on the verge of 
disintegration.  In late March 1948, the Soviet Military Governor walked out of a Control Council meeting and 
the council never met again.  As a result, thousands of former officers in the American Zone were secure in 
their jobs and university positions and those who had only just recently returned home might seek the same.   
All in all, the Americans had come a long way from considering permanent exile for elite officers and 
widespread restrictions and surveillance for other officers to requiring all of the men to undergo a 
Spruchkammer examination en route to virtually full participation in German society.  If the Spruchkammer 
requirement suggests a willingness to punish rather than to exclude and control, other American arguments and 
decisions reveal a determination not to alienate all former officers permanently and thus to drive them to more 
worrisome activities.  Over time, individual evaluation, integration, and, to a lesser extent, reeducation became 
the defining characteristics of American plans for most former German officers on both the grassroots and zonal 
policy level. 
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The Return of Germany’s Military Elites 
Together with the Nuremberg verdict, ACC Directive No. 38 settled the fate of most general officers 
and general staff officers still held by the Americans.  Neither completely eliminated all of the questions 
regarding the future of the men, but subsequent developments in Allied conference rooms did not impede a 
gradual release program.  Once freed, the officers’ experiences varied considerably depending upon their 
disposition, location, age, and former rank.  Shared by many, however, was a resentment of Allied measures, 
anger at their fellow citizens for perceived defamation, and frustration due to changed circumstances.  And from 
some, these conditions incited a vocal response. 
 
The Release of Elite Officers 
In late December 1946, the vast majority of former German general officers and general staff officers 
in the U.S. Zone were still in American hands.  Most general staff officers ranging in rank from captain to 
colonel had recently been officially discharged from POW status and moved to American-operated civilian 
internment enclosures.  And the commander of U.S. forces in Germany now ordered the discharge of all 
remaining officers from POW status, with alleged war criminals and witnesses to be sent to Dachau and 
Nuremberg and persons of interest to U.S. intelligence officials and those in automatic arrest categories 
transferred to civilian internment enclosures.  Exceptions to these instructions were officers working for the 
Historical Section, who would not be discharged, but rather “paroled in place, retaining their mil[itary] status, 
with a minimum of restriction” unless they fell into one of the other categories (not including membership in the 
general staff corps).135 
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Consequently, the American army began sending German generals and admirals home, where they 
eventually faced scrutiny from local denazification tribunals.136  Wehrmacht general staff officers once again 
proved problematic, however.  Their close association in Allied minds with German militarism, their place on 
the original automatic arrest list, and the Nuremberg indictment of the “General Staff and High Command” 
made their status more complicated.  In early 1947, American policy stated that general staff officers in U.S. 
custody should be turned over to German-run civilian internment enclosures for eventual processing by 
denazification tribunals.  But certain USFET officials were now suggesting—perhaps prompted by complaints 
from lower-ranking general staff officers—that because the Nuremberg judges had declared the general staff 
“not guilty,” these men should be “released outright.”  OMGUS officials, in turn, rejected this proposal, noting 
that Clay wanted the former officers transferred to German custody to be “tried” by German tribunals prior to 
release.137  OMGUS’s Legal Division, moreover, stressed that the Nuremberg judges had not declared the 
general staff “not guilty,” but rather merely had declared that the “General Staff and High Command” was not a 
criminal organization.  In fact, the court had made very clear that the Wehrmacht had sullied itself through 
crimes and its individual members should not be considered exonerated.138  American military officials thus 
turned over to the Germans all former general staff officers not working at Allendorf.139  
Among these were approximately 140 general staff officers newly assigned to Internment Hospital No. 
2 in Karlsruhe—appropriately housed in the former “Grenadier Kaserne” (infantry barracks)—and not happy 
about it.  Although the Germans had appointed as camp director a former Wehrmacht colonel whom an 
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OMGUS Public Safety Branch investigator reported with dissatisfaction had allegedly welcomed the new 
internees with the greeting “Gentleman, consider yourself under honorable confinement,” the facilities did not 
permit the physical separation of the 1,700 individuals of various origins awaiting denazification and the more 
than 350 others who had been sent there by tribunal judgments.140  Galled by their circumstances, the ex-
officers protested their internment with alleged war criminals and members of criminal organizations.  Writing 
to the head of Württemberg-Baden’s Denazification Ministry, their ombudsman complained that, aside from 
losing their freedom, being interned in such a fashion hurt their standing in the eyes of the public, which 
assumed that professional soldiers would be held as civilian internees only if they were personally guilty in 
some way.  In support of their case, he referred to the 23 SD and 48 Gestapo members, 818 high-ranking SS 
members, and 860 former political leaders who shared the officers’ accommodations.  Ultimately, the soldiers’ 
situation did not change.  But local tribunals gradually processed their cases and they could finally go home. 141 
In late June 1947, meanwhile, all history project officers finally received their discharges, with 150 
continuing to work as part of a smaller historical program.  Some became paid employees of the Americans, but 
all general staff officers and potential war criminals remained officially in U.S. custody as civilian internees.142  
In August 1947, new U.S. regulations at last permitted the release of all individuals in automatic arrest 
categories other than war criminals or security detainees, although denazification officials from each Land had 
30 days to issue arrest warrants for the men or to ask for an extension.  In the wake of this, Württemberg-Baden 
officials agreed to the release of all but one of the roughly two dozen general staff officers from their Land.  A 
special German denazification tribunal considered their cases during the spring of 1948.143 
In the end, as discussed previously,144 this Spruchkammer and other German denazification tribunals 
declared the vast majority of former general officers and general staff officers to be “not incriminated” or “not 
affected” by the March 1946 law.  Notable, too, is the fact that, whatever hopes the Americans may have 
entertained regarding the impact of these proceedings, in reaching these verdicts the tribunals evaluated only the 
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officers’ past conduct and, to a lesser extent, their past attitudes, primarily asking to what degree these men had 
supported the Nazi dictatorship and its criminal activities.  They did not examine the officers’ present skills, 
assess their attitudes toward the Allies, question whether their work in military training schools during the 
1930s or at the War Academy during World War II made them likely candidates to assist in the underground 
establishment of a new German army, or evaluate whether the fact that the Wehrmacht’s leadership had 
commanded them to general staff training—due solely, as they all claimed, to their military capabilities—in any 
way meant they were dangerous.  Future Allied security considerations essentially played no role in the tribunal 
judgments. 
 
Aftermath of Captivity 
Some two years after Germany surrendered, men whose appearance had previously reinforced their 
aura of power now began turning up at their new living quarters not in chauffeur-driven staff cars with flags 
waving, but alone.  Thinner, perhaps with more gray hair and weathered and worn faces, perhaps injured or ill, 
in sometimes saggy uniforms without medals or in unexceptional civilian clothing, they greeted their old or new 
neighbors.  During the years that followed, they attempted to adapt to their new economic and social position, 
with mixed success.   
Sharing many challenges with lower-ranking colleagues who had returned earlier, their experiences 
also differed in certain respects.  Economic conditions had worsened, increasing the difficulty of obtaining 
work.  And former senior officers were more often older men forced to launch new careers at an advanced age 
while possessing few civilian skills.  The generals also faced lingering prejudices directed especially at high-
ranking officers.  Thus, they might find themselves, like Donat, scrambling to make ends meet while coping 
with illness or an unsuccessful job search, their difficulties compounded by deliberate discrimination on the part 
of potential employers.145  
On the other hand, the passage of time had no doubt tempered the discriminatory impulses of some 
Germans, particularly since many former officers could eventually flash their denazification tribunal decisions 
to deflect accusations of militarism.  There were firms that took no notice of the past activities of their 
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employees, including certain enterprises that employed more than a few former officers.  Prewar and wartime 
military connections could facilitate the hunt for new positions, and some generals had contacts in business 
circles which cushioned their transition to a civilian existence.  Some officers reluctantly wound up in jobs as 
unskilled workers, but others secured leadership posts in corporations.146  Though Donat would later blame his 
past profession for his difficulties finding a job, in July 1947 he viewed the world more optimistically.  In a 
letter to an acquaintance in which he referred to some fifty former generals living in Stuttgart, Donat reported 
that it was “not so completely hopeless” for generals to find work in his area.  “If I were healthy,” he declared, 
“I would probably already have something.”147 
Even for those who found work, the return to a satisfactory economic standing could be slow and 
painful.  In the meantime, there were other troubles to be dealt with as well.  Meeting their fellow Germans face 
to face for the first time since the war’s end was not always a pleasant event.  For one thing, the former officers 
sometimes resented what had occurred during their absence.  While interned, the men had heard tales of what 
they considered to be the slandering of their profession and the related mistreatment of their families.  In part 
because the U.S. government had blocked most of their assets,148 at least some officers had been unable to 
personally support their families financially.  Despite this, complained General Toppe in 1948, “nobody 
provided for them or even troubled about them, they were ignored by everybody, and many cursed them.”  The 
reason for this, to him, was clear: “Such were the effects of hatred and revenge.  Wife and child had been 
deprived of all protection.”149  While his assessment no doubt contained a grain of truth, New York Times 
reporter Drew Middleton’s description of an “upper middle class” officer’s wife living in “elegant poverty” in 
Wiesbaden provides an interesting counterweight to Toppe’s assertions.  The woman, wrote Middleton in 
September 1945,  
uses her position as an excuse to act as a sort of advocate for the disgruntled housewives in her 
neighborhood.  She is frigidly polite, ignorant of almost everything that has happened in the world 
since 1933 and has an unawareness of social changes which would be appalling even in a Hottentot. . . 
. [S]he is contemptuous of everyone who is not “well born.” . . . She believes that Hitler and his gang 
                                                 
146
 Meyer, “Soldaten Ohne Armee,” 692-693; Hans Speier, From the Ashes of Disgrace: A Journal from Germany, 1945-
1955 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981), 112, 161. 
 
147
 Donat to S., 22 Jul 47, BA-MA N571 No. 324; Hans von Donat to Herr Dipl.Ing. Kurt S., 10 Aug 48, BA-MA N571 No. 
506. 
 
148
 Plischke, “Denazification Law and Procedure,” 818-819. 
 
149
 Toppe, “The Story of a Project,” 17. 
 
 261 
started toward defeat when they broke with the old German officer caste, of which her husband is a 
member; she sees no reason why the Americans should not restore this caste to power.  She has an 
almost pathological feeling for Grafs [Counts] and Ritters [Knights], and she has informed me nine 
times that the commander of her husband’s division, Graf von something or other, was a “most 
knightly soldier.”150  
 
Furthermore, given the day-to-day struggles confronting all Germans, it was hardly surprising that they had had 
little time or desire to look after the unhappy relatives of interned generals.  Watching from behind barbed wire, 
however, the officers had not always seen or conceded this point.   
Once home, the men also entered a society that not only was most likely to attach the “militarist” label 
to high-ranking professional officers, but which had read reports of the Nuremberg trials and often viewed the 
Wehrmacht’s leadership as deeply implicated in the ruinous choices and misdeeds of a discredited Nazi 
dictatorship.  Many Germans thus condemned their senior military leaders for a range of sins.  For such 
ungrateful souls, some officers groused, they had selflessly served and risked their lives.151 
Perhaps not surprisingly, many ex-officers, of all ranks, felt abused, convinced they were being 
“defamed” and discriminated against by their fellow citizens and unfairly singled out for punishment by the 
Allies.  In part, their views resulted from their immediate postwar suffering; in part, they were a product of their 
experiences during the Third Reich.  At that time, war preparations had thrown wide the doors of the barracks to 
new recruits who could expect not only a comfortable future, but elite status in a society enamored with all 
things military.  Experienced NCOs had found their services required as commissioned officers in the larger 
Wehrmacht.  And all current officers had seen their chances of promotion dramatically improved, with 
concomitant financial rewards and social standing.  Life was good.  But the price paid for the good life was 
sworn allegiance to a man who some veteran officers disdained and, ultimately, a pragmatic or ideologically 
committed devotion to and (later regrettable) public identification with a murderous regime.152  Being forced to 
establish a new life in the wreckage of the Fatherland, their social status now significantly eroded, was yet 
another cost.   
As Bert-Oliver Manig has stressed, however, most former professional officers were incapable of 
recognizing—or unwilling to admit—that their present suffering and social degradation were in truth 
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consequences of the war and developments affecting many other Germans, too, rather than merely a punishment 
uniquely inflicted upon them.  Although he dismisses their outraged claims of discrimination a bit too 
cavalierly, Manig appears to be correct in arguing that such claims were a skewed and exaggerated 
interpretation of contemporary circumstances.153  American speeches and regulations combined with new or 
long-standing anti-military attitudes in certain quarters of German society to produce real discrimination against 
military men.  Moreover, postwar rhetoric did loudly indict former officers as potentially dangerous militarists 
and lumped them together with an array of political offenders.  On the other hand, both the Americans and the 
Germans saw a need to evaluate individuals as individuals and specifically sought out former officers for jobs 
on occasion.  The failure of former officers to obtain employment or admission to universities surely most often 
resulted from a scramble for a limited number of openings.  Furthermore, German denazification tribunals in the 
U.S. Zone regularly refused to take advantage of the chance to investigate, condemn, and punish former officers 
as militarists—or Nazis—even when they may have had cause to do so.154 
Germany’s former professional officers nevertheless angrily decried their treatment, lambasting the 
Allies and German officials alike.  In the end, moreover, their resentment congealed into protests and activism 
directed especially at one particular Allied law: ACC Law No. 34 and its termination of military pensions.   
 
The Beginnings of Officer Activism155 
Virtually since it was first conceived, JCS 1067 had included a clause barring the payment of military 
pensions except in cases of employment-impeding physical disability.156  And American MG officers almost 
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immediately suspended these payments upon entering Germany.157  City finance officials in Heidelberg, for 
instance, received instructions to this effect just seven days after American troops first appeared.158 
In targeting military pensions in this fashion, the Americans and their allies hoped not only to prevent 
pension offices from assisting in some future secret remobilization of German troops, as had occurred after 
World War I,159 but also, as one American report from early 1947 explained, to “discredit the military class in 
Germany, to reduce their influence in society and to impress upon the public that a military career bears neither 
honor, profit nor security.”160  This meant that even disability payments should be discontinued, as the Allies 
believed that giving the war-disabled special treatment served to glorify the military and war, while also 
permitting Germans to avoid experiencing war’s true costs.  On a pragmatic level, concerns about Germany’s 
precarious financial situation also played into U.S. thinking.161 
When in August 1946, the ACC issued a law officially dissolving the German Wehrmacht, general 
staff, and officer corps, it therefore confirmed these pension provisions on a quadripartite level while also 
reiterating certain other restrictions on military men.  Specifically, the new ACC Law No. 34 repealed all laws, 
decrees, and regulations pertaining to the “legal status and privileges of military and ex-military personnel and 
members of quasi-military organizations and their families” and made illegal all veterans organizations, all 
other military and “quasi-military” groups, and “all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military 
tradition in Germany.”162   
When formulating the law, the Allies expected to address the financial needs of disabled and elderly 
soldiers through a new uniform social insurance system.163  In fact, Allied experts had already agreed to general 
guidelines for integrating the war-disabled into Germany’s other social security programs.  However, there was 
still no consensus on a replacement system when the law effectively shut down the existing disability allowance 
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system.  Only in December 1947 did Allied officials finally reach an agreement, but the collapse of 
quadripartite governance the following spring prevented implementation of their compromise.  Disability 
benefits thus remained a zonal matter.  And in the U.S. Zone, this meant dismantling the pension infrastructure 
and shifting the needy war-disabled onto the general welfare rolls.164   
For the hundreds of thousands of war-disabled, their families, and the survivors of men killed in action, 
the various U.S. measures produced truly difficult circumstances and provoked feelings of shame and anger.  
These developments aroused the pity of other Germans and, concomitantly, fostered support for demands for 
better treatment.  Along with the strain placed on local welfare agencies, they also prompted German authorities 
to urge U.S. officials to rectify the situation and permit them to provide the hurting with the support they were 
due.165   
Although the United States was slow to alter its stance and to take action to alleviate the suffering 
caused by its pension policies, at least some American MG officers had begun to recognize the problem 
developing in both human and political terms even before the issuance of Law No. 34.166  As the 1947 MG 
report put it, it was one thing to attempt to undermine the standing of the military in German society, but 
another “to leave a large category of disabled, aged, and survivors without any means to care for their needs 
[other] than public relief, especially when large numbers were unwilling draftees.”  Doing so “would run the 
danger of creating a revengeful, self-conscious, under-privileged class detrimental to successful democratic 
development in Germany.”  Key, then, was ending “all privileges heretofore accorded for military service 
without creating a resentful class dangerous to democracy and without promoting obvious injustice.”167   
In early 1947, the Americans took steps in this direction.  Following many months of negotiations with 
German authorities, MG officials authorized a system that integrated war-disability benefits into the German 
industrial accident disability insurance program, with payments starting on the basis of a 40 percent disability.  
Although the new approach met the Allied goal of ending the special status of military men and their 
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dependents and offered an improvement over the existing situation, it granted war victims fewer benefits than 
they had received during the Third Reich and also raised worries among those entitled to funding from the 
already financially endangered systems (individuals who had actually contributed substantially to them) that 
their own pensions might be reduced to cover disbursements to new beneficiaries.  The new provisions thus 
eased the most immediate suffering, but remained a point of contention for the war-disabled and the surviving 
dependents of deceased soldiers.  German officials accordingly continued to push for further concessions from 
MG authorities.168  
The war-disabled themselves were hobbled in their lobbying efforts by Law No. 34’s restrictions on 
veterans’ organizations.  In due course, local groups formed to provide mutual assistance and to work for 
improvements in the legal situation, and a Land-level organization eventually appeared in Württemberg-Baden.  
On the other hand, MG officials would only authorize groups that acted on behalf of all of those receiving 
pensions, rather than just the war-disabled and their survivors.  And “this ‘demilitarization’ of the war victims’ 
movement, which paralleled the efforts to ‘civilianize’ the war-disability pension system, was greatly resented 
by the war victims and their leaders,” writes historian James Diehl.  Over time, the levels of benefits for the 
disabled and survivors gradually crept upward, but major changes in the system had to wait for the founding of 
the new West German state. 169 
If the war-disabled began receiving at least some financial assistance less than a year after the issuance 
of the ACC law, long-service military pensions remained unpaid.  Moreover, the disbursement of monies to 
even the neediest former recipients of these payments did not begin until well into 1948.  As a result, the 
pension issue continued to fester and quickly came to serve as a powerful catalyst to activism by former 
officers. 
In his recent study exploring the political maneuvering of ex-officers after the war, Manig helpfully 
reexamines the roots of this activism.  Significantly, he notes that far from severely injuring all former officers 
financially, as contemporary and historical accounts tend to imply, the suspension of long-service pensions 
produced untenable circumstances for only a portion of the men.  Those harmed most included permanently 
disabled veterans and elderly men and widows who had started receiving pension benefits already before 1939, 
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but who now had to turn to their savings, personal possessions, and, in particularly dismal cases, public welfare 
for support, with their financial position hurt further by the 1948 currency reform.  Altogether, however, they 
constituted just over 10 percent of those entitled to military pensions in 1950, numbering approximately 23,000.  
Older officers born before 1900 who were eligible for a military, but not a civilian, pension, along with a set of 
widows and some recently pensioned men, comprised another severely affected group of some 18,600.  But the 
majority of former soldiers fell into other categories.  These included roughly 25,000 pension-eligible younger 
officers who could expect just a small pension; NCOs who had become officers and some 70,000 NCOs 
themselves; and very young officers who had no pension claims unless they were disabled.  The financial 
outlook and needs of former officers therefore varied a great deal.  And many could not expect a pension to 
substantially affect their economic position.  Furthermore, by the early 1950s, even most of those significantly 
harmed by the law and the residue of war were well on the road to financial recovery.170 
Despite differences in circumstance and the law’s generally limited economic impact, former officers 
rallied to the pension cause, drawn by psychological as well as financial reasons.  Ignoring or failing to 
recognize the Allied goal of eventually integrating former soldiers into a uniform social insurance system that 
would eliminate their special status and reduce the attractiveness of a military career, ex-officers classified the 
law as a punitive attack on their profession.  Ironically, Manig contends, the law actually proved to be 
something of a godsend for them.  Vilified as a revocation of their legal entitlements and condemned for its 
impact on the disabled and elderly, the law could be brandished by activist officers as concrete proof of 
discrimination and of their unwarranted status as scapegoats for the German people.  The men could also avoid 
searching their own pasts for any contribution they may have made to their own suffering by attributing their 
current situation to the arbitrary political actions of their occupiers and cooperative German officials.171  In the 
end, their campaign for the reinstatement of their benefits became more than simply a struggle to obtain 
financial relief.  It became, even more, a campaign to achieve the restoration of the reputation and social 
standing of the officer class generally.172 
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The Allies, Manig observes, could hardly have anticipated the indignation and activism Law No. 34 
provoked.  Pension restrictions of one sort or another had, after all, been in place since early in the occupation 
without generating excessive comment.173  Early on, some military men had recognized that continued payment 
of high military pensions would be untenable given Germany’s financial state, not to mention contemporary 
public attitudes toward soldiers as former social elites.  In addition, the Allies had not all immediately 
dismantled the pension infrastructure in their zones, nor completely stopped pension payments to the old and 
disabled.  But the new law now went further than previous measures and also crushed any hopes of an eventual 
resumption of payments.  The timing of its issuance—shortly before the Nuremberg judgment and just as the 
American Zone’s new denazification system was beginning to operate—influenced its reception as well.  
Former officers believed they were the objects of a singular Allied revenge campaign, and even their fellow 
Germans began to take a sympathetic interest in their plight.174  The gradual return during 1947 of Germany’s 
military elites, many of whom might have expected healthy pensions, may also have heightened emotions 
within military circles. 
Regardless of the immediate stimulus to action, in late 1946 ex-officers began mobilizing their 
scattered numbers and marshalling their arguments to press American and German officials for a change in 
policy.  Here, the weaknesses of the Allies’ pension policy came back to haunt its designers.  Most importantly, 
by cutting off all long-service pensions, the Allies caused genuine hardship for military widows, invalids, and 
old and infirm men who hardly posed a rearmament threat and who could not seek civilian jobs, thus giving the 
policy unintended punitive overtones.  In addition to creating injustices that opponents of plans for a uniform 
social insurance system could use for their own purposes, the cessation of benefits disproportionately affected 
men who were politically unobjectionable, had ties to German political leaders, had few other commitments, 
and who, feeling that their honor had been attacked, were motivated to protest.  While hardly typical of former 
German officers, they nevertheless became the driving force and face of the movement during the late 1940s.175 
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Although Law No. 34 prohibited veterans from creating formal associations and former officers 
remained unhappily aware of how quickly the Americans could quash their activities if they acted too boldly or 
organized without permission,176 they nevertheless developed loose correspondence networks and set up 
informal local groups that provided immediate relief to needy individuals while also advocating the rights of 
soldiers.  The leading champion of their interests was retired Admiral Gottfried Hansen, who worked out of the 
British Zone.  And it was in this zone that former officers were most organized when the Federal Republic was 
founded.177  But ex-officers in the American Zone were not idle.  Around Stuttgart, an informal group arose 
under the leadership of former General der Panzertruppe Rudolf Veiel.  Upon returning from captivity, Donat 
quickly became a vigorous veterans’ advocate and ultimately played a dynamic role in mobilizing the “Veiel 
Circle.”  Securing a position as a traveling salesman, he used his journeys to establish contacts with other ex-
officers whom he eventually recruited as members.  “Secret instructions, secret talks,” Donat later wrote in 
describing the organization of the circle starting in the fall of 1948.  Within a short period of time, there were 
some 30 subgroups active in the area stretching from Stuttgart to Ellwangen to Mannheim to Karlsruhe.178 
In letters to Allied and German authorities, as well as in internal communications, these and other 
former officers expressed a deeply felt sense of victimhood.  “I, too, am among the victims of POSTWAR 
CRIMES,” opened a letter to Donat from General Erich Dommenget.179  Complaining to an acquaintance about 
the termination of his 84-year-old mother’s widow’s pension, Donat similarly suggested that depriving such an 
old woman of a pension was akin to the cruelties of Hitler.  “Perhaps he was even better,” fumed Donat, “since 
he paid pensions to the elderly.”180  Others, too, compared the suffering of former officers and their families to 
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that of victims of National Socialism.181  Shrewdly emphasizing their most potent argument, they particularly 
stressed the misery of those genuinely hurt by the pension prohibition, citing, for example, the former general 
turned pool attendant and passing on stories regarding an alarming number of suicides among ex-officers and 
their wives, especially following the currency reform of 1948.182  Circulating newsletters eventually 
documented cases of excessive need and distress.183 
Denouncing the denial of their legal rights, they also complained that the Allies treated proven Nazis 
better than loyal soldiers with clean political records.184  Here, the already sometimes distorted perceptions of 
men inclined to dismiss evidence that contradicted their sense of unique victimhood were reinforced by two 
factors: the Americans’ insistence on making further opportunities in German society dependent upon favorable 
tribunal judgments and their decision only to compel former officers to present their cases to denazification 
tribunals, rather than also (or alternatively) barring the men specifically and visibly from educational and 
influence-wielding activities, which may have made the Allies’ deep concerns about the officers’ special 
abilities and social clout more apparent.  As Donat saw the situation, numerous former party members were 
back at work and receiving their full pensions despite having been declared followers and assessed penalties.  
Conversely, “the people’s courts” had pronounced most soldiers not affected by the law or not incriminated.  
Not unreasonably, Donat argued that these legal decisions meant there were “no grounds whatsoever to 
withhold the rights and steal the just compensation of those found innocent.”185  This singular treatment, 
asserted his colleagues in a letter to Württemberg-Baden’s minister-president, could “only be seen as the result 
of a politics of hate against former members of the Wehrmacht.”186 
Former officers also challenged their accusers.  Soldiers could not vote during the Weimar Republic, 
reminded Donat in two letters to Radio Stuttgart.  Rather, the German people had delivered them to Hitler to do 
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his bidding.  “If the Wehrmacht had been asked,” he sniffed, “they would never have elected a corporal as 
commander in chief.” 187  Singing familiar refrains, they also stressed that German officers had simply lived up 
to their oath to Hitler during the war and were now being punished for doing their duty as any officer in any 
military was expected to do.  They had been in no position to avert a war or alter its course, some asserted.  
Furthermore, the Wehrmacht had actually been a refuge from National Socialism; the events of July 20, 1944, 
showed that there had been more resistance to the Nazis in the Wehrmacht than elsewhere in German society.188  
Nuremberg provided still more evidence in their favor.  Ignoring the judges’ labeling of the Wehrmacht 
leadership as a “ruthless military caste” and a “disgrace to the honourable profession of arms,” they pointed to 
the acquittal of the “General Staff and High Command” and claimed exoneration.  This decision, some officer 
activists contended, provided grounds for rescinding Law No. 34.189   
Some former officers also resisted the charge that undergirded all of the Allied measures.  “The soldier 
is merely the executive organ of the power-political will; the carrier of this will is the militarist,” wrote Hansen 
in 1946.  Later he suggested that militarism was “a political lesson,” while “soldierdom” was “a conception of 
duty, of absolute human virtues like love of country and loyalty, obedience, and bravery.”190   
This fundamental dichotomy was emphasized by other former soldiers as well.  Generaloberst 
Johannes Friessner, a prominent activist officer from Bavaria, offered a much deeper, instructive analysis of the 
differences—and essentially critiqued the American demilitarization program in the process—in a September 
1950 speech at one of the German Protestant Church’s Evangelical Academies.191  “Soldierdom,” he 
maintained, was “the tradition of intellectual and ethical values of the soldierly profession which has been 
proven and tested for over one hundred years.”  For soldiers, it was “the embodiment of a readiness to accept 
the highest mission of preserving the eternal values of life, such as culture and custom.”  Militarism was its 
opposite: a “soulless, unspiritual, mechanical form which degrades the military profession to a ‘military caste’ 
that is intent on action as an end in itself and does not see an ethical-moral duty as the ultimate reason for 
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military deployment.”  It was “almost a political position that shaped the mindset of a people in a warlike way 
and destroyed its moral character.”  Influencing young people to desire revenge, giving and tolerating speeches 
during peacetime that agitated for war, singing military marching songs in peacetime, and an obsession with 
imitating military nomenclature and manners should be viewed as militaristic, he asserted.  “We professional 
soldiers,” he added, “have always found such imitating to be laughable and repudiated it.”192   
If Friessner willingly assigned some German cultural practices to the category of “militaristic,” he also 
drew clear lines.  It was most certainly not militarism when the Germans enjoyed and applauded troop parades 
or when they delighted in “our famous, beautiful military marches.”  He explained: “Our people love these; 
other people are crazy about jazz music.”  Friessner similarly found little to criticize in a preference for the 
appearance and manner of German soldiers over that of foreign soldiers.  “These are matters of taste—other 
people—other customs!” he concluded.  “They have absolutely nothing to do with militarism.”193 
Friessner then wandered into territory that would hardly have reassured many Americans that 
“soldierdom” presented a healthy alternative to militarism.  History taught, Friessner contended, that even in the 
present age there were “warlike and unwarlike people”—those for whom “soldierdom” was in the “flesh and 
blood” and those who more or less rejected it.  “The difference in the appraisal of soldierdom cannot be 
explained solely by the different nature of peoples,” he asserted,  
rather it is above all to be found in completely different geographical and political conditions. 
Thus, we Germans always—above all because of our location—belonged to the warlike 
peoples.  We approve “soldierdom” and esteem and foster it in a long, glorious tradition. 
The ethical-moral duties and responsibilities endow soldierdom with its high value and entitle 
it correspondingly to appropriate respect.  This also explains why we soldiers place especial value on 
our sense of honor, . . . 
. . . the tasks and responsibilities of the soldierly profession lie at a particularly high level, if 
they are understood correctly.  They serve not only their own needs, but provide for the collective good 
of a whole people. . . . 
If one educates their soldiers in this spirit, and prepares them for the mission of their lives, for 
this highest good, only then may one expect that they will fight wisely and not carry out their military 
service only as a conqueror or as an adventurer. 
We German officers have always sought to prepare our soldiers in this spirit.  They 
demonstrated the success of these preparations in peace as well as in war, also in the Second World 
War, especially in the East.  They knew exactly why and for what they fought.194 
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The general went on to defend the value for military performance and for German society of German 
military training, with its emphasis on order and discipline, and to affirm the importance of obedience.  He 
advocated education at home, in schools, and by the church that familiarized youth with order and discipline 
and encouraged them to be reliable, clean, orderly, and punctual and to do their schoolwork, help the weak, and 
respect their teachers and elders.  The soldiers’ opponents called this militarism, noted Friessner, but he 
believed such an education facilitated later military training and ultimately decreased the spilling of blood in 
wartime.  While he admitted that a few officers had let the others down during and especially after the last war, 
Friessner attributed deplorable wartime conduct largely to the Wehrmacht’s rapid expansion, which lowered the 
quality of training and caliber of men, and to National Socialism’s negative influence on the honorable practices 
and customs of the German military.195 
 
Reactions to Officer Activism 
Certain aspects of Friessen’s analysis of militarism clearly coincided with the thinking of American 
policymakers.  But many Americans were not yet ready to accept the vaunted qualities of German “soldierdom” 
as entirely admirable and benign.  On the other hand, in the late 1940s this basic sense of dichotomy was clearly 
shared by some German “opinion leaders.”  Licensed German newspapers, surveys on militarism conducted by 
American information control officials, and the decisions turned out by German denazification tribunals all 
revealed a readiness to distinguish between dangerous or condemnable militarism and commendable devotion 
to soldierly duties.196   
This willingness to differentiate between a negative militarism and a positive “soldierdom” likely also 
influenced the way German “opinion leaders” responded to former officers in other venues.  In the late 1940s, 
church leaders and journalists helped to publicize the plight of suffering former officers by circulating stories 
(and rumors) about extreme cases of hardship and misery.  Beginning already during the summer of 1946, 
moreover, prominent CDU and SPD politicians spoke out on behalf of disabled veterans, contending that Allied 
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measures were unjust and that soldiers should not be unfairly punished for doing their duty.197  Manig 
documents the substantial informal influence former officers had in political circles in the British Zone, in 
particular,198 but political activism on behalf of former officers and their dependents was also apparent in the 
U.S. Zone.  In October 1947, for example, the DVP’s Theodor Heuss sternly criticized American policies on the 
floor of Württemberg-Baden’s legislature, asking whether one really weakened German militarism by suddenly 
halting pension payments to the eighty-something widow of a former major in the medical corps.199   
In their willingness to speak out on behalf of former soldiers, Germany’s new leaders were 
undoubtedly motivated by sympathy, but also by legal arguments and pragmatism.  The troubles of the old and 
infirm touched them.  Some also viewed pensions as the legal entitlement of former officers.  And some shared 
the opinion that most soldiers, even officers, were themselves the victims of National Socialism.  German 
leaders also knew that restoring officer pensions could reduce the dissatisfaction of an overwhelmingly young—
most publicized cases to the contrary—and disgruntled group of citizens whose predecessors had contributed 
greatly to the instability of the Weimar Republic.  But beyond this, ex-officers represented a not insignificant 
voting block.  If they were the natural constituents of the bourgeois parties, the Social Democrats were 
unwilling to completely relinquish former officers to their political opponents, though typically they were also 
not ready to agree to officer benefits larger than those dispensed to civilians.  German politicians recognized, 
too, that they could reap substantial political capital by challenging the occupation authorities with large 
demands, and often at little cost to themselves, as they knew that the Allies would be unlikely to give in and 
would bear the largest share of criticism for any rejected overtures.200 
Within the wider population, meanwhile, views regarding officer pensions varied.  Issued in 
anticipation of a debate to be broadcast in mid 1948, a request from Radio Stuttgart for opinions on the subject 
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reportedly elicited 198 letters supporting the officers’ position and seven opposing it.201  But the pages of 
Württemberg-Baden’s leading newspapers painted a multihued picture.  Assorted colors of the public debate 
were evident, for example, in a set of articles carried by Heidelberg’s Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung in early 1948.  
Alluding to recent political discussions regarding a possible reinstatement of officer pensions, one writer called 
for a new law that would permanently eliminate all such pensions.  It was incomprehensible to him that at a 
time when millions of Germans had lost everything, there were still people ready to support efforts to make 
officer assistance a priority—and this via taxes paid by everyone else.  Contending that the officers’ guilt or 
lack thereof was not important, he nevertheless blamed the “Prussian officer caste” in part for Germany’s fate 
during recent decades and suggested that large pensions had contributed to the problem.  “Are ‘the people’ the 
only ones who have lost this war, too?” he asked.  Former officers should have to learn what it meant to earn 
their daily bread with their own hands, just like other Germans, and just like the many conscripts forced to start 
over after years of service.  Old and disabled officers incapable of working were entitled to no more than other 
Germans in their situation.  And government officials should be most concerned with the cripples, refugees, 
widows, and others who, though innocent, often lacked even life’s basic necessities.202 
The writer’s assertions prompted a response from none other than Heuss, who stressed that this was 
not a case of politicians supporting the interests of a particular group or dispensing donations to soldiers even as 
the rest of Germany suffered.  Rather, it was a question of legal rights; pensions were not discretionary funding, 
but payments withheld from a soldier’s compensation.  Those who saw the issue as a legal matter, as he did, 
paid no heed to accusations that they were reactionaries or “militarists.”  Heuss conceded, however, that not all 
of the former officers’ claims could be satisfied.  German leaders needed to keep in mind the state’s financial 
capabilities and to handle pre-1933 officers differently than high-ranking officers who had benefited from the 
liberal promotion policies of the Third Reich.  For Heuss, paying pensions was not about handing out special 
privileges, but about recognizing a special injustice.  He warned, too, that one should not “defame” the entire 
officer class just because one happened to be thinking about an overbearing lieutenant or colonel.  Every 
profession included a range of personalities.  Heuss suggested, finally, that the issue at stake was whether a new 
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German state would begin with a “broken sense of legality” and with former public servants and their 
dependents treated as pariahs—men, he added, who were members of a profession that was just as honorable as 
that of teachers or judges.203 
Several days later, an attorney suggested that from a legal perspective, the soldiers’ position was 
problematic, as neither a Wehrmacht financial administration nor a successor organization existed upon which 
they could press their claims.  He went on to assert that the highest echelons of the officer corps had wanted, 
planned, and prepared for war, often only for personal gain.  Most officers, too, had participated in prolonging 
the war and contributed to the destruction of their own homeland and countless unnecessary deaths.  These 
“uncontestable premises” had to be considered when preparing pension legislation.  They made clear, for 
instance, that those who had become active officers after 1933, who had “consciously bet on rearmament and a 
war of aggression,” should be categorically denied pensions.  In all cases, the feasibility of making a living in 
another way should be carefully examined before granting pension claims, while the amount dispensed should 
depend upon what Germany could afford.204 
Letters sent to Karlsruhe’s Badische Neueste Nachrichten similarly denigrated the past service of 
military officers and complained about their apparent demands for special treatment.205  One writer pointed out 
that Germany had attacked and destroyed France in 1870, 1914, and 1940 and that “Hitler with his military” had 
invaded and decimated almost all of the states bordering Germany.  “And for this,” he observed, “these 
‘destroyers’ still want pensions.”  That would be an insult to those who had suffered and also to the German 
people.206  A local medical doctor responded by invoking the conquests of Napoleon, contending that Napoleon 
III’s “provocative conduct” was the true cause of the Franco-Prussian War, and citing American historians who 
refused to blame Germany for instigating World War I.  However, other letters printed alongside of his were 
less ready to contest interpretations of Germany’s past.  One advocated benefits for suffering soldier widows, so 
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long as their husbands had not been among the “war-mongering golden pheasants,” that is, highly decorated 
Nazis.  Another referred to contemporary arguments that Germany’s war-disabled needed to be retrained and 
asked when these “lords” would begin thinking about retraining themselves, as there were still mountains of 
rubble to be removed.  Furthermore, if these “lords” were entitled to pensions, what was a penniless, terminally 
ill returnee entitled to?  “What did militarism cost us in goods and blood, in privation and distress, during the 
last 100 years?” the writer asked in conclusion.  “It therefore simply isn’t enough to say: ‘Never again war.’  
No.  ‘Never again militarism.’”207 
Confronting the pleas of German officials and others on behalf of former officers, as well as those of 
the former officers themselves, the Allies initially refused to make concessions.208  Yet they also came to realize 
that the regulations were causing real distress and began to recognize both the potentially radicalizing effect of 
their policies and the ways in which German political parties were instrumentalizing the grievances of ex-
officers for their own purposes.  As a result, in March 1948, with the looming currency reform promising 
devastating effects for those already in poor financial straits, the British and Americans finally partially relented 
on the matter of pensions.209  The Germans might now pay small “maintenance grants” to those who were 
already pensionable prior to August 1946, though payments might be made only to minor children, to those 
whose earning capacity was reduced due to injuries, to men older than 65, and to women older than 60 or 
unemployable because they cared for minor children.  In a probably useless stipulation, the Americans specified 
that the grants should be “administered under conditions designed to eliminate as far as possible any military 
character from the payments and to indicate that the payment is in recognition of public, rather than military, 
service.”210  It took some time before the required German legislation was finally put in place in the 
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Württemberg-Baden, with some lawmakers arguing that the victims of Nazism should receive compensation 
first,211  but by the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949, needy veterans and their dependents in the Land 
were receiving maintenance grants.212 
 
A Look Ahead: Former Officers in the Early Federal Republic 
Former officers clearly had some success in achieving recognition of their grievances during the 
occupation years.  But small maintenance grants did not fully address their complaints either financially or in 
terms of perceived injustices.  The campaign for their rightful entitlements and the restoration of their honor 
therefore continued into the 1950s, when decisions regarding pensions were left entirely to German leaders.   
German federal officials ultimately chose to handle officer pensions within the context of a new law 
dealing primarily with former civil servants from the territories Germany had lost.  Meanwhile, a relaxing of 
Allied restrictions on veterans’ organizations in December 1949 helpfully permitted the official creation of 
interest groups that did their utmost to influence the government’s decisions, while also lobbying against the 
“defamation” of Germany’s professional soldiers and protesting the continued internment of convicted war 
criminals.  Thus already by the end of 1951, former officers who had served ten years and NCOs with at least 
18 years of service had again secured pension rights.  Although German government officials recognized only a 
limited number of promotions, allotted no pensions to officers recruited during the late 1930s or to NCOs with 
fewer than 18 years of service, and awarded benefits that were not as generous as former officers believed they 
deserved, the pensions implicitly acknowledged the service of former soldiers, helped to encourage the respect 
of ex-officers for the new German state, and would increase in both scope and size during the 1950s.  By the 
1960s, former officers were voicing few complaints on this count.213 
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The question of soldierly honor was another matter, however.  If restored pension payments conceded 
a legal right and might acknowledge most former officers as victims of National Socialism, they were not 
necessarily symptomatic of a charitable public perspective or a restored public standing for former officers.   
Numerous scholarly studies have documented the situation of ex-officers during the 1950s, analyzing, 
especially, their relationship with the new German state and its leadership.214  They show that German veterans 
successfully lobbied for the satisfaction of many of their demands, including not only pension benefits, but the 
early release of many of their compatriots convicted of war crimes.  In the early 1950s, they also listened to 
both Eisenhower and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer confirm that the Wehrmacht’s honor had not been 
compromised during the war, with any criminal activities representing the rare actions of a reprehensible few.  
The recent studies of Manig and historian Alaric Searle, in particular, draw attention to the impact veterans had 
on the Federal Republic’s political culture, as well, demonstrating how former officers influenced federal 
decision-making processes both directly and indirectly.  While veterans’ organizations lobbied for changes in 
German social legislation, some former generals helped to plan for West Germany’s rearmament, even as others 
spoke out on the subject in informal or public forums.  The government, meanwhile, kept a watchful eye on the 
activities of new “tradition associations” comprised of former soldiers and their families who had belonged to 
particular military formations.  Particularly during the early 1950s, it took steps to keep German veterans in line 
and content, using both informal means and legislative measures.  Federal officials desired and needed the 
support of former officers not only to help solidify their new democracy, but also to achieve their foreign policy 
goals—namely, rearmament and western integration.  Former officers would help to staff any new army.  
Furthermore, West Germany was not yet fully sovereign, and the possibility of a German military contribution 
to the defense of western Europe had emerged as a potentially powerful tool for obtaining increased autonomy.  
But both new military forces and German sovereignty were partly contingent upon keeping the western Allies 
convinced that German veterans were not a dangerous wellspring of nationalist sentiment and posed no threat to 
the political stability of West Germany or to the security of Europe.  Former officers thus could not be ignored. 
Scholars have also highlighted the extent to which former officers were reintegrated into German 
society and obtained respectable and even influential jobs.  Casting a glance at the postwar experiences of all 
former professional officers, historian Jay Lockenour cites the findings of a 1950 survey indicating that 31,001 
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of some 167,000 former career soldiers (including NCOs) who responded had obtained civil service positions.  
State and community level posts accounted for the largest number of jobs (9,421 and 12,867, respectively), with 
the railroad (4,832) and the post office also boasting their share (1,292).  Thus, concludes Lockenour, “while 
positions of national prominence were often denied to former officers (the significant exception being a number 
of later Bundestag representatives, including former General Hasso von Manteuffel), many of them found 
comfortable positions in local or state government offices, making them influential members of the local 
community.”215   
More anecdotally, American émigré sociologist Hans Speier later recounted a late 1951 conversation 
with General Toppe who, now the editor of a journal on military affairs, informed him that all former general 
staff officers had found employment.  A large number were in executive positions in industry, while many 
younger ones had learned trades and were quite successful.  With some pride, Toppe had argued “that a German 
general staff officer can do anything he puts his mind to” and challenged, “I’ll give you ten marks for every 
former staff officer you can name who today has no job.”216   
Examining the fate of certain former naval officers during the 1950s and considering other 
developments in the Federal Republic’s early years, Manig similarly points out that even when ex-officers 
started their postwar lives in reduced circumstances and in positions seemingly beneath their former social 
standing, this situation did not necessarily last.  Aided by the “economic miracle” of the 1950s, many were 
comfortably ensconced in the republic’s upper classes by the end of the decade.217  In certain spheres, then, 
former officers reclaimed a measure of respect and social influence. 
On the other hand, Searle raises important questions about the position of these former elites within 
West German society.  Notably, he shows how some German generals had begun to earn a modicum of public 
respect for their professional expertise amidst ongoing discussions of rearmament in the early 1950s, but also 
documents a weakening of the influence of veterans’ organizations and a reversal in budding positive views of 
the German generals over the course of the decade.  He contends, for example, that publicity surrounding trials 
of several former high-ranking officers reveals a “trend toward a more critical and condemnatory view of 
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Wehrmacht generals.”218  Alluding to Searle’s study, historian Kristin van Lingen rightfully argues that it “was 
the aim of the former military elite to recapture the social standing which the German military had enjoyed up 
to 1945, despite military defeat, and to regain political power” and that “this aim was not fully achieved.”219   
Former Wehrmacht officers clearly assumed new, sometimes influential roles in German society and 
political life during the 1950s, even as the Wehrmacht enjoyed a reputation for mostly exemplary conduct 
during World War II and a new German army made its appearance.  By the end the twentieth century, however, 
scholars were again darkening the Wehrmacht’s luster by analyzing the depth of its National Socialist 
ideological indoctrination and its extensive participation in the racial and war crimes of the Third Reich. 
Germany’s military officers, moreover, had never entirely regained their former positions as particularly 
glorified social elites with unusual ability—whether through sins of commission or omission—to shape the 
course of German public affairs. 
 
Conclusions 
Setting up operations in Germany in 1945, American policymakers had several interrelated objectives 
when it came to former German officers: restraining them from mobilizing the German people against their 
occupiers, reducing their social and political influence, and preventing them from preparing for and launching 
another war.  Ultimately, a range of measures introduced to realize these goals brought mixed results, with their 
impact sometimes determined by social forces over which the Allies had little control.  And when the Federal 
Republic assumed primary control of the American Zone, the final outcome of the two long-term projects was 
still in question and would remain a concern into the 1950s. 
Interning Germany’s military elites during the earliest days of the occupation, the Americans hoped 
captivity would prevent the men from stirring up trouble in the immediate postwar period and beyond.  In the 
end, this action incited fervent resentment and also facilitated undesirable networking.  The historical studies 
initiated at Allendorf, moreover, were hardly compatible with stated American objectives.   
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But animosities and fault lines developed in the camps as well.  More importantly, well-connected and 
capable high-ranking officers and general staff members remained excluded from German society for several 
years.  They were thus not only incapable of menacing Allied security, but also unable to participate fully in 
conversations regarding their own status or Germany’s future.  That former officers might eagerly have done so 
is suggested by their later actions.  Many, Lockenour emphasizes, were eager to serve their country after being 
released.220  And there were those, like Donat, who within weeks of arriving home were discussing with their 
former colleagues what could be done to improve their situation and to undo the damage to their reputations 
caused by the war and Allied occupation.  It is difficult to believe that their response to the occupation would 
have been substantially less energetic had they returned just months after Germany capitulated.   
In the meantime, American and German reeducation initiatives worked on the minds of the German 
people and a dialogue on German history, the war, and the Wehrmacht unfolded free of the voices of many of 
those most passionately accused.  Although still in flux into the early 1950s, political leadership patterns were 
also being established during the period these officers were absent.  Manig helpfully reminds that former 
officers did not encounter a rigid existing political structure when they became politically active, but instead 
helped to shape political life in postwar Germany.221  However, by the time most high-ranking officers returned, 
they were also not dealing with the wide open political scene of 1945 and were therefore unable to detrimentally 
influence German political developments to the extent they had in the past. 
If captivity was an important first step, the Americans also had to develop a policy for the long-term 
treatment of Germany’s former officers.  And here the delays caused by a lack of Allied unity essentially 
worked to the officers’ advantage.  The opinions of American officials regarding how best to handle these men 
were never entirely unified, but, broadly speaking, the prevailing American approach did evolve over time and 
this influenced quadripartite deliberations as well.  Specifically, a commitment to constraints and surveillance 
shifted to an endorsement of extended isolation for some officers, which subsequently gave way to support for 
individual evaluation, punishment, and, effectively, full reintegration into German society for virtually all 
former officers not convicted of war crimes.   
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Although the Americans’ assessment of the German officer corps was not without grounds, they were 
clearly misguided in considering all of Germany’s military elites to be potential security threats.  Eventually 
committing to evaluate each case individually was therefore a step forward.  The mechanism chosen for this 
purpose was ineffectual, however.  Theoretically expected to control potentially dangerous officers as well as 
assess their level of responsibility for events during the Third Reich, the American Zone’s March 1946 law had 
not been written in a way that would force German tribunals to judge ex-officers on both counts.  As 
implemented, the law produced few concrete results, other than bitterness, and served as little more than a speed 
bump on the officers’ road to rebuilding their lives.   
Still, in retrospect, this leniency, combined with the Americans’ adamant refusal to impose firm 
restrictions on all former officers at any point during their occupation, may well have avoided creating a pool of 
aggrieved outsiders and thus best served American interests in the long run, as some MG officials clearly hoped 
it would.  German veterans, rightly or wrongly, already felt defamed and discriminated against, and the extent 
of pension activism suggests that deeper-cutting measures might have stimulated even more dangerous 
resentment and agitation.  
If tribunal processing failed to identify and restrain real security threats, the Allied pension policy 
obviously mobilized former officers in a way that undermined U.S. objectives.  Terminating the pensions of 
elderly soldiers, disabled veterans, frail old women, and orphans, regardless of plans to integrate them into other 
social insurance programs, caused real distress, hurt the standing of the occupation powers, encouraged 
sympathy for former military men and their dependents, and gave ex-officers a tool to use in demanding 
restitution and respect.  By and large, the policy came to be viewed as a measure designed to single out former 
officers for special punishment, rather than as an educational initiative designed to deny former officers special 
treatment.  Motivating military men, it provoked outrage, support, and pragmatic tactical moves from church 
officials, politicians, and other leaders in German society.  In the end, too, the policy’s negative byproducts 
spurred the Americans to permit the payment of maintenance grants to former soldiers and their dependents—
thus reestablishing military families in a separate category.  During the Federal Republic, the distinction was 
once again institutionalized in federal legislation.  Furthermore, while the pension lobbying effort helped to 
integrate former officers into the new democratic state, it also—along with rearmament initiatives—assured 
them at least limited influence in government circles. 
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The Allies obviously did not consider carefully enough the possible effect of their pension decisions on 
the financial well-being of those most affected—or, in some cases, probably did not care.  But their policies also 
encountered unanticipated cross-currents.  In discussing the fate of German officers, the Allies were essentially 
operating with old categories of analysis.  They assumed the problems of World War II could be solved very 
much like they should have been solved following World War I.  Despite the concurrent proceedings in 
Nuremberg, they—not surprisingly, perhaps—failed to recognize a fundamental difference in character between 
the two wars.  If German militarism had, in fact, evolved into something inherently criminal, this was lost on 
them.  Quadripartite policymakers crafted a pension policy and introduced other measures that were rooted in 
anxieties about the social influence and technical abilities of the German officer corps and their link to a 
possible future war.  But in postwar Germany, exposed atrocities were coloring and complicating views of the 
Wehrmacht.  And its officers were being chastised and denigrated by their own people for their recent conduct.  
Allied pension restrictions, along with other Allied policies (including extended captivity for Germany’s 
military elites), effectively became caught up in an array of accusations buffeting former German officers.  The 
problem of military threat and the need for security became entangled with allegations regarding support for the 
destructive policies of the Nazi regime and responsibility for war crimes.  This development was not just a 
product of conversations among the Germans and perhaps some guilty consciences.  It can also be attributed in 
part to the Nuremberg tribunal’s assumption that aggressive war was a crime, the ongoing supplementary war 
crimes trials, the American Zone’s denazification law, ACC Directive No. 38, and no doubt other factors.  Put 
concisely, in the minds of ex-officers and other Germans, alleged political and criminal offenses resulted in 
punitive Allied policies for former German officers.  Even some Allied leaders seemed to forget the original 
intent of the pension measure during the later years of the occupation.222   
Although common, defenses grounded in references to soldierly duty, retained honor, or the limited 
involvement of German officers in war crimes did not really touch the heart of Allied concerns.  In fact, former 
German officers were not being treated as more guilty of Nazi crimes than other Germans, even including the 
crime of launching an aggressive war.  Courts tried high-ranking officers for this crime, but they tried civilians 
as well.  There may have been a lingering underlying assumption that these men bore special culpability for 
helping the Nazis to power, but explicit references to this were rare in Allied policy discussions.  Rather, the 
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Allies treated German officers differently because they believed that these men had the training, skills, desire, 
and influence to plan and wage a future war.  Their involvement with National Socialism, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity was another issue entirely.   
A stronger emphasis on the true purpose of the pension law and other measures in Allied public 
rhetoric might, theoretically, have helped to soothe the indignation of the officers and their sympathizers.  But it 
seems more likely that even pointed declarations would have failed to penetrate the myopia of former 
professional soldiers or to overcome any tendencies to deliberately misconstrue Allied policies, particularly 
when protests against injustices became a vehicle for demanding increased respect more generally.  Elite 
officers, moreover, did not consider equalizing measures themselves to be inoffensive.  Nor were charges of 
militarism and accusations of having contributed to the launching of an aggressive war accepted as valid. 
On the other hand, if the Allies wanted to diminish the status of officers in German society, the pension 
law did not entirely backfire.  Public debates on the question provided a forum for Germans to lash out at 
former officers.  In addition, although officer activists may have won new converts to their cause, they 
obviously also stimulated, rekindled, or confirmed the belief that they were arrogant elitists.  Furthermore, 
achieving recognition of their special status, or earning influence through force of presence, could not have been 
easy for former officers who were regularly complaining about going hungry and periodically spreading stories 
of colleagues who had committed suicide when they could no longer cope with the weight of the world.  
Purportedly struggling to survive and made the suffering victims of Allied policies and German malice, former 
generals could hardly have struck all Germans as larger than life and worthy of excessive social respect.  Thus, 
Allied policies, confused as they were at times, ultimately did contribute to permanently altering perceptions of 
the German officer corps.
  
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
GETTING THE UNIFORM OUT OF THE GERMAN 
 
 
The day after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, American military officers were required to report to 
their desks in Washington in full uniform.  In his history-memoir Washington Goes to War, American journalist 
David Brinkley recalled the challenges this presented, as normal dress had “generally run to outfits like brown 
tweed jackets and gray trousers,” with higher-ranking officers donning uniforms only for ceremonial occasions.    
And so on Monday morning the corridors of the army and navy buildings were filled with officers who 
looked a mess.  Some wore uniforms and parts of uniforms dating to 1918, many of them now two 
sizes too small.  Majors were in outfits they had bought when they were second lieutenants.  Others 
were dressed in clothes partly military and partly civilian.  There were wool leg wrappings from the 
1918 war and other outfits equally outlandish and topped with garrison caps (leather bills), field caps 
(the ‘overseas’ cap folding open like an envelope) and campaign hats (wide brimmed, as worn by 
forest rangers and Boy Scouts).  It was a rummage sale gone to war.1 
 
This somewhat comical turn of events was in part the product of an earlier order instructing military 
officers posted in Washington to wear civilian clothes, a measure designed “to reduce their visibility.”2  In a 
country with only a small (if rapidly expanding) military, strong isolationist sentiments, and a long-running 
suspicion of standing armies and professional soldiers, active duty soldiers were scarce and a highly 
conspicuous officer corps was not necessarily desirable.  The United States had “a multitude of serious 
problems” shortly before becoming involved in World War II, observed one historian, “but the impact of the 
military on American life was not among them.”3 
Just days after many middle-aged American officers struggled into musty uniforms, however, the 
United States found itself at war with a nation that presented a different picture.  If already in the nineteenth 
century Americans had marked a German predilection for shiny buttons, braid, and tailored military wear, the 
Third Reich had pushed this tendency to new heights.  State ceremonies and local rituals flaunted row upon row 
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of uniformed men and boys, with thousands of girls and young women in matching outfits.  The Germans of 
Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will comprised tight rows of subdued hues, adorned with badges, belts, and 
insignia speaking a complex language of belonging, conformity, and grades of authority.   
For the Americans, the German passion for uniforms spoke volumes about the Germans’ militaristic 
propensities and the danger these posed to the world.  Soon after the occupation began, they therefore set aside 
their concerns about the adequacy of German clothing supplies and joined their allies in issuing an order 
demanding that German military uniforms and insignia disappear from public view.  Although this produced a 
real hardship for the German people, the Americans were willing only to delay, rather than discontinue, its 
enforcement.   
In general, scholars have been inclined to dismiss the uniform ban as inconsequential or excessive.  
Yet a closer consideration of its implementation and results suggests that it was not completely without effect.  
Certainly, with their communities now lying in shambles, many Germans were already eager to abandon their 
uniforms.  And some German commentators needed no Allied prodding to condemn the harmful role uniforms 
had played in Germany’s past.  But other Germans resented American attacks on their uniforms.  In addition, 
severe clothing shortages not only led to vocal criticism of the uniform prohibition for the added suffering it 
caused, but ensured that the Germans could not discard their uniforms even when they wanted to do so.  
Ultimately, despite the resentment it caused, the ban effectively bolstered prevailing native sentiments while 
helping to make certain that any uniforms that remained lost much of their visual dignity and thus their 
influence.  Introduced into a poor postwar economy and traumatized society, it helped to recast the connotations 
of “the uniform.” 
 
Making Policy 
“Appearance and discourse are two distinct dimensions of the social transaction,” sociologist Gregory 
P. Stone first argued years ago, and appearance is “more basic.”  Individuals express their identity through dress 
and behavior, while others make assumptions about a person on the same basis, even before either has spoken.4  
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Clothing, therefore, can serve as a form of language.5  Sociologist Nathan Joseph has suggested that uniforms 
can be seen as a type of “sign” whose abstractness enables others to read them at multiple levels of meaning.6  
While Stone notes that observers do not always interpret someone’s dress the way the person intends,7 Joseph 
has stressed that the same clothing can mean different things to different people depending upon governing 
social structures, personal experience, and other factors.8  In short, scholars have pointed not only to the very 
real functional and symbolic value of uniforms, but also to the simultaneity of diverging, overlapping, and 
conflicting meanings for both wearers and observers.   
Recognizing this multifaceted communicative character of uniforms is helpful both for comprehending 
the role uniforms played in German society and for understanding American policies.  For German uniforms 
sent multiple messages to other Germans and to American observers as well.  These messages, moreover, not 
only incited the promulgation of the  uniform ban, they also helped to determine its impact.  
 
Reading German Uniforms 
In the years following World War I, uniforms remained a highly visible element of the German social 
landscape.  Despite defeat, former officers readily donned their old uniforms for assorted gatherings.9  The 
World War I “front soldier” was increasingly idolized, seen by some as a role model for German youth and for 
German society as a whole.10  And uniformed paramilitary groups became conspicuous across the political 
spectrum—with even the Social Democrats sponsoring a uniformed organization.  In the chaos of 1918, 
spontaneous attacks on military elites who were closely identified with the monarchy had often involved ripping 
off epaulettes, and Social Democratic leaders in the 1920s had likewise criticized the traditional ornamental 
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“frippery” of the German armed forces.11  However, although the SPD’s paramilitary Reichsbanner now echoed 
these concerns in “frowning upon” the wearing of military decorations from World War I,12 even it did not 
eschew uniforms.  
In taking a position somewhere between militarism and pacifism, historian George Mosse suggested, 
the SPD was in part conceding “the attraction of the war experience even for Republican youth.”13  According 
to historian Richard Bessel, “It was almost as if, in the absence of opportunities to sign up for the army, young 
men in Weimar Germany looked to various paramilitary organizations and uniformed squads to express their 
admiration for military values and to have an outlet for violence.”14  If so, uniforms were not merely a trapping, 
but enhanced the pseudo-military experience offered by paramilitary groups.  At the same time, a uniformed 
group could provide the disaffected with overt signs of belonging, while also giving individuals the chance to 
express their political beliefs visibly in an environment of increasingly polarized politics.15 
The uniform trend gained additional momentum in the Third Reich.  Hitler’s desire to turn all Germans 
into soldiers marching in step with his ideological objectives received outward expression in a proliferation of 
uniforms, which could simultaneously encourage discipline and allegiance and intimidate Germany’s 
neighbors.16  How even small-scale displays could evoke emotional excitement and loyalty among Germans is 
suggested by a Helene S. in describing her childhood in a town near Ludwigshafen.  “When on certain holidays, 
early in the morning, the uniformed groups marched through the streets and sang marching songs, that awoke an 
uplifting feeling in me, too, as had already been encouraged in school,” she remembered.  “We were so lucky to 
be German, German was good, yes, German was the best in the whole world.  We had the greatest man, Adolf 
Hitler, who led us, who brought all the Germans outside of our land home into the Reich, whether they wanted 
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that or not, and why shouldn’t they want that, when they were offered so much.”  Her father had reluctantly 
joined the SA in order to get a job, she recalled, but upon achieving his goal had put his uniform away.  
Secretly, she lamented the fact that he was not marching and that “the uniform in the closet lived out a useless 
existence.” This, she added, had made her even more eagerly await the day when she could join the Hitler 
Youth and proudly wear her own—admittedly home-made—uniform.17 
Uniforms also contributed to prevailing conceptions of manliness.  Nazi Germany, scholars have 
observed, was characterized by a “militarized masculinity.”18  For men, the Nazis’ increased emphasis on 
military ideals meant military training in school, youth groups, and the army; to be a man was to be a soldier in 
uniform.19  The Nazi emphasis on physical appearance, moreover, meant that uniforms could serve another, 
related function.  Mosse has described “heroism, death, and sacrifice on behalf of a higher purpose in life” as 
“attributes of manliness” in the early twentieth century, but also stressed the importance of conceptions of the 
perfect male form.  If idealization of (Aryan) male beauty reached its apex in fascist Germany,20 uniforms not 
only accentuated key elements of this beauty—narrow hips and broad shoulders—but could lend the illusion of 
such features even where they were absent.21  Furthermore, though the Nazis preferred to stress the asexual 
nature of a perfect body, a uniform could also confer sex appeal.22 
But uniforms carried very concrete messages, too.  According to cultural analyst Jennifer Craik, 
military uniforms have historically “convey[ed] symbols of authority, status and power by constructing clean 
lines and a handsome silhouette.”23  And, in the words of a historian of Nazi women’s fashions, “Nowhere did a 
weapon and the right type of uniform evince power so convincingly as in the Third Reich.”24  Insignia, medals, 
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and badges, meanwhile, allowed observers to categorize a uniform wearer based on a complex system of colors, 
shapes, and emblems.25  As Joseph has observed, there is no uncertainty when one confronts a person in 
uniform, their “group membership, and perhaps rank, seniority, and prior achievements are proclaimed by their 
apparel.”  Reading their clothes, one also receives clues as to how they should be treated.26  True for all soldiers, 
this was perhaps most important for Wehrmacht officers, whose appearance immediately distinguished them as 
powerful elites.   
A uniform could thus identify a German man as a noble soldier or simply associate him with highly 
regarded military values or skills.  At the same time, it could confirm his abilities, status, and manhood, both to 
himself and to those around him.  Not everyone put on a uniform with great enthusiasm, but for many, it could 
be an elevating experience.  Recalling his wartime service, one soldier later wrote, “How many times . . . had I 
thought myself invulnerable, filled with the pride we all felt, admiring our shoulder straps and helmets and 
magnificent uniforms, and the sound of our footsteps, which I loved, and love still, despite everything.”27  
Not unlike Adolf Hitler, Americans in the 1930s associated the proliferation of German uniforms with 
an increased potential for war.28  When seen marching in precise formation, uniforms also provided visual 
evidence for their belief that the German people had willingly surrendered their individuality and rights to their 
militaristic leaders, becoming what historian Benjamin Alpers has termed a “regimented crowd,” a mass of 
obedient automatons.29  U.S. Army training films used the National Socialists’ own film footage to draw 
attention to this aspect of the Third Reich.  Along with images portraying a militaristic and aggressive people 
who had embraced the Nazis, “shots of the current regimentation of the German people through compulsion, 
force, and indoctrination yielded a picture of a country completely oriented to military conquest and world 
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domination.”30  Americans believed, too, that on an interpersonal level, uniforms served as symbols of authority 
for most Germans.31   
Not surprisingly, American wartime planners often focused on policy-related aspects of the problem.32  
They saw German paramilitary groups as partially responsible for the failure of the Weimar Republic and 
worried about the role such organizations and their accoutrements played in grounding a strong military 
system.33  Roosevelt linked the German fondness for uniforms with the growth of German militarism in the 
twentieth century and believed that prohibiting uniforms would help to convince the Germans of their total 
defeat, a step necessary to transforming their militaristic outlook.34 
Even beyond the presumed unique function of uniforms in German society, Allied military officers 
clearly recognized the power of a uniform—they needed to look no further than their own experiences.  General 
Patton once confided to his diary that he sometimes depended upon his uniform to help sustain his courage.  He 
also firmly believed that his own appearance—distinctive and occasionally flashy (he liked to wield an ivory-
handled pistol)—could help motivate his men and keep their spirits up (Figure 1).  General Eisenhower chose to 
acknowledge the special contribution of officers leading combat troops by introducing a dark green band to 
their uniform shoulder loops, thus setting them apart from officers who were not serving on the dangerous front 
lines.35  Meanwhile, high-ranking British officers had traditionally expressed their elite status by ignoring strict 
uniform regulations36 and often favored corduroys during World War II.  Field Marshal Sir Bernard J. 
Montgomery once used his preference for eccentric casual dress (not to mention his understanding of the 
language of clothing) to make a point in dealing with the Germans, deliberately donning a sweater and faded, 
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limp corduroys to receive a quartet of surrendering German officers, men who, even in defeat, struck 
Montgomery’s assistant as “overpoweringly sinister in their jackboots and long black leather overcoats.”37 
The military uniform, in many respects, had a standing all its own.  An officer’s guide from the early 
1940s captured this idea in reminding U.S. officers that “millions of American citizens have worn the uniform 
of the Army during wars and other times of trial and sacrifice, bringing honor to themselves and a heritage to be 
observed and upheld by those who follow.”  Officers should thus “present a fine appearance,” carefully 
maintain their clothing, and dress neatly according to regulations.  This meant, too, that, as leaders, they were to 
“impress upon all in the military service that the dignity of the uniform and the respect due it are best preserved 
when its wearers so conduct themselves as to never cast discredit upon it.”38 
 
Dealing with the Germans 
Although Roosevelt’s influence on policymaking was frequently decisive, the initial American policies 
for occupied Germany did not incorporate his desired uniform prohibition.  High-ranking U.S. officials and 
their British counterparts in SHAEF were not keen on leaving the Germans in uniform, but agreed that clothing 
shortages would make a ban difficult to enforce.  They decided, accordingly, to allow discharged German 
soldiers to retain one full uniform.39  SHAEF policies did stipulate, however, that all badges of rank, 
Reichskokarde (circular insignia of black, red, and white adorning most German headgear), Hoheitsabzeichen 
(the national insignia of a spread eagle over a swastika), and any other emblems, medals, or decorations “of a 
Nazi nature” should be confiscated before a soldier’s release, though he might be permitted to keep and wear 
any “medals or decorations awarded for merit or long service, or for particular campaigns,” so long as any Nazi 
markings on them had been removed or “obliterated.”40 
The fact that as a result many discharged soldiers were soon moving about freely and behaving like 
civilians while still dressed in uniform proved galling to French military observers.  In late May 1945, a general 
                                                 
37
 Fussell, Uniforms, 46-47. 
 
38
 The Officer’s Guide, 8th ed. (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1942), 123-124.  Not an official 
military publication, this guide drew information from assorted official military regulations and had the input of high-
ranking American officers. 
 
39
 Group Meeting on Disarmament of Germany, 4 Sep 44, Morgenthau Diary (Germany), 485; Eclipse Memorandum No. 
17, enclosed in Newman to Distribution, 30 Mar 45, NA, RG 260, Records of the USGCC, Box 22, F: AG 388.4 Militarism. 
 
40
 R.E. Lewis to Commanding Generals, 4 Jul 45, NA, RG 331, SHAEF, Entry 198, Box 223, F: 431.4  Insignia. 
 
 293 
from the French First Army, a body officially attached to the U.S. Sixth Army Group and temporarily 
controlling Stuttgart and Karlsruhe, went so far as to write a memo on the subject.  He called for the death of 
Prussian militarism through reeducation, “first by crushing all outward signs.”   
Above all, and at once, suppress the uniforms, commencing, naturally, with the soldiers, but also the 
civilians (police, public employees, etc. . .).  Kill the German cult of the ‘Mütze’ (cap) (a German who 
wears a ‘Mütze’ on his head thinks Prussian and Nazi.)  No longer offer for the admiration of the 
urchins, the policeman, the Beamte (civil servant), the soldier, booted, polished, belted, helmeted, 
arrogant.  Attempt to bring back the taste of ‘Gemutlichkeit’ with the long trousers, the jacket, the hat.  
It will be sufficient to distinguish the branches of the Public Services by easily visible insignias, hat-
bands, arm-bands, colored sleeves, scarves, badge, etc. . . .41    
 
France’s Lieutenant General Louis Marie Koeltz echoed many of his colleague’s complaints in an 
official request to SHAEF asking for a policy change.  “In order to obtain the moral disarmament of German 
minds and the destruction of German militarism,” he wrote, “it seems absolutely necessary to force the German 
people to lose its respect and its passionate love of the uniform.”  With a silent reference to the aftermath of 
World War I, he maintained that a soldier who returned home “with a neat military equipment” would “not fail 
to tell people that he has been discharged ‘with honour and dignity’, and this might constitute the first step 
towards the building up of a new legend of the ‘unvanquished German soldier’, as well as an encouragement to 
new dreams of restoring the Great Reich.”   Furthermore, European plundering had provided most of the 
German clothing and leather, while the inhabitants of Holland, Belgium, and France presently lacked clothes 
and shoes.  More offensive still, German civilians were “as a rule, correctly clothed and in possession of good 
shoes.”  He therefore recommended that German soldiers be forced to remove all “insignias of a military 
appearance” and, if they had to wear uniforms traveling home, they should be required to turn them in within 48 
hours of arriving.  He had little sympathy for those for whom this might represent a hardship.  “Should certain 
German soldiers still be incompletely or badly clothed,” he concluded, “they should not be pitied more than any 
other population of liberated Europe which have suffered through this war.  And it may happen that these 
soldiers and their fellow countrymen will come to the conclusion that war does not pay, which would be another 
step towards the moral disarmament which is our common aim.”42 
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A SHAEF official rejected Koeltz’s appeal in early July, referencing existing regulations regarding 
military insignia and reiterating the reasoning behind SHAEF’s original uniform policy.  Practical experience 
had shown the decision to be sound, he added, “not only because of the administrative difficulties involved, but 
also because Allied air bombardment has robbed the Germans of any material gains which they may have 
acquired . . . leaving the vast majority of the German Forces without civilian clothing.”  Discharged soldiers 
provided clear evidence of the latter point by continuing to wear their uniforms “in spite of the fact that they 
have long since ceased to have anything approaching a neat military appearance.”43 
But SHAEF’s opinion soon did not matter, as in July 1945 it was officially dissolved.  In the U.S. 
Zone, American policies now took effect, to be supplemented by any instructions from the ACC, which began 
operating in August.  And the new policies included the long-discussed law on “military training,” which 
specifically barred “the use of military or Nazi uniforms” and insignia except by soldiers not yet demobilized.44  
Before U.S. officials could issue implementing instructions, however, the ACC approved its own directive. 
The French had not abandoned their hopes of clearing German streets of military uniforms.  Thus, in 
early August, Koeltz, now deputy military governor of the French Zone, had circulated a memorandum on 
uniforms for consideration at a meeting of the deputy military governors of the four occupation zones—a group 
soon to comprise the Allied Coordinating Committee responsible for recommending policies to the ACC.  
Expressing a wish to signal clearly the Allies’ desire to eliminate militarism, the memo recommended that the 
ACC forbid the wearing of all military clothing, even freed of its insignia and badges, and require the Germans 
to turn in all uniforms.45  The four officials all “agreed in principle to the desirability of the French proposals,” 
but they also acknowledged the problem of German veterans who had no replacement clothing.  In the end, they 
decided that uniforms could be dyed to produce acceptable civilian clothing.46  An early draft of an appropriate 
order accordingly prohibited the wearing of all military and paramilitary uniforms in their “present color” after 
October 1, 1945.47  Submitted to the ACC, the draft elicited protests from the British who argued that it would 
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not allow enough time to complete all of the dyeing operations required to meet the needs of some two million 
former soldiers in their zone.  The Soviets, on the other hand, could not understand the fuss, claiming to have 
already essentially achieved the directive’s goals in theirs.48  After a delay to determine a reasonable time frame 
for implementation, the ACC on August 30 approved an order banning the wearing of all insignia, medals, and 
badges as well as all uniforms in their original color after December 1.49 
With the new order in hand, U.S. officials in September issued an ordinance that permitted Germans to 
wear military and paramilitary uniforms and “any police uniforms similar thereto” only if they had dyed or 
altered them to resemble civilian clothing.  Boots might be worn, but no headgear.  Violators would be subject 
“to any lawful punishment, other than death.”  German officials, meanwhile, were to devise programs for 
dyeing and retailoring uniforms and collecting clothing for the needy.  A letter of instruction to American 
commanders advised that they could turn to welfare agencies for assistance in converting and replacing 
uniforms and indicated that U.S. officials would release captured stocks of German uniforms to German 
government agencies for dyeing, retailoring, and eventual distribution by German welfare agencies.50 
Subsequent ACC issuances would confirm the Allies’ intent to erase uniforms from the visual map of 
Germany.  ACC Law No. 8 outlawed all military training and related activities, stating, as had the earlier U.S. 
law, that no one might wear military or Nazi uniforms, insignia, or decorations.51  Similarly, ACC Law No. 34, 
along with its many other provisions, repealed all legislative measures pertaining to uniforms and decorations.52  
 
The Official Response 
The Procurement Problem 
Allied concerns about German clothing supplies were well-founded.  The Germans had begun 
rationing clothing already in 1939 and, as the war progressed, stores had been unable to satisfy even these 
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limited demands.  Used clothing grew expensive.  And even as supplies dwindled, the Nazis had collected 
winter clothes for troops on the Eastern Front and other items for Germany’s poor.  When civilian production 
stopped completely, German women already had learned to stitch together fabric scraps to make skirts, to create 
lingerie from fallen parachutes, and to knit socks from unraveled grain sacks.53  Once hostilities ceased, 
destroyed factories, raw material shortages, plundering, transportation deficiencies, and Allied requisitioning all 
impeded the production and shipping of new supplies.54  Making worse an already bad situation, destitute 
refugees and concentration camp survivors were soon joining bombed out families and millions of displaced 
persons (DPs) in Germany.  During the summer of 1945, the influx of returning soldiers exacerbated the 
problem, as many had lost all their possessions or simply outgrown their civilian clothes.55 
Certain areas of Württemberg-Baden found their stocks of clothing reduced still further by French 
actions.  In Karlsruhe and Stuttgart, the French required each German family to turn over to local authorities 
one man’s suit, one shirt, one necktie, two handkerchiefs, and one pair each of underwear, socks, and shoes—all 
in excellent condition—for use by French deportees and the homeless in France.  Protests from local officials 
met with little sympathy.56  Moreover, the volume of goods amassed was substantial.  In late June, for instance, 
one of Karlsruhe’s 16 administrative districts reported having collected some 2,200 shirts, 1,900 pairs of pants, 
and 1,900 pairs of underwear.57 
Incapable of altering the larger supply picture, German authorities had little choice but to continue to 
ration often unavailable goods and solicit or demand donations from their fellow citizens.58  In this regard, the 
French collection effort ultimately proved to be something of a boon.  Withdrawing in mid July, the French left 
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behind a portion of the goods they had assembled.  The Americans had no need of the clothing and distributed it 
to indigent individuals and eventually to local officials for dispensing to the German people.59  Interestingly, the 
responsible MG officer in Karlsruhe advised city authorities to give priority in distributing clothing first to 
concentration camp survivors, but then to discharged soldiers, as he wanted the uniform jackets of the latter to 
“vanish from the street scene” (though the wearing of uniform pants and boots was still permitted and full 
uniforms might be worn at work sites).60   
By the time the ACC debated the uniform question, American MG officers on site were very aware of 
the difficult clothing conditions.  Already on the day Germany surrendered, the Landrat of Landkreis 
Heidelberg, Hermann Specht, had reported that retailers had “no stocks worth mentioning of clothing, footware 
or textiles,” few people were more than “barely supplied with these articles,” and retailers could not expect new 
supplies any time soon.61  He repeated these thoughts again and again over the succeeding weeks and months, 
noting, in fact, that supplies were diminishing while applications for purchase permits were increasing.62  In late 
August, the American captain overseeing Landkreis Karlsruhe reported to his superiors on a meeting with a 
local mayor, indicating that “clothing is a big problem” and that he had suggested to the German official that 
“uniforms of returning soldiers be altered and dyed to look like civilian clothes.”63  A week later, one of his men 
met with the Landkreis Wirtschaftsamt (Commercial Office) staff regarding the use of German uniforms, 
subsequently recording in his daily report that he would “make up model of conversion for display at 
burgermeister’s meeting.”64  
 In early fall 1945, American officials nevertheless banned uniform wearing.  Local newspapers now 
explained that uniforms might only be worn if they were not immediately recognizable as such and that 
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uniforms must be dyed a color other than blue, black, or olive green65—colors reserved for American troops and 
certain categories of individuals outfitted in dyed American uniforms, such as DPs.66  Posing the greatest 
challenge for returning soldiers, the ordinance affected others as well.  Years of deprivation had made almost 
any free item of clothing desirable.  Thus, as historian Irene Guenther writes, following Germany’s surrender 
many women “were spotted wearing dirtied and torn military jackets, which German soldiers and officers had 
hastily abandoned in their retreat.”67  In the Stuttgart area, as elsewhere, Germans had looted Wehrmacht supply 
trains during the final days of the war.68  The previous emphasis on war production also meant that Wehrmacht 
uniform and fabric stocks represented one of the only sources of replacement clothing.   
In the face of a deadline, ongoing efforts to deal with the clothing situation took on new urgency.  
Heidelberg officials were among those who investigated the possibility of dyeing surplus uniforms.  When the 
Americans arrived in April 1945, Heidelberg’s Schädla Laundry and Dry Cleaning Plant had had in its 
possession a large stock of uniforms and other supplies left by the Wehrmacht for cleaning.  Facing their 
possible confiscation, the firm had given the items to the city, which had, in turn, begun distributing the clothing 
to returning soldiers who had nothing else to wear.  The Wehrmacht supplies now needed to be dyed.  But 
Heidelberg encountered a serious obstacle in the U.S. Army, whose Seventh Army had established its 
headquarters in the city and requisitioned the city’s various dyeing works.  In late September, the Americans 
relinquished three small dyers for city use, but it soon became clear that the available equipment would satisfy 
only a portion of the demand.69   
In early November, Heidelberg mayor Dr. Ernst Walz outlined the situation for local MG officials.  A 
survey of five dyeing works had shown that most lacked dyestuffs.  One had indicated that it was understaffed, 
since the city labor office had assigned some of its employees to help with bridge construction.  Another was 
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busy providing dry cleaning and laundry services and presently had no expert on staff to handle the dyeing.  A 
third had already accepted several thousand articles of clothing from individuals.  Not only would they be 
unable to finish this work by December 1, but taking on city orders would require them to postpone the private 
work for weeks.  Altogether, Walz reported, four of the firms could together dye, daily, 180 Wehrmacht coats, 
350 Wehrmacht jackets or blouses, or 360 Wehrmacht trousers.  But the largest of the five facilities was still 
requisitioned.70  In addition, the Schädla plant, Heidelberg’s largest dyeing works, could dye roughly 500 
uniform pieces daily and had the materials to dye some 12,000 uniform parts, but this plant remained in 
American hands as well.71 
The local MG commander immediately asked Seventh Army officials whether the army could release 
one of the two requisitioned plants or permit the city to use the plants at night, noting that his request had been 
delayed while securing detailed information on the facilities.72  The Seventh Army rejected his petition 
unequivocally.  The Schädla plant was handling dry cleaning services for all U.S. troops in the area, was already 
behind schedule in part because it had been without electricity for a time, and was about to begin a night shift.  
Its dyeing department was already operating around the clock dyeing American uniforms for DPs and 
repatriated Allied personnel.  The second plant was engaged in similar dyeing operations, while its dry cleaners 
was tied up cleaning uniforms for reissuing.  The responding Army official ended his November 21 reply by 
observing, “If the burgermeister continues to delay starting the dyeing program until the last minute he will 
naturally not be able to complete it in the allotted time with the equipment available to him.”73  City officials 
thus had little choice but to turn to the few available facilities to dye small consignments of uniforms or 
particularly essential items, such as winter coats, while also exploring other options.74 
In Stuttgart, there were no facilities available for dyeing uniforms as of early November.  A large firm 
some distance away was operating, but buried under U.S. Army orders, while two other facilities lacked 
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sufficient coal to do the work.75  Worried about the situation of former soldiers, Stuttgart Wirtschaftsamt 
officials made arrangements for the two firms to disinfect, dry clean, and dye a small cache of Wehrmacht 
uniforms.  However, not until mid November, when the military government turned over some 20 freight cars 
of coal to the city, were they able to allocate two truckloads of fuel to one of the firms so it could begin dyeing 
uniforms.76  The Wirtschaftsamt then set up a station where individuals could, for a small fee, exchange their 
uniforms for uniforms of approximately the same quality dyed dark green, brown, or slate gray (depending upon 
the dyestuffs available).  The Stuttgarter Zeitung announced the program on November 21, specifying that 
individuals who were both Stuttgart residents and had no other clothing besides their uniform would be served 
first.  All uniforms turned in would, in turn, be dyed for future exchange.77 
Like the people of Heidelberg, many individuals in the Karlsruhe area made their own arrangements 
with dyers.  Taking stock of the local situation in mid December at the request of local MG authorities, 
Karlsruhe mayor Hermann Veit reported that there were just two dyeing works.  At the time, one firm had 
10,000 kilograms of uniforms on hand, with an output of approximately 500 kilograms per day, or roughly 200-
300 uniforms.  The second currently had 3,000 kilograms of uniforms on hand and had indicated that it would 
need five to six months to complete all of its orders.  So far as local officials had been able to ascertain, the two 
dyeing works were the only firms available in all of North Baden (clearly a mistaken assumption).  Veit 
therefore believed they should assume “that approximately 4-500 000 uniforms and overcoats will be turned in 
for dyeing.”  In his closing remarks, he estimated it would take “at least 1 year to dye all the uniforms on hand, 
even if the work will be forced,” noting, too, that zonal divisions were hindering shipment of necessary raw 
materials.78 
With less than three months to complete their dyeing activities, the Germans’ troubles were obviously 
increased by American demands.  The Americans had begun dispensing army stocks to poorly clothed refugees 
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crowding Germany, but these had to be dyed first lest American GIs be blamed for criminal conduct.79  
Eventually the U.S. also started dyeing American uniforms issued to German POWs, and, as of December 1945, 
required that German uniforms worn by prisoners be dyed before their discharge.80  The latter measure relieved 
some pressure on local authorities.  Yet the combined American efforts still meant that the U.S. government 
was procuring literally tons of dyestuffs.  Overall demand for dyes was therefore enormous at a time when 
dyestuff supplies were inadequate, German factories could produce only a certain amount, and coal shortages 
impeded production.81 
With dyeing not the sole answer, German officials sought other ways to address the clothing problem.  
In Ulm, a notice published by the mayor in late November urged local tailors to immediately set aside all other 
work to alter uniforms.82  Military government officials later noted, however, that tailors did not always like 
doing alterations “for fear of doing it all over again when the modifications will not be sufficient.”83  About the 
same time, the Heilbronn MG office supplied city and Landkreis authorities with an allotment of men’s suits 
made up from Wehrmacht fabric supplies to be distributed primarily to discharged soldiers.   To receive one of 
the suits, an applicant needed to obtain a coupon from the local Wirtschaftsamt, at which time he was to sign a 
statement indicating that he possessed no suit other than the one in which he had been discharged and was 
currently wearing.  When picking up the new suit at a designated local business, he was to pay 55 marks and 
turn in either a uniform or another suit in wearable (tragfähig) condition.  Local welfare authorities intended to 
use these to clothe refugees.84 
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German officials also continued to issue purchase permits for limited goods and, along with welfare 
agencies, solicited clothing donations.85  But these measures could not entirely alleviate the problem either.  In 
mid October, a Karlsruhe Wirtschaftsamt official reported to a gathering of district administrators that retail 
stores had few clothes left and donated clothing stocks were shrinking.  His staff could no longer supply every 
applicant with a decent suit (Paradeanzug) and there was “understandably dissatisfaction among the former 
soldiers regarding the quality of the clothing distributed.”  One district head noted, too, that the clothes that 
remained were in many instances “little more than rags.”86  Additional clothing drives followed.87  Several 
districts also established sewing rooms, sometimes periodically staffed by a tailor or dressmaker, where women 
could alter clothes and sew items from fabric scraps.88 
Small towns tried similar methods of coping.  Landrat Specht reported in early December that 
procuring clothing for returning POWs “at such a short notice” was still a problem.  In mid November, he had 
informed the mayors of communities within his jurisdiction that they would need to conduct clothing drives.  
Some of these initiatives had been “relatively successful, whereas in others hardly any clothing was obtained 
owing to the poverty of the population.”  He indicated that he would soon order the mayors to “do what they 
can in order to achieve more satisfactory results,” adding, “It is to be hoped that some result will be forthcoming 
in spite of the extremely difficult conditions.”89  Specht had earlier alerted the Americans to a number of other 
apparent problems as well.  He pointed out that most German males had only Wehrmacht field caps to wear as 
headgear, due to the scarcity of hats in recent years.  Arguing that “particularly for the coming winter, these 
caps will be most useful for all the numerous persons who have to work out-of-doors,” he asked that they be 
permitted to wear the caps “after eliminating the raised point at the front.”  Specht also stressed that sewing 
materials, particularly thread, were in very short supply, with limited stocks precluding even purchase ticket 
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recipients from immediately obtaining needed materials.  “In view of this state of affairs it seems quite 
impossible to provide the sewing materials required for remodeling the uniforms,” he concluded.90 
There were some successes.  In early December, Heidelberg’s Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung praised those 
whose generous donations had enabled the majority of local veterans to meet the uniform ordinance’s 
deadline.91  But American MG officials also realized that most German compliance efforts were falling short, 
even accounting for a certain amount of exaggeration and foot-dragging on the part of German authorities.  On 
November 30, Major Maxwell Pullen, head of the MG in Karlsruhe, reported to his men on a meeting he had 
attended that day with his counterparts from other offices.  Citing the December 1 deadline, he noted that “this 
is the order from higher H[ead]Q[uarters], but it has not been accomplished yet, because of lack of dye and 
dyeing facilities.”  Pullen reported that Colonel Clifton Lisle, the officer responsible for military government in 
all of North Baden, had “written up stating the situation and asking for an extension” but so far had received no 
answer.  “The Police,” he added, “should be instructed to take it lazy on arrests until we get an answer.”92 
Later that same day, Lisle learned that U.S. zonal authorities had decided to delay enforcement of the 
ordinance.93  Newspapers now carried word that dyestuff and clothing shortages had led to a temporary 
reprieve.94  The shift in American requirements apparently caused a certain amount of confusion, however.  
Military government authorities in Karlsruhe, Ulm, and other areas disregarded the ordinance until spring.95  In 
Heidelberg, an initial notice in the Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung announcing a withdrawal of the ordinance was 
followed by one clarifying that soldiers who owned only a uniform might wear it until they were able to obtain 
replacement clothing from the city, which was in turn followed by a announcement—made at the express 
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request of the local MG office—that the ordinance was not only still in effect but would be enforced.96  
Officials in Stuttgart felt compelled to clarify in late December that individuals wearing uniforms would still be 
arrested unless they could prove that they had no civilian clothing and had to date been unable to have their 
uniform altered or dyed.97  On the other hand, in early January, officials at the U.S. Zone’s headquarters were 
acting on the assumption that strict enforcement had been suspended.98 
As the Americans continued working to procure sufficient coal supplies and dyestuffs to push forward 
the broader dyeing program—a challenge that also received the attention of Clay himself99—the Germans 
continued their attempts to comply with the ordinance.   Dyers accepted new orders and local authorities 
organized additional clothing drives and dispensed ration tickets.100  In February 1946, Ulm’s refugee 
commissioner announced the impending opening of a workshop for mending and reworking clothing where 
refugees and former POWs would receive priority service.101  In Karlsruhe, an evangelical welfare organization 
distributed clothes donated by a church in Basel, Switzerland.102  Heilbronn, meanwhile, received a new 
shipment of clothing made from confiscated Wehrmacht stocks.103 
Regardless of how local officials had viewed the status of the original ordinance during the winter, 
American leniency soon ended.  In April 1946, with the harsh winter months now past, local MG officers 
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informed German officials that they should now enforce the original ordinance.104  The head of Ulm’s police 
accordingly announced that his men would immediately arrest anyone who violated the ordinance.105  U.S. 
occupation troops received similar instructions.106 
Scattered reports from the first half of 1946 suggest, moreover, that at least some American soldiers 
vigilantly followed their orders.  Already in February, local military police in Heidelberg had arrested and 
expelled from the city a number of uniformed former German sailors visiting from the British Zone.  Protesting 
the incident to local MG officials, Heidelberg’s mayor urged the Americans to inform the British of the rules in 
the American Zone, suggesting that such incidents would hurt the good relationship between the Americans and 
the local population.  Conceding that the Americans had been doing their duty, he nevertheless pleaded for 
attention to the feelings of the sailors—who had only done what was permitted them by the British—as well as 
their families in the area.107 
Several months later, in mid May, a mayor in Landkreis Karlsruhe reported to the Landrat that U.S. 
police had stopped several members of his community.  When he asked whether he might issue certificates 
stating that they had no other clothing, the Landrat warned against it, citing both the new regulations and the 
fact that the Americans would soon be conducting raids to locate persons illegally wearing uniforms (the major 
newspapers had carried warnings to this effect).108  The Landrat also notified all the mayors within his 
jurisdiction that, starting immediately, anyone caught in a uniform would, without exception, be arrested.  They 
should inform local residents, post notices to this effect, and report back to him when they had done so.109  
During the summer, he continued to pester those communities that had not responded to his request, asking for 
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notification of action taken.110  One mayor was undoubtedly not alone in soon finding himself facing distressed 
residents who had seen the newly posted notices and objected that they had nothing else to wear.  He had no 
ration tickets to issue, the mayor complained, the dyers were taking no new orders, and, even if they did, the 
soldiers had nothing to wear while their uniforms were being dyed.111 
Once again, American occupation officials looked with some sympathy upon the German predicament.  
Recognizing the culpability of clothing shortages for continuing violations of the uniform ban, they told 
German authorities in early June that, at the very least, insignia, military buttons, and the like should be 
removed from uniforms and suggested that the German police must, above all, “be instructive,” taking stronger 
action against repeat offenders.112 
Providing for discharged soldiers would continue to be a challenge for German officials.113  But the 
problem of military uniforms seems to have faded gradually, perhaps because of the changing nature of 
veterans’ clothing.  The Americans began releasing their POWs in dyed uniforms and other soldiers were 
returning in prison camp garb.  Additionally, responsible administrators increasingly used words like “torn,” 
“primitive,” and “tattered” to describe POW clothing—descriptions which reinforced their assertions that these 
clothes urgently needed to be replaced, presumably whether they violated American regulations or not.114  
Furthermore, as of early 1947, the Wehrmacht clothing stocks confiscated by the Americans had been 
completely exhausted.115  
In January 1947, New York Times reporter Kathleen McLaughlin observed that one still occasionally 
saw former soldiers “in full uniform” in Germany—especially in the British Zone.  In fact, she asserted that 
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American and British instructions regarding uniforms “were widely ignored for months,” a response she 
intimated had much to do with clothing shortages, though she also criticized the Germans for their insensitivity 
to Nazi victims in their insistence on wearing even offensive—if denuded—uniforms like those of Nazi camp 
guards.  Among several additional reasons for German noncompliance, she blamed the “rapid demobilization 
and decimation of Allied occupation forces” which limited surveillance capabilities.116  A reiteration of the 
uniform ordinance by Heidelberg officials in January 1948 likewise suggested that problems persisted.117  But 
McLaughlin also asserted that “on a mass basis, the program of ‘denazifying’ clothing” had been relatively 
successful.118   
 
Demilitarizing the Appearance of Organized Groups 
If the Americans could point to noticeable success in their efforts to eliminate Wehrmacht uniforms 
from German streets, they were also enforcing uniform restrictions in other arenas.  In particular, they were 
monitoring the German police and various youth and sports groups. 
During their first months in Germany, amidst continuing hostilities, the Allies’ concerns regarding 
German police attire had centered especially on distinguishing police officers from Wehrmacht soldiers.  
Reports indicated that some had been mistakenly carted off to POW cages and Allied officials worried others 
might be inadvertently shot.119  In March 1945, SHAEF authorities had directed Allied commanders to make 
German civilian officials responsible—subject to military government approval—for re-outfitting local police 
in “distinct” clothing that did not resemble either Wehrmacht uniforms or Allied dress.  In the meantime, 
German police were to wear civilian clothing and identifying armlets.120  The September 1945 uniform 
ordinance outlawing the wearing of police uniforms similar to military clothing thus did little more than reword 
existing U.S. policy.  
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The Allied approach, which at first resulted in police officers who could be distinguished only by their 
armbands, raised interesting issues.  One military government report got to the heart of the matter when it 
suggested in early June 1945 that “the efficiency and authority of the German police would be enhanced by 
putting them into uniform.”121  (The fact that many policemen were new, minimally trained recruits armed only 
with wooden truncheons certainly also contributed to the problem.)  Landkreis Karlsruhe MG officers similarly 
reported that the “Vehicle Patrol” in their area was experiencing difficulties because drivers did not recognize 
them as police officers, “with the white Mil Gov armband being their only badge of authority.”122  Occupation 
officials were thus forced to straddle a rather blurry line.  On one hand, they required uniforms as a means of 
identification and a sign of delegated authority to maintain order.  On the other, they tried to get rid of the 
German police officer’s traditional military look, his semi-military status, and the not unrelated privileges and 
power—both real and assumed—he often had enjoyed in the past. 
With the security situation not particularly threatening during the early months of the occupation, “the 
most pressing concern of [American] public safety officers was often with getting the German police out of 
their traditional nineteenth-century Prussian drill sergeant uniforms and into American styles, usually modeled 
on the uniforms of the New York City police,” writes historian Earl Ziemke.123  German officials were 
ultimately responsible for providing new police uniforms, but they were operating within the larger context of 
clothing and dye shortages.124  American MG authorities therefore frequently had to press them to act, as well 
as assist them in procuring the necessary materials.  In late summer 1945, for instance, the public safety officer 
assigned to Landkreis Karlsruhe was using his American contacts to try to track down old Wehrmacht uniforms 
or fabric for local police departments.125  A local public safety officer similarly spent part of his time during the 
first winter of the occupation running interference for the city of Heidelberg, which had ordered new uniforms 
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from a manufacturer in Worms but had not yet received all of them due to complications created by the French 
Military Government.126 
The transition from old to new was thus typically not one of simply exchanging passable uniforms of 
one sort for those of another sort.  In Karlsruhe, whose police force was partially composed of young men 
recruited from the non-functioning streetcar system, early police attire included both elements of streetcar 
uniforms and dyed party and Wehrmacht uniforms.127  The latter had posed certain problems, a Karlsruhe 
official later noted, as the original blue dye had not held and the clothing had had to be re-dyed.  The dye also 
had turned the uniform-wearer’s underclothing blue—not a good development, he added, when underclothing 
was the personal property of the wearer.128  Meanwhile, Heidelberg’s procurement activities resulted in a 
quarrel with the German North Baden office responsible for commerce regarding the distribution of scarce 
clothing and shoes.  Reporting to the mayor in February 1946 on his department’s allegedly nefarious activities, 
the city’s police director not only pointed to the unresponsiveness of North Baden officials, but indicated that 
some 230 of 440 city policemen were still without an overcoat and 170 had no uniform at all.  The police 
department had repeatedly asked American officials whether its men might wear old Wehrmacht field coats, but 
these overtures had been rejected every time.129 
In Stuttgart, police officials received MG approval for their gray-green uniforms, only to have the 
Americans demand in April 1946 that the uniforms be changed to dark blue—a demand apparently provoked by 
a recent violent altercation between local police and Jewish DPs.  Though city authorities decided the switch 
would be expensive, wasteful, and difficult to carry out, the head of MG in Stuttgart made it very clear that he 
expected obedience, not an expression of opinion, and the uniforms were changed.  At the same time, the police 
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replaced their traditional shakos with eight-cornered caps similar to those worn by some American police forces 
and began wearing badges displaying their service numbers.130   
On the other hand, as late as November 1946, one small town in Landkreis Karlsruhe had not even 
bothered to replace the white armbands of its six policemen with real uniforms.  Chalking this up to a lack of 
initiative, an American public safety officer complained, “They sit and wait for someone from higher 
headquarters to furnish them equipment or tell them what to do.  It is understandable the difficulty a department 
of several hundred would have securing material or uniforms, but not six!”131 
Despite obstacles, however, a transformation gradually occurred.  An American MG officer observed 
in late June 1946, for example, that the appearance of the Karlsruhe police had “improved considerably” in 
recent months.  “It has lost its ‘Wehrmacht’ appearance; no more shiny boots etc.,” he explained.  “The traffic 
police is decked out in white blouses and dark blue trousers and white ‘Bobby-type’ head-gear.”  The “one 
military tendency” he had seen was “in the case of the guard detachment” where “men guarding billets snap to 
attention, accompanied by resounding heel-clicking, and render the German military salute when one of their 
superiors passes.”132 
Even with most police forces newly attired, the Americans continued to monitor the situation.  In late 
1946 and early 1947, public safety officers from the Land MG inspected police departments throughout 
Württemberg-Baden, checking compliance with MG regulations pertaining specifically to “Public Safety” that 
included provisions barring the use of military-like uniforms, insignia, and ranks.  In addition to recording 
weapons-related infractions, they occasionally censured communities for unacceptable uniforms or caps, or for 
the use of military or “semi-military” rank insignia, with their highly specific comments attesting to American 
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watchfulness but also confirming that most German police departments were generally compliant.  Each 
community so censured had to report back once they had corrected any problems.133   
A Stuttgart precinct chief was thus cited for “wearing an old German police coat similar to the 
Wehrmacht uniform blouse, with military insignia still attached,”134 while a lengthy internal MG report 
criticized Mannheim for using chevrons to indicate rank.135  A similar report on Heilbronn indicated that its 
police were “wearing green uniforms with semi-military insignia of rank.”136  Two months later, Heilbronn 
officials notified Land authorities that all of their police officers would soon be wearing blue, the new cap 
would be octagonal, the old insignia of rank were gone, and these would soon be replaced with insignia similar 
to those of Stuttgart’s police.137  Authorities from Blaubeuren similarly reported that their chevrons had 
disappeared, in keeping with MG criticism, although they also reminded that MG officials in nearby Ulm had 
previously verbally approved the emblems.138  In Heidelberg, meanwhile, a police official reporting on the 
inspectors’ visit noted that they had objected to the new cap of the city’s criminal police, describing it as very 
“soldierly.”  Admitting that the current caps did not actually violate MG regulations, the Americans had 
nevertheless repeatedly stated that they really wished Heidelberg had introduced an octagonal cap.139   
American concerns regarding uniforms and insignia also extended into the arena of sports 
organizations and youth groups.  In mid 1947, for instance, the American youth activities officer for 
Württemberg-Baden approved a large number of emblems for sports clubs, later reminding German officials 
that American MG authorities did not object to the wearing of membership emblems or badges, so long as they 
were “not reminiscent of or an indication of a nationalsocialistic [sic] or militaristic spirit.”140  In mid 1948, 
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moreover, military police apprehended several members of the reconstituted Boy Scouts for wearing uniforms, 
prompting John Steiner, director of the Land MG’s Education and Cultural Relations Division, to remind youth 
group administrators that no youth organization might wear uniforms without American authorization.  That the 
Boy Scouts represented a particularly touchy problem was suggested by an internal MG memo from November 
1948 wherein Leon Shelnutt, who oversaw group activities for the Land MG government, discussed the reasons 
why the Americans had not previously granted the Boy Scouts such an authorization.  Not wanting to reinforce 
divisions between various Boy Scout groups in Germany, they had also avoided this move because “to a large 
degree Scouting is considered militaristic by the German people” and permitting them to wear uniforms “would 
help to aggravate this feeling.”  The Scouts, he added, had undoubtedly been “rather militaristic in pre-war 
Germany.”  Steiner’s letter to youth officials also hinted at the Scouts’ precarious position, suggesting that the 
German Scouts were essentially on probation with the international movement.  “Foreign Boy Scout leaders 
will observe the activities of the German Boy Scouts very carefully during the next few years,” cautioned 
Steiner.  “They will want to know whether character-building will be emphasized or uniforms, marching, and 
other external characteristics.” 141   
Interestingly, the Boy Scouts’ right-wing reputation had led left-wing youth groups such as the 
socialist Falcons to attack the new organization, both overtly and covertly.142  Yet American officials had also 
noted that a large gathering of the Falcons in Stuttgart in September 1947 had generated protests from observers 
in part because of the Falcons’ own flag-carrying, marching, and uniforms.143  Keeping German youth out of 
any type of uniform apparently had at least some popular support.  
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Overall, then, German officials could not take the American uniform regulations lightly.  Magnifying 
an already distressing material situation, the restrictions forced the Germans to expend valuable clothing and 
fuel in meeting Allied requirements.  The Americans, on the other hand, found that local economic conditions 
hampered enforcement.  But while they showed some understanding for German problems, they stuck to their 
original demands.  In fact, in September 1949, as discussions of possible German rearmament heated up, a new 
Allied High Commission law reaffirmed the ban on wearing medals, insignia, and uniforms.  Violators could be 
imprisoned for up to five years or fined up to 25,000 DM or both.144  No doubt intended in part to soothe 
concerns about Allied intentions, the law was not just for show.  In November 1949, a 19-year-old from 
Landkreis Sinsheim was sentenced to six months in prison for leading a church procession while astride a horse 
adorned with Nazi insignia and dressed in his father’s old Nazi Ortsgruppenleiter uniform.145   
 
Views From Outside of the Bureaucracy 
Although Allied wartime policymakers occasionally proved woefully ignorant of actual conditions in 
Nazi Germany, their assessment of the uniform issue was not far from the mark.  Beginning even before the 
Nazi seizure of power, uniforms had served an increasingly important function in German lives, honoring 
military ideals, confirming masculinity, and indicating status.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the collapse of the 
Third Reich into defeat and ruin altered the perceptions of many Germans.  In a radically changed environment, 
many now willingly abandoned their uniforms.  The condemnation and banishment of the uniform, meanwhile, 
elicited a mix of sometimes strong reactions, both positive and negative.   
 
Getting Out of Uniform 
Destruction, defeat, and the arrival of the Allies had a dramatic effect.  As the war collapsed into 
retreat, chaos, and capitulation, some soldiers abandoned their uniforms to evade capture.  One member of the 
Waffen SS later recalled tearing off all of his insignia while hiding in the countryside, then deciding his clothing 
still looked too much like a uniform and sneaking back into an American-occupied city to procure civilian 
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clothes.146  Some men went so far as to outfit themselves in women’s apparel, complete with borrowed 
identification cards, in attempting to pass unnoticed through military roadblocks.147  Others saw discarding the 
uniform as a more symbolic gesture.  One soldier later remembered being released from British captivity in July 
1945: “Quickly I change my clothes and leave the camp, looking like a civilian on the outside, too, clothed in a 
jacket and pants of a plain blue navy uniform.  It is a wonderful feeling, to no longer be a soldier.  I obtained 
this marvelous piece of clothing, in which I feel like a civilian, in the chaos at the end of the war. . . .”148   
In fact, many soldiers were eager to abandon their uniforms.  If not literally worn out, uniforms often 
bore unmistakable marks of defeat, and, for some, the psychological residue of a war they wanted to forget 
(Figures 6 and 8).  Complaining to the Stuttgarter Zeitung about the difficulties he had experienced in obtaining 
civilian clothes, one former soldier explained, “I had no yearning for tails, a tuxedo, no, only for—finally, after 
six years—getting out of the uniform and putting on something civilian-like.”149  Another veteran painted a 
vivid picture in a November 1945 letter to the Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung lamenting the local clothing situation.   
Three months ago we returned from captivity.  The uniform, formerly covered in decorations, now 
empty, filthy, tattered from a thousand dives into the muddy ground, into which swarms of enemy 
airplanes repeatedly chased us.  Now we returned home, inside hollow and burned out and full of 
anxious worry; outwardly small, ragged, in the garments of a beggar. . . . Now we were still missing 
one thing: clothing. . . .We had nothing other than a tattered uniform on our body.  With it we unloaded 
lime, hauled mortar, oiled machines, mined and went walking on Sundays.  Purchase permits?  The 
Wirtschaftsamt gave them to us, a whole bag full, we could have constructed suits out of them!  Now 
we have been home a quarter of a year, working on the reconstruction of the Heimat, our uniform is 
disintegrating on our body in the process and our purchase permits have become useless.150 
 
Explaining why Heidelberg officials were charging a fee to cover costs when distributing donated clothes, the 
newspaper later reported that “many a private was so happy to obtain clothing that he voluntarily added five 
marks to the amount required, to show his thanks to the city.”151 
The impatience of many to change into civilian clothes can also be explained by the fact that, as 
draftees, their identity was not tied to their uniform.  Many had another career to return to, while those who did 
                                                 
146
 Gerhard Hessel, Auf Jahr und Tag, Part 2, Krieg und Nachkrieg, 1942-1952 (1982), 67, Kempowski Archiv No. 277/2. 
 
147
 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 45, 18 Jun 45, NA, RG 498, European Theater Operations Historical Division, 
Program Files, 12th Army Group, Box 7. 
 
148
 “Durchs zwanzigste Jahrhundert,”DTA No. 845. 
 
149
 “Der gescheiterte Zivilist,” SZ, 19 Jan 46. 
 
150
 “Zuschriften aus dem Leserkreis,” RNZ, 10 Nov 45. 
 
151
 “Das Heidelberger Kleideropfer . . . ,” RNZ, 12 Dec 45. 
 
 315 
not were often eager to begin one.152  In fact, for some former soldiers, a uniform merely signified confinement.  
The uniform, Alison Lurie reminds, “is the costume totally determined by others. . . . To put on such livery is to 
give up one’s right to act as an individual. . . . What one does, as well as what one wears, will be determined by 
external authorities.”153  Reporting on their difficulties recruiting border control policemen, MG officials in 
Landkreis Karlsruhe hinted at this issue, noting that local public opinion attributed their troubles partly to “a 
natural desire of returning soldiers to shed uniformed service and the regularity and discipline of police life after 
serving a number of years in the Army.”154   
The mixed reception of returning soldiers may also have fueled a readiness to cast off the outward 
signs of military service.  Public discussions of veterans would eventually adopt a more sympathetic tone, but 
immediately after World War II, many Germans greeted returning soldiers with indifference, even hostility.155  
One veteran alluded to the entire scope of problems facing returning veterans in a commentary in the Stuttgarter 
Zeitung criticizing those who appeared to be unaware that Germany had lost a war.  Identifying himself as 
among those who had nothing to wear but a “tattered uniform,” he recalled recently walking past a well-dressed 
man who had commented to a companion, “There comes another one who can’t bear to part with his uniform.”  
A similar encounter with two females in furs had ended with the younger remarking loudly to her mother, 
“Mama, [I can’t believe] that there are still men who can continue to wear this uniform!”  It should be made 
clear to such people, the writer argued, that many other German closets were empty.156   
For these veterans, the uniform ordinance was less a psychological burden than a material one.  In 
November 1945, the Stuttgarter Zeitung reported receiving numerous letters from worried veterans who could 
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not locate a tailor or dyeing works.157  Six months later, city police informed the Americans that virtually all 
returning POWs complained about the harshness of the prohibition.158 
On the other hand, divesting a uniform of its decorations and insignia was less troublesome.  Allied 
soldiers began this process for German POWs.  And some veterans lost little sleep over bidding good-bye to 
their uniform ornamentation.  Remembering his immediate postwar experiences, one later recalled having 
stripped his uniform of its insignia of rank and “the Hoheitsadler [Nazi eagle] or Pleitegeier [bankruptcy 
vulture], as we sarcastically called it.”159  Some former soldiers expressed their sense of the present value of 
their once highly coveted decorations by simply tossing them into roadside ditches, while others used them as 
currency, trading them for precious commodities such as bread, chocolate, and cigarettes.160  For the Allies, 
German medals and decorations became prized souvenirs—and not just for occupation troops.  James K. 
Pollock, an American university professor integrally involved in re-establishing a functioning German political 
system, sent German medals—including an iron cross—home to his family.161 
If many men were happy to put their war service behind them, not all soldiers were eager to re-
establish themselves as civilians.  Unlike draftees, many officers considered soldiering their profession, not a 
temporary occupation.  They also had a decidedly different postwar experience, facing restrictions on 
organizing, the loss of profession and pensions, and, in some cases, extended captivity.  Decrying the 
“defamation” of the German soldier, professional officers frequently retained a strong sense of group identity. 
162
  As officers, moreover, this group identity had been established partially on the basis of special privileges 
and an elite social position.  Both were now gone.163 
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Evidence of these former officers’ views of the American uniform ordinance is thin.  However, a 
glance at the founding of the Bundeswehr in the mid 1950s is instructive.  A new military necessarily meant 
new uniforms and here two general perspectives emerged which reflected broader reformist and traditionalist 
views of the Bundeswehr.164  In choosing a uniform, former officers working with West German government 
officials intentionally steered clear of anything resembling Wehrmacht attire, selecting designs, in dark gray, 
that more nearly resembled the less formal patterns of the American uniform, with new branch insignia and 
badges of rank.  Recognizing that modern warfare required sober, functional clothes, they also wanted to break 
with the past, keeping in mind, too, the potential reaction of ordinary Germans (many of whom had vocalized 
their “ohne mich” sentiments), skeptical politicians, and Germany’s former enemies.  Postwar developments 
had made clear that outsiders associated the uniforms of the Third Reich with militarism, National Socialism, 
and war.  The outward appearance of the Bundeswehr thus needed to convey a reassuring message consistent 
with the military’s new self-conception as a force of “citizens in uniform.”165  Conversely, for the Germans, the 
uniform should now be viewed as “work clothing.”166 
Not surprisingly, not all officers favored breaking with past tradition.  Many interpreted the reform 
movement as a criticism of the Wehrmacht, an institution they believed had performed both well and honorably; 
accordingly, they favored field gray uniforms and the Stahlhelm (steel helmet).167  Beyond this, they criticized 
the new uniforms, finding them, as did many Germans, to be laughable (certain observers compared the jackets 
to those of mailmen).168  But some officers also had deeper concerns.  Former General Johannes Friessner 
suggested that the uniforms did “not suit a German soldier and appeared unsoldierly,” adding that the design 
would do little to attract recruits.  “Anyone who knows something about the psychological effect of soldiers’ 
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uniforms—even in our unromantic age—will confirm that,” he concluded.169  Earlier, another former general 
had argued “that the new army must have well-tailored and striking uniforms; otherwise a heroic death on the 
battlefield would not be possible.”170  “If one makes the uniform into overalls,” he maintained, “then death on 
the battlefield becomes an industrial accident.”171 
For these officers, the uniform was intimately tied to what it meant to be a soldier.  A uniform 
announced his status, his worth, and, arguably, his heroic manliness.  Elite soldiers did not die in industrial 
accidents.  Stuttgart’s General Hans von Donat made the connection between the uniform and his soldierly 
identity explicit.  Highly active in the veterans’ movement of the 1950s, Donat maintained a “defamation” file 
in which he kept copies of newspaper articles and other items that, in his eyes, demonstrated the maltreatment 
of professional soldiers.  The collection included many cartoons, snipped from the pages of the Neue 
Illustrierte, Münchner Illustrierte, and other publications, which ridiculed the frippery and foibles of military 
officers, most of whom were outfitted in Prussian military splendor.  Arranging the cartoons in sets with cover 
sheets summarizing their themes, Donat also often added captions that provided additional thoughts on a 
cartoon’s meaning.  With spiked helmets puncturing limousine roofs, epaulettes serving as cigar holders, and 
starfish coveted as chest decorations, many, Donat rightly observed, mocked the Prussian officer’s love for 
medals and the absurdity of his over-garnished uniform.  Read one cover sheet: “12 helmet spike cartoons.  
These are supposed to show that soldiers are dumb, conceited, proud, and narrow-minded (borniert).”  Another 
stated: “Officers are dumb, cowardly, and presumptuous.”  Under several cartoons in the latter packet, he typed 
“Disparagement [Herabsetzung] of the Appearance of the Uniform.”172  For Donat, ridiculing the uniform 
meant denigrating the soldier.173  One can only speculate on what he thought of the ban. 
Along with the question of military uniforms, discussions concerning potential rearmament raised the 
issue of Wehrmacht medals.  And, in fact, support for the right of soldiers to again wear their decorations from 
World War II proved substantial.  Not all soldiers had tossed aside their decorations at the war’s conclusion and 
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some now wanted to wear them again.  The question generated considerable debate during the 1950s, with one 
camp arguing that no Wehrmacht medals should be worn, another contending that they should be worn as 
awarded, and still another suggesting that medals should be permitted but without the swastika—recognizing 
service for Germany, rather than the Nazi regime.  In the end, the latter approach won out.174  A 1951 survey 
nevertheless offered an interesting commentary on popular views of Wehrmacht decorations two years after the 
Allies formally ended their occupation.  Of 2,000 people interviewed, approximately half of the men indicated 
that they still had medals or decorations from the Third Reich.  Moreover, some 53 percent of the men and 50 
percent of the women thought that Germans should be allowed to wear their medals and decorations.  Only 28 
percent of the men and 25 percent of the women viewed the omnipresent swastika emblem as an obstacle to 
granting this permission.175  Medals and decorations recognized courage, not politics, respondents argued.  
Soldiers had earned them, and the right to wear them.176 
If contemporary voices are muted, Stuttgart’s General Erich Dommenget hinted at his opinion of all of 
the actions taken by the Allies with respect to uniforms and decorations in a note submitted to Württemberg-
Baden officials in 1947.  When early in the year the Allies demanded the declaration of all war materiel, 
including uniforms and medals, a local announcement led a number of individuals to report their personal 
belongings to German authorities.177  In this context, the 62-year-old general wrote: 
I am informing you with this, that I have in my possession my custom-tailored general’s uniform with 
the bravery decorations [Tapferkeitsauszeichnungen] awarded to me during my 42 years of service.  
The Hoheitsabzeichen of the Third Reich were removed from these.  Also, several medals were taken 
from me by members of the American army after the ending of the hostilities.  I am not in possession 
of other pieces of equipment or weapons.  Because the uniform and medals are my private possessions 
and the former, after being dyed, will serve to supplement my civilian clothing, in my opinion, we are 
not dealing with war materiel.178   
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       While it is possible to infer certain attitudes from comments made later by professional officers, it is 
difficult to assess the extent of any outright resistance to the American ordinance.  American regulations 
prevented German media sources from directly criticizing Allied policies, effectively denying opposing voices a 
forum.  That such views existed, however, cannot be doubted.  Opinion pieces in local newspapers periodically 
condemned the Germans’ long-standing admiration for “the uniform”179—suggesting that there were those who 
still revered it.  Scattered evidence supports this theory as well.  In 1946, for example, American officials 
intercepted a letter in which a Bavarian referenced his decision not to have his field coat dyed.  “I was filled 
with an uncontrollable defiance!” he wrote.  “Just for spite, no!  And I am still wearing that coat now..with the 
same pride with which I formerly wore my uniform.”180  Several years later, after a long visit to Germany, an 
Englishman warned of the dangers posed by older university students, many of whom were former officers.  
“They have known responsibility, power, and the prestige which went with splendid uniforms and batmen,” he 
contended, adding,  
They cannot be other than malcontents in their present abject condition.  As I saw them they were 
indescribably bitter and almost choking with self-pity.  One of them made this very clear when he took 
me to the garret where he slept on an iron bed and studied early German folklore.  He was hungry-
looking and thin; a wretched fellow without hope or affection.  But from under his bed he pulled a tin 
packing case and carefully unfolded his beloved uniform.  “I commanded a tank squadron at Tula,” he 
boasted.  “Now, I am a neurotic student, rotting in a miserable Germany.  I cannot bear it forever.”181  
 
For some, then, undyed, unaltered uniforms could be the focus of defiant, even seemingly revanchist, views.  
But Allied regulations denied them the right to wear uniforms in public.  At the same time, most Germans could 
not afford to preserve unused uniforms under their beds for some glorious day yet to come; instead, they had to 
put them on each morning, even if that meant first dyeing them brown or eventually patching their sleeves.  
Postwar economic conditions ensured that resentment simply could not metastasize around the uniform. 
 
Occupiers in Uniform 
Clearly, getting the Germans out of military uniforms remained a consistent objective of the American 
demilitarization program.  In part this resulted from concerns about the qualities and behavior uniforms 
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encouraged in their wearers, but the Americans also worried about the response uniforms inspired from others.  
American measures were thus also intended to weaken automatic respect and adulation for the uniform.   
However, there were problems associated with this approach.  Although the Americans wanted to 
change German attitudes toward military uniforms, they also counted on using those attitudes to achieve their 
short-term objectives during the occupation.  American military officials had worried about the response U.S. 
troops might elicit from German soldiers if they were not carefully dressed, disciplined, and sufficiently firm in 
handling POWs.  And American wartime policymakers had assumed that the occupiers could use the German 
respect for uniforms to secure deference and obedience, as well as convince the Germans of their defeat.  As 
late as the summer of 1946, when the U.S. moved to civilianize a larger portion of its military government staff, 
the personnel assigned to the 192 liaison and security offices dispersed throughout the American zone remained 
military, according to Earl Ziemke, “for the psychological effect of the uniform.”182   
Perhaps predictably, given these conflicting intentions, the uniformed Americans did not always 
generate the response they had hoped for in dealing with the Germans, though their uniforms nevertheless 
played a role in the reeducation process.  Even as some Germans criticized American troops for their 
inadequacies, others evaluated them positively precisely because they lacked the correctness and rigid attention 
to hierarchy characteristic of their German equivalents. 
Certainly, most Germans obeyed the Americans.  The absence of major incidents of resistance or 
violence and the daily execution of American orders by German officials suggested a widespread respect for 
American military authority.  What is more difficult to assess is what role, if any, American uniforms played in 
this process.  A soldier’s identity as a member of the U.S. armed forces, his role as a representative of the 
victorious military power, his authority by virtue of this status, and his uniform were so tightly interconnected 
as to be almost indistinguishable.  The uniform was an indicator of a certain association.  American officials 
acknowledged this in their stringent enforcement of regulations issued in 1945 forbidding anyone but authorized 
Americans to wear undyed U.S. Army clothing.183  And the uniform obviously served as an indicator of 
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authority.  But its potency was derived from its relationship to the authoritative American position as a whole.   
In this instance, speaking English may have served as an equally effective spur to obedience  
Some contemporary German observers nevertheless did maintain that German respect for “the 
uniform” played a role in the ready submission of their fellow citizens to the commands of their occupiers.184  
And Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, assistant chief of staff for army intelligence, U.S. Forces, European 
Theater, offered a comparable assessment of the Germans in early 1946.  Noting that they regularly turned up at 
various military government headquarters to report accidents, lodge complaints, or recommend improvements, 
he asserted, “None of them would think of going to their own police or to their own Buergermeister; instead 
they go to the men with power, the men in uniform who carry guns and must, therefore, be right about 
everything.”185   
More easily identified than motives for obedience or deference were German perspectives concerning 
the outward appearance of American troops.  Here, many saw military dress as closely linked with military 
conduct.  And just as American analyses of German reactions to U.S. troops reveal certain presuppositions 
about the nature of their enemies, German appraisals of American uniforms could simultaneously shed light on 
their views of their own armed forces. 
As U.S. military officials had worried, some Germans were scornful of the appearance of American 
troops or sneered at American pretensions to soldiering.  Retired James M. Gavin, who as a major general 
commanded the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division while still in his late 30s, later described an incident that occurred 
in Germany during the final days of the war.  “I was standing near the curb of a main street intersection, 
wearing a parachute jumpsuit faded from three years of war, carrying an M-1 rifle over my shoulder, looking 
like any other GI in the 82nd, except for the two stars on my collar and helmet,” he remembered.  At that point, 
he was informed him that a German general was trying to find the American general in charge.  Recalled Gavin:  
He arrived, rather haughtily I thought, and a bit threadbare, but otherwise impeccably attired in the 
field gray uniform of the Wehrmacht.  It was set off by the red collar tabs and insignia of a general and 
an Iron Cross dangled at his throat.  When told that I was the American general, he looked at me with 
some disdain, saying that I couldn’t be; I was too young and did not look like a general to him.186 
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Considering the issue of American troops more generally, Julian Bach, a journalist who had spent 
more than two years with the U.S. Army in Europe, wrote in early 1946 of two types of German attitudes.  
Those Germans “with strong Nazi traits, convinced that Germany lost the war only because of inferiority in 
numbers and equipment, take vicarious pleasure in stressing the ‘sloppiness’ and ‘poor discipline’ of American 
troops,” he reported.  To Bach, this made sense.  “Since the ideal soldier of these Germans would naturally 
goosestep, or at least strut, the American, slouching along with his hands in pockets and his field jacket undone, 
confirms in their minds the excellence of the German soldier.”187  A young woman working as a MG interpreter 
in Karlsruhe during the summer of 1945 seemed to exemplify this perspective.  Critical of the way American 
soldiers treated German women—as if all of them were as loose as those who gave themselves freely to the 
occupying troops—she had compared their behavior negatively with that of German soldiers.  According to 
local U.S. officials, she had argued that “we know that man for man there is no better soldier in the world” and 
insisted that the Germans had simply been defeated by superior equipment and numbers.  While American men 
insulted German women, German troops wherever they were located had been “courageous, respectful, well 
mannered . . . and much better disciplined.”188 
Bach also identified a contrasting viewpoint, however, one that similarly factored the appearance of 
American uniforms into an appraisal of the U.S. armed forces.  “Older Germans, with more elasticity of 
thought, tend to gloss over the ‘sloppiness’ and emphasize the good-naturedness of Americans and the 
informality (to a German) of relationships between American officers and men,” Bach indicated.  “They are 
impressed with the fact that privates rarely come to attention when speaking to officers, that men receive the 
same medical care as officers (which was not the case in the Wehrmacht), that the officers’ field uniform is 
identical with that of the men, and finally that the U.S. Army uniform is cut on the lines of a regular civilian 
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suit.”189  Sociologist Nathan Joseph has noted that “in the dress of officers, especially those of high rank who 
have greater leeway, either of two tendencies may be given primacy—status emphasis and separation, or 
identification and integration.”190   While most Germans were used to the former, the Americans generally 
exhibited the latter.   
Germans might thus receive the Americans as figures of authority, identifying them as members of the 
victorious occupying army, but American military uniforms did not necessarily lead them to equate American 
GIs with their own soldiers—nor would American soldiers necessarily generate the same emotional or 
behavioral response (Figures 1-8).  In fact, at least one observer suggested U.S. troops were not even wearing 
uniforms.  Writing of the Americans he encountered in Munich, Victor Klemperer concluded that in their dress 
and conduct, they bore little resemblance to the military men familiar to many Germans. 
Apart from [their tendency to race through the rubble-strewn streets of the city in cars while all 
Germans are forced to walk], the Americans make neither a vindictive nor an arrogant impression.   
They are not soldiers in the Prussian sense at all.  They do not wear uniforms, but overalls or overall-
like combinations of high trousers and blouse all in gray-green; they do not carry a bayonet, only a 
short rifle or a long revolver ready at hand; the steel helmet is worn as comfortably as a hat, pushed 
forward or back, as it suits them. . . . I have not seen even the smallest group marching: they all drive. . 
. .
191
 
 
Heinrich Köhler, former Center Party Reichstag representative, (briefly) Minister of Finance in the 
Weimar Republic, and later president of the Landesbezirk Baden, similarly recorded his early impressions of 
U.S. soldiers, writing in late April 1945 in a small village in Baden.  Overall, they gave a very good impression, 
he admitted.  “Certainly, one saw little of Prussian militarism and the amalgamation of courage, perfect posture, 
and spit-and-polish associated with it that has become second nature to us,”192 he observed.  “There was no 
heel-clicking in front of Herr Non-Commissioned Officer, no snappy salute or similar; in fact, one really had to 
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take pains to distinguish between superior and subordinate in their conduct.  These were civilians who waged 
war and attached no great importance to denying this.”193 
 Köhler’s perception of American soldiers as civilians waging war was echoed by others.  In April 
1946, a Dr. Gerhard Starke explored this idea explicitly in the Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung.  He began by quoting a 
recent speech of Secretary of State James Byrnes in which Byrnes had argued that Americans were a nation of 
“freedom-loving citizens, not soldiers,” emphasizing that despite their resounding victories in Germany and 
Japan, American soldiers remained civilians at heart.  Starke then went on to note that Germans previously had 
known little about American soldiers, and what the Nazis had shown them of U.S. troops made the Americans 
appear much like German soldiers—uniforms, standing at attention, marching.  But the differences became 
clear once they arrived in Germany.  “And now this discovery. . . . In spite of everything, they had remained 
civilians and did not want to ever be anything else.  Here were young men who viewed being a soldier 
[Soldatentum] differently than we had been taught, without appearing as weaklings because of this.”  Asked 
Starke: 
Before, could we connect the idea of being a soldier [“Soldatsein”] with an absolute requirement for 
respect for the individual, with no restrictions on having one’s own opinion, born of knowledge and 
deliberation, with overall critical intellect [Verstand] and cool soberness?  An understanding slowly 
dawned of that which was at first incomprehensible: how the young men from over there could 
forthrightly declare how gladly they take off the uniform, how wistfully they await their return home, 
their profession, their studies—in short, await doing something useful [etwas Vernünftiges].  No 
enthusiastic praise for the craft of war, which, in their eyes, is only a bitter necessity to ensure a future 
for themselves in civilian clothes. . . .  
 
Pondering why German and American youth had turned out so differently, Starke laid the blame on Germany’s 
historical evolution—the unsettled political conditions and other obstacles which had turned youthful idealism 
and willingness to act in the wrong direction.  Byrnes’ words, he concluded, illuminated something that, in the 
months American soldiers had occupied Germany, the Germans had already clearly felt.194 
This “feeling” on the part of the Germans had a notable consequence as well, in that the American 
military’s desire to improve the discipline, polish, and overall presentation of its occupation forces could 
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actually work against its fundamental objectives.  In July 1945, American information control authorities in 
Heidelberg commented that it had been one of the U.S. army’s “strongest assets . . . in the eyes of the observant 
public that it is truly an ‘Army of civilians.’”  The German people, “for the most part tired of German 
militarism, thought very highly of the unstrained relations between American officers and men, between the 
various enlisted ranks, and of the genial, at times even lax manners in which the American soldier performs his 
duties.”  The recent arrival of the headquarters of the U.S. Seventh Army had thus given rise to comment.  “A 
certain ‘militarism’ which was imposed on American soldiers in the Heidelberg area . . . did not escape the 
watchful eyes of the public,” they reported.  “Strict enforcement of the exchange of the salute regulations, signs 
at various places of entertainment ‘For Officers Only’ and the like, have caused many people to remark: ‘Well, 
we thought it was different in the American Army, but apparently all armies are alike.  I always pitied the poor 
Landser [private]!’”195 
Starke’s article some nine months later hinted that this reprobation was not necessarily a lingering one.  
The report nevertheless underscored both the ambiguity of the American position and the challenges of 
employing military uniforms and proper military behavior as tools of reeducation when not all Germans 
interpreted uniforms and military conduct the same.  The fact that the dress and behavior of American troops 
led some Germans to consider the possibility of a different type of relationship between a uniform, the soldier 
wearing it, and his overall role in a military hierarchy was no doubt welcomed by many American officials.  
Their assessment of the means by which this was sometimes accomplished was probably less enthusiastic. 
 
Interpreting the Uniform 
Perhaps predictably, given these conflicting If some Germans concluded that, despite their uniforms, 
American soldiers were quite unlike Wehrmacht troops, there were also Germans who perceived their own 
soldiers differently in the absence of medals and uniforms.  Helene S., then sixteen, was among them.  Shortly 
after her town fell to the Americans, she was already struggling to make sense of her feelings regarding the end 
of the war and the collapse of her beloved Reich, when her friend Alfons, an “almost gentle” young man who 
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previously had manned a nearby anti-aircraft artillery position, appeared at her home.  Pleased to see him again, 
she was also unsettled. 
He smiled and shook our hands, as if everything was as it had been before.  If it had not been for those 
clothes he wore.  A pair of pants and jacket that were at least two sizes too large, and with nothing on 
his head.  It was the latter, probably, the sight of his bareheadedness, that produced a surge of pity in 
me. 
 . . . . I was glad and relieved to see him standing before me so healthy.  “Alfons without cap,” went 
through my head, “exposed, debased, perhaps somewhat shamefacedly helpless” [etwas schamhaft 
hilflos].  At that moment I believed I saw him suffering from this. 
 Alfons always liked to wear his high soldier’s cap, probably because it was very attractive on him, or 
made him look so manly, or only because of his thinning hair.  Uniforms lend a certain dignity 
[Würde] and often command respect. 
 And there he now stood before me, so “without” in this miserable clothing, a pitiful figure bereft of 
this dignity. . . . 
 
She subsequently learned that after Alfons’s best friend had died at his side, he had turned tail and run 
until he found shelter and civilian clothing on a nearby farm.  A later visit revealed that Alfons, formerly an 
enthusiastic soldier, no longer believed in German victory.  “With the discarding of the uniform, the fighting 
spirit and the whole devotion to the Fatherland must also have left him,” she concluded.  “He had become a 
civilian.  It appeared as if the discarded clothing had allowed another person to become visible, as if a magic 
spell had become powerless.”196  
If Helene S. saw in the removal of a uniform the end of counterfeit masculinity, misplaced self-
assurance, and unwarranted faith in victory, newspapers illuminated the diminution of once formidable men in 
covering the initial Nuremberg war crimes trial.  The Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung’s Kurt Fried, for example, 
summed up General Alfred Jodl in a sentence: “Without decorations, at most a staff sergeant.”197  “Horrific is 
the impression one receives from [Field Marshal Wilhelm] Keitel,” wrote Walter Schwerdtfeger,198 publisher of 
the Badische Neueste Nachrichten, in a similar vein.  “Now, without the glamour of the uniform and medals, 
without the always lieutenant-like, slightly tilted cap, without the accustomed arrogant expression, which has 
been replaced by sullen rage, he appears staggeringly empty.  It is incomprehensible that this man of 
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unintellectual physiognomy could year after year be the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht.”199  
Schwerdtfeger’s newspaper later emphasized the visual deceptiveness of uniforms using a graphic depicting a 
small-shouldered man with a slightly protruding stomach, long arms, and big hands, wearing non-descript pants 
and shirt, standing next to a clothes stand bearing an officer’s cap and uniform jacket, the latter bedecked with 
arm bands, collar patches, lanyard, iron cross, ribbons, and medals.  Below it stood a poem: “Ach, a good many 
of these ‘greats’/one sees them in underwear/they were not at all heroes/so passes away the fame of the 
world!”200 
By the late 1940s, the dominant image of the German uniform was the ragged, naked version worn by 
veterans (Figures 7-8).  Far from exuding power and manliness, uniforms now undoubtedly contributed to 
contemporary perceptions of masculine weakness and impotence that have led scholars to identify a “crisis of 
masculinity” in the immediate postwar years.201  Once dressed in tight-fitting, smartly decorated attire, soldiers 
were now trapped in dyed fabric that hung loosely on undernourished bodies.202  Uniforms became textiles, 
divested of their power through transformation into work clothes, house-cleaning attire, and gardening 
outfits.203  Field gray lost its belligerence, no longer the color of military authority but of skirts embroidered 
with flowers, 204 dolls for DP children, and slippers with floppy bunny ears.  One reason uniforms could still be 
seen in Germany in 1947, suggested the New York Times’ McLaughlin, was a “recognition of the loss of 
prestige these faded trappings have undergone with the civilian population” which made their presence less 
worrisome.205 
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Significantly, the Americans clearly were not alone in identifying and actively working to destroy the 
power of the uniform.  In a September 1945 memo to local MG officials arguing against early elections, one 
Landrat criticized the Germans as “a people adoring the uniform by prime instinct, to whom war and conquest 
mean its main substance of life.”206  Public complaints regarding German youngsters wearing even non-military 
uniforms suggested some sensitivity on the issue as well.  Moreover, in letters and commentaries, prominent 
newspapers intermittently condemned the Germans’ traditional uniform worship, shared stories revealing the 
silliness of automatic obedience to uniformed authority, and pointed to the destructive role the uniform had 
played in German society.207 
In the Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung, one veteran argued at the end of a series of critical articles on his 
wartime experiences that clothes did not make the man.  “Get away from the external trinkets and fuss,” he 
implored,  
we finally want to see men!  Men who don’t lose their breath when confronted with braid and lacings 
and who don’t get wrapped up in performing bows.  The system that we buried under the salvo of 
enemy guns taught us, . . . that the salute, the greeting, on the execution of which so much importance 
was placed, was meant not for the person, the wearer of the uniform, but for the uniform itself.  That 
spoke—subjectively and objectively—volumes about the estimation [Einschätzung] of the person.208 
 
Writing in September 1946, the former soldier clearly was not certain the Germans had learned this lesson yet.  
And even while sometimes agreeing with McLaughlin that the uniform no longer enjoyed its former prestige, 
observers would continue to express this concern during the years that followed.209   
That present conditions might nevertheless go a long way toward permanently changing attitudes was 
suggested in a June 1946 commentary in the Stuttgarter Zeitung.  After recounting his experiences in Russian 
and British custody, a veteran recalled reading about a Munich merchant who had created women’s belts from 
non-commissioned officer’s braiding and shopping bags that “looked like corporals with officer’s caps” using 
military stripes on the bags and cording for handles.  The writer had been reminded of being overcome by an 
overwhelming sense of freedom upon seeing, in a POW camp, soldiers cooking soup in Stahlhelme laid across 
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grills constructed from carbine barrels.  “The false gods were fallen,” he had marveled, “the sinister, 
irresponsible, cruel, impersonal power over life and death lay shattered on the ground, the regalia, with which 
they celebrated their bloody festivals, again had profane duties, were once again metal, in the form of pots and 
grills, and those they had revealed were again men, no longer the submissive [willenlos] and glassy-eyed [starr] 
servants of that power.”  Steel helmets now had mundane duties, and women filled be-ribboned shopping bags 
with radishes, lettuce, and bread, without once standing at attention—and this, when formerly soldiers might be 
punished for smoking while wearing their helmet and a uniform had had its own independent powers, quite 
apart from the person who wore it.  “Millions of graves cover the earth of Europe,” he concluded,  
and it appears that millions of those gold and silver braids and stars are still here.  But now they are 
used for shopping bags and women’s belts.  Perhaps it is better this way, better than that an all-
encompassing “away with them!” removed them from our eyes.  It is good to see them still another 
couple of years and to think about them.  Sic transit Gloria mundi.  Gloria?  Sic transit vanitatum 
vanitas.”210 
 
Conclusions 
In listing the uniform ordinance among the assorted Allied measures designed to psychologically 
disarm the German people, historians often recall the words of a British journalist who quipped: “It’s dye or 
die.”  Implying that the Allies threatened the Germans with death for violating a dress code, use of the quote 
often suggests disapproval or incredulity at excessive Allied zeal.211  Pithy and clever, the quip was also 
essentially inaccurate, however, at least for the American Zone.  Although several laws addressed uniforms, and 
thus former officers who wore uniforms within the context of a paramilitary group meeting might have suffered 
severely, the well-publicized, operative military government ordinance concerning uniforms specifically 
excluded violators from punishment by death.  The Americans, furthermore, were committed, but also lenient.   
Perhaps more pertinent, then, is the question of the excessiveness of the ordinance, which also 
ultimately revolves around the issue of its necessity.  The uniform regulation, more than any other American 
demilitarization measure, had the potential to touch every German.  Adding to everyday anxieties, it increased 
the burdens of local officials who had to divert scarce coal supplies and expend valuable staff time addressing a 
now even more worrisome clothing situation.  Clothing shortages, moreover, were already forcing a change in 
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the outward appearance and, thus, the connotations of “the uniform.”  In fact, they were one among a variety of 
influences contributing to its condemnation, quite apart from American initiatives.  Soldiers, officers, 
newspaper commentators, and ordinary people were ready to set aside uniforms for what they stood for—
whether unwanted discipline, a war that never had or no longer seemed glorious, defeat and humiliation, 
Germany’s fateful militarism, Allied condemnation, or false courage, discredited values, and tragic docility and 
submission.  For most soldiers, a forced exodus from their uniform was considered liberation, rather than 
humiliation.   
Yet evidence also suggests that others were less accepting of the ordinance, and there were those for 
whom a uniform retained a great deal of meaning.  Even German observers understood that ornamented 
uniforms shaped perceptions of military men.  And uniforms and medals had negatively influenced Germany in 
the past, newspaper commentators reminded—this was a lesson that needed to be learned.  Permanently.   
Given prevailing economic conditions, it seems unlikely that even German officials critical of German 
militarism and uniform worship would have channeled their sentiments into dress restrictions.  Instead, it was 
left to the Americans to insist that military braid assume a new functional, rather than symbolic, role and to help 
ensure that field gray evolved into new shapes and that ragged uniforms with wilted collars changed color, even 
as American soldiers modeled a new kind of relationship between a soldier and his uniform. 
The American measures thus nurtured a strong indigenous process.  At the same time, the severe 
clothing shortages actually magnified the ordinance’s effectiveness in attaining its ultimate objectives.  Added 
to the dismal economic conditions and the emotional battering many Germans had recently suffered, the 
uniform order helped change the visual landscape of Germany and the connotations of “the uniform.” 
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Fig. 3 – Captured German offices, Paris, France, August 1944.  (Credit: U.S. National Archives) 
 
Fig. 2 – Captured German general, France.            
(Credit: U.S. National Archives, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library) 
 
 
Fig. 1 – Lt. General George Patton, U.S. Third 
Army commander, pins the Silver Star on an 
American private, France, October 1944.                             
(Credit: U.S. National Archives) 
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Fig. 6 – An American GI with captured German soldiers, Germany, April 1945.                     
(Credit: U.S. National Archives) 
 
Fig. 5 – American GIs with Nazi flag, France, August 1944.                 
(Credit: U.S. National Archives) 
 
Fig. 4 – General Henry “Hap” Arnold, Commanding 
General, U.S. Army Air Forces, with his staff at the Potsdam 
Conference, July 1945.  (Credit: U.S. National Archives, Harry S. 
Truman Library) 
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Fig. 8 – Captured German troops, Aachen, Germany, October 1944.                   
(Credit: U.S. National Archives) 
 
  
Fig. 7 – German troops parade through Warsaw, Poland,          
September 1939.  (Credit: U.S. National Archives) 
                                                               
  
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
EXPURGATION 
 
 
Writing to colleagues in late 1945, General Robert Harper, director of OMGUS’s Armed Forces 
Division, assessed the scope of the American demilitarization program.  “The task of demilitarizing the 
Germans reaches into every field of human endeavor,” he argued.  Referring specifically to the “field of 
spiritual and intellectual demilitarization,” Harper added that “literature, symbolism, perpetuation of traditions 
and every kind of military study and training” were “all factors in the problem of uprooting militarism in 
Germany.”1  Even for Harper, a career military officer, “demilitarization” involved much more than destroying 
Germany’s military infrastructure, shutting down its war industries, shunting its soldiers into new careers, and 
negating the influence of militarists who had pressed for the Wehrmacht’s expansion, glorification, and use.  
From the outset, American policymakers had maintained that permanently demilitarizing Germany and thereby 
ensuring world security would require “striking at the roots of German militarism,” as the New York Times put 
it, in German culture.2   
While eventually encouraging new ideas and practices, American efforts to eradicate the sources and 
manifestations of militarism in German culture began with prohibitions, removals, and confiscations.  Banning 
the wearing of uniforms was a key step in this process.  But the Americans did not hesitate to cut even deeper, 
targeting rituals, material culture, and intellectual life.  Specifically, they banned saluting, flags, and parades; 
demanded changes in street signs, monuments, and museums; and ordered the removal of militaristic books 
from bookshops and libraries. 
Producing discernible results, these exercises in excision nevertheless suffered from some of the same 
ailments plaguing other American initiatives.  If uniformed occupiers sometimes had trouble demystifying the 
German uniform, the parading conquerors’ ban on German marching similarly highlighted the very thin line 
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between demilitarization and remilitarization.  And if identifying “militarists” was problematic, determining 
what made a monument “militaristic” could be equally perplexing.   
But these measures also brought with them entirely new challenges.  Central to the cultural dimension 
of the demilitarization program was the problem of drawing boundaries.  What, specifically, was harmful in the 
German cultural environment?  Certain types of objects?  Their messages?  How they were used?  Their dates 
of origin?  Their national character?  More fundamental, still, was a question that was virtually impossible to 
answer: How could one be sure removals and confiscations would not do more harm than good?  In some cases 
ignoring or failing to perceive the complexity and potential hazards of their demilitarization agenda, the 
Americans also disagreed on how to proceed.  In addition, policymakers could not always count on the vigilant 
support of those who carried out and enforced their decisions. 
Differences of opinion evident within the occupation administration, moreover, were more than 
matched by divisions among the Germans.  American cultural excision initiatives thus not only claimed 
valuable German resources and time, but also influenced an internal German conversation concerning the scope 
of environmental cleansing required to help propel postwar Germany in a new direction. 
 
Flags, Salutes, and Marching 
“A baseball diamond has been cut in the turf of the great stadium where Nazi party minions used to 
strut before their Fuehrer,” wrote Raymond Daniell in the New York Times in late June 1945, describing 
conditions in Nuremberg, the Franconian city that had once been home to Nazi Party gatherings staged on a 
monumental scale.  American ordnance officers, Daniell continued, were using another enormous stadium 
“where Adolf Hitler was wont to rail and rant against the inequities of Versailles” to store “captured remnants 
of the broken war machine.”  The American army had also converted into a supply dump an esplanade 
alongside a nearby lake “where the SS in their black uniforms, with skull and crossbones on their hats, marched 
at party rallies in the heyday of nazism.”3  The vast spaces and immense architecture so integral to Nazi Party 
pageantry, the imposing backdrop to blocks of “Sieg Heil”-ing spectators and the relentless advancing rows of 
uniformed men, he made clear, had now been reduced to venues for American sporting events and storage 
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facilities for the detritus of the Third Reich.  Juxtaposing images of Nazi Germany’s ascendancy with images of 
American domination, Daniell underscored the magnitude of Germany’s defeat.   
That American policymakers also considered German saluting, flags, and parades to be offensive and 
threatening is hardly a surprise.  Nor is the fact that they chose to deal with the problem through a layering of 
directives and laws that inverted the meaning of some practices and attempted to eliminate others.  Where JCS 
1067 prohibited the public display of national and Nazi flags and banned all types of parades, SHAEF military 
courtesy regulations prohibited most salutes and demanded that respect be shown toward Allied flags.4  The 
July 1945 omnibus U.S. military government law addressing military training soon banned “the use of military 
or Nazi . . . flags, banners or tokens and the employment of distinctive Nazi or military salutes, gestures or 
greetings” and also outlawed “all civil or military parades and all military formations of any character . .  . 
except in so far as expressly permitted by authority of the Military Government.”5  And in late November 1945, 
at the impetus of the Americans, the ACC issued Law No. 8, which contained language on saluting, flags, and 
parades nearly identical to the U.S. law.6 
Overall, the American approach to flags in Germany was two-pronged.  On one hand, regulations 
specifically required German men to remove their hats and to come to attention when they were passed by a 
flag belonging to any of the Allies (and to remove their hats even when merely passing these flags) or when the 
American national anthem, or equivalent Allied music, was played during ceremonies.  On the other, they 
barred the display of German military and Nazi flags and the playing of German military music and anthems.7  
During the earliest days of the occupation, the Americans distributed posters informing the Germans of 
the conduct expected of them toward U.S. flags and anthems.8  How conscientious they were in holding the 
Germans to this standard is difficult to assess, however.  One MG official later reported that when the 
Americans took over Karlsruhe from the French in mid July 1945, city residents had appreciated their more 
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relaxed approach, including the fact that they did not require civilians to remove their hats when passing the 
flag of the occupying country.9  Moreover, in late June 1945, U.S. Army instructions urged caution in 
publicizing the SHAEF regulations.  The requirements were not to be unduly emphasized or “too rigid an 
enforcement threatened” where the terms could not be easily policed.  Although the instructions suggested that 
German policemen might be enlisted to help enforce the rules, in stating that German civilians could be 
prosecuted by a military government court for “provocative or concerted action . . . in public in disregard of the 
rules,” they also implied that most violations should not be severely penalized.10  
Still, repeated notices in German publications show that the Americans, if not religiously monitoring 
German behavior, continued to formally insist on adherence to the rules.  They also confirm that some Germans 
either ignored those rules or defiantly refused to obey them.11  In June 1947, Heidelberg city officials noted that 
most of the male spectators at a recent parade had greeted the approach of the U.S. flag and military pennants 
respectfully.12  But the Americans could not count on such conduct.  In March 1946, a front-page notice in 
Ulm’s official gazette reprimanded local men for not responding as the MG had instructed when American flags 
were raised or lowered or carried in parades.  Reminding that this conduct showed deference to the flag and 
honored the fallen, it warned that henceforth those who disobeyed would face legal action.13  Some six weeks 
later, newspapers in Heidelberg and Ulm carried a statement from American MG headquarters which, citing 
widespread noncompliance, stressed that the Germans needed to show due respect to the U.S. flag and national 
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anthem just as American civilians did.14  In May 1947 and again a year later, Heidelberg’s official gazette 
reminded its readers, once more, of the behavior expected of them.15 
Pressed to show respect to the stars and stripes, the German people could not display their own military 
or Nazi flags (which, at the time, included the official German national flag).  While some Germans perhaps hid 
or destroyed their flags, others, as with military uniforms, treated them as textiles, using the fabric for red 
tailored skirts or, later, for flags representing their new democratic government.16  Allied soldiers also eagerly 
appropriated them as souvenirs.  Most German flags, the New York Times’ Kathleen McLaughlin suggested in 
January 1947, “long since have been carried out of Germany in the luggage of homebound soldiers of various 
nations and now decorate dens and bedrooms across the world.”  She added that at U.S. Army headquarters in 
Frankfurt, which normally assumed custody of such items, “nobody cares.”  It was “one less headache for the 
staff to handle, and the official attitude is that in American Legion clubrooms and their equivalents in England, 
France and Australia they probably look good.”  Brigadier General Robert McClure, head of OMGUS’s 
Information Control Division, had still another use for a Nazi flag.  Visitors to his conference room found 
themselves offered seats on a sofa with an unusual covering: “a huge scarlet swastika flag,”17  McClure thus 
effectively turned upside down regulations describing the respect U.S. officers were to accord the American 
flag, which was “under no circumstances” to be draped across chairs or benches or to have anything placed 
upon it.18 
Some Germans asked local MG officers for authorization to use flags and banners for specific 
purposes.  Clubs, for example, requested permission to carry banners in funeral processions, as was traditional 
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for them.19  The Americans apparently allowed this, at least occasionally,20 although as late as March 1948, the 
Badischer Sängerbund (Badenese Singing League) was informing its members that, per military government 
orders, they might not march to burial sites with banners unfurled.  Flags and banners should instead only be 
displayed at the cemetery.21  In mid 1947, Land MG officials also reported receiving a growing number of 
requests from youth groups that wanted to “march and carry banners,” usually “in their sports uniforms with 
some form of flag or pennant being carried by their leaders.”22  By then, education officials were stipulating that 
youth groups might “display distinctive banners or flags known to be part of their established paraphernalia” 
when the group was licensed by the MG, but that any new banners or flags introduced later required specific 
American approval.23  More significantly, in late 1946 the Land MG authorized the Germans to fly the red, 
black, and gold flag specified in the recently approved Württemberg-Baden constitution as the Land’s new 
official flag.24  “For the people of Stuttgart,” reported the city MG office in late November, “the most important 
event of the week was to see their flag flying from the Tagblatt-Building on Monday morning.  It was noted that 
considerable pride was expressed by the population and they seriously feel they have earned this privilege.”25 
If American rules concerning flags were not particularly popular, they apparently caused little 
controversy in official circles.  The same could not be said for Allied regulations on saluting.  Here, uncertainty 
regarding official MG policy caused confusion locally, while at OMGUS headquarters, American officials 
disagreed not only with the practices of some local MG officers, but with those of their allies as well.   
Developments in Heidelberg, in particular, shed light on problems associated with the saluting 
regulations.  In mid September 1946, the city’s top MG officer complained to lord mayor Dr. Hugo Swart about 
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the behavior of special policemen posted outside of his residence, demanding, among other things, that the men 
stop saluting.  Allied Control Council regulations specifically barred the use of “any type of military hand 
salute,” he pointed out, and then suggested that Swart “have this practice stopped immediately in all 
organizations within the city administration.”26  The American officer’s letter raised some questions about the 
exact scope of the ban on saluting, however.  Notifying Swart that city police officials had been instructed not 
to salute Allied military personnel, Heidelberg’s police director added that he did not think the American’s 
directive pertained to the salute city policemen employed amongst themselves.27  The director also met with the 
local MG public safety officer and subsequently reported that this officer did not object to Heidelberg 
policemen greeting one another with salutes that involved placing their right hands on their service caps, as was 
currently standard practice.  The public safety officer merely refused to let them salute members of the 
occupation forces in this fashion.28   
But Swart was still concerned, his doubts fed by a recent newspaper article regarding the Hessian city 
of Kassel that described a MG ban on the use by its police of any kind of military salute and the new greeting—
a “slight bow”—introduced by local officials as a replacement.  A week later, Swart contacted the lord mayors 
of Stuttgart and Karlsruhe, asking about police greeting practices in their cities and whether they knew of any 
specific instructions from the Land Interior Ministry on the issue.  Heidelberg officials did not, he noted, though 
he had not yet approached the ministry itself.29 
Officials from both cities reported that their police forces currently used the hand salute with the 
blessing of local MG public safety officers.  The head of Stuttgart’s police explained that an American official 
had, in fact, issued a directive forbidding the police to use military salutes.  However, the German opinion that 
the salute being used was not a military salute was “silently tolerated and thus allowed” by the Americans.  The 
Stuttgart official added that in referring to a “military salute” he believed the occupiers really were referring to 
the standing at attention and the “so-called snappy style” (sogenannte zackige Ausführung) of the salute.  The 
“civil servant type” (beamtemässig) of salute currently employed was both practical and appropriate to 
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enhancing the discipline of a “uniformed troop.”  A greeting involving a “slight nodding of the head” was 
“neither practical nor desirable,” he maintained, and suggested that the MG authorities may have conceded this 
point as well.  He also advised against raising the issue of the police greeting officially.30 
Karlsruhe’s lord mayor Hermann Veit indicated that his city had likewise received no specific 
instructions.  Military government regulations governing the German police prohibited military salutes, he 
noted, but the MG public safety officers posted to Karlsruhe—and there had been several—had held diverse 
views on the issue.  And all had “let themselves be convinced . . . that it was indispensable to the preservation of 
discipline to demand a salute from police officials.”  Conversely, they had banned the saluting of American 
officers.  “Equally objectionable,” he added, “is a flamboyant [auffällig] coming to attention.”  According to 
Veit, Karlsruhe’s top police official had specified that, when standing, the city’s policemen should greet their 
superiors by standing up straight and looking at them.  When moving, they were to greet their superiors by 
standing upright, looking at them, and raising their right hand to their cap, “in a civilian way briefly and 
casually.”  In both cases, it was also permitted to slightly nod the head and offer a greeting—“Good morning, 
Herr Kommissar…”—as was typical in civilian life.31 
At this point, Swart evidently let the matter rest until, in mid 1947, Land police officials complicated 
the situation by asking Land MG public safety authorities whether there were any concerns about German 
policemen employing a hand salute.  When the MG officials objected, indicating that they did not want German 
policemen to use military gestures and wished to avoid any appearance of militarism, the Land’s Interior 
Ministry spread the word.32  This led Swart to complain to North Baden officials that the new instructions 
directly contradicted those of the local MG which permitted city policemen to greet civilians with salutes that, 
in Heidelberg, were “in no way carried out in a military or militaristic style.”  Swart asked, too, how the police 
were now to show respect—a requirement, he added, that, to his knowledge, had not yet been abolished.  “Shall 
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the police take off their caps or greet local residents and their superiors with a polite bow and a friendly smile?”  
Or were they to do something else?33  
In January 1948, North Baden officials notified Swart that representatives from the Interior Ministry 
had spoken with the MG about the matter more than once, but that the Americans would not relent.34  In 
response to further prompting from Swart regarding a substitute greeting, they reported in May that the ministry 
was working to achieve a uniform regulation for the entire U.S. Zone.35  No further references to the issue 
appeared in the Heidelberg police files.  However, in December, OMGUS’s chief of public safety complained 
to the heads of all of the American Land MGs that some German police organizations apparently wrongly 
believed that MG restrictions on saluting had been relaxed or rescinded.   This, he stated, was not true, and they 
should be so informed.36 
In fact, at the very time Swart was seeking clarification of American saluting regulations, OMGUS 
officials in Berlin had been confirming their policy in a conflict with their allies.  In August 1946, the Armed 
Forces Division staff had grown concerned about German police in the U.S. sector of Berlin who were saluting 
Allied officers and, upon investigation, discovered that American officials had authorized this conduct because 
members of the police served in all four sectors and the other three powers all permitted saluting.37  Considering 
military salutes a violation of both ACC Law No. 8, which banned the “employment of distinctive Nazi or 
military salutes or greetings,” and an ACC proclamation outlawing “military training, military propaganda, and 
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military activities of whatever nature,” they sparked a discussion of the issue within the ACA’s Internal Affairs 
and Communications (IAC) Directorate.38 
The Americans, these talks showed, had a unique perspective.  To the British, French, and Soviets, the 
hand salute was not a military gesture but a deferential greeting.  The British, one of their delegates noted, 
believed that the German police should be “compelled to show some mark of respect to allied officers and their 
superiors” and the only suitable gesture was a hand salute.  This did not mean the British were not committed to 
demilitarization.  “I would stress,” said the delegate, “that the English policeman, who is the most peaceful 
creature and wears the most ordinary unmilitary type of clothes and carries no weapons, does on occasion adopt 
the hand salute.”  The delegate was also convinced that if the Allies tried to outlaw the practice they would be 
criticized for “going beyond the bounds of common sense in imposing demilitarization measures upon the 
German people.”  The French, too, insisted that saluting was absolutely necessary as a sign of respect.  
Recruiting choices were more important for demilitarizing the police, suggested one French representative,39 
while a Soviet argued that it was more critical to refuse to arm the police.40  The bottom line, all three powers 
agreed, was that demilitarization did not require the abolition of saluting.   
In opposition, the Americans called the salute a military gesture and pointed to Allied regulations.  
Explained one delegate: “The purpose, the very specific purpose of the occupation is to destroy all military 
attitude in the German population.”  For this reason, saluting should be prohibited.41  “I am still utterly 
incapable of conceiving what a non-military salute is,” professed another, adding later: “I would hate to have 
the German police raise their hats to me when I go home or to work, or shake hands with me—that, to me, is a 
form of greeting, but I still cannot imagine any combination of placing the hands that does not constitute a 
military salute of some kind.”42   
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Asked by the IAC Directorate to examine the matter, the Legal Directorate reported that existing 
Allied legislation banned military salutes but would permit a non-military salute.43  Subsequently consulted for 
assistance, the Combined Services Directorate reported that it could not come up with a non-military salute to 
be used in place of the current hand salute.44  Given these developments, the Americans insisted that salutes 
should be abolished, with their “Puritanism”—as one American official put it—resulting in this relatively minor 
question being forwarded to the Coordinating Committee.45  In this forum, Clay, too, remained firm.  In 
addition to highlighting the Allies’ sometimes differing opinions on how the Germans might best be 
demilitarized, his remarks made clear the meaningful role national cultural practices could play in shaping those 
views.  According to the committee’s minutes, Clay told his colleagues  
that in the United States a salute by the police would be very obnoxious to the people.  In that country 
police were considered to be in the service of the people, who did not surround them with pomp and 
ceremony and formality.  The U.S. delegation recognized that arrogance and the military spirit were a 
part of the German police system and one of the reasons for its failure.  He saw no useful purpose in a 
salute by the German police. 
 
Unable to agree, the committee members decided that rules on police saluting should be left to the commander 
of each zone.46  And in the U.S. Zone, this meant that German policemen, officially, could not salute either 
Allied officers or their superiors. 
If conflicts over the potential militarizing effect of hand salutes were essentially rooted in divergent 
interpretations of the gesture itself, interpretive problems of a different sort eventually came to light in the 
sphere of marching and parades.  Here, as with flags, MG officers were responsible for both eliminating 
existing practices and authorizing exceptions.  While preventing marching by a disbanded army and defunct 
paramilitary organizations was obviously essential and relatively simple, the reach of the Americans also 
stretched further.  The Badischer Sängerbund, for example, warned its members in early 1948 that the 
previously often customary practice of walking through town in ordered columns en route to the cemetery was 
presently not allowed.47  On the other hand, as early as May 1945, MG authorities granted permission for towns 
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to hold their annual Corpus Christi Day processions, and they repeatedly authorized these festivities thereafter.48  
They also explicitly sanctioned May Day parades.49  Beyond this, youth and sports clubs were most likely to 
seek and obtain MG authorization to parade or process.50   
American officials nevertheless remained both attentive and cautious.  In August 1947, one MG report 
noted that a track and field meet in Ludwigsburg had “begun and ended by formal marching, with music, onto 
and off the sports field” and commented that “other activities during the meet such as standing at attention, 
formal presentation of awards, etc.,” showed that the Turnverein (a gymnastics club which also offered other 
athletic activities) had “the greatest tendency toward militarism of any of the sport organizations.”51  In other 
cases, the Americans evidently tried to nip some of these problems in the bud.  In July 1948, a sports group in 
Geradstetten asked for permission for some 150 athletes to process several blocks from a schoolyard to a nearby 
athletic field in connection with a sports competition the community was hosting.  The point of the procession, 
the petition assured, was solely to attract attention and encourage people to attend—thus ensuring the financial 
success of the contest.52  Granting conditional approval, an American official reminded that MG directives 
against marching were still valid.  Therefore, the athletes might “walk through the streets as a group,” if they 
wished, but they might not walk in step, in formation, or to music.53 
For their part, some Germans complained about what they perceived to be an American double 
standard.  In October 1946, Herbert van der Berg reported that people in Ulm were criticizing “the military 
formations of the DP’s” and described a recent incident wherein a “group of Jewish DP children marched by the 
Military Government building in perfect military cadence, singing spirited songs.”  Those watching, he 
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observed, “were taken with surprise at this display of militarism and could not quite understand how such 
actions can be branded other than militaristic, merely because Germans are not represented.”  In view of such 
groups, he added, the Germans would comment: “The DP’s, they are allowed to do all the marching they want, 
but any one of us doing the same thing would be brought before a Military Government court.  I ask you where 
is all this democracy one hears about.  What is good for them should also be good for us.”54  Stuttgart officials 
reported a comparable phenomenon the following summer when a group of International Boy Scouts from DP 
camps pitched their tents in the woods near the city.  This development had “caused much discussion among the 
German youth and youth leaders,” they pointed out.  “The German youth leaders are asking why these boys are 
permitted to wear uniforms, take part in militaristic drills, and perform other functions which they are forbidden 
to do.”55 
If these complaints revealed a lingering desire to participate in pseudo-military activities and perhaps 
some racial resentment as well, they were directed at displays by rather harmless children.  Yet a more obvious 
double standard had been playing itself out on local streets since the occupation began.  Victorious Allied troops 
periodically engaged in exactly those activities forbidden to the Germans.  In some cases, these activities, such 
as drilling, were intended to enhance the discipline and performance of American soldiers (and, through this, 
German respect for American authority).56  Others were examples of military rituals long performed by armies 
to celebrate important occasions, although they were without question at times staged with a clear awareness 
that the German people would be a key—and perhaps most unhappy—audience.   
Shortly after their arrival, for example, the French held a victory parade in downtown Stuttgart, the 
first of a number of French ceremonies of this genre.57  And beginning already in July 1945, the Americans 
annually staged Independence Day parades that sent U.S. troops accompanied by military bands marching past 
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crowds of curious Germans and platforms filled with American and German officials.58  Local soldiers also 
marched to honor particularly esteemed military or civilian visitors.59  Late in the occupation, parades of troops 
and military hardware became occasions for the Americans to demonstrate their armed strength for yet another 
purpose, as the Germans became the protected and a former ally became the target.60   
Regardless of their intent, these activities did not go unnoticed by the Germans.  “The Ulmians 
comment on drill instruction which is given to Constabulary Troops on Ulm streets,” reported one American 
official, who also quoted a German remark: “At last the Americans believe Hitler died, because his spirit lives 
on in the American Army.”61  American military parades, meanwhile, elicited both praise and condemnation.  
Describing German responses to the July 1945 Independence Day parades, a MG report concluded that “some 
were impressed by the sight of troops and armor, and enjoyed the display as a ‘show’,” but “others were 
observed to have been reminded by it of the utter defeat of the Wehrmacht and of their land.”62  Later, 
introspection regarding Germany’s defeat seems to have waned.  In 1947, Heidelberg officials reported on local 
reactions to several ceremonies, usually pointing out that many Germans had watched with interest and were 
impressed.63  More than once they noted that German veterans had expressed their approval, as “experts.”64  
Sometimes positive comments from German spectators took a form that may have actually displeased their 
occupiers.  At festivities to honor General Omar Bradley, one former professional sergeant indicated that the 
ceremony had “aroused in him old, happy memories of his time as a soldier, which remain unforgettable to 
him.”  Heidelberg officials also observed that there were “not a few” in the crowd that day “who were delighted 
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that also the American army keeps alive its military tradition in such excellent form.” Other Heidelbergers were 
more critical.  Asked their opinions, three onlookers had reportedly declared: “We believed that the Prussian 
spirit and the Prussian drill were dead, but that appears not to be the case.”65 
Comparisons between German and American military ceremonies could take a more explicit form as 
well.  Clay’s March 1949 visit to Karlsruhe, for instance, stimulated a brief exchange of letters in the Badische 
Neueste Nachrichten that centered in part on the nature of Prussian militarism.  Prior to visiting American 
troops stationed in the vicinity, Clay had traveled to the city’s center where he had accepted gifts from the lord 
mayor and, accompanied by military music, reviewed a unit of American soldiers.  This ceremony, the 
newspaper reported, “was over quickly, executed in a nonchalant way that because of the crush of many curious 
people—including soldiers—had even more the tone of a happy, somewhat playful celebration.”66  Several 
weeks later, a man from another town in Baden wrote to the paper regarding the event, citing, in particular, 
criticism he had overheard and using this to make several larger points regarding German attitudes.  “The critics 
were unanimously of the opinion that the Germans (aka Prussian militarism) could have done the thing better,” 
the writer noted.  He then commented:     
Granted, the Germans would have perhaps blared a snappy march, they would have perhaps lined up a 
few hours earlier (one must, after all, also notice that a general is coming), they would have put up big 
barricades and one would have recognized the general better, because of his silver and gold collar 
patches and stars, than the inconspicuously clothed General Clay.  But it is exactly that which 
distinguishes the military of other states from the simple Prussian blind obedience.  What there is to 
say in this matter would be, above all things, that here once again the typical German arrogance was 
expressed.  Only because it was new to us, it was termed inferior.  So long as we don’t eventually learn 
to also appreciate the achievements of others and, above all things, to try to understand and respect the 
customs and traditions of other nations, there exists no prospect that we will come to a . . . better 
understanding with all of the other peoples of the world.67 
 
This letter writer, responded a critic several weeks later, “had probably come running from his 
hometown so as not to miss out on the rare spectacle of a democratic parade.”  Unburdened with a knowledge 
of history, he must have been “deeply indignant” to overhear the comments of Germans “who were still 
afflicted with militaristic trains of thought.”  Then the critic added his own punch line.  The letter writer, he 
asserted, “has probably never heard of this joke of world history, that it was precisely a representative of 
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Prussian militarism, namely General Steuben, who during the American war of independence organized the 
militia troops of George Washington.”68 
Although apparently often impressed by American military displays, the Germans clearly differed 
widely in how they evaluated them.  Spectators might praise perceived understated military pageantry, or 
criticize the lack of pomp and bombast.  They might condemn practices considered equivalent to the very things 
the U.S. was trying to eradicate from Germany, or admire American technique.  In other words, some Germans 
drew “demilitarizing” lessons from American parades, while for others the ceremonies probably had the 
opposite effect.   
In truth, some Germans raised legitimate questions about American policies.  Why could DPs and 
American troops march in formation in Germany while the Germans could not?  The easy answer, of course, 
was that German proclivities made this unsafe.  But this easy answer was predicated on two other, more 
doubtful, assumptions: one, that only participation, not observation, was dangerous; and, two, that the Germans 
would recognize the color and style of the uniform and feel shame and defeat rather than exhilaration and 
excitement when watching American parades. 
Overall, even where enforcement efforts succeeded, problems of interpretation made American 
policies with respect to flags, saluting, and marching questionable.  As the Karlsruhe critic’s reference to 
George Washington reminded, German and Allied military practices and customs had common roots.69  It was 
this shared heritage that made it possible for German officers to speak of established rules of military courtesy.  
And it was this shared heritage that enabled the Allies to presume that any message they chose to send through 
their treatment of German officers or through their directives regarding German police salutes would be clearly 
understood by those affected.  Yet this shared heritage also meant that the German people might evaluate and 
interpret American rituals exactly as they had interpreted the rituals performed by their own troops.  Moreover, 
many military practices and customs were themselves ambiguous.  The French and British stressed the value of 
the salute as a sign of respect and, to all intents and purposes, submission.  OMGUS officials interpreted it as a 
military gesture.  Parades could emphasize Germany’s defeat.  But they could also inspire future soldiers.  In 
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short, when it came to military practices and customs, the ultimate impact of American policies simply could 
not be predicted. 
 
Street Signs and Monuments 
If Nazi flags were coveted souvenirs for the invading forces, they were not the only elements of 
Germany’s cultural landscape that captured the interest of the Americans.  German street signs and monuments 
received immediate attention as well.  Furthermore, spontaneous removals and sporadic early orders from 
American officers soon gave way to official MG instructions and, eventually, to a broader Allied initiative that 
required the appraisal of thousands of street signs and memorials.  Significantly, these various efforts enjoyed 
the enthusiastic support of at least some Germans, both inside and outside of local governments, who 
themselves were actively pushing for changes.  The Americans, however, ultimately determined the scope of 
change.  And in the final analysis, the results of the MG measures, though identifiable, did not substantially 
transform the backdrop of German street signs and monuments as a whole.70   
 
Early Efforts 
In the immediate aftermath of war, German street signs, buildings, and monuments were early targets 
of American soldiers, Allied occupation authorities, and sometimes the German people themselves.  In the wake 
of Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, Nazi officials and enthusiastic Germans had erected new monuments, 
redecorated old and constructed new buildings, and eagerly renamed and named German streets and plazas after 
Hitler, other National Socialist heroes, and momentous events and leaders from Germany’s military past.  Now, 
just as the Nazis had erased residues of the Weimar Republic from Germany’s material culture, remnants of the 
Third Reich were discarded or destroyed.71    
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A mere ten days after Ulm fell to U.S. troops, American MG officers demanded that the city’s Adolf-
Hitler-Ring and Hermann-Göring-Strasse (Street) revert to their old names.72  In nearby Langenau, Adolf-
Hitler-Strasse temporarily became Lt.-Smith-Strasse, after the local MG commander.73  And by the end of July, 
Heidelberg’s Hindenburgbrücke (Hindenburg Bridge) was again Ernst-Walz-Brücke, and the city’s center again 
had a Universitätsplatz (University Plaza), rather than a Langemarckplatz.74  Soon after arriving, French 
officials likewise ordered local authorities in Karlsruhe and Stuttgart to eliminate street, square, and building 
names honoring Hitler and his cronies.75   
While some American officers obviously were quick to instruct their new charges to take down 
offensive signs—a MG report later described these actions as “ad hoc” decisions76—in a number of places, the 
Germans had already done so even before Allied troops appeared.77  Some local officials, moreover, were 
themselves engaged in discussions regarding what names should be removed, restored, or added.78  Allied 
officials thus took the lead, but the exact impetus behind changes made during these early, chaotic days is not 
always entirely clear.  Similarly, even prior to Germany’s surrender, occupation troops and German officials 
had begun removing Nazi monuments, plaques, swastikas, and other symbols.79  Some Germans had also 
occasionally taken this task into their own hands as Allied forces approached.80 
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In June 1945, a small committee of American officials finally began preparing more formal 
instructions for local occupation officers, producing a draft directive which stipulated that any street, park, 
institution, building, or “industrial concern” named after “any person or thing associated either with Naziism or 
German militarism” must “have its name removed from public display and use.”  In addition, all movable 
monuments associated with Nazism or militarism were to be collected and all offending emblems and symbols 
on immovable structures removed.  For the directive’s purposes, the term “German militarism” was to apply to 
“all persons, battles, campaigns, and institutions directly associated with German militarism subsequent to 1 
January 1933.”  As the committee’s chairman later explained, he and his colleagues had selected this date 
because they believed that “an attempt to eliminate militarism from German thought through the medium of 
obliterating names and symbols having a military connotation prior to this date will do more to make our 
occupation appear ridiculous than to eliminate militarism.”  Nevertheless, the draft directive did list 11 
luminaries of Germany’s pre-1933 military past—“Bismarck, Clausewitz, Gneisenau, Hindenburg, Kaiser 
Wilhelm II, Ludendorff, von Moltke (the elder), Richthofen, Scharnhorst, von Scheer, [and] Tirpitz”—who 
should also be considered subject to its provisions.81  Including these 11 men in fact represented a compromise 
position, as staffers from the USGCC’s Political Division and Monuments and Fine Arts Branch had argued that 
the directive should not affect “purely militaristic figures” from the pre-1933 period, but rather “only military 
figures who were associated with the Nazi movement.”82  And, in the end, their reasoning seems to have 
prevailed.83  In August 1945, MG officers in Württemberg-Baden dutifully ordered local German authorities to 
eliminate street names, monuments, and symbols associated with post-1932 German militarism.  They cited no 
exceptions to this rule.84   
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When it came to renaming, the new directive generally widened the scope of ongoing efforts.  Thus, 
Heidelberg city and university officials made a few additional changes, in particular excising the name of 
Philipp Lenard, a Nobel-prize-winning physicist turned passionate Nazi, from a street, a university institute, and 
a local school.  The city’s Langemarckstrasse also acquired a new name, and a school named after Hindenburg, 
a World War I hero and the Weimar Republic’s Hitler-abetting last president, again honored Friedrich Ebert, the 
republic’s first president.85  Stuttgart officials similarly expanded a renaming operation the French had 
instigated locally, although the total number of streets impacted was considerably greater.86  As of late 
November 1945, they had changed more than 70 street names in Stuttgart proper and its various integrated 
suburbs.  Included were no less than seven streets and plazas named after Adolf Hitler, four streets each named 
after the Nazi heroes Horst Wessel and Albert Schlageter, and many others honoring individuals uniquely 
associated with National Socialism.  However, only a few names slated for purging had military themes, among 
them Langemarckstrasse, Ludendorffstrasse, Schlieffenstrasse, Clausewitzstrasse, and Yorckstrasse—almost all 
street names the Nazis had introduced.87 
Perhaps most interesting were developments in Karlsruhe.  Here, as elsewhere, the MG order pushed 
forward work already in progress.  But certain city leaders also pressed for deeper cuts than those prescribed, 
thereby kindling discussions that illuminated a range of competing viewpoints and wealth of issues tied up with 
renaming.   
Karlsruhe leaders had begun identifying and planning for the replacement of Nazi-related street signs 
already in mid April 1945.  Charged with this task, in particular, were the newly appointed heads of 16 
administrative districts,88 a group of men untainted by National Socialism who during the summer of 1945 
included 14 Social Democrats and two Communists.89  Their work continued, with a marginally wider sweep, 
after Social Democratic lord mayor Hermann Veit asked the city office that supervised the districts, headed by 
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his party colleague August Furrer, Sr., to prepare a list of all official names changed in “the National Socialist 
spirit” or first applied since 1933, so that the city might comply with the new American directive.90 
But city leaders were also soon considering changes that went beyond these.  More than once during 
the summer, Furrer had called for replacing street names that honored Germany’s imperial history.  “What 
should we do with a Hohenzollern-Strasse, Kaiser-Strasse?  Away with them!” he had argued to a gathering of 
district leaders.91  And several districts now submitted reports that contained not only the requested Nazi-related 
names, but also additional suggestions.92  One district chief, for instance, called for eliminating Kaiserstrasse, 
Kaiser-Platz, Moltkestrasse, and Bismarckstrasse, as well as two streets each that invoked the Franco-Prussian 
War and recognized Badenese royalty.  He argued that the city should instead honor men like Karl Marx, Karl 
Liebknecht, and those who had more recently battled fascism, reasoning that “these are all names which the 
working class reveres because they have shown the world that they have led an upright and honorable fight to 
realize democracy.”93 
In late August, a circular from Furrer’s office suggested that it was now appropriate to ask what should 
happen to names from the imperial era.  Specifically citing streets honoring various former ruling families who 
had “brought the German people enough calamity,” it added that the names of past German military leaders 
such as Hindenburg, Schlieffen, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau deserved to be eliminated “so that also nothing 
more commemorates the reign of terror of militarism.”  The circular directed the district heads to identify 
relevant local names and to prepare suggestions for replacements.94  Two days later, however, Furrer’s office 
issued new instructions stating that Veit wanted them first to provide the city with information on old names 
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they had restored to Nazi-named streets or, alternatively, with recommendations for new names for these 
streets.95   
This did not mean that a more expansive assessment had been permanently shelved.  Rather, Veit 
apparently was most concerned with first obeying the MG order.  Soon thereafter, he sent the Americans details 
regarding Karlsruhe’s 21 Nazi-named streets and indicated that he had also arranged for an appraisal of the 
city’s remaining street names to ascertain whether there were others (“e.g., those of a militaristic nature”) that 
appeared to warrant replacement.  He subsequently gave the city’s civil engineering office information on street 
names collected by Furrer’s office and asked its staff to evaluate the city’s street names themselves to determine 
which other streets should be renamed “due to the present political situation.”96 
Although the civil engineering staff may have completed this task, Karlsruhe officials had made no 
other major changes by late November 1945 when the city council took up the street name question.  Prompted 
by a request from local Christian Democrats to name a street or square after Reinhold Frank, a lawyer executed 
by the Nazis for his participation in the events of July 1944, the councilmen quickly became embroiled in a 
much broader discussion on street renaming.  In this context, Communist Karl Deck called for getting rid of all 
street names that recognized military personalities or which had a military character.  One of his party 
colleagues wanted to rename Kaiserstrasse and Kaiserallee, arguing that it should be unbearable for good 
democrats to think that the name of the “grape-shot prince,” who had bloodily put down the 1848 revolution, 
would continue to be immortalized.  On the other hand, Professor Albert Kessler, head of the city’s liberal 
party, spoke against removing names with historical significance—when he heard “Kaiserstrasse,” he thought 
of the creation of the German Empire, not of Kaiser Wilhelm I, he reported.  In addition, he believed the council 
should not overestimate the meaning of street names for local residents; there were some names whose origins 
the locals had forgotten.97 
Several councilmen also pointed to the work involved.  Social Democrat Fritz Töpper argued for 
putting off a discussion on honoring victims of fascism until the spring because of the difficulties involved in 
renaming streets and the need for an overall plan specifying who should disappear and who should be honored.  
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Kessler agreed with this approach, pointing out that the city would have to change address and phone books as 
well as assorted lists and plans.  He also advised that they should be careful to avoid introducing laughable 
names like the Nazis had.  Another Social Democrat called for assigning the problem to a committee, though he 
expressed his support for both honoring the victims of fascism and getting rid of street names with a military 
character.98 
Veit, meanwhile, focused particularly on the problem of renaming itself, noting not only the work 
involved— according to the civil engineering office, he reported, 50 “official acts” would be required for each 
change—but also the fact that he had always seen this issue as a “political explosive.”  There had been some 
“most impossible” suggestions for new names, such as a proposal to rename the Marktplatz (Market Square) 
after Marx.  Urging the council to proceed with moderation, Veit also argued that the more careful and stingier 
they were with renaming, the more meaningful the honor would be for those whose names graced the city’s 
streets.  Ultimately, the council agreed to honor Reinhold Frank, as well as Social Democrat Ludwig Marum 
and Communist August Dosenbach.  In addition, it named a commission to decide which streets should bear 
their names and to discuss renaming in general.99 
In early February 1946, the council revisited the issue, this time wrangling at length over the question 
of which particular streets should be renamed and for whom and considering whether or not more than three 
victims of fascism should be recognized.  Their comments, moreover, made clear that the present discussions 
were in part a continuation of politicking that had occurred during the intervening months.  Rather out of the 
blue, Communist Fritz Aschinger also read a letter from the works council of Karlsruhe’s streetcar service 
complaining about how little had been done to date to denazify the city’s “street scene.”  “Having been liberated 
by the United Nations from the brown pest and Prussian militarism,” the group argued, “it is no longer 
acceptable that in our so badly damaged city there are still so many Prussian generals remembered in street 
names.”  Previously streets had honored the Weimar leaders Matthias Erzberger and Friedrich Ebert, but these 
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names, “for inconceivable reasons,” had not yet reappeared.  The works council went on to point to names that 
should be changed and offered suggestions for replacements.100   
After the councilmen had again discussed the work and expense associated with renaming, the 
desirability of exercising moderation, and the need to rename streets in such a way that the people would 
actually use the new names, they finally set up a committee to devise a solution.  If these men could not reach a 
decision, the council agreed, it would postpone the project until after a new council was elected in May.101  
Thereafter, the issue of street renaming in Karlsruhe evidently languished, mostly unresolved, until the 
following autumn.   
In Karlsruhe, then, the Americans’ July 1945 instructions regarding Nazi street names primarily 
accelerated a process that was already underway.  And when the actual changes made are compared to the total 
number of city streets, the impact of these instructions appears small, a result due in large part to the very 
limited scope of the American initiative.  Noticeably absent was any American call for the wide-ranging 
demilitarization of street names favored by some residents.  In addition, while it is not unusual for new rulers to 
replace street names,102 the Americans had no interest in putting their own imprint on the city.  They wanted 
certain names gone; beyond this, they left it to the Germans to decide what new message, if any, their city 
streets would convey.   
During the first year of the occupation, therefore, the demilitarization of street signs in Karlsruhe—and 
elsewhere—remained largely a local matter.  But pleas for changes that went beyond rudimentary 
“denazification” failed to spur action.  Although the divisions were not hard and fast, in many respects 
traditional German politics were at play in Karlsruhe.  The left showed signs of anti-militarism, anti-
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monarchism, and anti-Prussianism; those leaning right defended Germany’s national history or stressed the need 
to avoid aggravating local residents with sweeping changes.  Consequently, choosing names for eradication was 
difficult, while selecting replacement names—and the location of the streets that should bear them—was 
equally controversial.  In a heavily damaged city, worries about the labor and expense involved were 
necessarily pertinent as well, whether raised as genuine concerns or presented as convenient fig leaves for other 
motives.  The result of this accumulation of forces was a stalemate. 
As with Württemberg-Baden’s street signs, the July 1945 military government instructions also led to 
additional monument removals.  In Heidelberg, for example, municipal officials removed a Saarland memorial 
near the city hall and, at the university, a bronze eagle, a stone soldier’s head, and an inscription at a memorial 
for World War I dead which read: “Germany must live, even when we must die.”103  However, as with 
Mannheim’s now missing Albert Schlageter monument, Karlsruhe’s Paul Billet memorial, and a Horst Wessel 
monument in the Stuttgart area, most objects affected by these and earlier measures were, like most street signs, 
examples of Nazi propaganda rather than suspected embodiments of a deep-seated German militarism.104 
Although apparently less controversial than street renaming initiatives, not all of these monument 
changes occurred without comment.  One politically clean professor pleaded the Heidelberg University eagle’s 
case noting that he had never considered it a Nazi emblem—a view that had some credence, as the bird’s creator 
had in fact refused to place a swastika in its claws.105  Another observer argued in Heidelberg’s Rhein-Neckar-
Zeitung that the four-meter-high bird had actually been an oddity amidst the Third Reich’s horde of eagles and 
described its upraised wings as symbolic of the upward-reaching spirit of free research.  But the eagle did not 
survive.106 
Other Germans thought even more should be done.  The works council of Karlsruhe’s street car service 
argued that the city’s Kaiser Wilhelm I and Bismarck monuments should also disappear, and even offered to 
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remove them at no cost107—although Karlsruhe officials never accepted this offer.  Similarly, in May 1946, 
Ulm’s Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung ran a short editorial on the subject most likely written by the Social 
Democrat Johannes Weisser, who during the previous year had twice urged the city’s advisory council to 
remove militaristic street names, only to have his arguments deflected, at least temporarily, with references to 
the work, confusion, and possible ridicule such changes would generate.108  Now Weisser presented his views 
publicly, contending that if the Germans were to become democrats, their skewed perspective of history first 
had to be set straight.  Not only was this duty being overlooked, in some instances it was being intentionally 
sabotaged.  In particular, Weisser referred to the “false gods of our militaristic-nationalistic past” still enthroned 
on their pedestals in both monuments and street names.  Those who called these trivial matters, he accused of 
being either lax or reactionary.  German reeducation should begin with the small things, he argued, so the 
offending signs and monuments had to go.109 
 
Directive No. 30 
By May 1946, the Allied Control Authority was also discussing street names and monuments.   In 
February, the Military Directorate had considered a draft law proposed by the United States prohibiting the 
installation of any new monument, building, emblem, street name marker, or similar object and requiring the 
destruction of existing ones that tended to “perpetuate the German military tradition, to revive militarism or to 
commemorate the Nazi Party, or which is of such a nature as to glorify incidents of war.”  Like the American 
regulations, it defined the terms “military” and “militarism” as referring to the period after January 1, 1933.110  
A similar French proposal had set no specific date range but exempted monuments honoring fallen members of 
regular military formations (as opposed to paramilitary organizations and the SS and Waffen SS).111 
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The Military Directorate had subsequently inserted the French qualification into the American text, 
clarified that the law would not affect gravestones, and replaced the 1933 date with January 1, 1918.  They also 
had added language prohibiting the opening or reopening of military museums and exhibitions and requiring the 
closing and liquidation of those still operating.112  The directorate’s final draft, meanwhile, had introduced an 
even earlier operative date, August 1, 1914 (the first day of World War I), as originally suggested in an Allied 
subcommittee by a Soviet, who had argued that this date best signified the start of the current conception of 
German militarism and would avoid encouraging the idea that World War I had been justly fought by the 
Germans.  But the draft also allowed for the retention of artistically valuable objects and permitted publicly 
useful structures to be modified rather than destroyed.113  In eventually approving this May 1946 draft as ACC 
Directive No. 30, the Coordinating Committee overruled a British preference for a January 1918 date and 
resisted a French overture for no date, with a British delegate suggesting that while many monuments from 
before August 1914 had an “undesirable character,” he thought it “undesirable today to go too far into 
history.”114   
In making its final revisions, the Military Directorate had reworded the directive’s clause regarding 
monuments honoring fallen soldiers.  But Allied officials quickly revisited this phrasing, as it seemed to spare 
only battlefield graves, while they had intended to protect memorials for the fallen wherever they might be.  
Nearly every German village had a World War I monument, often with a table of names listing those who had 
died.  Demolishing these memorials, the members of the Political Directorate contended, “would cause an 
unnecessary animosity against the Control Powers, who would gain nothing by such action.”115  In supporting a 
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revision of the new directive, the British were in part responding to protests the directive had incited in Britain, 
due mostly, they believed, to misinterpretation.  The British delegate to the Coordinating Committee thus went 
so far as to spell out his country’s official interpretation, stating, according to meeting minutes, that 
commemorating those who lost their lives in war “was not of itself a glorification of war or liable to revive 
militarism or perpetuate the German military tradition.”  Therefore “only Nazi memorials or such memorials as 
by the nature of their design or the character of their inscriptions exceeded a purely commemorative purpose 
would be considered as coming within the terms of this Directive.”116  A revised directive resulting from this 
renewed dialogue exempted from destruction all monuments honoring the dead of regular military 
organizations, so long as they did not evoke militarism or remember the Nazi party, and permitted memorials to 
be modified rather than destroyed, where feasible.117 
 
Museums.  Directive No. 30 necessarily sparked yet another wave of MG instructions to German Land 
and local authorities, with the smallest effort provoked by these involving German museums containing military 
collections.  In August 1947, American officials informed their allies that the directive’s provisions regarding 
museums affected fewer than two dozen institutions in Württemberg-Baden.  Most importantly, the Land’s 
three military museums were no longer open.  By that time, the modern arms from Mannheim’s Zeughaus 
(armory) museum had been confiscated and its remaining holdings deposited in the building’s basement.  All of 
the contents from Stuttgart’s Heeresmuseum were still in repositories where they had been sent during the war 
for safekeeping.118  The third museum was Karlsruhe’s Armeemuseum.  “By all odds the most advanced of its 
kind in Europe,” the Karlsruhe museum had opened in 1934 under the auspices of a local Nazi official and had, 
a contemporary American observer noted, also “naturally assumed a strong militaristic and Nazi coloration, and 
by its exhibit techniques demonstrated the force—for better or for worse—of a well-planned and equipped 
collection.”119  In 1946, however, many of its holdings were still stored in outlying repositories, some of which 
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were in the French Zone and would remain difficult for museum officials to access for several years.  Other 
pieces lay buried under the ruins of the bombed-out palace which had been the museum’s home.  To comply 
with the new directive, museum officials had nevertheless divided up the remaining salvageable materials, 
transferring models and other objects to the state museum, turning over archival materials to the state archives, 
and giving the state library some 150 books.  The museum was not reconstituted until 1956, and then in the city 
of Rastatt.120 
Ironically, even as the Americans were divesting the Land’s museums of their military collections, 
some of these same institutions began receiving temporary transfusions of new weapons.  One of the first orders 
Allied troops had issued to the Germans upon their arrival was to surrender all weapons.  While U.S. occupation 
forces only rarely faced any organized resistance after that time, they continued to encounter armed individuals 
and occasionally discovered caches of weapons.  In December 1946, for example, MG courts in Württemberg-
Baden convicted more than 30 individuals of possessing or using firearms.  American officials therefore 
declared a period of amnesty for the first ten days of February 1947 during which Germans could, without 
penalty, turn in or report previously undeclared weapons, ammunition, and explosives.121  The language 
describing the applicable directive’s scope left much to be desired, however, containing a blanket reference to 
“all other weapons of any kind.”  As a result, during the weeks that followed, Land public safety officials and 
the Land Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives (MFA&A) officer, Captain Edith Standen, were inundated with 
inquiries from local MG officers, who were themselves being questioned by the Germans, asking what they 
should do with antique, artistic, and historic weapons.122    
In general, confusion reigned.  OMGUS’s Public Safety Branch in Berlin had not issued a clear policy 
addressing antique weapons or provided a definition of an antique or historic weapon.  This left local public 
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safety officials hesitant to make pronouncements.  Informally, Lieutenant Colonel R. L. Perry, head of 
Württemberg-Baden’s public safety office, advised local MG officers to direct owners of weapons collections 
“to deposit their collections against receipt with some public museum.”  Officials in Berlin, he noted in 
explaining his advice, “will not state officially that knives, swords, etc are not to be turned in although they 
agree that it is carrying the program toward the extreme.”  His own doubts were perhaps revealed in his 
subsequent observation: “No doubt a knife is a deadly weapon at close range but so is a paving brick.”123  
Perry’s approach nevertheless meant that the Ulm museum became the temporary home of four privately held 
weapons collections, including one encompassing more than one hundred pistols and rifles dating from 1750 to 
1918 and another that included “103 Papua arrows,” “13 Papua and Buginese lances,” and “28 Buginese swords 
and Java daggers.”124 
For some local museums, Perry’s advice was not particularly welcome.  According to a late February 
report drafted by Standen, MG and German officials did not always specify where the weapons should be 
delivered, and “this sometimes resulted in loads of weapons being dumped upon a museum director who had, in 
fact, nowhere to put them.”  Other problems frustrated her as well.  The overall uncertainty of the situation and 
the fact that not all local MG officers had asked for advice had led to what she regarded as unfortunate 
developments. 
In one Kreis, the Rathaus [city hall] contained 60 18th century firearms; the [MG] officer directed that 
50 should be confiscated, 10 retained.  In another, the [MG] officer stated that he had seen what he 
called “14th and 15th century muskets” among the confiscated arms.  In several instances, the police 
have been insisting on the turn-in of pre-historic and ethnological weapons collections, such as Bronze 
Age swords and Pacific Islanders spears.  The climax was probably reached when a sword-swallower 
appealed, through the Theater & Music Control officer, to be permitted to retain the 14 tools of his 
trade, necessary to his continuing business. 
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Other antique weapons, Standen added, “were actually arriving at the conversion and destruction centre at 
Willsbach.”  And U.S. soldiers had walked off with some of these.  She had since made arrangements to be 
alerted, informally, of any future such arrivals.125   
Irritated by the “hurricane” generated by the directive’s imprecision and the absence of clear 
instructions from higher levels, Standen tried to impose order on the situation, asking pertinent cultural 
authorities in North Württemberg and North Baden for lists of “suitable museums and publicly owned castles” 
where historic weapons could be both securely stored and protected from MG confiscation.  When local MG 
officers requested assistance, she was able to pass on this information.  But her task was made more difficult 
when the German officials were slow in responding, sometimes because they were having trouble securing the 
requested information themselves.126 
Gustav Wais, head of the Landesamt für Denkmalpflege, the Land agency responsible for historic 
properties and monuments, was not only corresponding with Standen regarding suitable repositories in North 
Württemberg, but also advising German museum officials.  In early February, he notified administrators at 
Stuttgart’s Heimat Museum that private citizens might be asking them for help.  He also explained that all 
antique or historically valuable weapons in their collections that could not be securely locked up in their present 
locations should be transferred to a room safe from thieves.127  In addition, he made plans to publicize 
information identifying local repositories where individuals could deposit antique weapons.  Directing that all 
modern weapons be turned in to the police, he apparently adopted a definition suggested by Land public safety 
officials in characterizing antique weapons as items dating from before 1850.  Exceptions could be made for 
post-1850 weapons that were obviously of unusual value, either because of their materials or craftsmanship.128 
The American instructions increased the work load of German officials forced to respond to individual 
questions and generally supervise compliance activities.129  It also exasperated the Germans affected.  Writing 
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to the local MG in late February, Stuttgart’s lord mayor warned that “the surrender of these old historic 
weapons will be perceived as being petty and bullying, since these weapons of past centuries have no practical 
importance as weapons at the present time.”130  The negative impact of the prevailing chaos was not lost on 
Standen either.  She concluded her rather biting appraisal of the current state of affairs in late February by 
observing that she did not believe “that any antique weapons have been, or will be, beaten into the modern 
equivalent of plowshares, but a widespread scattering has certainly taken place and many pieces may never be 
returned to their owners.”  Potentially more serious, she suggested, was “a strengthening of the German belief, 
frequently held though generally politely concealed, that Americans are congenital idiots.”131  Many Germans 
possessing antique, artistic, and historic weapons nevertheless eventually relinquished them, for a few years at 
least, to local officials or public museums.132   
 
Street Names.  Directive No. 30 affected many more street signs than museums, although its actual 
impact in any community depended upon both the overall number of objectionable signs and the carefulness, 
zeal, and analytical skills of local officials.   In Ulm, for instance, the directive triggered only a few changes.  In 
November 1946, lord mayor Robert Scholl received a form letter from Württemberg-Baden’s Interior Ministry 
instructing the city to send Land officials information on its eliminated Nazi and militaristic street names.133  As 
ordered by the MG, the old signs were to be gone by January 1, 1947, whether replacements were ready or not.  
That Ulm officials either never received or never made a point of checking the exact terms of the directive is 
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suggested by the names they considered for removal.  Specifically, Ulm’s civil engineering office compiled a 
preliminary list of names that encompassed an array of general military terms, such as Trommlergasse 
(Drummer Lane) and Soldatenstrasse (Soldier Street), and a large group of names alluding to Prussian military 
history, among them Blücherstrasse, Lützowstrasse, and Yorckstrasse.  In total, the roster for the former 
garrison city included 26 streets, 10 casernes, five forts, one bastion, and one fortress.134 
Reviewing this information, Scholl drew his own conclusions as to what deserved removal.  
Specifically, he chose 12 streets to receive new names, all of which referenced general military terms or rather 
dated Prussian military history.  He had no doubts, he told the city’s planning department, that street names 
referring to drummers, buglers, and the like could stay, as could, among others, Hindenburgring.135  By the time 
Scholl submitted the name change recommendations to the city council’s building committee, moreover, the list 
had shrunk still further to six.   In Ulm, therefore, Directive No. 30 led to new names only for Königs-
Grenadier-Strasse, Faber du Faur-Strasse, Lützowstrasse, Artilleriestrasse, Dragonerstrasse, and Ulanenweg.136   
Most of the names listed on the original roster that did not make the final cut did not blatantly violate 
Allied regulations.  But a few did.  Most notably, Hindenburg retained not only his ring, but a caserne as well.  
More significantly, Ulm’s surviving street name landscape hints at a conceptual weakness of the Allies’ 
narrowly defined excision policy.  Although Scholl was probably right in concluding that streets named after 
buglers and pipers could retain their names, these were just two of a group of streets comprising a largely 
military-themed webbing around Ulm’s Sedankaserne (itself named after an 1870 Prussian victory over the 
French), with neighboring streets bearing such names as Moltke, Blücher, Yorck, Strassburg, Saarland, and 
Sedan.  In other words, a small district of the city essentially retained its military character.137 
Not surprisingly, given this outcome, Weisser in January 1947 again vented his frustrations in the 
Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung.  “More slowly than the clearing away of the material rubble proceeds the 
elimination of ideological and historical rubbish,” he began, adding that “the Sedan-Strasse and other memorials 
to our ‘glorious past’ and flawed historical development still spoil the present.”  He did not buy arguments 
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regarding the difficulties involved in making changes and dismissed any professed “respect for the past.”  It was 
not so long ago, he contended, that the bureaucracy “fetched like a well-trained poodle” in response to wishes 
only hinted at by its rulers, regardless of any difficulties.  “Behind the petty bourgeois bureaucratic rhetoric,” 
Weisser maintained, “hides, not infrequently, the reactionary.”  Even as efforts in other arenas presented the 
Germans with an accurate historical picture and new political ideas, “the gods of a false view of history” 
remained right in front of them, due to “backwardness and short-sightedness.”  He reminded his readers that the 
world was watching and awaited evidence of an inner change on their part.  “It is still full of mistrust toward us, 
which we can only defuse when we earnestly work at renewal.”138 
If Ulm’s leaders wielded the knife sparingly, more than 50 communities in North Baden removed all 
traces of Field Marshal Hindenburg from their street signs.139  The new MG regulations also sparked further 
changes in Karlsruhe, where the city council had earlier fended off the renaming enthusiasm of some of its 
members.  In particular, in late 1946, city officials made plans to eliminate street names commemorating eight 
military men and eight World War I battles.140  While the council could not object to these changes, Veit did ask 
it to approve a list of recommended replacement names and thus unleashed another lengthy discussion during 
which council members dredged up and aired many of their old arguments.   
Communist Fritz Aschinger thus took the opportunity to argue that the council must finally get rid of 
street names honoring Prussian history and lamented the fact that the city had to be reminded by the MG to 
clean up its streets—an opinion repeated later by the CDU’s Wilhelm Bauer and supported by the SPD’s Fritz 
Töpper.  On the other hand, Christian Democrat Fridolin Heurich cited the work required and added that a 
complete cleansing of names appeared to be very risky at present.  “The baby must not be thrown out with the 
bath water,” he argued.  “Every Reich needs a certain dependence on the past.”  Karlsruhe’s building director, 
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meanwhile, contended it would take city officials an entire year of work to change just the 16 names already 
being discussed.141 
Veit urged the council to stick to the agenda of adopting new designations for the street names that had 
to be eliminated immediately.  But even this business proved troublesome.  The CDU’s Franz Sprauer proposed 
renaming Hindenburgstrasse after Weimar cabinet member Matthias Erzberger—who had signed the armistice 
ending World War I, supported the Treaty of Versailles, and been assassinated.  The DVP’s Kessler objected.  
“The Erzberger case,” he observed cryptically, “has become a current issue.”  It served no purpose, he 
continued, “to suddenly install the name Erzberger in a district.”  Perhaps they would later be glad that they had 
not done so.  Bauer countered that this was a “historically absolutely justifiable” move; the predecessors of the 
Nazis and a “clique around Hindenburg” were responsible for Erzberger’s death.  Kessler suggested that in four 
years they might need to change all the names again.  Sprauer declared that if the council did not have the 
courage to introduce new political names, then it should choose names like “Mayflower.”  “Then in all eternity 
no street name changes would occur.”  In the end, the council voted to replace Hindenburg with Erzberger and 
approved 15 other names with little further excitement.142 
Although some Karlsruhe councilmen feared a negative public reaction to extensive changes, an early 
December 1946 article in the Badische Neueste Nachrichten not only revealed implicit support for Directive 
No. 30, but also showed that Aschinger’s broader agenda had additional proponents as well.  Urging his readers 
to put an end to the “street of war” and choose the “street of peace,” its author insisted that they had the power 
both to hinder “every murderous fool” who wanted to extend the street of war and to wipe out everything, 
“large and small,” that could lead to war or encourage its ideology.  In particular, he railed against Karlsruhe’s 
street names, which did exactly that.  The Germans were building a new democracy, he noted, yet on the city’s 
street signs 
militarism, demanding obedience, shows off the names of Roon and Werder, of Hindenburg, who 
screamed for capitulation and then found no words to contradict the Stab-in-the-back legend (instead, 
engaged a Hitler), . . . S.M. [His Majesty] with the armored fist and the shimmering weapon continues 
to haunt the Kaiserstr[asse], the Kaiserallee, the Kaiserplatz, . . . the iron chancellor resolutely claims 
the Bismarckstr[asse], the smith who forged the empire, who set German unity on the monarchical 
path, which led to the street of war.  The grenades still burst and the rifle shots still hiss and whine in 
Karlsruhe in the Sedan- and Belfortstrasse, Hindenburg and Ludendorff still lead battles in Karlsruhe 
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in the Tannenberg- and in the Masurenstr[asse], the German volunteers of Langemarck still die here, . . 
. Over Flandernstr[asse] and Lorettoplatz drone the motors of fighter planes to Immelmann-, to 
Boelcke- and to Richthofenstr[asse]. 
   
His words were aimed not at these men “who fought and died for their land,” the writer explained, but 
rather “against the glorifying remembrance of war that is inseparably bound to the naming of these streets.”  It 
was time for these and similar signs to vanish.  This was not “a matter of iconoclasm.”  Instead, these were 
“things of such deadly seriousness, that slogans are not appropriate.”  Feelings of resentment were misguided; 
one had to summon the necessary courage to let them go.  In place of the offending names, the writer added, 
should appear those of men who promoted peace.143 
No demilitarizing revolution broke out in the streets of Karlsruhe during the years that followed, 
however.  In November 1947 and again in November 1948, the Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft (German Peace 
Society) actually petitioned the city to rename its military-themed streets, but by the time the council seriously 
considered the request in early 1949, the 1948 currency reform had decimated the city’s funds and the 
councilors rejected a major renaming effort as completely unfeasible.  Protesting this, a Social Democratic 
councilman argued that it was absolutely inappropriate to be too “pussy-footed” about renaming streets and 
reported having recently flipped through a city address book where he had encountered Grenadierstrasse, 
Kanonierstrasse, and a variety of other military-glorifying names added by the Nazis.  This experience 
notwithstanding, he settled for formally requesting a name change only for Schlieffenstrasse, one of the city’s 
“shortest and most frequently used streets.”  “Even when 50 official actions are necessary,” he implored, the 
street should immediately be given its former name, Seminarstrasse, and Herr Schlieffen—former chief of the 
general staff and architect of Germany’s World War I strategy—demounted.  The council approved his 
request.144  Hindenburg, a handful of World War I pilots, and the theatres in which they fought thus vanished 
from the city’s streets at the behest of the Americans.  But in the early twenty-first century, Grenadierstrasse 
and Kanonierstrasse, as well as Kaiserstrasse, Bismarckstrasse, and other street names associated with 
Germany’s imperial past and Prussian and Nazi militarism still appeared on the maps of Karlsruhe.145 
                                                 
143
 “Die Strasse des Krieges . . . ,” BNN, 21 Dec 46.  Identified only by the initials “W.S.,” the author may well have been 
Social Democratic publisher Walter Schwerdtfeger. 
 
144
 Niederschrift über die 11.Sitzung des Stadtrates am 3.August 1948, 17 Aug 48, StAK 3/B No. 1476; Niederschrift über 
die 19. – ausserordentliche – Sitzung des Stadtrates am Montag, dem 7. Februar 1949, 9 Feb 49, StAK 3/B No. 1577. 
 
145
 Stadt Karlsruhe, “Strassennamen in Karlsruhe,” http://www1.karlsruhe.de/Stadt/VLW/vlastrn.htm. 
 371 
Unlike their counterparts in Ulm and Karlsruhe, Stuttgart city leaders were already discussing 
additional name changes when they received the new MG instructions.  And a subsequent transformation of the 
capital city’s maps apparently resulted from events that unfolded relatively independent of any American 
influence.  In late spring 1946, Communist city councilman Karl Gross gave Stuttgart officials a list of proposed 
name changes he had collected from various local “work committees,” groups which had begun their lives at the 
end of the war as “anti-fascist committees.”146  In mid summer, the city council’s internal affairs section 
considered this petition and also the gamut of issues related to street renaming, including potential costs, the 
advisability of eliminating duplicate names within the region, the need to get rid of Nazi and militaristic names, 
and the selection of replacement names.147  The renaming movement received added momentum in early 
September following meetings involving city and Land officials, political party leaders, and members of a Land 
committee for individuals persecuted by the Nazis.  Specifically, assistant mayor Josef Hirn asked the full 
council to approve nine new street names honoring individuals who had resisted the Nazis which would be 
announced during upcoming ceremonies to commemorate the victims of fascism.  He also recommended that 
the body agree to the renaming of 60 city streets bearing names that were “no longer acceptable and no longer 
in keeping with the times,” using some of the proposed new names to replace them.  Hirn observed that 
Stuttgart should also eliminate some 327 duplicate names within the city limits (primarily a product of the 1942 
incorporation of several other communities), but argued that the work, costs, and potential confusion associated 
with these changes were presently prohibitive.148  The cleansing of the city landscape apparently took priority 
over this task.  
With the council’s approval, Stuttgart’s official gazette subsequently announced 60 new street names.  
In addition to roughly 10 names associated with Germany’s colonial ambitions, more than 40 of the streets and 
locations affected had military themed names, including Hindenburgstrasse (three streets), Hindenburgplatz 
(two plazas), Moltkestrasse (two streets), Scharnhorststrasse (two streets), Gneisenaustrasse (two streets), Von-
Seeckt-Strasse, Tirpitz-Strasse, Roonstrasse, and Blücherstrasse, as well as Kanonenweg, Militärstrasse, 
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Kasernenstrasse, and a number of street designations honoring famous World War I pilots.149  It seems likely 
Stuttgart officials were guided in part by Directive No. 30 in assessing existing street names.  However, the 
council evidently did not invoke the directive during its discussion of the matter, nor did the directive require 
the eradication of nineteenth-century Prussian military heroes such as Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Roon.  The 
fact that many of the men whose names were excised were Prussians, rather than Swabians, may be significant, 
perhaps making the names more desirable targets or at least making their excision a less emotionally charged 
undertaking. 
If Stuttgart officials were far more aggressive in renaming streets than their colleagues in Ulm and 
Karlsruhe, their critics attacked their assertiveness rather than their timidity.  The renaming initiative had 
“become the subject of debate” in certain circles, observed a mid December 1946 report of the local MG 
detachment. 
Nationalistic circles as well as the majority of unpolitical bourgeoisie resent having Freiherr von Stein, 
Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau put into the category with the Nazi war criminals.  It is believed that such 
re-naming is more or less designed to annihilate Germanism.  In particular the abolition of 
“Kanonenweg” is debated, “Kanonenweg” because from there—at that time a street outside the city 
limits—each year, at the king’s birthday, a gun salute was given.  A “highly militaristic affair,” 
somebody commented.150 
  
Culture Minister Theodor Heuss also brought the Stuttgart situation to the attention of Württemberg-Baden’s 
cabinet, seemingly concerned about the number of removals.  In particular, he asked whether it would be 
possible for the Interior Ministry to intervene to prevent further changes.  Ultimately, the cabinet members 
agreed that they could only act in an advisory capacity, working through party channels.151  What effect any 
efforts along these lines may have had is unclear, although there were no other major renaming initiatives in the 
years immediately following. 
Why so few streets in Ulm and Karlsruhe received new names while Stuttgart officials changed street 
signs even the Allies were content to leave in place is not easily explained.  All three cities had suffered heavy 
wartime damage, making reconstruction a priority for city expenditures.  Although the Stuttgart area had a 
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larger number of military themed street names, this does not explain why city leaders elected to remove street 
signs honoring Moltke and Blücher when their counterparts in Ulm and Karlsruhe did not.  Ulm’s residents may 
have had a special affinity for Prussian military heroes, but it seems logical that any resentment of Prussian 
dominance would have been shared by the inhabitants of Karlsruhe and Stuttgart.  Comparing the composition 
of their respective city councils in 1946 offers some insight into their different choices, but also provides no 
definitive answers.   
 
City council seats held by the four major parties during the fall of 1946.152 
 KPD SPD DVP CDU Other Total 
Ulm 2 8 6 16 4 36 
Karlsruhe 2 9 3 10  24 
Stuttgart 6 17 10 12 3 48 
 
 
Where the Christian Democrats and the right-leaning parties, more generally, had a firm hold on Ulm’s council, 
Karlsruhe’s council was relatively balanced, something that also had been true during its 1945 discussions.  
Conversely, Social Democrats dominated in Stuttgart; however, even here the combined votes of the CDU and 
DVP nearly equaled the combined votes of the SPD and KPD.   
Stuttgart’s councilors may have been responding to the perceived desires of their constituents.  But the 
complaints their decisions provoked raise doubts on this point and, in fact, hint that these men were to some 
extent acting on the strength of their own convictions.  Whatever the explanation, Stuttgart leaders showed a 
greater willingness to eradicate Germany’s military past from their city streets than colleagues in other key 
cities in Württemberg-Baden and, indeed, in other parts of western Germany.153 
Wide-ranging to be sure, the September 1946 changes in Stuttgart were not comprehensive.  The 
names of various World War I battles, German soldiers, and even armaments producers survived into the 
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twenty-first century.154  Significantly, unchanged names included Flandernstrasse, Sommestrasse, and 
Verdunstrasse155—familiar names from World War I which MG officials should have known violated Directive 
No. 30. 
On the whole, American policing of German street names was not overly stringent.  Removal actions 
varied throughout Württemberg-Baden, suggesting MG officers did not conscientiously seek uniformity.  
Furthermore, while they demanded lists of names the Germans had eliminated, they apparently did not request 
information on names that had not been replaced.  Even where they might reasonably have identified violations, 
they did not.  A 1948 map of Ulm, for instance, bears both a street named Hindenburgring and an imprint 
indicating the American MG had authorized its release.156   
American handling of several German army barracks was far more ironic.  In Heidelberg, the 
Grossdeutschland-Kaserne—christened shortly after the Anschluss—did not receive a new name until August 
1948.  By then serving as the headquarters of the American European Command, the caserne was renamed 
Campbell Barracks in honor of an American sergeant killed near Mannheim two days before Heidelberg 
surrendered.157  Meanwhile, as of 1950, all of Ulm’s casernes retained their original names.158  And in the early 
1950s, American troops, now on hand “to protect Germany from aggression,” took up residence in six of them, 
including the Flandernkaserne and Hindenburgkaserne.159  Whether most Germans interpreted this as a final 
insult, or saw the barracks as a fitting home for their new protectors is impossible to say. 
Sometimes lenient, uninformed, or negligent, MG enforcement of the various directives on naming 
did, nevertheless, push the Germans to act, first by requiring the removal of all Nazi-related names and later by 
ordering a purge of military themed markers.  And here, the Americans had indigenous support.  In fact, some 
Germans were quick to demand changes without MG prompting and even lobbied for more extensive renaming 
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efforts, although they often did not have the political strength to achieve their goals on their own.  Those 
rejecting calls for greater change could, on the other hand, see many reasons for proceeding cautiously.  Some, 
perhaps, truly were reactionaries in bureaucrats’ clothing.  But genuine concerns about potential costs, labor 
requirements, and confusion, as well as an unwillingness to wipe out their city’s historical consciousness—and 
their own interpretation of their local and national history—especially in a period of upheaval and transition, 
could also make leaders hesitant to act. 
 
Monuments.  Given Directive No. 30’s expanded chronological and substantive scope, Württemberg-
Baden’s leaders had to take another look not only at the Land’s street signs, but also at its monuments.  Military 
government officials therefore issued new instructions in late August which outlined their expectations in this 
regard, noting the directive’s January 1, 1947, deadline, stressing that it was not punitive but preventative, and 
urging the Germans to make certain that any actions taken in terms of altering or destroying monuments did not 
“offend accepted good taste or…occasion unnecessary bitterness or lasting resentment among the broad masses 
of the citizenry.”160   
At an early September meeting, two American officers also gave further guidance to the man 
supervising the work, Gustav Wais, head of the Landesamt für Denkmalpflege.  Concerned that anxious or 
overzealous monument owners might destroy valuable pieces, the officers indicated that no monument should 
be changed without the explicit authorization of Wais’ agency.  Using photographs, written descriptions, or, 
when necessary, site visits, each individual case was to be thoughtfully considered.  For example, they 
explained, a steel helmet could be left on a gravestone, but not on a building.  An iron cross need not be 
removed from a war monument, but should be taken off of a barracks entrance.  The listing of names of 
regiments or fallen soldiers might be permissible, depending on their location.  Artistic considerations were also 
to play a role, with appeals submitted to the zone commander for particularly significant objects.161  Soon 
thereafter, Wais furnished instructions and blank questionnaires to the mayors of major cities and to all 
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Landräte in North Württemberg, as well as to the Landesdenkmalamt in Karlsruhe, which would oversee efforts 
in North Baden.162   
A sense of how the subsequent monument review process actually unfolded is provided by records 
compiled by officials in North Baden.163  As Land administrators had requested, completed questionnaires 
submitted to the Landesdenkmalamt by local officials described the monuments in their communities, indicating 
whether they included swords, flags, and the like, if a monument was made up of figures and/or name tables, 
and which was most important to the overall impression conveyed.  Answers were brief and to the point.  
Typical in its content was one submission reading: “The monument consists of a stone on which the names of 
the fallen from 1914-1918 are carved.  The inscription is decisive.  Other than an iron cross with a laurel wreath 
(carved) there is nothing on the monument which could give offense.”164  Images enclosed with the reports 
showed a wide variety of angels, eagles, helmets, iron crosses, boulders, and name tablets, as well as depictions 
of soldiers (Figures 12-16).165 
In mid-November, the responsible official in North Baden, Professor Otto Haupt, wrote to Wais for 
additional guidance.  Referring to the Americans’ evaluation criteria and examples, Haupt observed: 
Because it is exactly these cases [that is, the examples the Americans had given] that make up the 
majority by far, they have especial significance, since it can’t be missed that through them a military 
tradition will be maintained.  To cite a few details: on almost all monuments for the fallen there is an 
iron cross, frequently it dominates the whole form.  Also, steel helmets, swords, and such emblems are 
represented almost everywhere and appear in many cases more than once.  When these appear in 
connection with name tables, there is probably no reason for them to be eliminated. . . . Is that also 
valid when there is no name table, but only a general dedication?166 
 
Referring to the many portrayals of uniformed soldiers, Haupt commented that dying fighters, praying 
soldiers, and mothers with wounded sons were no doubt unobjectionable, but what about expressionless soldiers 
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standing watch, carrying flags, or with weapons by their feet?  Most questionable appeared to be representations 
of battle scenes—for instance, someone throwing a hand grenade or soldiers attacking.  And what of modern 
weapons, lists of battles, and inscriptions?  With respect to the latter, he noted, “Several examples show me that 
in these very inscriptions many times the desire to maintain military tradition is expressed very clearly.  
Couldn’t unpleasant accusations against us result from this?”167 
In responding, Wais did not engage the larger issues raised by Haupt, but provided very specific 
answers.  Iron crosses, steel helmets, and swords were unobjectionable, with or without a name table.  Soldiers 
standing watch, with weapons by their feet, or as flag carriers were not objectionable, but hand grenade 
throwers were.  Groups of charging soldiers should be evaluated individually, and Wais recommended that 
photographs be submitted to MG officials for a decision.  He believed that machine guns, submarines, and 
planes should be removed, but battle names on regimental monuments would not be objectionable, since they 
were historical commemorations.  Inscriptions with militaristic tendencies were, of course, prohibited.168 
The difficulties involved in reconciling these explicit criteria with the Allies’ highly subjective 
instructions, and applying both to sentence-long descriptions, sometimes small or muddy photos, and sketches 
on which body postures and facial expressions were at best approximate seem obvious.  In a number of cases, 
North Baden’s Landesdenkmalamt sought additional information,169 asking several communities, for example, 
to better characterize their soldier figures, as those embodying a “fighting spirit” would likely need to be 
removed.170 
Submitting his results to Wais in late December, Haupt also forwarded materials relating to eight 
questionable memorials for submission to MG officials.  The most interesting of these was a plaque 
commemorating troop maneuvers in 1907 that had involved Hindenburg, a World War I hero.171  Initially 
objecting to the plaque, the Americans eventually approved its retention, concluding that it was a site of 
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historical remembrance whose significance related to the pre-1914 period.172  In several cases, the 
Landesdenkmalamt also later arranged for site visits.  One town’s soldier appeared to be both throwing a 
grenade and filled with a definite “fighting spirit,”173 while that of another looked as if his right hand was raised 
in the “German greeting.”174  Told their soldiers might require removal, both towns protested, the first claiming 
their figure was in fact a dying soldier holding a broken sword,175 the second describing theirs as carrying a 
machine gun on his right shoulder, while raising his left arm to indicate “Forwards!”176  A local professor sent 
to investigate eventually confirmed that the grenade thrower was, as reported, a dying soldier and could stay.  
The second soldier, outfitted with a machine gun, an ammunition belt, and a large pistol, and gesturing to 
unseen comrades, was deemed both militaristic and reflective of a Nazi spirit and was removed.177 
Haupt’s need to rely on local experts for assistance was, in fact, indicative of troubles afflicting the 
German review effort as a whole.  Erratic postal service and a lack of transportation hampered the work in 
North Baden.178 And Wais complained repeatedly to the Land Ministry of Culture about his bureau’s limited 
office space, its need for an automobile, and its shortage of personnel due to denazification proceedings and 
budget constraints.  Still evaluating the more than 1,000 completed questionnaires from North Württemberg in 
late December, Wais reported that these problems were continuing to impede efforts to review submissions and 
to photograph, evaluate, and recommend changes for questionable monuments.  His photographic lab, 
moreover, was currently unavailable, as it had been turned into a kitchen for the family of the state library’s 
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boiler tender.179  Wais seemed prone to complaining, but it cannot be overlooked that at the time the Allies 
issued their directive, the two Land agencies tasked with its implementation were already busy dealing with 
countless war-damaged historical buildings and monuments, as well as locating and retrieving stored church 
bells, works of art, and the like.180 
In January 1947, German officials nevertheless began securing written statements, as demanded by 
U.S. authorities, confirming that those monuments identified as offensive had been modified or removed and 
the objectionable elements completely destroyed.181  Some incoming notices also proposed changes or 
described alterations made to the monuments.  The village of Bellberg, for example, asked for permission to 
replace its absent soldier with a stone cross.  In Ludwigsburg, the drum held by a youth had become a twig.  
Most fittingly, Lautenbach had turned the sword carried by a child into a peace palm.182   
Despite the paper and time expended, however, the final results of the appraisal effort were modest.  
Of nearly 1,500 reported monuments in Württemberg-Baden only 39 required destruction or modification 
(Figures 17-22).183  Some monuments had been removed or altered already in 1945, but overall the touch of the 
MG in 1946 was light. 
This restrained approach earned praise from an observer in Karlsruhe, whose city had survived the 
most recent review effort unscathed.184  Writing in the Badische Neueste Nachrichten in January 1947, a man 
loosely affiliated with the Landesdenkmalamt assessed the city’s various extant monuments.  Removing the 
city’s politically questionable but artistically admirable Wilhelm I statue, he concluded, would turn the Kaiser 
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into “Wilhelm the Great” in the minds of many locals, a status he did not currently hold.  A nearby horse and 
rider honoring World War I dead he described as a “harmless little figure of bronze.”  His lance having 
vanished, the figure had become a “peaceful horseman” (Figure 18).  The writer argued, too, that eliminating 
the battlefield names inscribed on a towering obelisk near the main post office would merely encourage every 
father to explain to his children what was now missing.  People, he warned, could also turn monuments and 
buildings into martyrs.185 
The local Communist Party disagreed.  Supporting the retention of artistically valuable works, the 
party nevertheless asserted that there was a difference between “a piece of art and a monument as a symbol of 
an apparently ineradicable militarism.”  As for inscription-deprived fathers, had the previous writer considered 
how many might remind their children that another so-called world conqueror had just as needlessly ordered 
their grandfathers into Moscow’s ice fields?  “Sentimental war romanticism” should be done away with, it 
argued.  Wilhelm I and Bismarck belonged in a museum; what their spirit had cost the German people was 
immense.  And if questionable monuments remained after January 1947, reactionaries would be pleased, 
arguing that these were not militaristic, but harmless, and that Germans were conservative, not revolutionary.  
But working people expected progress, the party countered, and did not walk unthinkingly past “these gods of 
the past.”186   
This brief dialogue was not alone in raising the issue of pre-World War I monuments.  In August 1947, 
an Allied committee evaluating the implementation of Directive No. 30 proposed that it be expanded to include 
all monuments, observing that Germany also maintained militaristic monuments that pre-dated August 1, 
1914.187  But only the French ultimately supported this revision.188  Similarly, for several years officials in 
Stuttgart periodically discussed the meaning and possible removal of their Wilhelm I monument,189 though the 
statue remained (Figure 11).   
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Clearly there were Germans in Württemberg-Baden who, like the Allies, believed war monuments 
were harmful, glorifying a military tradition that had brought Germany excessive pain and destruction.  
Nevertheless, as was the case with street signs, the evidence suggests that these voices alone could not have 
forced such an extensive evaluation effort.  This required the initiative and authority of the Americans, 
substantially influenced by their allies.  Significantly, however, the fact that the United States set the rules also 
meant that it effectively established the limits of change.  In drafting Directive No. 30, the Allies had—perhaps 
unintentionally—dealt with the slippery problem of defining militarism by also prohibiting monuments that 
glorified incidents of war and kept alive German military tradition.  Yet they immediately narrowed this broad 
perspective by restricting the directive’s application to monuments falling within a certain date range.  More 
importantly, the Americans urged German authorities to judge each monument individually, but also introduced 
guidelines which precluded truly nuanced appraisals and the removal of design elements that even German 
officials thought might keep alive Germany’s military tradition. 
Excluding numerous World War I monuments as simply commemorative ultimately protected many 
that were not so innocuous as Allied officials believed.  Reinhardt Koselleck has observed that remembering 
those killed in war is a political act, with the living left to assign meaning to the deaths of the fallen.190  This 
need to give meaning was particularly great following the mass slaughter and defeat of World War I.  In a far-
reaching study of the forms, symbolism, and dedication ceremonies of Weimar-era war monuments, Meinhold 
Lurz has identified as repeated themes defiance against the Treaty of Versailles, summons to continue 
Germany’s fight in the present, and calls to restore German unity and strength—ideas conveyed not just by 
aggressive soldiers, but also by rigid horsemen, dying warriors, classical nudes, and steel helmets.191  The 
Karlsruhe dragoon therefore not only remembered dead comrades, but in his muscular physique and upright 
bearing was representative of an iconography praising war-hardened manly virtues, German military prowess, 
and invincibility (Figure 18).192  George Mosse similarly pointed to the importance during the interwar years of 
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what he termed the “Myth of War Experience,” which legitimized the war experience and displaced its ugly 
reality by stressing soldierly camaraderie, manliness, and war as a regenerating process.193  Central to this myth 
was a “cult of the fallen soldier” that saw a soldier’s death as a noble sacrifice redeeming or revitalizing the 
nation and drew part of its strength from monuments embodying these ideals.194  The Nazis only intensified the 
glorification of war martyrs, constructing more aggressive monuments and staging elaborate ceremonies 
honoring the war dead that made the call for emulation even more explicit.195  World War I monuments had 
thus spoken to Germans of their nation’s past, present, and future in ways that post-World War II American 
officials did not and German officials were not required to acknowledge.196 
Still, as Koselleck has suggested, a war monument’s political message tends to fade after those who 
erected it pass on.  Monuments rarely continue to convey meaning without support from society.197  The 
Americans, British, and Soviets seemed to sense this in dismissing the possible negative effects of pre-World 
War I monuments, though they did not spell out the distinctions they were making or apply this sensibility to 
more recent monuments.  In theory, the U.S. approach supports Koselleck’s further assertion that monuments 
will be removed when they are seen as a threat, where unwelcome traditions are still alive.198  In practice, 
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however, the Americans exercised selectivity and restraint, an approach that resulted not just from oversight or 
ignorance, but that was also rooted in a conviction that respecting German sensitivities would in the end benefit 
Allied interests more than would insistence on all-encompassing destruction.  Paradoxically, limited 
demilitarization would best serve the interests of a lasting peace. 
Even as the review process unfolded, moreover, World War I monuments were losing their potency.  
One North Württemberg official alluded to this already in September 1949 when he wrote to Ulm’s lord mayor 
asking the city to arrange for the clean-up of a local regimental monument and the grassy area surrounding it.  
“Even if monuments to the fallen of the First World War are presently not very popular,” he observed, “the city 
administration would nevertheless earn the thanks of many old soldiers if it could fulfill this small wish.”199   
Form and iconography determine the parameters of monument interpretation, but meaning is best 
perpetuated when it is continually reinforced.200  In occupied Germany, the social and cultural context of these 
and other tangible points of continuity was changing.  The now unavoidable confrontation with destruction and 
death, the humiliation of occupation, and the introduction of new political leadership, as well as the many 
deliberate efforts to draw attention to Germany’s militaristic past, were altering the meaning projected onto and 
drawn from the existing physical remainders of that past. 
 
Publications  
If invading troops and the first military government officials on the scene readily divested German 
buildings and avenues of their swastikas and Adolf Hitler street signs, the Americans usually proceeded more 
carefully when dealing with German books.  A commitment to eradicating potentially destructive ideas, 
reinforced by a need to alleviate paper shortages, eventually impelled them to act, however.  In the end, MG 
officials overcame the resistance of those Americans—including some within their own ranks—who worried 
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that confiscating books would not only fly in the face of basic American values but, because of this, also prove 
counterproductive.  The result was a succession of removal efforts that, as with so many other demilitarization 
initiatives, began haphazardly amidst the post-invasion chaos before solidifying into broader Allied policies.   
While American MG officials battled their own consciences and eventually scrambled to neutralize an 
emotional outcry at home, German schoolteachers, librarians, and book dealers repeatedly combed through 
stacks of books and outdated magazines searching for items that trespassed against vague criteria set by their 
occupiers.  Whether eager, resentful, rolling their eyes, or attempting to reconcile their current work with a 
stated American commitment to democracy, they had little choice but to keep vetting. 
 
The Early Months 
SHAEF divided responsibilities for dealing with German books between two different organizations.  
SHAEF education officers were to supervise all libraries other than commercial lending libraries, while the 
latter, along with bookstores and publishers, fell within the jurisdiction of information control officers.201  Not 
surprisingly, the different types of institutions were also covered by coordinated, but separate, policies. 
The SHAEF military government handbook finalized during the fall of 1944 had ordered the 
confiscation of all schoolbooks and teaching materials “reflecting a Nazi or militaristic outlook,” but also stated 
that books in public and university libraries and “reference books in the libraries of other institutions of higher 
education” were not to be removed, seized, or destroyed.202  In May 1945, SHAEF officials were still directing 
that all books found on a school’s premises should immediately be placed in a locked room to prevent the future 
use of objectionable publications.203  But they were reconsidering and still debating a policy for other libraries 
just days before Germany surrendered, with some on SHAEF’s civil affairs staff recommending that the Allies 
prohibit the circulation and review (but also destruction) of all materials deemed objectionable and its Legal 
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Branch protesting that the closing and control of libraries other than those in elementary and secondary schools 
was neither “desirable or practicable.”204 
In particular, policymakers advocating restrictions worried that unacceptable books would continue to 
nurture Nazi ideas.205  Some SHAEF planners also maintained that permitting objectionable publications to 
circulate freely “would render MG ridiculous.”  Others argued the opposite.  “From a psychological point of 
view,” they suggested, “it might be a good thing to require every German adult to re-read Mein Kampf and its 
derivative literature.”206  Legal Branch officials pointed out that banning “otherwise insignificant books” just 
made them more tantalizing, while if left alone they would gradually become obsolete.  They also cited the 
challenges of compiling a list of proscribed books, argued that library regulations would not eliminate the 
holdings of numerous clubs, associations, and individuals, and underscored the problems associated with 
cleansing technical libraries.  “The reform of technical (i.e. educated) thought cannot be effected by preventing 
access to books,” they stressed.  “In our especial field we should consider any attempt to control law libraries as 
impractical and as likely to defeat its own purpose.”  Furthermore, they believed that MG officers had neither 
the qualifications nor the time to do the job.207 
In contrast, information control regulations distributed by SHAEF early in the occupation explicitly 
prohibited the circulation of objectionable books.  Lending libraries, book dealers, and printers could register 
with MG authorities and then reopen, but they had to clear their shelves of materials propagating Nazi, racist, 
anti-democratic, anti-Allied, or “militaristic ideas, including pan-Germanism and German imperialism.”208   
Many bookstores and commercial libraries thus reopened quickly with vetted stocks.209  This was true 
in Heidelberg, where information control officers also soon issued instructions for all unacceptable publications 
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to be delivered to one location in the city.210  American supervision, moreover, did not always end with the 
registrations, book confiscations, and follow-up spot checks.   In mid July, for instance, a publications control 
officer noticed an objectionable book in the window of a Heidelberg lending library, prompting the local public 
safety officer to order a search of all of the city’s book dealers.  The rest of the establishments were “in pretty 
good shape,” another publications control official later reported, although the offending library had “quite some 
objectionable material.”  Still, the official was not terribly worried, as he had earlier segregated some 100 books 
at the library and most of those recently identified were items the proprietor had simply not yet removed from 
the premises.211 
Despite the fast action of some information control officers, it appears that early treatment of German 
libraries was erratic and not particularly proactive.  In mid July, one publications control officer informed his 
superior that his detachment had been “forced to extend its control function over the local public and town 
libraries . . . because this important means of information has remained without supervision.”212  Commenting 
on the entire U.S. Zone, an Information Control Division (ICD) report similarly noted in late August that most 
libraries were closed and “few, if any, steps are being taken towards their reopening.”213   
At Ulm’s Max-Eyth library, the head librarian stopped lending books on the day the Americans took 
over the city, apparently without receiving any specific instructions from them.214  Only in late summer 1945 
did German officials segregate its objectionable books and those of other area libraries.215  As instructed by MG 
authorities, in mid September local public and commercial libraries, bookstores, antiquariats, and publishers 
also delivered more than 4,000 vetted books to a central location, where the items were locked up in 
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anticipation of eventual transport elsewhere.216  In Heidelberg, the local MG reopened the public library and its 
two branches on May 9 only to have new MG officials close them again at the end of July for a thorough 
cleansing.217  With its offending books “sequestered in a place of safekeeping,” the city library finally received 
permission to reopen in late October.218  It was one of the first in the area to do so.219   
By comparison, the French moved swiftly and showed little reluctance to confiscate German books.  
Karlsruhe, Stuttgart, and surrounding communities in Baden and Württemberg thus had an experience 
considerably different than those areas initially controlled by the Americans.  Already in mid June 1945, French 
MG authorities issued directives to local German officials in and around Karlsruhe giving them less than two 
weeks to collect in a single location all “Nazi books” held by schools, universities, bookstores, publishers, and 
others, including individuals, though the French did offer to make exceptions for books to be used for historical 
and scholarly purposes.220 
Orders in hand, the Landrat of Landkreis Karlsruhe immediately instructed the mayors under his 
jurisdiction to collect all offending publications and transport them to the Papier- und Zellstoffwerke AG, a 
paper and pulp firm in Ettlingen, where a plant official had been tasked with safeguarding the materials.221  One 
mayor subsequently reported that local residents had destroyed most of the relevant materials before the French 
arrived.222  Others indicated that occupying troops had already confiscated or burned the books.223  Another 
explained that he had recently ordered the people in his town to destroy any offending publications that the 
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French had left untouched.224  Still another professed that few people in his Catholic village had ever owned 
such items.225  On the other hand, the mayor of one town reported collecting some 3,000 kilograms of books 
and papers,226 and, altogether, individuals and organizations in the Landkreis surrendered more than 10,000 
kilograms of printed materials.227 
In Karlsruhe, meanwhile, the directive provoked a flurry of activity.  Provisional mayor Josef Heinrich 
quickly put city officials to work securing personnel assistance, arranging for the printing of placards and 
handbills, and notifying schools, bookstores, printers, and the district officials who were to organize and 
supervise most of the collecting efforts.228  During the days that followed, district staffers posted placards and 
distributed some 35,000 handbills informing Karlsruhe residents, private businesses, associations, and others 
that they should turn in all printed matter dealing with topics like National Socialism, Japan, defense policies 
(Wehrpolitik), education for war (Wehrerziehung), military history, Nazi economics, and the Nuremberg laws, 
as well as all German histories published after 1933 and “all entertainment magazines, youth publications, 
readers, etc, with military, fascist, or racist tendencies.”229  In the meantime, the district chiefs located facilities 
suitable for amassing books.230  Several later complained in their weekly reports about the burden the book 
collection effort—added to the French clothing collection order—placed on their already overworked staffs.  
“Such additional work can bog down the whole operation of a district administration,” protested one.231  Once 
the districts had assumed control of all of the publications from their areas, hand- and horse carts supplied by 
the city picked the materials up and transported them to the Haus Solms (a small local palace), where other 
workers tracked the deliveries.232   
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On June 30, Heinrich reported to French authorities that Karlsruhe residents had turned in more than 
28,000 books and some 29,000 magazines and booklets.233  Burdensome to those struggling to meet a tight 
deadline, the goal of the enterprise had the tacit approval of at least a few involved.  The city library’s newly 
appointed director, for example, later described his institution’s review efforts as eliminating the “Nazi poison.”  
Citing the subjects listed in the handbills, he suggested that the “roots” lay beyond these, in the “evil spirit of 
Potsdam,” and should be traced back to this time.234 
Similar events were unfolding in neighboring Württemberg, where on June 25 the local French MG 
sent Stuttgart’s lord mayor instructions stating that all libraries should be closed.  All librarians were to lock up 
their books and to prepare, for submission to the MG, lists of books falling into four categories: Nazi 
propaganda, books that advocated Prussian militarism, anti-French works, and anti-Allied publications.  The 
French made the lord mayor responsible for collecting and storing all “literature works of the Third Reich in 
schools, libraries, publishing houses, and private libraries” and reporting back to the city commander regarding 
the outcome of these efforts before July 5.  Accordingly, Stuttgart officials hurriedly informed key city 
administrators of the directive and published a notice in the official city gazette specifying that all publications 
should be delivered to the city business school’s gymnasium.235  In early July, moreover, the French expanded 
the order to include all of Württemberg, with a notice in the gazette stressing that the Germans should use “the 
strictest standard” in deciding what books to surrender.  Even a guide to letter-writing that used the greeting 
“Heil Hitler” only once was offensive, it advised, although references to National Socialism, leading Nazis, or 
Nazi agencies found in technical or scholarly books could be pasted over.236 
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During the days that followed, employees of local factories, public libraries, city offices, and other 
establishments dutifully drew up lists and turned in their books.   The publications surrendered included 
numerous copies of Mein Kampf, as well as works by Josef Goebbels, Alfred Rosenberg, and other leading 
Nazis.  Some books dealt with pet Nazi themes: Was ist Rasse (What is Race?), Wie ein Proletarierjunge SA-
Mann wurde (How a Proletarian Boy Became an SA-Mann), and Die germanischen Grundlagen des 
schwäbischen Bauerntums (The Germanic Foundations of the Swabian Peasantry).  237  Stuttgart’s Zeiss Ikon 
firm turned over 34 copies of Das Geheimnis japanischer Kraft (The Secret of Japanese Power).238  Several 
schools submitted categorized lists.  Among the items they classified under “militarism” were works produced 
by the Wehrmacht High Command, books describing assorted military campaigns, biographies of men such as 
Hindenburg and Richthofen, and texts aimed at young readers and their teachers, including Jungens in Feldgrau 
(Boys in Field Gray), Hans wird Flieger (Hans Becomes a Pilot), Der Fliegerbuch des deutschen Jugend (The 
Aircraft Book of German Youth), Luftfahrt im Unterricht (Aviation in School), Wehrgeist in der Schule 
(Military Spirit in the School), and Soldatendienst im Neuen Reich (Military Service in the New Reich).239 
Some respondents had little to report, as Allied bombing and fires had destroyed parts or most of their 
holdings.  Others cited difficulties arising from the fact that materials had been moved to outlying locations 
during the war.  Seven public libraries in the Stuttgart area initially indicated that they would turn in catalog 
cards describing the books removed, since the shortage of typewriters made it impossible for them to prepare 
the required lists by the deadline specified.  (City officials apparently eventually dealt with this problem.)240  
Meanwhile, a ruined card catalog could exponentially magnify the time needed to complete a review.241 
School administrators who, in terms of sheer numbers, were most affected by the directive, sometimes 
had more unusual problems.  Children had taken books home and had now left the area or could not retrieve 
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books from houses commandeered by the Americans.242  Sometimes no one was available to do the work.  One 
regional official sent an instructor from a nearby school to clean out the library of a school whose teacher was 
elsewhere helping with the harvest.243  Another reported difficulties conducting a review of a student library 
because both the principal and the library administrator were absent and the books locked up.244  School 
officials also had trouble simply obtaining access to their schools.  Several schools were housing Russians or 
serving as military hospitals.245  One administrator attributed his delay in reporting to the fact that until recently 
a Wehrmacht unit had been using the local school as a demobilization center.246  Many others explained that 
occupation forces—sometimes French, sometimes American—had requisitioned their schools and denied them 
access.247  In a few cases, the arriving troops had looted the books.248  The head of one secondary school 
reported that when it was evacuated, the school’s libraries had been hastily moved to the building’s stage.  
“Everything lies there now higgled-piggledy—the goats next to the sheep—jumbled,” he complained.  A sorting 
effort was currently impossible on the dark stage, he added.  He and the school librarian nevertheless completed 
a vetting of the materials several weeks later, as ordered by a regional official.249 
At some point, a few mayors evidently burned objectionable books identified in their villages.250  And 
the French took away most of the books assembled at Stuttgart’s business school, as well as publications 
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gathered in some other communities.251  As directed by Württemberg education authorities, most school 
officials locked up books culled from their libraries and sought instructions from local MG officers as to what 
they should so with them.  But by this time, American officials had inherited responsibility for their disposition 
in North Württemberg and often had no immediate answers.  In at least one case, MG officers told a regional 
administrator to keep the materials secured in the schools and await further instructions.252   
The French also left North Baden before determining the fate of books amassed at Karlsruhe’s Haus 
Solms and at the Papier- und Zellstoffwerke AG in Ettlingen.253  The Landrat from Landkreis Karlsruhe almost 
immediately recommended to incoming U.S. officials that the materials in Ettlingen be pulped and any monies 
received donated to a fund for local Nazi victims.254  But although the Americans inspected the publications 
soon thereafter, it was months before they finally decided how to dispose of them.255  In the interim, Karlsruhe 
officials had also looked into sending their books to the paper mill, with the city to receive supplies of much-
coveted new paper in return.256  At the end of 1945, the city library’s director was reporting that the MG had 
ordered the books stored in the Haus Solms to be pulped.257  But this, too, did not immediately occur. 
By now, another American player had joined the game.  Nobly preserving materials for posterity, it 
was also effectively slowing the work of local MG officers and reducing the volume of paper the Germans 
might receive in any bartering operations.  Shortly after the war ended, the U.S. Library of Congress (LoC) had 
established a “mission” in Europe designed to augment its own collections and assist other American libraries in 
doing the same.  Specifically, library agents began tracking down book orders that had remained unshipped 
when war broke out and buying up old stocks from publishers to distribute to more than 100 American research 
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libraries that had been unable to keep their collections current during the hostilities.  The LoC personnel, 
however, also agreed to help with the screening and disposing of objectionable German publications and thus 
had their pick of materials confiscated not only from German army and Nazi organizations and but also from 
German booksellers, publishers, libraries, and other sources.  Altogether, the library representatives sought to 
purchase and rescue from paper mills “up to fifty copies each of books of general reference value and at least 
three copies of all other publications.”258 
The picture that emerges of these efforts during the spring of 1946 is a rather disorderly one involving 
LoC agents traveling about occupied Germany, visiting publishers and inspecting stashes of books captured by 
the army and collected by the ICD, selecting items for preservation, and making plans for the books to be 
shipped back to the United States.  In this context, the LoC’s representative in Württemberg-Baden, Julius 
Allen, finally determined the fate of many of the confiscated publications.  As of January 1946, no ICD outpost 
could authorize the pulping of books until an LoC agent had first examined them.259  After Allen concluded that 
there were no items of interest held in Pforzheim, for example, an ICD official recommended to a local MG 
officer that the materials be pulped.260  In Landkreis Aalen, Allen identified publications turned over by a 
library that were actually unobjectionable and could be returned.261  On the other hand, in late March, he 
acquired “about three or four boxes” of “tendentious literature” from Stuttgart’s ICD detachment.  He also spent 
several days in Karlsruhe, where at the Haus Solms he sifted through Nazi literature, school books, and 
periodicals published since 1933, which he believed comprised “a fair percentage of the material of this nature 
collected in Baden.”  He later reported that he had laid claim to roughly “5,000 volumes (at least), certainly 
enough to load two 6x6 trucks if books were not crated.”  In addition, he planned to take several boxes of the 
city library’s offensive publications.  A portion of the remainder was destined for the archives of the badly 
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decimated Baden State Library, while the rest was to be pulped.  Allen also visited Ettlingen’s paper mill, where 
he rescued from pulping some four boxes of materials, including music.262 
As suggested by Allen’s report, the Americans were not averse to allowing German institutions to 
retain objectionable publications themselves.  In addition to permitting Baden’s state library to supplement its 
holdings, the Americans agreed to let the Karlsruhe public library keep more than 600 books for scholarly use 
and also approved a request from Württemberg cultural officials that the Land’s research libraries be allowed to 
retain books from the Third Reich, provided they remained under lock and key with access granted only to 
authorized researchers. 263  Yet the Americans evidently did cart off some rather significant materials.  Allen, for 
instance, was also deciding how best to handle Stuttgart’s Weltkriegsbücherei (World War Library), a large 
collection of books, pamphlets, pictures, and other items relating to the First World War.  At least a portion was 
eventually sent to the United States.264  Library officials in Washington, however, ultimately decided against 
retaining or distributing materials clearly identified as belonging to German research institutions and actually 
shipped 190 cases of Weltkriegsbücherei materials back to Stuttgart even before the occupation had ended.265 
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ACC Order No. 4 
Late in 1945, the chief of the ICD’s Publications Section summarized for a colleague the American 
position regarding German books, explaining that it was against U.S. policy for Americans to destroy German-
owned publications or to specify “particular publications  which Germans may not own, read, lend, sell or 
display.”  They were, however, permitted to specify “the types of publications which conflict with the stated 
purpose of the occupation.” They might also make German registrants responsible for preventing the sale or 
circulation of this literature, help German agencies to “segregate publications they consider objectionable in 
terms of U.S. policy and move them to paper mills for pulping,” and accept lists of objectionable books 
prepared by the Germans to use in spot-checking publications held by registered book dealers.266  In other 
words, as a compromise between outright censorship and American long-term security needs, while 
simultaneously promoting new German values, the Americans prohibited the Germans from circulating certain 
kinds of literature, monitored their obedience, and were willing to help arrange for the destruction of offending 
materials to produce badly needed paper.  But, officially, they were unwilling to instruct the Germans as to what 
books, specifically, should be removed or to destroy the publications themselves. 
As with so many American policies, Berlin’s quadripartite governing apparatus was slowly catching 
up.  Not surprisingly, Allied talks regarding the confiscation of Nazi and militaristic literature now provoked 
new discussions in U.S. policymaking circles concerning the advisability and potential impact of such 
measures.  Perhaps more unexpected was the storm of protest the policy now incited at home. 
Prompted by papers submitted by the Soviets and by an informal quadripartite information control 
services group, respectively, both the Military Directorate and Political Directorate began discussing the issue 
of German publications in early 1946.  While the military paper emphasized forbidding Germans to possess 
books, journals, memoirs, regulations, and other materials that could be used in military training or study, as 
well as Nazi works,267 the second document centered on more typical concerns in seeking to ban the selling, 
lending, or distribution of literature that supported or glorified Nazi or militaristic ideas or that tried to create 
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divisions among the Allies.268  Eventually, the Political Directorate decided to combine the information control 
paper with one approved by the Military Directorate to produce a document for further discussion.269 
OMGUS officials had mixed feelings about these developments, struggling to navigate between 
conflicting concerns.  For ICD officers, the proposed information control plan essentially represented only a 
minor change in degree.  The division did, however, adamantly resist Soviet pressures to order the vetting of 
personal libraries.270  Absolutely committed to confiscating all military training materials, the Armed Forces 
Division worried less about infringements on personal freedoms.  “It must be remembered,” wrote Colonel 
Thomas Whitted, Jr., head of the division’s Demobilization Branch, “that the primary reason for the occupation 
of Germany is the liquidation of its war potential and the removal of a threat to peace.  Democratic principles 
and privileges should be granted to the German people, in such a measure, as they are earned and can be 
absorbed by the German people themselves.”271  Division officials, however, were also being coached by 
members of OMGUS’s Political Affairs Office, who were the most squeamish about ongoing talks.  A proposal 
for the confiscation and destruction of literature was undemocratic and too reminiscent of the Nazis’ own 
conduct, Donald Heath explained informally to the military representatives.272 
State Department officials in Washington were even more disturbed.  In a telegram to Secretary of 
State James Byrnes, Clay’s political advisor Robert Murphy conceded that measures being considered might 
provoke a negative reaction in democratic countries, but also pointed out that the ACC’s Law No. 8 on military 
training already banned many of the materials.  “Furthermore,” he suggested, “during early stages of occupation 
when Germans are exposed to democratic way of life which many of them still regard as alien and with which 
many others are unfamiliar, a wisely drawn paper giving more precise content to Law 8 and perhaps also 
incorporating provisions curbing possible abuses of police power in matter of restraint of public expression, 
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might be beneficial.”273  His Washington counterparts remained skeptical.  The department, Byrnes replied, was 
concerned “lest a program for suppression of allegedly noxious printed material lead to grave abuses 
reminiscent of Nazi book burnings and similar acts of violence to the intellect” and wanted to study the new 
proposal before OMGUS officials agreed to it.  Consistent with the department’s emphasis on reconstruction 
and reeducation, Byrnes also explained that it recognized the “need for carefully weighed measures to prevent 
literary campaigns for revival of National Socialism and militarism,” but was “persuaded that fundamental 
change of German outlook must come from positive program of democratic teaching and democratic example 
rather than from attempting to suppress the extended categories of materials” the information control group had 
proposed.  “As Dept understands this program,” he concluded, “it appears not only impossible of enforcement 
without excessive police methods but also psychologically unsound.”274 
 Despite Washington’s concerns, a proposal regarding literature confiscation slowly made its way 
through Berlin’s quadripartite machinery.  The major sticking point here involved books held by individual 
Germans.  The Americans and the British, in particular, refused to countenance any provision to remove books 
from private homes, while the Soviets stressed the need to eradicate Germany’s Nazi and militarist heritage and 
countered claims that enforcement would be impossible by reporting satisfactory results in their own zone.275  
The end result of the talks was ACC Order No. 4, which required all circulating libraries, bookshops, and 
publishers, as well as all city, state, school, university, research institution, and scientific and technical 
association libraries—but not individuals—to turn in a broad range of materials, including “books, pamphlets, 
magazines, files of newspapers, albums, manuscripts, documents, maps, plans, song and music books, 
cinematographic films and magic lantern slides,” containing Nazi propaganda (including “incitements to 
aggression”) and any textbooks, instructions, diagrams, plans and other items that contributed to “military 
training and education or to the maintenance and development of war potential.”  All of the materials, the order 
noted, “shall be placed at the disposal of the Military Zone Commanders for destruction.”276   
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From nearly the moment the ACC ratified it on May 13, 1946, Order No. 4 caused controversy.  And 
OMGUS officials were immediately thrown into damage control mode.  At two news briefings on the 
thirteenth, an agitated Berlin press corps hurled a barrage of questions at Vivian Cox, an assistant to the U.S. 
member of the Military Directorate.  No, she reported, the United States had not objected to the measure on the 
grounds that it impinged on freedom of speech and the press, but rather due to concerns about practicality.  No, 
it did not matter that American-licensed German newspapers might be denied the use of critical resources.  The 
objective of the order, like the directive regarding monuments issued the same day, was to wipe out German 
militarism and Nazism to the degree that this was possible.  Yes, she understood that book banning elsewhere 
had increased book sales and that thousands of copies of Mein Kampf circulating outside of Germany could be 
returned when the Allies departed; in fact, the Germans could hide and circulate copies of their own, if they 
were so inclined, she added. Yes, even short passages might doom entire books.  Yes, only German authors and 
German militarism were covered.277 
To Cox’s audience, the implications of her explanations were clear.  As the New York Times’ 
McLaughlin put it, “All books glorifying militarism of other countries would be available to students of history 
in German universities, to whom, however, would be denied an opportunity to peruse works of German authors 
contaminated by even brief mentions of German military successes.”  One particularly sensitive issue raised at 
the news briefing, moreover, was that of burning books.  When a reporter asked how the principles embodied in 
the order differed from those of the infamous Nazi book burnings, Cox indicated that she believed the principles 
involved were the same.  Nevertheless, according to McLaughlin, Cox “stoutly defended the action . . . on the 
ground that it was imperative to cleanse the German mentality of any militaristic taint.”  It may have been this 
assertion that prompted McLaughlin to conclude the first paragraph of her article on the order with the sentence: 
“It is assumed that books will be burned.”278  This supposition, and its unstated corollary, that the Allies were 
swimming dangerously close to fascist waters, earned MG officials fierce criticism. 
“Of all the orders issued by the Allied Military Government in Germany, the one that must sound most 
familiar to the Germans is that decreeing the burning of millions of books, newspapers, and other writings 
deemed ‘anti-democratic, militaristic, or Nazi,’” declared the editors of the New York Times two days later.  “If 
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the Germans still desire to read about war,” they added, “they can satisfy their perverse desire by reading the 
military literature of their conquerors. . . . But they must not gaze upon such products of their own authorship, 
even if that means rewriting their whole political, military and economic history.”  Suggesting that “Hitler’s 
ghost” was laughing at how his conquerors were “beginning to tread in his footsteps,” the Times editors argued 
that “to the democratic world, and to the American people in particular, the order will appear simply stupid, if 
only for the reason that it is bound to achieve precisely the opposite result.”  The order would make Nazi 
ideology a persecuted religion and teach that Hitler had been correct—the Allies, after all, were adopting his 
methods.  Moreover, outlawing “patriotism” would drive it underground “to nazism.”279 
The following day, a letter to the Times from a representative of the New York City bar association 
expressed a similar view.  Americans had fought the war to defend and extend the principles of the Bill of 
Rights, the writer insisted, and if they now abandoned their ideals and burned their enemies’ books, they would 
have “won a war only to betray the great principles for which [they] fought.”  Instead, the books should be 
preserved so that all might understand “the thoughts and motives which made Germany the most hated nation in 
the world and reduced that once honored and respected country to dust and ashes.” 280  American Library 
Association leaders, meanwhile, sent telegrams to President Truman, the secretaries of war and state, and key 
members of Congress labeling the plan to confiscate and destroy Nazi publications “short-sighted, unsound, and 
contrary to democratic principles” and calling for its revocation.281  American officials also received a variety of 
other letters protesting the burning of German books.282 
On the other hand, some Americans no doubt agreed with another Times letter writer who asked, “Do 
we imitate a criminal when we pay him back tit for tat?” and contended that burning books would be wrong in 
the United States, “but in present-day Germany, with heart and mind still full of Nazi poison, drastic measures 
are necessary.”283  In June, Library of Congress officials in Germany also jumped into the fray, telling 
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colleagues from the library association that the recent telegram was “a harmful piece of poor statesmanship” 
likely “based upon incomplete (if not inaccurate) information probably deriving from sensational press reports.”  
The “practice of military authorities,” they argued, had been “reasoned, enlightened, and in no sense 
undemocratic,” with welcome recognition for the importance of preserving materials for research.  “They 
should be commended rather than reproved.”284 
Despite certain votes of confidence—and the reality that the American MG had been confiscating 
books for nearly a year—U.S. Military Governor General Joseph McNarney in late May acknowledged the 
extent of the negative reaction in the U.S., admitting at a press conference that officials were reviewing the 
policy.285  In fact, OMGUS was responding in a number of ways.  At several meetings in mid May, high-level 
personnel from the information control, education, and political staffs agreed that the new order called for no 
change in existing policy.  For some time, books had been pulped to provide badly needed paper for new 
schoolbooks.  “The aim followed in disposing of undesirable literature by pulping has been the production of 
paper for the execution of a positive program of democratic re-education of Germany,” they concluded.  But 
they also were not entirely happy with the way the order had turned out.286  Almost immediately, American 
ACA delegates began pushing for an amendment stating explicitly that zone commanders could permit books to 
be saved for “research and scientific study.”287  Prevailing over Soviet resistance, the Americans, with solid 
British support, achieved this objective in August.288  OMGUS also launched a review to assess how such an 
unsatisfactory order had come to be issued.  Concluding that “the staff action was badly bungled,” an 
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investigator cited a pervasive lack of initiative and the breakdown of internal consultation processes on multiple 
fronts.289 
Clay, meanwhile, was dousing fires in Washington.  In late May, the War Department Civil Affairs 
Division’s head, Major General O. P. Echols, raised the issue of civil liberties with Clay.  The new order, Clay 
replied, introduced no substantial policy change—MG had prohibited the circulation of offensive literature 
since the occupation began and hundreds of thousands of books had already been pulped.  Nazi textbooks could 
clearly no longer be used in German schools, he reminded, and he favored pulping the most egregious books 
currently sequestered in German libraries as well.  There would, of course, be no public book burnings, and the 
Library of Congress was ensuring that copies of the pulped books were being saved.  Clay, however, conveyed 
this information within a lengthy commentary on the civil liberties question.  “It was my understanding that 
restoration of civil liberties in Germany was an objective to be obtained as rapidly as consistent with other 
objectives such as denazification and demilitarization,” he began.  “Of course we have not restored all civil 
liberties in Germany.”  He cited post-publication press censorship, the “thousands still in jail without bond 
awaiting trial until Nuremberg is over,” control of scientific studies that might be applied to war, the possible 
restraint of general staff officers “for years to come,” and American approval of party platforms.  “None of 
these measures are consistent with our understanding of civil liberties,” he pointed out.  Restoring civil liberties 
under MG, he advised, “must be a slow process during which there will always be conflicting opinion as to the 
rapidity with which such liberties are being restored as compared to the attainment of our other objectives.”  
The Americans had “advanced more rapidly” than the other zones, but they were “still far from having a 
democratic Germany.”  If the War Department thought they should restore civil liberties now, he added, they 
“would probably have to withdraw from quadripartite government as the other powers are not ready for such 
action.”  He continued: “In my opinion neither is the U.S. zone in Germany, even though we have progressed 
better than expected.”290 
Soon thereafter, General John Hilldring, now an assistant secretary of state, asked Echols for 
comments on a draft cable to army officials in Germany stating that the order was “so sweeping in import” that 
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the government wanted to study the issue further before endorsing it as policy.  Leaving out Clay’s comments 
regarding German civil liberties, Echols summarized Clay’s remarks on the new policy for Hilldring and 
reported that Donald Heath had assured that the order would permit reference and university libraries to retain 
books for authorized users.  Echols also pointed out that the cable “would undoubtedly embarrass General Clay 
in quadripartite circles since it could be regarded as nonconcurrence in his judgment by the United States 
Government” and “would require that no action be taken in the U.S Zone on an Order which has already been 
published and is being implemented.”  He suggested, too, that “most of the objections . . . have been caused by 
the poor public relations job done in allowing such an important story to be released by Miss Cox. . . . The 
references in the press to ‘burning of books’ and the likening of the order to Nazi practices were most 
unfortunate.”  He advised that Clay be asked both to carry out the order as planned and to fully explain the 
program to the American press in Germany to make clear that there would be no book burnings or witch 
hunts.291  Echols’ view evidently ultimately prevailed. 
Interestingly, as Clay had informed Echols, the American people seemed far more distressed by the 
new order than the Germans were.  This may have been due, in part, to the fact that the measures were not 
really new to them.  The democratic sensibilities of some were perhaps also less acute.  Yet Clay was correct, 
too, in arguing that “some responsible German liberals who have always opposed Nazism have consistently 
favored the removal of Nazi literature from Germany or its destruction.” 292   
Shortly after the ACC issued Order No. 4, the ICD sent out interviewers to solicit German opinions on 
the subject.  Some raised the very issues about which many Americans were concerned.  “In Heidelberg 
publishers’ circles the opinion prevails that the application of such a law is incompatible with democratic 
principles,” MG officials reported, adding, “Quite a few publishers called this order a copy of national-socialist 
legislation.”  They had also maintained that publishing it was “dangerous for creating opposite tendencies.”  A 
number of Germans worried, similarly, that proscribing books would just make them more attractive.  
“Forbidden books always are exciting for young people and are a great temptation,” noted a secondary school 
principal in Stuttgart.  In Ulm, a publications control official raised a different issue.  Booksellers and librarians, 
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he observed, “know that these books become rare and that their value increases steadily.” They were therefore 
taking them home or giving them to friends to prevent their confiscation.293 
A few of those interviewed suggested that many Germans were indifferent to the new order.  Others 
appreciated it.  Ulm’s Weisser, reported a local intelligence officer, “could not think of a more ideal way of 
tackling the question.”  The order, he also noted, “was generally welcomed in publishers’ circles.  They take a 
positive attitude towards the law and think it almost too tolerant.”  Most thought it quite generous in permitting 
private possession of the banned literature.  In Heidelberg, Hans Meier, the chairman of the SPD, and Ralph 
Agricola, the Communist editor of the Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung, both advocated burning Nazi books, the latter 
indicating that the new order was, in the words of a MG report, “absolutely necessary for the rebuilding of the 
young democracy.”294   
Many of those approached by ICD interviewers occupied a middle ground.  Like Agricola, a few 
suggested that the surrender of books should be voluntary.  More often, individuals argued that certain books 
were dangerous and should be removed from public libraries and schools, but also lobbied for retaining samples 
of Nazi materials for educational and research purposes.  Having Nazi literature at hand was critical for those 
trying to combat old ideas and instill new ones, some explained.  Others hoped to reveal the foolishness of Nazi 
ideas.295 
Whether or not they saw value in the book removal initiative, a number of Germans saw its limits.  
Obtaining new books containing new ideas was equally, if not more, important some pointed out.  “The Nazi 
period itself has shown that you cannot suppress an entire literature by forbidding it,” reminded a librarian from 
the Württemberg State Library.  “Ideas have to be killed by ideas, not by governmental orders.”  His thoughts 
were echoed by an Ulm high school student who maintained “that if democracy offers better ideas than those 
represented by fascist and militarist literature, there is no need for destruction.”296 
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Literature Confiscation: Round Two 
While the Germans assessed the order’s merits and the OMGUS staff in Berlin began crafting 
implementing instructions, information control officials locally began issuing new directives to lending 
libraries, bookshops, and publishers mandating the removal of all objectionable books.297  In mid summer, the 
head of Württemberg-Baden’s MG education staff, Richard Banks, followed suit, ordering Land officials to see 
to the vetting of all books held by schools and public libraries.  The objectionable publications were to be 
delivered to collecting points already established by the ICD.298  Although OMGUS headquarters set a mid 
August 1946 deadline, the collecting effort dragged into the fall and beyond.  Land MG officials also waited 
until mid September for headquarters to disseminate instructions regarding procedures for sorting and pulping 
the materials.299 
When asked about the new ACC order, a number of German librarians, publishers, and book dealers 
had expressed a desire for an index of objectionable items.  Some worried that anxious librarians would hand 
over books not targeted by the order and others were uncertain as to what should be considered offensive, 
particularly in terms of “militaristic” books.300  But a definitive list continued to be officially anathema to the 
Americans.  Instead, they turned to German professionals for help in compiling an advisory document, 
ultimately settling on a register of 35 magazines and 1,000 books and authors developed at their request by the 
director of the Württemberg State Library.  This they distributed to local MG authorities as an illustrative list 
containing obvious works of Nazi propaganda and militarism for use in spot checking compliance.  The list, a 
cover sheet emphasized, was not exhaustive, but indicative of the “type and character” of literature to be 
removed.  Titles included books such as Deutsche Soldaten sehen die Sowjet-Union (German Soldiers See the 
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Soviet Union), Luftmacht Deutschland (Air Power Germany), and Das Buch der Freikorpskämpfer (The Book 
of the Free Corps Fighter), as well as magazines like Volk und Rasse (People and Race) and Odal. 
Monatsschrift für Blut und Boden (Monthly Magazine for Blood and Soil).301  Conceived as an aid to MG 
officers and their German assistants, it was sometimes circulated more widely to school officials and bookshop 
owners.302  However, other Germans charged with cleaning up their holdings had to rely on their own instincts 
or turned for help to a Soviet Zone catalog containing roughly 15,000 entries (a document that was not entirely 
compatible with the U.S. list).303 
A list—any list—could facilitate the review process, but the absence of definitive guidance still 
prolonged and complicated the work.  In addition to sorting out obviously objectionable works, the Germans 
had to carefully check many other publications.  The instructions from Banks stated that any textbooks 
disapproved by the Americans had to be removed from libraries, but urged a close examination of all other 
materials, specifying that “only those which are completely bad should be collected.”304  Yet German officials 
could hardly allow even slightly dubious publications to circulate.  Recent editions of older books thus had to be 
scoured for fawning tributes to Nazi leaders, as did the prefaces and epilogues of works on seemingly innocuous 
scholarly topics.305  One employee of the Karlsruhe city library later recalled some of the idiosyncrasies of the 
review effort, noting, for example, that saving a book on the ascent of the north face of Switzerland’s Eiger 
mountain required the library staff to cut out various pages and to black out parts that discussed Hitler receiving 
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the climbers.306  Heidelberg’s city library placed an insert in each book it loaned out asking readers to alert the 
staff if they discovered questionable passages inside.307 
In the end, Stuttgart officials removed an additional 2,900 books from the city’s libraries.308  In Ulm, 
city library personnel culled out more than 1,600 items and set aside several hundred others for minor changes.  
Most, explained an article in the local paper, were standard Nazi works or contaminated works for youth, with 
the militaristic literature encompassing primarily the “countless accounts of experiences” that had appeared 
during the war.309  Herbert van der Berg noted in late July that of the approximately seven tons of books 
collected in Ulm to date that were not school books, two thirds were “of a militaristic nature.”  “When 
requisitioning the books in the libraries, [a local representative of MG] ran into quite a number of 
misunderstandings,” he added.  “MG was criticized for confiscating some of the militaristic type books, 
especially those types which are of historical nature.”310 
Agents authorized by the ICD checked the holdings of bookstores and lending libraries, where 
violations might only lead to a removal of the offending works, but could also lead to a revocation of the 
operator’s registration.311  The Land’s schools, meanwhile, reported to the Ministry of Culture, with many 
stating that they had already removed all or most of their objectionable books during the past year and turned 
them over to the MG, town authorities, or a local paper firm.  Some submitted lists of titles harvested during a 
second review effort.  Occasionally, schools still had items they had segregated months before which no one 
had yet picked up.312  As negotiated in Berlin, the Land’s key scholarly institutions obtained permission to 
retain their sequestered books.  As of  September 1946, this group included the Württemberg and Baden state 
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libraries and the libraries of Heidelberg University, Hohenheim Agricultural College, and the Karlsruhe and 
Stuttgart Institutes of Technology.313 
By the end of July 1946, Württemberg-Baden MG officials were reporting that with their work half 
done they had amassed more than 90,000 books.314  Most of the collecting was done by late September, but 
contributions continued to trickle in during the fall.315  In addition, spot checks exposing violations led the Land 
MG to demand yet another vetting of all school libraries in early 1947.  Informing their subordinates, German 
education administrators told them to make sure, in particular, that they removed all booklets from the series 
Kriegserlebnisse schwäbische Frontsoldaten (War Experiences of Swabian Front Soldiers).316  The new 
initiative elicited many negative reports, but exhumed additional offending materials as well.317  It led one 
school official to suggest that with this review, they had removed books that, viewed impartially, would cause 
no harm in a school library.  Still, the 21-item list he enclosed contained four works by authors whose entire 
output was condemned in the Americans’ illustrative catalog.318 
As long discussed, MG directives called for most of the newly confiscated materials to be pulped to 
produce new paper.  But OMGUS officials also felt an obligation to posterity (and perhaps to the American 
public and press).  In addition to allowing German institutions to preserve their collections, therefore, the 
Americans decided to set aside 150 copies of many of the confiscated publications for use by OMGUS, U.S. 
government agencies, American libraries, other countries, and other interested parties (UNESCO, for example, 
requested 20 copies of each book for research purposes).  Helpful to administrators and scholars, this decision 
delayed pulping activities appreciably, as LoC officials laboriously cataloged collected materials in Berlin and 
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attempted to locate and gather multiple copies of literally thousands of texts.319  Poor or non-existent record-
keeping in the collection centers especially impeded this process.  To facilitate the LoC’s efforts, Württemberg-
Baden's MG had directed that all confiscated works should be delivered to a location in Stuttgart for evaluation 
by library representatives, with both military and German trucks with unused space to assist in the enterprise.  
But higher priority demands for transporting fuel and food meant that most of the books remained scattered at 
various collecting points throughout the winter of 1946.320 
The delays caused by higher echelons, especially the LoC personnel, frustrated some ICD staffers at 
the Land level.321  They indirectly annoyed the Germans as well.  In late December 1946, education authorities 
from North Baden asked Ministry of Culture officials whether books not yet delivered by some schools might 
be sent instead to waste paper dealers for coupons for badly needed new writing materials.  They were told that 
all publications had to be delivered to MG officials who would undoubtedly make sure that the confiscated 
literature benefited the schools.322 
The long-term retention of the materials at sometimes poorly secured collecting centers had other 
consequences, too.  In August 1946, van der Berg reported that some Nazi literature confiscated locally had 
been stolen.  Although he cited rumors attributing the theft to former Nazis, he pointed out that rumors also 
indicated that Mein Kampf sold for 300 cigarettes on the black market.323  For that matter, paper itself was a 
valuable commodity.  Collecting centers were also attractive targets for American scavengers.  Describing their 
survey of some 15 centers in the U.S. Zone, several OMGUS officials later reported that “a good percentage of 
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the collection points have been visited innumerable times and culled over by unauthorized Americans seeking 
souvenirs and collectors items, so much so in fact, that at several of these points the [German] director’s first act 
was to rummage through the collection and hand us a copy of ‘Mein Kampf’, hoping thereby to dissuade us 
from further perusal of the collection.”324 
During the summer of 1947, military government officers in Württemberg-Baden finally received 
clearance to turn over for pulping all of the confiscated publications still on hand.325  Their responsibilities did 
not immediately end, however.  In early 1948, some communities in North Baden were still turning in small sets 
of objectionable books.326 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
Dragging on longer than military government efforts to eliminate offensive street signs and 
monuments, the literature removal program also drew on the energies of many more OMGUS officials and 
provoked a greater degree of American soul-searching.  Education, information control, military, and library 
authorities, among others, were forced to seek a balance between fundamentally incompatible interests and 
objectives: the need for paper and the need to protect resources for future research; the need to eradicate 
poisonous intellectual influences in Germany and the need to satisfy the American press and public; and, most 
importantly, the need to protect, but also to exemplify, democracy.  Washington policymakers and MG officials 
hesitated to confiscate German publications because such actions were anti-democratic and too reminiscent of 
Nazi policies.  Yet despite obvious discomfort with this task, which revealed itself most clearly in a refusal to 
seize privately held literature and a “no blacklist” policy that was in truth more apparent than real, they 
remained committed to demilitarizing and denazifying German intellectual life for ideological and, sometimes, 
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practical reasons.  In this respect, the dire conditions in Germany were a blessing, as the Americans could point 
to the importance of replenished paper supplies for the success of more popular, less divisive democratization 
programs. 
At the same time, the American decision to proceed with book-gathering efforts added still more tasks 
to the already cluttered daily agendas of state, regional, and local German administrators and drafted new cadres 
of their fellow citizens to work on the postwar demilitarization project.  Multiple rounds of screening thinned 
library holdings that had already been depleted by Nazi purges and Allied bombings.  In some areas, the 
upheaval of the immediate postwar period and transportation and personnel shortages impeded the Germans’ 
ability to respond promptly, or served as a convenient excuse for their failure or refusal to do so.  Some 
Germans nevertheless welcomed the initiative, while others conceded that it might not be such a bad thing. 
As with German street signs and monuments, the Americans ultimately left many items untouched.  
Research libraries kept their collections, as did individuals.  On the other hand, thousands and thousands of 
volumes ended up in the vats of German paper mills where they became the raw material for much-needed 
newsprint, school textbooks, and healthier literature.  Moreover, despite some grumbling regarding the 
inconsistencies of American policy, the literature purging detour on the road to democracy apparently caused 
little long-term damage.  This can perhaps be viewed as proof of the Americans’ successful navigation of a 
middle road between censorship and liberty.  But it may also merely illuminate the absence of a deeply felt 
passion for discredited Nazi ideas and a genre of literature centered on the very military adventures that had 
made obeying American orders to repeatedly vet German libraries a reality in the first place.  
 
Conclusions 
In early June 1946, a young former German officer who now served as the mayor of a village near 
Stuttgart told an American ICD officer “that he would approve of the destruction of German war monuments 
and nationalist or militarist books—provided the Allies themselves practice the ideals they preach in Germany.”  
Explained the American: “He suspects that as a result of the present war the Allied nations will glorify at home 
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the very ideas they say they came to Germany to destroy—destroy war monuments in Germany and set them up 
in Russia, Britain, and the USA.”327 
The former officer’s observations pointed to just one of the many difficulties 
afflicting American efforts to excise seemingly injurious practices, objects, and intellectual influences from 
German culture.  Military government officials stifled saluting, prevented the Germans from marching and 
making a spectacle of carrying flags, made sure they removed or altered their most offensive street signs and 
war monuments, and confiscated and arranged for the destruction of many tons of Nazi propaganda, militaristic 
literature, and military training materials.  However, while the Americans’ achievements were measurable, the 
obstacles to countering a culturally produced phenomenon proved to be many and varied.  The result was a 
demilitarization enterprise that was systematic and broad—sometimes absurdly so—but not always uniform, 
consistent, or thorough. 
Eliminating the sources and symptoms of militarism in German culture was not a simple task.  It was 
easy to ban—and easy to justify banning—swastikas and Nazi greetings.  And specifying 1933 as a cut-off date 
for denazification projects was indisputably logical.  But tackling militarism raised an entirely different 
spectrum of questions.  Did the deleterious influence of the phenomenon begin with the Nazis?  Or with 
Hindenburg?  Or Bismarck?  Or Scharnhorst?  Was a hand salute itself dangerous, or only the manner in which 
it was performed?  Were monuments honoring Germany’s war dead either inherently insidious or inherently 
harmless?  Or did that depend upon how the Germans interpreted them or what forms of community life 
centered on the physical structures?  Were sober histories of the Franco-Prussian War harmful?  Or only those 
that glorified German military exploits in World War I?  What about military training manuals?  Or 
Clausewitz’s On War? 
Not every American was sure.  And those who were could not assume that their nearest colleague 
would agree.  Officials at the highest levels coped with the uncertainties both by refusing to draw fine lines—a 
salute was a military greeting, period—and by drawing very fine lines, choosing specific dates, sometimes 
influenced by their allies.  In other instances, they, officially, left it to the Germans to decide.  Did a soldier 
statue “glorify incidents of war”?  Should a book be classified as militaristic?  In the former case, monuments 
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that contravened American regulations undoubtedly slipped through the review process, while in the latter, 
librarians could be overly zealous in rejecting texts. 
The ultimate effect of particular policies could also not be predicted.  In no case was efficacy assured, 
and nearly every measure that offered hope of positive results either had potentially negative side effects or 
could stimulate a reaction that was exactly the opposite of that intended.  In fact, the factor that most 
complicated the American expurgation enterprise was the German response.  In some cases, American decision 
makers considered this carefully and thoughtfully.  Drilling and marching U.S. troops could teach lessons to the 
Germans.  Conversely, resentment, ridicule, and charges of hypocrisy, which might threaten the Americans’ 
ability to achieve the major goals of the occupation, had to be avoided by exercising caution and restraint.  In 
other instances, however, the MG officials evidently either ignored or failed to think through the possible 
repercussions of their actions.  This was particularly true when it came to the Americans’ rather naive or 
unconsidered assumption that the negative influences of military parades and war literature were rooted as 
much in German nationalism as in a German penchant for all things military—that it was a national 
manifestation of the ritual or subject, rather than the ritual or subject itself, that trigged German enthusiasm. 
Then, too, OMGUS policymakers could not always be sure that their underlings in the field would 
agree with their judgments or attentively enforce Allied policies.  A public safety officer in Stuttgart might 
appreciate the value of a well-disciplined, saluting police force far more than American concerns about a future 
recrudescence of German militarism.  Local MG officers may also have simply lacked the knowledge or 
information to supervise the Germans.  Without a list documenting possible objectionable street names, would 
the average military policeman have recognized the names of all of Germany’s World War I flying aces?  Even 
where they had the knowledge, moreover, MG officials could be less than vigilant, or certainly less than strict.   
The small number of MG officers and their concomitant inability to regularly visit every one of 
Württemberg-Baden’s tiny villages also undoubtedly restricted American enforcement efforts.  Thus, it is 
perhaps not surprising that as late as May 1947, the Landrat of Landkreis Karlsruhe felt compelled to send an 
admonitory notice to all of the communities in his jurisdiction.  During a recent visit to one village, he 
explained, he had discovered that there were still pictures of Hindenburg and Frederick the Great hanging in 
various rooms of the town hall.  The local library still held “purely militaristic books,” which could be better 
used to produce paper, and had maps on its walls showing the 1940 campaign in France and the eastern front in 
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1943.  In the mayor’s office, there was a fireman’s helmet still bearing a swastika.  It was, he stated, the duty of 
all local leaders and community employees to make sure these symbols of the past disappeared.  He threatened 
to take the “sharpest action” if he discovered any problems in the future, arguing that such thoughtlessness was 
irresponsible not only vis-à-vis the Americans, but also vis-à-vis Germany’s youth.328  The Landrat also 
reprimanded the village concerned, noting that his discovery was especially unfortunate as a German agent of 
the MG had accompanied him and would surely report his findings.329   
Although relatively minor, the Landkreis Karlsruhe incident calls attention to the degree to which the 
MG had to rely upon a large number of Germans for help in its efforts to change German culture.  Clearly, 
German administrators and politicians had no choice but to implement MG regulations.  Yet even when they 
resented or bemoaned the work created, they could be supportive of the Americans’ basic objectives.  The 
German discussions regarding monuments and street signs, in particular, shed light on an assortment of fault 
lines in German society during the immediate postwar years.   
Although their individual views could be diverse, those taking a stance on the removal question fell 
into roughly three categories.  On one hand, Communists, often supported by Social Democrats and sometimes 
by those of other political leanings as well, recommenced their pre-Third Reich campaign against Prussian 
militarism with new passion and commitment.  For them, the need to get rid of military monuments and street 
signs honoring German military exploits of the past 200 years was self-explanatory.   
A second group believed that the Germans needed to put Nazi values behind them and to plot a new 
future in which the military and war would have a much less prominent role, but their ideas on what this should 
mean for German culture were both less severe and less uniform.  Some saw the cleansing of Germany’s 
cultural landscape as draining time and resources that were either already inadequate for the tasks at hand or 
better spent on reconstruction.  Changes might be warranted, or at least tolerable, but they could wait.  Others 
worried about acting too vigorously in haste or refused to “throw the baby out with the bathwater” by tossing 
aside legitimate commemorations of Germany’s history.  For some, this stance was perhaps the outward 
expression of an inner resistance to the argument that the achievements of Kaiser Wilhelm I, the machinations 
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of Bismarck, or Prussia’s illustrious military record had led to Hitler’s rise and Germany’s fall.  For some, it 
was grounded in a belief that the nation’s past undergirded German society and honoring the past was therefore 
both positive and necessary.  This perspective was inherently controversial, however, when decision makers 
could not agree on what in that past deserved commemoration.  Those on the left often had little interest in 
remembering men who had deliberately and forcefully combated democracy, socialism, and peace.  Conversely, 
their desire to change street names could rightfully be interpreted by their opponents as an attempt to 
reconceptualize the nation’s past in the city’s streets.  Removing the names inserted by Nazi usurpers was one 
thing.  Re-writing Germany’s history was another. 
Finally, although their voices were normally barred from city council chambers and the pages of local 
newspapers, there were those who saw very little need to redirect Germany’s course in any major respect, with 
its monuments and street names naturally to be left alone as well.  The best evidence that such opinions did, in 
fact, exist are the passionate arguments men like Weisser felt compelled to launch against them. 
In the absence of a German consensus regarding the necessity and scope of cultural cleansing 
measures, American influence proved decisive.  Without explicitly supporting one German faction over another, 
MG regulations effectively threw weight behind Communist demands.  But the extent and depth of change 
demanded by the Americans, and the vigilance (or lack thereof) with which they enforced their orders, also 
effectively set the boundaries of these efforts.  German leaders, as exemplified by Stuttgart’s city councilors, 
sometimes pushed beyond them, but, more often than not, the limits established by the Americans became the 
limits of physical, if not necessarily psychological or spiritual, change. 
German politicians and administrators made the difficult decisions and bore the weight of 
responsibility for obedience.  But many Germans helped with a multitude of little tasks.  Complying with 
American orders required the hands and minds of hundreds of people who unearthed old “Hauptstrasse” signs, 
took down “Hindenburgstrasse” markers, re-labeled maps, renumbered streets, sketched war monuments, 
chiseled off inscriptions, distributed handbills door to door, reviewed card catalogs, scanned book pages, boxed 
up runs of old magazines, typed up lists, loaded trucks or wagons, or just walked across town to retrieve the 
local schoolteacher from his garden.  When considering the final impact of American excision regulations, this 
cannot be overlooked, for the process of implementation, which compelled Germans to evaluate their 
environment, may have been as powerful in its effects as any material results.   
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In the end, in rural areas as well as large cities, Allied policies intruded into the daily lives of nearly all 
Germans, if only in small ways.  Residents of Karlsruhe and Stuttgart began the occupation by combing their 
personal libraries for books outlawed by the French.  In some villages, meanwhile, “militarism” may have been 
just an abstract concept left unexamined by most.  But local inhabitants no doubt noticed that the old field 
marshal no longer commanded their main street or that the monument to the fallen located at the center of town 
looked slightly different now.  And perhaps a few, at least, paused to consider why. 
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Monuments and Memorials Not Covered by ACC Directive No. 30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
       Fig. 11 – Kaiser Wilhelm I Monument, Stuttgart.   
       (Credit: Author, 2004) 
 
    
   Fig. 9 – Gravestone, 1917,  
   Stuttgart Waldfriedhof.  
   (Credit: Author, 2004) 
                   
   
     
     Fig. 10 – Gravestone, 1917,  
     Stuttgart Waldfriedhof.  
    (Credit: Author, 2004) 
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Images Submitted for Review Under ACC Directive No. 30 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
   Fig. 16 (Credit: U.S. National Archives) 
    
   
     Fig. 12 (Credit: U.S. National Archives) 
 
 
 Fig. 14 (Credit: U.S.  
 National Archives) 
 
   
  
  Fig. 13 (Credit: U.S. National Archives) 
 
           
    
     Fig. 15 (Credit: U.S. National Archives) 
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Monument Altered Under ACC Directive No. 30 
 
 
     Fig. 17 – Military Monument, Ulm, 2004. 
     In 1946, Land officials required the removal of three reliefs— 
     “The Infantryman Then and Now”—from the upper portion of 
     this three-sided monument.  One of the reliefs depicted a soldier 
     with hand granades and a spade.  (Credit: Author, 2004) 
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Monuments and Memorials Not Altered Under ACC Directive No. 30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
    
     Figs. 21 and 22 – World War I Monument, Marbach. 
     (Credit: Author, 2004) 
  
  
 Fig. 18 – World War I monument,  
 Karlsruhe.  The “harmless little figure 
 of bronze” with his lance restored.   
 (Credit: Author, 2004) 
   Figs. 19 and 20 – Statues 
   decorating the exterior of the 
   U.S. Army’s Campbell 
   Barracks (formerly  
   Grossdeutschland Kaserne) 
   in Heidelberg.   
   (Credit: http://www.history.hqusareur. 
    army.mil/photos/photos.htm) 
                                             
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Chapter 8 
 
FROM DYING FOR THE FATHERLAND  
TO LIVING FOR A PEACEFUL DEMOCRACY 
 
 
“Although this was always denied by Hitler Youth leaders after 1945, the hallmark of [Hitler Youth] 
socialization was militarization, with a view to a war of territorial expansion and, as its predetermined goal, the 
neutralization of Europe’s Jews,” historian Michael Kater has observed in his recent study of the National 
Socialists’ all-encompassing youth organization.  For the young people of the Third Reich, uniforms and 
marching were ubiquitous.  Rigorous camping trips included roll calls, flag ceremonies, map study, rifle 
practice, and war games played out under a hierarchically organized command structure.  For enhanced drilling 
performance, children learned to chant songs, “in the manner of soldiers on the march,” that were “clearly 
martial in character, related to Fatherland, duty, honor, blood and soil, and above all fighting and death.”  
Agricultural service brought them to German border regions where hiking trips introduced them to unknown, 
but desirable, territories.  During the war, they assisted disabled soldiers, served as air raid wardens, and helped 
build fortifications.1 
By the mid 1930s, the Hitler Youth had also largely wrested control of all youth sports from the 
principal Nazi sports organization, which was itself a successor to or umbrella organization for a multitude of 
sports clubs that frequently had their own histories of emphasizing the connection between athletics, soldierly 
achievements, and war.  Viewed by the Nazis as critical to maintaining the general health of the Volk, sports 
were also valued for preparing individual bodies for war and teaching special skills needed by military units.  
All boys from ages 10 to 18 learned to shoot, first with air guns, later with small-caliber rifles.  Special elite 
Hitler Youth units took in young men with distinctive interests or aptitudes.  In groups for fliers, for example, 
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boys constructed model airplanes and piloted gliders, perfecting their flying abilities for later Luftwaffe 
service.2  Participation in sports could shape attitudes as well.  Raving about the Wehrmacht’s recent success in 
1941, Carl Diem, a renowned German sports official and secretary general of the 1936 Olympic Games 
organizing committee, argued that a fundamental reason for this was a maturation in the “spirit of sports” in 
Germany’s youth.  “No longer is there among them that flabby reluctance to compete, that dull greediness of 
softer times. . . . Instead we have joy in struggle, joy in self-denial, joy in danger.  Only with such ideals could 
Norway be conquered and France be overrun.”  Diem also venerated the German soldier’s female “comrades in 
sport.”  “These women did not, in fact, storm through France, but they contributed to the new attitudes that led 
to the battle charge,” he maintained.  “As mothers, sisters, and wives, they have fashioned this new 
generation.”3  
Significantly, these militarizing activities did not necessarily draw questions or criticism.  Even before 
the start of World War II, Kater has reminded, “the most ingenuous Hitler Youths found this trend quite normal: 
they had been told in school and at home—to say nothing of the [Hitler Youth] itself—that Germany was 
preparing for an ‘unavoidable war.’”4  Indeed, physical education in German schools was being infused with a 
similar spirit.  Furthermore, education officials had rewritten textbooks and instructors adapted their teaching of 
science, literature, history, geography, and other subjects to reflect the ideology and interests of Nazi leaders 
who were committed to readying the entire German Volksgemeinschaft for a war of conquest.  
While not aware of all of the details, American wartime policymakers knew that Germany’s Hitler 
Youth leaders and teachers were providing paramilitary training and actively indoctrinating the country’s young 
people.5  And they were concerned.  Not only might defeated and disillusioned young Nazis equipped with 
military skills pose an immediate security threat to Allied occupation forces, but they represented a major long-
term problem.  Likely to be the most deeply indoctrinated individuals in all of Germany, they were also its 
future leaders.  Early encounters between U.S. intelligence analysts and German youngsters did little to dispel 
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these concerns, as a number of the young Germans voiced highly racist, nationalistic, and militaristic opinions, 
apparently oblivious to how offensive and shocking their ideas sounded to their interviewers.6  Recounting his 
experiences near Aachen, journalist Julian Bach captured American thinking regarding German children in its 
most basic form.  “You watch a youngster, perhaps aged six, goose-stepping back and forth by the road every 
time an Allied truck passes,” wrote Bach.  “He thinks he is being cute. . . .You think so too. . . .Until you 
remember that unless he is taught to stop goose-stepping, your son may be doing close-order drill.”7 
It took time for the specifics of U.S. policy relating to German schools and youth work to take firm 
shape, but American officials had settled on certain principles already prior to Germany’s surrender.  First, they 
agreed that German children should learn to be good democrats.  Changing German attitudes and increasing 
understanding of the workings and value of a democratic system were essential if a democratic government was 
to succeed.  And it was critically important that it do so.  As Assistant Secretary of State Archibald MacLeish 
told his boss in July 1945, the U.S. needed to “encourage the self-government of people on the grounds that 
tyrannies have been demonstrated to be dangerous to the security of the world and that nations in which the 
people govern themselves are more likely to keep peace and to promote the common interests of mankind.”8  
Second, the Americans decided that they would be working at cross purposes if they attempted to force 
democratic reforms on the Germans.  Instead, any changes in the educational system and youth programs should 
come from the Germans themselves, working with American advice and under the watchful eyes of their 
occupiers. 
However, the Americans also realized that their educational work would need to have two overlapping 
phases.  According to SHAEF’s technical manual for education, the first phase would be “one mainly of 
destruction, destruction throughout the German educational system of Nazism, German militarism and all they 
connote,” while the second would be one of reconstruction.9  Or, as a planning paper drafted by U.S. Group 
Control Council education officers in the spring of 1945 explained, the American mission would include, first, 
eradicating “Nazi influence and doctrine,” especially “instruction giving support for world domination, 
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militarism, pan-Germanism, the ‘Fuhrer’ principle and discrimination,” and, second, encouraging “the 
development of a system of education inculcating in the German people democratic and humanitarian principles 
and values, and emphasizing the necessity for peace and international understanding.”10 
There is a goodly amount of literature on American educational efforts in Germany, especially with 
respect to German schools.  But most of it centers on the second, “positive” portion of the American agenda.11  
It was the positive elements of the program that suffered most from early OMGUS neglect and which 
encountered the most resistance from German educators.  Moreover, West Germany’s subsequent emergence in 
the context of the Cold War as a solid and solidly democratic American ally has generated legitimate interest in 
the mechanisms behind the country’s transformation.    
Much less attention has been given to the “negative” measures, particularly as they related to 
militarism rather than Nazism.12  Yet these merit closer scrutiny, for they shaped German education and youth 
programs directly.  They helped to determine the nature of instruction, or lack thereof, received by millions of 
German schoolchildren immediately after the war and influenced the character of teaching resources in both the 
short and the long term.  They also contributed to a visible transformation of German youth and sports 
organizations—a transformation which had committed, widespread support throughout Württemberg-Baden.  
As importantly, the American program of “destruction” was essential in clearing the ground upon which 
democratic, tolerant, and peaceful institutions and attitudes could be built. 
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German Schools 
Getting Started 
Historians have pointed out that although German schools were critical to the long-term reeducation of 
Germany, these institutions and the MG officers responsible for them often were not treated as crucial 
components of the American occupation program, especially prior to 1947.  Problems in the early years 
included insufficient MG personnel, inadequate support from OMGUS’s upper echelons, and the absence of a 
clear, focused policy for meeting stated positive educational goals.  At the same time, the Americans clearly had 
firm beliefs about what should be barred from German schools.  And, in this arena, they felt much less 
compulsion to defer to the wishes of German educators.   
According to SHAEF’s December 1944 handbook, all schools were to be closed until freed of 
undesirable personnel and teaching materials.  Objectionable books were to be impounded and, under threat of 
dismissal and punishment for disobedience, instructors were to purge from their lessons, among other ideas, 
anything that glorified militarism or “expound[ed] the practice of war or of mobilization and preparation for 
war, whether in the scientific, economic or industrial fields, or the study of military geography.”13 
Although reasonably straightforward, these prohibitions created real difficulties when combined with a 
desire to reopen schools quickly.  The Americans wanted to make sure that children “so completely and so 
viciously indoctrinated” and who had only recently served in the military or been trained by the Hitler Youth to 
be snipers or saboteurs might be “brought without delay under more wholesome influences.”14  But in 1944, 
members of the education and religious affairs section of SHAEF’s German Country Unit (GCU), which was 
tasked with making plans for the reopening of schools, realized that even aside from anticipated shortages of 
politically clean teachers and usable facilities, they would have trouble meeting this goal because most available 
textbooks would violate Allied regulations.  Leaving the procurement of suitable books to local authorities, 
moreover, would further slow the process.15    
Fortunately, stockpiling usable texts was a project GCU planners could undertake even while Allied 
forces remained outside German borders.  Their primary challenge thus became locating acceptable texts and 
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procuring, on relatively short notice, supplies adequate to permit the revival of elementary and secondary 
education in western Germany.  They dismissed Nazi-era books as too thoroughly permeated with National 
Socialist doctrine to be usable.  This held true even in fields like mathematics, where texts contained offensive 
elements such as arithmetic problems referring to usurious Jewish moneylenders.  Although the GCU planners 
considered pasting coverings over unacceptable passages, ultimately they discarded the idea as likely only to 
provoke greater curiosity.  They also discussed using Swiss texts—books which were both German and 
democratic.  But these contained uniquely Swiss details the men feared would kindle nationalist sentiments.  
For similar reasons, they rejected translations of American and English publications and also ruled out refugee 
works, lest the Germans resist them out of resentment toward those who had not shared in their suffering.16  
Daunting as the situation appeared, the GCU planners also agreed that the schools could not operate without 
textbooks, having learned from negative experiences in occupied Italy, where schools reopened without 
sufficient textbook supplies.17 
In the end, they decided that texts from the Weimar Republic, though hardly perfect, could at least be 
promoted as German books and could be used temporarily until the Germans themselves were able to produce 
up-to-date, pedagogically more sophisticated replacements.  Most Weimar textbooks had been pulped to make 
Nazi substitutes, but Dr. John Taylor, head of the American staff of the GCU’s education section, knew of a 
collection he had helped to assemble at Columbia Teacher’s College in New York City.  He therefore had 
nearly 270 books microfilmed and sent to the GCU’s quarters in England.  During the summer and fall of 1944, 
Major Oscar Reinmuth, chair of the University of Texas classics department in civilian life, evaluated the texts, 
identifying those he deemed “least objectionable” for certain key subjects.18   
Although a MG publication subsequently reported that U.S. officials had developed “techniques for the 
elimination of Nazi, militaristic, and nationalistic strains” in conducting this review,19 the GCU’s Marshall 
Knappen later suggested that the Americans’ interpretation of what was harmful was not as strict as that of their 
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British colleagues.  Describing consultations to compile a list of books to republish, Knappen recalled that “the 
most interesting feature was the British objection to much of the Weimar material as too militaristic and 
nationalistic.”  The British, for example, expressed misgivings about readers dealing with the Battle of Leipzig 
and the wars of liberation from Napoleon.  They also objected to referring to the history of “Germany” during 
the Middle Ages, when there was, in fact, no Germany, but rather a Holy Roman Empire.  A Michigan State 
College history professor himself, Knappen observed: “The discussions of historical perspective and whether 
there is any such thing as objective history made academic treatments of these problems in more peaceful days 
seem somewhat more practical than had once been suspected.”  On the whole, he added, the perspective of the 
Americans was 
(1) that war was a part of history and life and that to reflect this fact in reasonable moderation was not 
objectionable; (2) that, until England and the United States agreed on an objective treatment of the War 
of 1812 which could be taught in both countries, a certain nationalistic bias in the texts of any country 
was inevitable, and that (3) the admittedly imperfect Weimar texts were preferable to the only apparent 
alternative—attempting to conduct schools without texts.20 
 
       Eventually the group approved eight readers, five arithmetic books, three history texts and four works 
on “nature study” for elementary schools.  In early 1945, SHAEF began printing copies on presses in parts of 
Germany already occupied by the Allies.  Later, education officials secured access to the Munich presses of the 
former Nazi newspaper to turn out more than five million textbooks.21  Due to their reservations about the 
materials, they qualified their selections by placing a short statement in each newly printed book explaining its 
temporary nature and that its issuance did “not imply that it is entirely suitable from an educational view or 
otherwise.”  It was “merely the best book which could be found in the circumstances and must serve until 
Germany produces better textbooks of its own.”22   
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Vetting German Textbooks 
Although SHAEF managed to procure several million textbooks under difficult conditions, these did 
not come close to alleviating the schoolbook problem.  In Württemberg-Baden, for example, the distribution 
provided just one text for every four pupils.23  Children “often spend half the evening going from house to 
house searching for the book to do their lesson,” an October 1945 MG weekly report noted.24  The Americans 
therefore also investigated additional sources of textbooks.  Occupation guidelines specified that the Germans 
might use other publications, but only if SHAEF representatives approved them first.25  And it was not long 
before German officials began asking MG authorities about stocks of old, but apparently still serviceable texts.  
Publishers, similarly, submitted for approval partially revised or at least hastily corrected editions.  As a result, 
Reinmuth soon took charge of a staff of “readers” to confront the MG’s expanding library.26   
The Americans eventually devised a multilayered textbook evaluation system that lasted for nearly the 
duration of the occupation.  Potentially usable books were submitted to OMGUS’s Textbook Section by 
German education authorities or MG officials.  Following an initial reading, an analyst employed by the section 
forwarded the book and a completed evaluation sheet to the staff textbook specialist for approval, with each 
volume eventually receiving one of three designations: A—approved, B—disapproved, or C—conditionally 
approved but needing changes before it could be used.  In time, the readers began employing this same 
procedure to appraise new manuscripts prepared by German authors.  Although the Americans exempted certain 
books from evaluation starting in January 1946, these were not works which particularly lent themselves to 
instilling Nazi ideology or fostering militarism, as they included only higher secondary education standard 
author works (such as German classics by Goethe, and only those without editing, introductions, or notes) and 
books designed for adult, technical, and commercial schools and the like.  Even then, instructors were expected 
to use no objectionable material and had to provide Land education officials with, in the case of the former, a 
list of course materials they planned to use and, in the case of the latter, a statement guaranteeing the books’ 
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acceptability.27  It is worth noting that while the Americans required the explicit authorization of nearly all 
books used in German schools, they did not compel schools to use particular books.28  Selection from the pool 
of approved texts was left to German administrators.  
Altogether, MG personnel reviewed more than 3,100 books and manuscripts from 1945 through 1948.  
Of the 995 items consulted in 1945—more than 900 of which were textbooks used during the Third Reich or 
before—textbook analysts approved 70 percent, with another 13 percent conditionally approved and 17 percent 
rejected outright.  In 1946, by contrast, MG officials unconditionally approved only 48 percent of the 1,354 
submitted books, with 20 percent rejected in their entirety.  Interestingly, from 1945 through July 1946, analysts 
disapproved more than half of the Latin and geography texts and a full 67 percent of the 73 history books 
submitted.  In 1946, old books still made up more than two thirds of the materials reviewed, but by 1947 this 
figure had dropped to 16 percent and fell to less than 2 percent in 1948.  During 1947 and 1948, approval 
figures stabilized at about 80 percent, with fewer than 10 percent of the submitted books and manuscripts 
rejected completely.29 
It was during the early years of the occupation, then, that MG textbook analysts most vigorously 
wielded their knives, working their way through a backlog of Nazi and Weimar era texts, weeding out truly 
offensive or unsalvageable works and identifying passages, sentences, and even words to be deleted from 
conditionally approved books and manuscripts.  In late 1947, the character of the effort changed as the 
Americans replaced a strictly negative approach to textbook evaluation—i.e., searching out vestiges of Nazism, 
nationalism, racism, and militarism—with new textbook appraisal criteria that took into consideration a 
manuscript or publication’s pedagogical strategies and the degree to which it encouraged tolerance, democratic 
thinking, and other positive values.30 
The systematic review of several thousand publications confirmed for American analysts that not only 
Nazi textbooks, but also many Weimar materials were deeply infected with harmful ideas.  They reported that 
geography books referred to territory lost via the Treaty of Versailles and highlighted Germany’s relative lack 
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of colonies.  History books were “one-sided” and nationalistic and treated “militarists and battles . . . too fully.”  
French language books as well as German literature and language texts encouraged militarism.  Greek textbooks 
stressed “the patriotic fighting spirit,” while Latin texts were particularly offensive in glorifying strong leaders, 
stressing “the readiness of the individual to sacrifice himself for the state,” and presenting “illustrations of the 
great fighting spirit of the old Romans and the German peoples.”  Math books “taught militarism” by using 
bullets to calculate speed and integrating regimental recruits into problems designed to teach students to read 
mortality tables.31   
As interesting as the Americans’ general conclusions were, their assessments of individual textbooks 
were even more intriguing.  For MG textbook analysts were not only alert to the tiniest of details, they also paid 
more attention to the “big picture” than did many MG officials charged with cleansing various aspects of 
German culture.  At the very least, their eyes were good.  “Approved with omission of p. 6 picture. . . . Picture 
may be included if uniform is removed,” read an August 1945 evaluation sheet discussing a reader proposed for 
Mannheim’s elementary schools.32  Similarly, analysts assessing books submitted by Landkreis Ludwigsburg 
officials in late 1945 conditionally approved several math texts pending the excision of a number of individual 
problems whose “objectionable features” were identified as “soldiers” or “involves military matters.”  Two 
other arithmetic books contained three exercises each that referenced tin soldiers.  Another included a problem 
marked for removal due to its “unnecessary Prussian tone.”33  A fifth grade math book prepared in Stuttgart in 
1946 received only the following comment: “P 51 Substitute ‘Flugzeuge’ [airplanes] for ‘Düsenjäger’ [jet 
fighters].”34 
Strict and insistent, and undoubtedly sometimes overly sensitive, MG textbook analysts were not, 
however, necessarily just following the letter of the law for the law’s sake.  Individual sentences could teach 
values and preach harmful ideas.  One Greek text, for instance, contained the assertions “War terrifies the 
cowards, the good are not terrified” and “The fighting was terrible, but the victory beautiful.”35  The Americans 
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also believed that an accumulation of relatively harmless sentences could influence the overall tone and 
message of a book.  One MG official made this concern explicit in asking for the deletion of “military 
examples” on 15 different pages of a German language book.  “The constant use of war examples merely to 
illustrate rules in grammar,” the analyst noted, “is the sort of thing which gradually poisons the minds of young 
people into believing that war is a natural, inevitable occurrence, part and parcel of everyday life.  This is 
precisely what is to be avoided.”36   Bemused readers also criticized several shorthand books.  Wrote one 
analyst: “This manuscript requires a thorough revisal before it can be accepted.  Perfectly good examples can be 
found without resorting to the use of numerous war expressions.  Heldentum [heroism] does not have to be 
extolled to teach shorthand.”37 
In making their decisions, analysts also kept in mind both the recent experiences of Germany’s youth 
and contemporary conditions.  Identifying passages for removal from a compilation of sources from the 
Napoleonic era, one reviewer commented that these were not all automatically “objectionable in themselves,” 
but should be eliminated “because military and nationalistic aspects of Germany’s opposition to Napoleon have 
been exploited too much during the Hitler period with the intention of stirring up exaggerated national feeling 
for purposes of aggression.”  Other source material would provide a “more complete picture of the tendencies of 
the times.”38  Asking that a piece titled “Vom ewigen Frieden” (Of Eternal Peace) be eliminated from a reader 
manuscript intended for Mannheim’s elementary schools, another analyst explained that the piece “rouses 
skepticism and suspicion regarding the possibility of peace” and added that “in normal times this would be a 
harmless fable but can serve no useful purpose today when such thinking is already widespread.”39 
Overall, the textbook evaluators took a broad view of war and militarism.  It was not just German 
military references and influences that should be purged from textbooks, but an overemphasis on war and 
military glory in all its manifestations.  “This anthology in view of treatment of the French Revolution and 
Napoleon, presents a pretty war-like picture,” commented an analyst of a French book.  “Selections II and III 
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deal with Napoleon’s actual campaigns; this gives them proportionately more weight than they should enjoy in 
an anthology of this nature. . . . Good selections with less war content could be chosen.” Another MG official 
called for the deletion of a number of pages from a 1930 geography text on Australia and New Zealand with the 
observation that the “passages deal with warfare of native tribes and are not good for mental health of young 
people whose imaginations have already been overstimulated in this direction.”  The reviewer of a book of 
English poetry required the removal of “Rule Britannia,” “Ye Mariners of England,” “The Charge of the Light 
Brigade,” and several other pieces with the comment: “To reduce the number of military poems.”  Another 
reviewer slated “The Marseillaise” for excision, explaining that the policy of the textbook office was to 
eliminate all “military or nationalistic songs regardless of national origin . . . to enable German youth to regain 
their perspective.”  After calling for the deletion of a passage on the Spanish Armada, the analyst evaluating an 
English reader for secondary school students took the opportunity to comment on German textbooks more 
generally.  He urged that new books “cease to emphasize feats of war, . . . [and] empire expansionist, military or 
naval heroes . . . and devote more space to feats of another kind (such as Scott’s exploration of the South Pole), 
[and] heroes working in other fields (such as Livingston).”  A review of “hundreds of English books used in 
German schools,” the analyst added, had shown that “certain phases of British history” were stressed.  These 
included the Armada, “Cromwell (England’s moderate counterpart of a ‘Führer’),” and “British expansionism 
naval and military heroes (Clive, Wolfe, Nelson etc).”  This material was not necessarily “objectionable per se,” 
but the analyst believed “that a new Europe requires a complete change of emphasis.”40 
This did not mean textbook analysts got rid of all references to military activities and war, however.  In 
appraising a 1932 history book dealing with Hamburg, a MG reader noted that it discussed battles and wars, but 
the “descriptions are factual and war is not glorified.”  These, moreover, were “an integral part of the story and 
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furthermore necessary to give the student a comprehensive picture of life in the Hanseatic period” and therefore 
did not need to be removed.41  A 1931 text on the Middle Ages earned a similar review.  The book, wrote an 
analyst, emphasized militarism and “the German right to ‘colonisation’ (invasion of neighboring territories) 
under the pretext of cultural superiority.”  But the history was “interestingly written and well organized” and it 
was “not necessary to delete facts regarding wars and conquest . . . but individual interpretations which 
underscore the cruelty or glory of war and would see a meritorious thing in conquest and subjection of foreign 
peoples.”42 
Perhaps surprising in the work of the OMGUS Textbook Office is the number of new manuscripts 
found to contain objectionable material.  As of August 1946, for example, some 32 percent of the manuscripts 
submitted had been only conditionally approved.43  And in 1947, MG analysts still only conditionally approved 
14 percent of all new manuscripts.44  Some of this was due to laziness or a lack of vigilance on the part of 
publishers and education officials, as new manuscripts were sometimes merely hurriedly prepared revisions of 
older works.  But the Americans and Germans also did not always entirely agree on how German textbooks 
should be changed.  In August 1946, a MG report noted that this was especially true when it came to Latin and 
history texts.  It criticized one Latin manuscript as “old-fashioned and dry,” but also “full of militaristic material 
which could have been largely avoided even if the book is intended to prepare the student for the reading of 
Caesar.”  Three history manuscripts, meanwhile, were deemed “highly nationalistic and militaristic.”45   
Indeed, the writing of history proved to be particularly problematic.  In some fields, the inhibiting 
factor in the production of new books was the availability of paper.46  In history, other issues were definitive.  
Language, literature, math, science, and shorthand books, after all, could be filled with new examples taken 
from non-military fields.  But the study of history could not entirely discount the influences of past wars.  Nor 
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could books dealing with the recent past ignore the Third Reich and World War II.  History, moreover, was 
grounded in interpretation and presentation, both of which were products of the textbook author’s worldview.  
A new narrative might first necessitate a shift in thinking.  Creating acceptable textbooks could therefore be 
challenging.  And some writers clearly did not understand what the Americans wanted, even when MG officials 
were vetting primarily for negative elements.  In some instances, too, German authors were waiting for the 
Länder to develop new curricula into which their works would need to fit.   
In time, MG officials crafted guidelines for history textbook writing to help German authors.  The 
guidelines urged them to write less about war and to highlight its costs when compelled to do so.  While the 
Americans did not expect all nationalism to be eliminated, they encouraged the Germans to call attention to 
their country’s relationship with other nations and to the polyglot nature of German society itself.  They also 
advised them to discuss more than just German accomplishments.  In the end, the Americans wanted history 
instruction “to build responsible citizens, not only Germans but also Europeans and human beings.”47  
History textbooks nevertheless remained a bottleneck.  Military government officials continued to be 
concerned about these writing efforts in part because the Germans ultimately responsible for new textbooks 
often disappointed them.  Describing a recent meeting of educators from the U.S. Zone, the August 1946 MG 
report contended that “very few of the teachers present were able to see the subject of history from an objective 
or from a wider point of view than of a narrow national one.”48  The Third Reich had made Nazi, militaristic, 
racial, and imperialistic ideas “the current coin of the realm, to such an extent, that even unconsciously 
opponents of Nazism at times fall into the phraseology that was created by Hitler, Goebbels, and the rest,” a 
planning document from early 1947 similarly commented.49  In March 1948, Major Richard Banks, deputy 
director of the Land MG’s education division, suggested that “the change from a nationalistic to an 
internationalistic point of view is such a departure from past traditions that no body of literature exists in 
Germany today from which historians may draw in the preparation of such manuscripts.”  Like others, he, too, 
noted that very few historians were “competent to deal with history from other than a nationalistic standpoint.”  
                                                 
47
 Puaca, “Learning Democracy,” 153-154. 
 
48
 Textbooks in Germany, 22. 
 
49
 “Functional Program, Part IV, Education Section,” Jan 47, NA, RG 260, OMGUS, E&CR Division, Box 111, F: Policy 
Papers. 
 
 434 
To date only one history and one civics book had been published in Württemberg-Baden, he reported, and he 
did not think either was particularly good.50  By June 1949, instructional materials for history education 
produced in the Land still consisted of just “two small pamphlets on the 1848 revolution” and one lengthy 
history timetable.51  The fact that local sensitivities generally led administrators to resist using texts developed 
in other areas of Germany made this especially troubling. 
That is not to say there were no Germans who found their country’s recent, and even long-established, 
pedagogical and analytical approaches to be flawed.  Many German educators were genuinely committed to 
reforming German education.  Some had been pressing for changes since the days of the Weimar Republic.52  In 
Württemberg-Baden, men like Theodor Bäuerle, who initially served as deputy to Culture Minister Theodor 
Heuss and later as culture minister himself, and Ministerialrat Schneckenburger, head of the ministry’s 
elementary schools section, wanted to free the Land’s schools of history instruction that lauded the German 
nation above all others, focused too much on war, and glorified Frederick the Great and Bismarck while treating 
Matthias Erzberger and Friedrich Ebert as villains.53  A late 1945 report from MG education officials observed 
that conferences with Bäuerle and other key officials at the Culture Ministry had shown them to be “leaning 
toward the development in the German schools of a broad and free vision of the world and a development of 
background for the children based on an understanding of economic and cultural development rather than upon 
the militaristic ideology that has permeated much history of the world up until the last few years and German 
History always.”54  This did not mean, however, that these men always completely agreed with American ideas.  
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Nor did it mean they could always influence the writing of individual books.  When it came to history texts, the 
Germans themselves could not reach a consensus on what they should say.55 
Still, about the time the Americans turned vetting responsibilities over to the Germans and ended their 
supervision of German education with the birth of the Federal Republic, Land officials approved—and in the 
case of North Baden, even recommended—as an option for use in their schools a series of history textbooks 
recently prepared in Berlin with the support of the Americans.56  While still showing certain interpretative 
weaknesses (for example, in their approach to the Third Reich) the books replaced an openly nationalistic and 
militaristic interpretation of Germany’s past with a narrative that traced the nation’s struggle for democracy and 
introduced artists, scientists, and writers as men to be most admired.57 
 
In the Classroom 
The American decision to eradicate incitements to militarism from German schools had repercussions 
for German education beyond dictating the revision of German textbooks.  It led to the temporary removal of 
entire fields of study from the curriculum of some schools and to an abrupt shift in the approach to certain 
subjects.  Moreover, inadequate educational resources and new standards made even more challenging the job 
of teachers who were already battling unheated schools, hungry pupils, and, frequently, their own inexperience.  
For a time, schools in Württemberg-Baden were turning out students whose distorted view of German history 
and its attendant value system had not necessarily been corrected or who had reason to doubt whether what they 
had been taught was actually the truth. 
                                                                                                                                                       
apolitical “professional educator.”  Banks, “The Development of Education in Wőrttemberg-Baden,” 110.  See also Theodor 
Bäuerle, “Life,” 14 Aug 46, NA, RG 260, OMGUS, OMGWB, Box 883, F: 302.12. 
 
55
 Bericht über die Lehrbuchkonferenz am 25.Juli 1946, n.d., HStA EA 3/604 Bü 8. 
 
56
 Der Präsident des Landesbezirks Baden Abt. Kultus und Unterricht to Direktionen der Höheren Schulen, 29 Aug 49, GLA 
235 No. 35448; To the Westfälische Zeitung, 6 Apr 51, HStA EA 3/604 Bü 27. 
 
57
 On the creation and content of this series, titled Wege der Volker, see Puaca, “Learning Democracy,” 156-164; Gregory P. 
Wegner, “The Power of Tradition in Education: The Formation of the History Curriculum in the Gymnasium of the 
American Sector in Berlin, 1945-1955” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1988), Chapter 5.  “The sections [in 
the modern history volume] on Hitler’s war garnered the most print of any historical event with the exception of World War 
One,” states Wegner.  However, “in the few pictures chosen to accompany the text, most illustrated the dark underside of 
war. . . . The placement of the pictures along with factual descriptions on the course of the conflict suggested the utter 
futility of war.”  Battle plans and strategy were not covered in great detail.  Military leaders such as Rommel were 
“mentioned in connection with various military operations without any tendency toward hero worship” (275-276). 
 
 436 
As with German textbooks, American MG officers had to ensure that everything that occurred in 
German classrooms was unobjectionable.  In Heidelberg, U.S. officials issued demands almost immediately.  
Meeting with city and Landkreis authorities already on May 5, 1945, the education officer for Baden and the 
local MG commander explained procedures for initiating the reopening of schools, stressing that the 
reorganization of German education would be grounded in two principles: every political influence would 
disappear and any militaristic spirit would be eliminated.  As part of the reopening process, responsible officials 
were therefore to send the Americans not only information on each school’s history, staff, and current 
condition, but also a statement certifying, among other things, that the school would not teach the principles of 
Nazism or militarism.58 
In early October 1945, Württemberg-Baden’s MG confirmed the U.S. position officially, informing the 
Ministry of Culture that it was to prevent every teacher from permitting “physical training to be expanded into 
what would be para military training” and from teaching anything that “glorifies militarism” or “expounds the 
practice of war or of mobilization, preparation for war, whether in the scientific, industrial, or economic fields, 
or promotes the study of military geography.”59  The ministry subsequently notified school administrators that 
all instructors were to sign a statement containing the MG rules and indicating that they would adhere to them.  
Offenders would be punished, possibly with dismissal.60  During the summer of 1946, an ACC directive added 
additional bite to the American regulations.  It specified that any administrator or teacher who “spreads and 
advocates, or assists, therein, or encourages others to spread or advocate militarist, Nazi, or anti-democratic 
doctrine, at any time or place” was to be let go immediately.  In this instance, American officials clarified that 
the directive was not intended to prohibit “a limited amount of scientific, objective or factual discussion, 
explanation or exposition of Nazi history and philosophy or of militarist Nazi and anti-democratic doctrines” 
provided there was “no attempt made to extol, perpetuate or glorify National Socialist accomplishments, or to 
deliberately disparage, vilify or discredit the democratic form of government.”61 
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Ironically, vigilance in controlling textbooks sometimes actually hurt the Americans’ ability to control 
what occurred in German schools.  Because there were often only small quantities of OMGUS-approved texts 
available, institutions other than those that had originally submitted the books for review could rarely obtain 
copies.  A mid 1946 MG report explained that there were generally no more than 50 extant copies of each text; 
most schools used the original emergency texts supplied by the MG.  Even where there were books, they had 
“been passed from hand to hand, and shared by from two to fifty students,” the report pointed out, adding, “The 
state of the old books or of the paper-bound emergency texts after a year of such service may easily be 
imagined.”62  Some teachers responded to these problems by consulting pre-1933 texts as reference sources or 
drawing on their own knowledge and then dictating information to their students who took notes on whatever 
paper they could get their hands on and learned at home.  Other teachers compiled binders of self-authored 
material.  Some even wrote their own primers.63  Obviously, the ability of the MG to exercise pre-use 
censorship in these cases was limited. 
The paucity of acceptable books, combined with the contentious nature of the subject itself, also led to 
limitations and even prohibitions on history teaching.  German history teachers had traditionally offered up a 
highly nationalistic, military-focused interpretation of their country’s past that could not now be easily purged 
or reconceptualized.  Locating the boundary between “factual discussion” and propaganda, moreover, could be 
challenging.  Even educational experts did not always agree on how the subject should be handled in the wake 
of the Third Reich.  In the thinking of some Germans, the only sure way to avoid trouble—or to dodge 
unwelcome questions—was to avoid potentially touchy subjects altogether, at least for a time.  Ultimately, MG 
education officers and German administrators both cast a wary eye on history instruction during the first years 
of the occupation.  Although the evidentiary record is murky on this point, the apparent result was a suspension 
of history teaching in many schools, particularly when vetted or new textbooks were unobtainable. 
It is not entirely clear exactly what rules Land MG officials laid down for history teaching.  Writing in 
March 1948, Banks noted that “no ban upon the teaching of history exists in Wuerttemberg-Baden nor has any 
ban ever been ordered in Wuerttemberg-Baden by Military Government.”64  His assertion echoed a May 1946 
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letter from Land MG director Colonel Morris Edwards to Minister-President Reinhold Maier which observed 
that “an idea apparently exists that the teaching of history is forbidden” but that this was “not so.”  Rather, for 
history, as for other subjects, the only restriction was that the textbooks and curriculum needed MG approval.  
History teaching, Edwards added, “has been largely handicapped up until now by lack of source material from 
which to draw.”65  Just a few days before Edwards signed his letter, however, a monthly report from the Culture 
Ministry’s secondary schools section had stated that, “after lengthy negotiations with the American education 
officer,” the MG had granted the Germans permission to resume history instruction in secondary schools.66  
Taken in context, this reference can perhaps be explained by the section’s August report, which indicated that 
MG officials had now authorized Stoffpläne (subject matter plans) for history and geography—intimating that 
the Americans did not object to the teaching of the subject in and of itself, but rather had disagreed with the 
specific approach proposed by the Land.67 
The German perspective on history teaching is equally difficult to unravel.  In 1948, Banks reported 
that “for the first year of the occupation the German government on its own initiative banned the teaching of 
history until teachers could be reoriented at least to a slight degree.”68  He was evidently only partially correct.  
North Württemberg elementary schools that had access to Allied emergency textbooks resumed history 
instruction already in October 1945,69 although Culture Ministry officials did not authorize the teaching of 
modern history in elementary schools until 1948.70  June 1946 reports from the Heidelberg MG detachment 
likewise stated that some history was being taught in the primary schools of North Baden.71  On the other hand, 
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a late 1948 MG report from Landkreis Karlsruhe observed that there was no teaching of history in local primary 
schools, as ordered by North Baden’s government.72  A source from the 1950s similarly stated that North Baden 
officials did not officially reintroduce history instruction into elementary schools until the 1950-1951 school 
year, when acceptable preparatory texts, “in the new spirit,” were finally available for teachers.73   
The fate of history instruction in secondary schools also apparently varied.  In January 1946, the head 
of a Heidelberg gymnasium petitioned the North Baden government to recommence history instruction (which 
he viewed as extremely important to correct distorted Nazi interpretations) and noted that, to his knowledge, no 
history was being taught in secondary schools.74  He was later informed by North Baden officials—“after 
talking to the military government”—that instruction in history might be resumed only after new texts were 
written.75  As noted above, prior to the summer of 1946 there was also no teaching of history in North 
Württemberg secondary schools supervised by the Culture Ministry.  However, while ministry officials were 
soon making plans to reintroduce the subject there,76 North Baden did not direct its secondary schools to revive 
history instruction until mid 1947, when a detailed chronological timetable was published which teachers could 
use in the absence of new books.77   
Given this evidence, it seems plausible that local school officials were equally uncertain at the start of 
the occupation as to what, exactly, current policy was regarding the teaching of history.  Early on, it was 
difficult for Land officials to contact outlying schools, and the MG’s education division was appallingly 
understaffed and thus unable to visit schools to discuss MG policies or to check compliance.78  Furthermore, 
relations between Culture Ministry officials in Stuttgart and their counterparts at North Baden’s previously 
independent education administration left a great deal to be desired—writing in 1949, Banks suggested that 
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during the early years of the occupation they were “openly hostile” and remained “strained.”79  Then, too, local 
MG officials were not always fully informed regarding U.S. or Land MG policies. 
At the very least, there were real impediments to the resumption of history instruction.  Offering 
reasons why “practically no history or geography is being taught” in June 1946, one North Baden MG official 
pointed to a shortage of teachers, insufficient class time to cover material, inadequate educational resources, and 
a “lack of directives on what to teach and how to treat the material.”80  In the early 1950s, a retrospective piece 
on history instruction in North Baden’s elementary schools argued that even had the Americans not banned the 
teaching of history in the fall of 1945, German officials would have done so anyway.  Young people being 
hastily trained to be teachers had learned the subject during the Nazi era, veteran teachers had to be reoriented, 
refugee teachers needed to better understand Baden’s history, and, in the absence of new history books for both 
instructors and pupils, there was always the risk that teachers would rely on books from 1933 to 1945 to prepare 
their lessons.81 
Even where it was permitted, instruction in the schools left much to be desired.  “The quality of 
[history] teaching is probably lower than that of any of the other subjects because of the radical change in the 
standpoint necessary on the part of the teacher,” observed Banks in 1948.82  Some instructors, particularly older, 
more conservative ones, resented or resisted obeying MG regulations.83  Teachers also made their own rules.  A 
math instructor who headed a Karlsruhe secondary school immediately after the war later remembered 
prohibiting all references to Hitler or Germany’s immediate history.  “Neither a word about the past nor about 
that which everyone was talking about at the moment [was momentan an Bewegung war], for example, the 
suicide of Hitler or something.  That was never mentioned in the school at all,” he recalled.  “I made it a 
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principle, to make everyone forget the whole thing.”84  By contrast, a fifth grade teacher in the same city (who, 
like the math instructor, had been born in the 1880s) later recalled teaching history “secretly,” viewing it as an 
absolutely necessary part of a democratic education.85  Most teachers, at a minimum, required time to adjust to 
new circumstances and new ideas. 
The deficiencies and difficulties of history teaching led to predictable results.  In June 1946, the ICD 
sent its interviewers out to gather information on German schools.  At times citing the attitude of individual 
teachers as the definitive factor, American observers in Württemberg-Baden pointed out that while some 
German youngsters were quite knowledgeable, or were well informed on specific topics, others showed a 
regrettable ignorance regarding basic political and historical questions.86  A Heidelberg report, for instance, 
indicated that only nine of 43 pupils asked could correctly answer the question “did Germany declare war on the 
USA or vice-versa?”  When asked about the greatest man in German history, the responses were “Karl der 
Grosse, Bismarck and Hitler,” with “none of the children . . . in a position to explain why they thought so.”  The 
pupils’ teachers, the report added, “gave the excuse that history was only taken up recently and at present they 
were teaching the historical events of the middle ages.”87   
A MG official from Stuttgart similarly noted that only two of the 42 14- and 15-year-olds in one 
elementary school graduating class knew that Germany had been a republic between 1919 and 1933.  “One boy 
wrote that in 1933 the German government changed because a new Führer was elected,” he continued.  “Seven 
out of 42 guessed correctly what the League of Nations had been.”  The 17- and 18-year-old boys in a local 
secondary school had been much better informed, the American noted, but even eight of the 30 students polled 
there did not know what form of government Germany had between 1919 and 1933.  Meanwhile, the answers 
gleaned from the 16- to 18-year-old girls of one secondary school were “remarkable for the amount of 
dogmatically proclaimed misinformation” they contained.  He explained: “The inevitable survival of the Nazi 
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propaganda became apparent in the following answers: ‘In 1939 war broke out because Polish troops invaded 
Germany’; ‘the revolution of 1918 is the fault of the Communists’; ‘the KPD is bad because the wrong people 
(Jews) would assume power’; ‘Goethe is great because he expresses the German way of life.’”  Most telling 
were the comments of one girl—whom the American termed “a young skeptic in the group”—who wrote: 
“How can we possibly answer your questions?  We young people have no idea about what happened from 1800 
until 1933.”88 
Occasionally, students offered responses to simpler questions that the interviewers found equally 
disconcerting.  For example, asked about his reading preferences, a sixth grade boy in Sinsheim, who “seemed 
one of the brightest in the class,” said he liked soldier books the best.89  On the other hand, after speaking with 
teachers, students of a variety of ages, and the school superintendent for Landkreis Ulm, Ulm’s ever vigilant 
Herbert van der Berg had other concerns.  He reported being struck by the fact that “one of the boys asked when 
they would be allowed to march again as they had done in the [Hitler Youth]” and “that when leaving a class 
room the teacher would give some kind of a command which sounded like hupp and that thereupon the students 
would rise quickly and stand erect next to their desk saying Auf Wiedersehen.”  “These incidents,” he 
concluded, “gave the investigator the impression that militarism is still deeply impressed in the boys’ minds.”90 
Even apart from their irregular schooling during the final war years and the inadequate instruction they 
were currently receiving, the confusion of school children was perhaps understandable given the abrupt shift in 
Germany’s official value system and its new conception of historical truth.  If the sudden change could unsettle 
and confuse teachers it could undoubtedly jar, puzzle, or demoralize their pupils as well.  One German alluded 
to this in recalling his experiences as a teenager in neighboring Bavaria right after the war. 
The history teacher returned as if nothing had happened since he stopped teaching nine months earlier.  
But the “Heil Hitler” greeting on his entry into the classroom was dropped in favor of a snappy 
“Gruess Gott,” followed by a prayer in Latin.  In spring 1945 he had ended our survey of European 
history with the German invasions of the Roman Empire, having arrived in our slow trek through 
European history at around the year 100 B.C.  We had learned that morally pure Teutonic tribes, the 
Cimbri and Teutonici in particular, had swept in from the north to free the enfeebled Romans from 
their decadent way of life.  Now, at the end of 1945, the same teacher described the same German 
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invasion and the same battle of Aquae Sextiae, but this time he instructed us that the cosmopolitan 
Romans were defending civilization against the onslaught of the barbaric Teutons from the north.  
Where did he stand?  I asked myself.  He had switched sides without breaking his pedagogical stride.  
He lost all credibility in my eyes at that moment, and from then on, I devised ways of interrupting 
classes just below the threshold of detection. . . .91 
 
       Interestingly, many ordinary Germans were not overly concerned about these developments.  Nor did 
they always appreciate the American insistence on changing the content of history teaching.  In January 1948, 
ICD interviewers spoke with 223 adults from Stuttgart of assorted ages and income levels regarding educational 
issues.  When asked if they thought the failure to teach history would have “very serious effects,” 51 percent of 
those interviewed said “yes.”  The ICD’s summary report nevertheless pointed out that this statistic was 
misleading.  Almost no interviewees “volunteered” the idea that the dearth of history teaching in schools was a 
flaw in Germany’s current educational situation, and when asked specifically which subjects they believed were 
most affected by a lack of books, only 7 percent mentioned history.  The report also noted that interviewers had 
asked each person for their assessment of the “basic reason” history was not being taught.  “Replies to this 
question were, in the large, set within the frame of bitterness and sarcasm,” the report asserted.  It stressed that 
not even one in 10 individuals “lauded the necessity of complete removal of nazi and militaristic ideas” from 
history instruction, adding that “large majorities of the public, however, recognized that the matter hinges on 
this problem.”  These observations were supported with details regarding the responses given to the question. 
 
Answers to survey question “What do you think the basic reason is why history is not being taught today?” 
 
General confusion in political situation; revision in conception of history; Allies and “experts” 
disagree on interpretation. 
 
  31% 
Nothing more dare be said about militarism or nazism   21% 
Necessary and good idea to remove influence of militaristic and nazi ideas     4% 
National consciousness and Germany’s past great history are being suppressed     4% 
Scarcities and shortages (books, time, teachers, etc.)   14% 
No opinion   26% 
Total 100% 
 
 
Appraising the ICD’s findings in Stuttgart, as well as the results of interviews with some 450 Berliners, the 
report concluded that about half of the public viewed history teaching in schools as important, but that the 
Germans believed “physical problems” should be resolved first and that facilitating the teaching of other 
subjects should take priority over historical instruction.  “In the background of thinking about history,” it 
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contended, “is a very wide understanding of what seems to be termed ‘unduly revisionistic’ thinking about 
history on the part of the Allies.”92 
Still, there were some Germans who shared the Americans’ concerns about the shortcomings of history 
teaching in their schools.  Speaking to a March 1946 gathering of North Baden youth program officials, one 
Heidelberg youth argued that Germany’s young people passionately wanted truthful, objective history 
instruction.  A peer from Mannheim suggested that they needed to learn about the mistakes made during the 
past 12 years so that these could be eliminated.93  In January 1946, a writer in a Württemberg youth publication 
similarly lamented the absence of history and geography teaching in the upper grades and insisted that it was 
critical to reeducate Germany’s young people to correct historical thinking and to understanding for people 
outside of the country’s borders.  Underscoring the importance of finally freeing Germany’s youth from an 
accustomed glorification of and clamoring for war in German history writing, he called for producing new texts 
as soon as possible, if they were, in fact, necessary for reviving history instruction.  Every cohort of young 
people who emerged from the schools without the necessary knowledge of German history and the world was 
lost to the new state, he stressed, because it would not learn these things in the workplace.94   
Many influential German administrators also believed that the content of history instruction had to be 
altered.  Although they might not agree on what specific changes were necessary, Land education officials were 
genuinely trying “to infuse a new spirit of history, as a story of culture and civilization throughout the world” 
and to exclude “all war-making and radical propaganda.”95  Most notably, to encourage, reorient, and improve 
the capabilities of history teachers, the Culture Ministry eventually began sponsoring workshops and training 
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courses for instructors—endeavors that even drew on the services of such heavyweights as Theodor Heuss and 
Gerhard Ritter.96  
History nevertheless remained a ticklish subject.  In one enlightening case, an instructor who attempted 
to teach his students about Germany’s recent past found himself snared on the line between objective discussion 
and objectionable propaganda.  During the summer of 1948, the Schwäbisch Gmünd MG office received a 
complaint about a local secondary school’s principal.  According to U.S. officials, it was alleged that the man 
had “adopted a theme of extreme old-time Nationalism” in teaching sixth grade boys.  Specifically, he had 
“lectured for many hours on the ill-timed subject: ‘The war-guilt lie of 1914,’” emphasizing “the policy of 
encirclement of the former Entente Powers” and “peremptorily reject[ing] the suggestion that Germany had 
been responsible for the First World War.”  His unacceptable “manner” and “tone” were evidenced in excerpts 
from a lecture he had purportedly given on the Versailles Treaty.  “The whole peace treaty (Versailles) was 
founded on the spurious assumption that the Reich was responsible for the outbreak of the war 1914-1918,” he 
had allegedly argued.  “The terms of the treaty conceived in an attitude of insidious hostility not only failed to 
guarantee a real peace, but were deliberately designed to plunder and disintegrate Germany, and to keep 
Germany on her knees.  The peace was considered to be a continuation of the war in another form; Germany 
was to lose her independence. . . . It was intended to dishonour the Germans and to injure their reputation by 
those punitive measures.”97 
Both the instructor himself and Dr. Albert Mack, head of the Culture Ministry’s secondary education 
section, were distressed by these accusations.  In addition to sending a member of his staff to investigate in 
Schwäbisch Gmünd, Mack had a “long and thorough conversation” with the accused, Dr. F, in Stuttgart, 
discussing “point for point” the local MG’s report.  Mack also eventually gave the Land MG an explanation 
more than three pages long, single-spaced, written by Dr. F himself.   
In his written account, Dr. F offered a spirited defense of his teaching.  First, he noted, he had not been 
lecturing sixth grade boys, but rather young men in the ninth grade, most of whom were over 20 years old and 
many of whom were former soldiers and former POWs who already possessed more mature and independent 
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judgment.  Dr. F stressed that he had not spoken of the “war guilt lie,” but instead of the “war guilt question,” 
and had dealt with it as part of two different lessons rather than lecturing on the topic for hours.  Furthermore, in 
terms of content, he had made it very clear that Germany had instigated the wars of 1864 and 1866 and 
especially the war begun in 1939.  However, World War I was very different and he had informed his students 
of this as well.  Many European nations contributed to its outbreak, he had contended, though he had also 
criticized the “saber-rattling, harmful style of Kaiser Wilhelm II” and, above all, the Germans’ handling of the 
Austrian-Serbian conflict.  The victors of World War I had, in fact, justified the harshness of the Treaty of 
Versailles with the argument that Germany was responsible for the war, Dr. F reminded in his letter.  He then 
explained that he had told his students that the punitive treaty, influenced by the suffering and vengeful peoples 
of the victorious nations, did not bring a lasting peace, but, instead, as some had foreseen it would, led to further 
conflict.  To back up his interpretation of these events, Dr. F pointed to the war causation discussion printed in 
an American world history textbook circulated as a U.S. War Department manual, quoted forceful statements 
from Winston Churchill regarding the Versailles negotiations (as carried in the American-sponsored newspaper 
Die Neue Zeitung), and cited remarks regarding the Versailles Treaty made by none other than Marshall Foch 
and Georges Clemenceau.98 
Summarizing Dr. F’s main points in his cover letter, Mack reported that his section had “no doubt 
whatever, that [Dr. F’s] report represents the full truth.”  Never a party member and always a pious Catholic, 
Dr. F was a “most reliable personality whose sincerity cannot be called into a question.”  Ministry officials were 
firmly convinced that he was “neither an extreme nationalist nor a representative of chauvinism nor a 
militarist.”  As for the issue of history teaching itself, they believed that “in the highest grade, before the boys 
leave school and go to the university, they ought to be brought to a free and open discussion of decisive 
questions of the political life of Germany and that only thus the new democratic spirit for which we long for so 
intensely will be realized.”  They endorsed “the idea that history teaching ought to serve truth” and, Mack 
implied, also agreed with Dr. F’s interpretation of the past.  Mack concluded, however, that “the main point in 
those lessons . . . is the spirit, in and out of which historical instruction is given by the teacher.”  And there was 
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no doubt here.  Dr. F’s approach was “a purely democratic one.”  He advocated “the ideal of peace all over the 
world, a ‘no-more-war-atmosphere’ and full truth within the relations among the nations of the world.”99 
Taken as a whole, Dr. F’s arguments were certainly open to challenge, but they were not outrageous 
and would, undoubtedly, have found an accepting audience among some American historians.  If he had indeed 
presented these very ideas to his students, they could perhaps be viewed as provocative, but could hardly be 
termed dangerous propaganda.  Not surprisingly, both Mack and Dr. F believed someone had deliberately 
chosen to defame the instructor—someone who, in reading the contemporary environment in Germany, 
obviously had assumed that an accusation of incendiary nationalistic teaching regarding World War I would, in 
fact, cause trouble for the man.  What the MG ultimately decided to do with Dr. F is not clear, but it seems 
likely that they would have let the matter rest. 
Although Dr. F’s alleged defiance of MG rules proved to be a fire without much fuel, the Americans 
showed a certain amount of persistence in investigating the truth of the accusations, even as late as mid 1948.  
Moreover, if Dr. F was not guilty, MG officials did discover several obvious violations of MG regulations even 
relatively late in the occupation.  In July 1947, for example, Württemberg-Baden’s top MG education official, 
John Steiner, sent a sharp letter of reprimand to Bäuerle concerning Stuttgart’s business school.  Two weeks 
before, one of its teachers had given students preparing for a German-English exam copies of old examinations.  
This, Steiner noted, was a “clear violation of Military Government directives and indicates either gross 
negligence or a gross malicious intent.”  He added that a subsequent investigation of the school had revealed 
“much material of this type. . . . [that] was not even under lock and key.”  He blamed the school administration 
for making the material available.  But the teacher had also told investigators that the school had acted on 
instructions from the responsible section of the Culture Ministry in using old files for exam preparations.  This, 
Steiner continued, raised the issue of why Land officials had not removed these kinds of resources from their 
schools.  Concluding with a reference to this “distressing incident,” Steiner asked that the ministry look into it, 
check whether similar materials were still available in other schools, and take action to make sure all teachers 
knew what items could not be used in their classrooms.100 
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Equally surprising was the May 19, 1949, daily report from a Land MG official which read: “Attention 
all you textbook experts!  Picked up a copy of a school song book in the [Stuttgart] Moerikeschule in the 
evening and discovered that it contains such old [military and nationalistic] favorites as ‘die Wacht am Rhein’, 
‘Deutschland ueber alles’, ‘Barbarossa’, ‘Frisch auf zum Streit’, ‘Zur Strassburg auf der Schanz’, ‘Der Soldat’.  
So much for your efforts to revise the singing habits!”  Whether the Americans took action to confiscate the 
book of songs dating from the imperial era is unknown.101 
By 1949, German education clearly was still in transition.  The early days of the occupation had 
brought chaos and uncertainty, with textbooks in short supply and teachers often inexperienced or disoriented, 
or both.  At the same time, American regulations and the goals of German education officials required teachers 
and students to adjust rapidly to an entirely new value system.  A resulting hiatus in history teaching sometimes 
led to ignorant and confused students, but it also gave educators time to adapt and rethink their approach.  
Overall, lasting change and the arrival of stability came at different speeds in different places.  But by the time 
the Americans turned over complete responsibility for education to the Germans, teacher training programs 
were in place, improved texts were becoming available, and German education was settling into new patterns 
which would serve as at least a partial foundation for further improvements in years to come.102 
 
Organized German Youth Activities 
Establishing a Policy Framework 
The teacher and classroom shortages that substantially reduced the amount of time children spent in 
school did more than slow their intellectual development.  Shorter school days meant more free time for most 
young Germans and more headaches for German and American officials.  The dissolution of the Hitler Youth, 
Banks later recounted, “left the youth of Germany, who had been accustomed to strong direction, in the position 
of a leaderless milling band of sheep.”103  Children and teenagers testing their talents on the black market, 
running afoul of the law, or just wandering the streets with little to do worried MG officers and German 
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authorities both.  Both also recognized the potential psychological problems facing the young, who had endured 
six years of war, disrupted households, and, in most cases, the loss of homes, family members, or friends.  Now 
they were dealing with hunger and uncertainty.  Fiercely indoctrinated for much of their lives, they were also 
confronting the collapse of their value system and ideals.  Even young people who were only in their teens 
frequently had thrown their hearts into Nazi activism at home or had sacrificed important years of their lives 
and perhaps their health as soldiers in service of a system now defined as criminal.  Some now picked up the 
pieces and looked forward.  But many others were slow to adjust, either refusing to relinquish their faith or 
having difficulty coming to terms with a dramatically reordered world.  In Germany’s young people, American 
and German officials identified—often accurately—obdurate Nazi and nationalistic attitudes, disillusionment, 
and apathy.104  Addressing these problems became important for a multitude of reasons. 
 At the outset of the occupation, U.S. policy called for dissolving the Hitler Youth and stipulated that 
any new youth groups must be approved by SHAEF.  But occupation officers were not to deliberately 
encourage the formation of new organizations.105  Right after the war, therefore, youth programs were varied, 
spotty, localized, and dependent as much on the rules set by local MG officials as on the initiative of the 
Germans living in an area.  First to sponsor activities for young people were the Catholic and Protestant 
churches.106  Stuttgart’s anti-fascist working committees similarly organized sporting events, instructional 
sessions, and clean-up and reconstruction projects.107  Concerned about idle and restive young Germans, army 
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officials also soon instructed American troops to get involved in arranging German youth activities.108  In some 
instances, however, Germans eager to launch new programs encountered MG obstacles.  In Heidelberg, for 
example, former sports leaders assembled already in late July 1945 to discuss the resumption of sporting 
activities in the city, only to have local American officials deny them permission to implement their plans.109  
About the same time, a MG public safety officer was informing Landkreis Heidelberg’s Landrat that U.S. 
regulations presently barred Germans from meeting for purposes such as music, theater, and athletics.110  Both 
city and Landkreis officials subsequently pressed their cases by pointing out that in nearby areas sporting 
activities were already in full swing, including those under the auspices of authorized sports clubs.111 
 In late October 1945, a new OMGUS directive governing youth activities altered American policy 
and imposed greater uniformity on activities in the U.S. Zone.  Rather than leaving matters mostly to the 
Germans, American officials were now to encourage the formation of new youth groups and the reestablishment 
of defunct organizations such as the Boy Scouts and YMCA.  All groups, OMGUS headquarters explained, 
“should exist for purposes of culture, religion or recreation” and should “aim to make possible the successful 
development of democratic ideas and the cultivation of the ideals of fair play, tolerance and honesty.”  Detailed 
instructions specified, further, that Landkreis youth committees should be created to oversee local groups.  All 
organizations had to be authorized by MG officials, with all group leaders and committee members approved 
according to current denazification rules.  Seeking to instill new values in Germany’s youth, the Americans did 
not neglect to also state what was expressly forbidden as part of this effort.  Specifically, they prohibited 
political groups and directed local MG authorities to prevent the revival of military, paramilitary, or Hitler 
Youth-type activities.  German officials were to inform all those involved with youth programs that they would 
be severely punished if their efforts included anything that glorified militarism or nationalism, tried to 
“propagate, revive or justify the doctrines of National Socialist leaders,” or explained “the practice of war or 
preparation for war, whether in the scientific, economic, or industrial field” or “promote[d] the study of geo-
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politics.”  “Parades, drilling, marching, and any form of pre-military or paramilitary training” were also banned 
and U.S. officials had to approve all uniforms and emblems.112  Württemberg-Baden’s Culture Ministry, which 
the Land MG soon tasked with overseeing all youth programs, subsequently passed on these rules to all 
Landkreis youth committees.113  
Eventually the Americans permitted the Germans to form youth organizations that stretched beyond 
the Landkreis to the Land level and also fostered the creation of Land youth committees.  Political restrictions 
on youth groups were later relaxed, and by mid 1947, Landkreis youth committees had received authority to 
approve all local groups and leaders, although they had to keep MG officials apprised of their decisions, with 
the Americans reserving the right to intervene directly, if necessary.  The assistance of U.S. occupation troops 
with youth work was formalized in a new “German Youth Activities” (GYA) program.114  However, the basic 
goals and restrictions of the October 1945 youth activities directive remained in place until the end of the 
occupation. 
While falling under the purview of the various youth program directives, sports clubs were also subject 
to additional regulations.  The Americans had insisted from the start of the occupation that no military exercises 
should be carried out under the guise of athletic activities.115  And in late 1945, the Allies issued detailed 
instructions pertaining to sports.  Allied Control Council Directive No. 23 mandated the dissolution of “all sport 
and military or para-military athletic organizations” that had existed prior to Germany’s surrender.  Along with 
proscribing all “military athletic organizations,” particularly those “engaged in Aviation, Parachuting, Gliding, 
Fencing, Military or Para-military drill or display, [and] shooting with firearms,” it forbade military-type 
athletic instruction and activities in schools, factories, political groups, and other organizations.  Expressly 
authorizing local non-military sports associations, provided Allied officials approved and supervised them, it 
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required that any organizations above the Landkreis level be authorized by zone commanders, and only those 
“that could not possibly have any military significance” were permitted.  In addition, the directive swiped at the 
ghosts of the Hitler Youth, declaring that physical education for youth “will concentrate on elements of health, 
hygiene and recreation.”116   
In a March 1946 letter to the Länder MGs, OMGUS headquarters spelled out a new zonal policy based 
on Directive No. 23, offering supplementary instructions for enforcement officials which not only listed 
sporting activities that were banned, but also gave examples of specifically authorized sports, including soccer, 
handball, ice hockey, and boxing.117  Ultimately, the Americans sanctioned many activities that the Nazis had 
promoted as particularly beneficial for turning Germany’s youth into good soldiers.  German educators, for 
example, had stressed the value of sports such as handball and soccer for cultivating desirable personal qualities 
like manliness, and Hitler himself had favored boxing as an educational tool.118  Similarly, while the Americans 
banned air gun shooting, they did not forbid hammer throwing, though both sports had been among the events 
comprising the 1933 German Sports Festival’s “Wehrturnkämpfe” (military athletics contests).119  On one hand, 
the Americans’ choices thus appear rather arbitrary and perhaps naive; on the other hand, they might be seen as 
generous, and probably wise, in singling out for prohibition only those sports that seemed to have a clear and 
direct applicability to military operations.   
In keeping with OMGUS’s October 1945 instructions, communities throughout Württemberg-Baden 
set up local youth committees in late 1945 and early 1946.120  Starting in November 1945, MG officers also 
began formally authorizing church groups and other youth organizations under the new guidelines.121  Sports 
clubs were often the first to organize, with local officials reconstituting old associations, forming new ones, or 
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uniting several disbanded clubs.122  In North Baden, a MG report indicated that 1,600 local youth groups and 
560 sports clubs were operating in late June 1946.123  By January 1949, youth organizations in the Land 
encompassed more than 400,000 young people.124  Some 180,000 belonged to sports clubs.125  Despite their 
growth over time, the many groups did not include all of Germany’s youth, however.  Figures compiled in May 
1946, for instance, showed 85,000 young people enrolled in the Württemberg-Baden’s youth organizations, 
with some youngsters belonging to more than one group, at a time when the Land had more than 412,000 
children between the ages of six and 14 attending its elementary schools.126  
 To be approved, all youth committees and groups had to provide the Americans with information on 
their proposed leaders, who were then evaluated according to applicable denazification criteria.  In early 1946, 
the MG official responsible for youth and sports activities in North Baden told German officials under his 
jurisdiction that no former active military officers might be members of local youth committees, but it is unclear 
whether this ban was widely applied or how long it remained in force.127  Both more and less explicit were the 
several dozen formal authorization letters Landkreis Heidelberg officers mailed out to sports clubs and other 
groups in December 1946 which stated that “no former leading nazis or militarists may be admitted as 
leaders.”128  In later years, Ulm’s sports chief approved club leaders with the cautionary note that this approval 
was contingent upon their obeying the current rules for athletic activities.129   
Over time, the authorizing process for leaders was streamlined and its stringency relaxed.  
Increasingly, applicants could simply supply youth committees with their Spruchkammer decisions.  When the 
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MG’s 1947 regulations clarified that no person assigned to Groups 1, 2, or 3 under the March 1946 
denazification law might occupy a leading position in a youth or sports organization (although the Americans 
technically could still deny positions to anyone),130 the leniency of the tribunals meant that very few individuals 
were excluded from these posts.  During the last years of the occupation, then, the door was opened for the 
return—at least to the sports arena—of men denied responsible positions by the Americans during the early 
years.  In this, the sports community followed a broader trend in German society that saw the rehabilitation of 
former Nazis fueled in part by a need for experienced, competent personnel.131   
 Policies regarding the membership of youth organizations were much less exclusionary.  In fact, MG 
officials explicitly advised German officials to welcome former Hitler Youth members and the children of SA 
men and party members into the new organizations.  As one set of instructions noted, the Americans were 
especially interested in reeducating these young people.132 
 In addition to reporting on their leaders, organizations seeking MG authorization had to describe their 
goals and planned activities.  The Americans therefore received applications from a range of groups proposing 
to offer German youngsters religious and musical instruction, healthy sporting activities, and organized 
opportunities for hiking and otherwise communing with nature.  Some groups addressed the issue of militarism 
directly in their submissions or in their official documents, either explicitly eschewing militaristic activities or 
promising to fight against militarism itself.  Thus, the March 1946 statutes of the Deutsche Jungenschaft 
(German Boys’ Club)—described by a MG official in 1948 as a club having “a complete balance of youth with 
reference to ideological groups”—stated that “every militaristic activity” would be rejected “in sport and 
game.”133  The socialist Falcons listed among their aims the eradication of Nazi and militaristic thought from 
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home and school,134 while the communist-leaning Schwäbische Volksjugend (Swabian People’s Youth) set as 
their overarching goals the “transformation of the lives of our youth on a democratic basis” and the overcoming 
of “the spiritual and practical causes and effects of fascism and militarism.”135 
 Obviously, groups were unlikely to propose sponsoring paramilitary exercises or to include among 
their goals the preparation of Germany’s youth for war.  At the same time, neither the Germans nor the 
Americans could be certain that the organizations they authorized were genuinely committed to their stated 
agendas.  Initially even authorized groups had to notify the local MG in advance of all meetings, however, and 
had to allow American officials to attend if they wished.136  The Americans could therefore monitor group 
activities and possibly deter illegal undertakings.  Additionally, MG policy required youth groups to submit 
regular reports concerning their gatherings.  ICD intelligence officials also occasionally reported on the 
activities of approved groups. 
 
Reconceptualizing German Youth and Sporting Activities 
 In supervising German youth programs, the Americans had two principal goals: permanently 
eliminating militarism and Nazism and encouraging the growth of democratic practices, institutions, and 
attitudes.  In practice, this meant that after the first few months of the occupation, measures to combat 
militarism were carried out within a larger framework of ongoing democratization efforts, which were often 
both frustrating and frustrated.   
 The methods and plans promoted by American military government officers, for instance, frequently 
conflicted with the traditional approaches and priorities of German youth authorities.  During the Weimar era, 
Germany’s youth scene had been characterized by a multiplicity of youth groups and leagues that frequently 
mirrored the political and religious fragmentation of the adult world.  In addition to the right-leaning “Bünde” 
(leagues)—more martial and hierarchical successors to the elite, individualistic, semi-mystical Wandervögel 
groups of the pre-World War I era—and, on the far right, the Hitler Youth, groups sponsored by various 
                                                 
134
 Daily Report, Education and Religious Affairs, 23 April 1946, 24 Apr 46, NA, RG 260, OMGUS, OMGWB, Box 888, F: 
Weekly Reports E&CR [2]. 
 
135
 Satzungen der Schwäbischen Volksjugend (SVJ), 14 Apr 46, HStA EA 1/013 Bü 50. 
 
136
 “An die Sportvereine!” AU, 3 Jan 46; William J. Truxal to Herr Karl R., 18 Dec 46, GLA 356 Zug. 1977-31 No. 800; 
William J. Truxhal to Herr Erwin O., 18 Dec 46, ibid. 
 
 456 
political parties had appeared, as had youth leagues affiliated with the Protestant and Catholic churches.137  
Upon receiving military government permission to form new youth clubs, German youth authorities therefore 
quickly returned to their old patterns, erecting a multitude of organizations and, in the process, often 
reestablishing old religious and political barriers, as well as jealously guarding their right to independent action.  
Comfortable with the pluralistic German approach, the Americans worked to restrain state officials from 
interfering in the operations of individual clubs.  But they also pressed for integrating young people themselves 
into the management of youth affairs and clashed with German officials when establishing youth centers 
intended to foster interaction between young people belonging to different groups and to corral youngsters who 
had not joined any official organizations.138 
 American objectives likewise entangled MG officers in the complicated and turbulent politics of the 
German sports world.  German discussions regarding the postwar revival of athletics came to center especially 
on the question of organization and, as a corollary, on the issue of personnel.  Many in the field wished to form 
a more unified sports system than had existed in the 1920s, as sportsmen across the political spectrum viewed 
the condition of the pre-1933 German sports movement, which had been nearly as fragmented as the youth 
scene, as partly responsible for the Nazis’ ability to easily subjugate and manipulate even the right-leaning 
Weimar sports organizations.  However, while former members of the pre-1933 workers’ sports clubs generally 
favored the creation of one unified sports association with numerous branches, other sports leaders, above all 
the remnants of the former “bourgeois” clubs, wanted to reestablish multiple associations—Fachverbände—
emphasizing one type of sport, perhaps integrated into a loose union, but without conceding too much power to 
the umbrella group.  This quarrel over structure, moreover, was in part an argument about the past.  To the left-
leaning men who took charge of German sports after the war, it was self-explanatory that the leaders of the 
former “politically neutral” bourgeois clubs should be excluded from influential roles in any rebuilding effort.  
Their history was one of militarism and antidemocratic tendencies, and they had jumped aboard the Nazi sports 
bandwagon “with flags flying.”  Representatives of the bourgeois clubs, meanwhile, considered themselves 
betrayed by the Nazis and denied any wrong-doing.  Many criticized, too, the socialists’ unapologetic desire to 
use athletics to instill a new anti-militaristic, anti-fascist outlook in Germany’s youth and to prepare them for 
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resisting future attempts at political seduction.  They also disliked submitting themselves to the authority of left-
leaning officials.  Instead, they called for the return and strengthening of apolitical Fachverbände.139  In 
Württemberg-Baden, MG officials navigated these churning waters by promoting the founding of a range of 
sports organizations, battling perceived attempts by sports leaders to hoard power and authority, and working to 
counteract the politicization, centralizing inclinations, and predisposition toward dominating other organizations 
of those associations formed as umbrella bodies for multiple groups.140 
 Yet whatever the points of contention between the Germans and their occupiers, and among the 
Germans themselves, there was widespread agreement that German youth and sports operations needed to be 
substantially reoriented.  In this arena, more than any other addressed by the demilitarizing Americans, MG 
officials encountered a shared perspective and few prominent critics.  Some Germans disagreed with specific 
MG decisions or with the particulars of individual regulations, but the Americans’ overriding “negative” 
objective was endorsed by most. 
 Land and local officials, for example, repeatedly called for cleansing youth programs of militaristic 
practices and for using them to prevent, rather than to prepare for war.  Speaking to members of the new Land 
youth committee in April 1946, Deputy Culture Minister Bäuerle argued that introducing German young people 
to the spirit of genuine democracy was their most important assignment.  “Actions based on freedom and 
responsibility” were the goal, he maintained, adding that commitment (Bindung) and freedom were 
interdependent.  “Gemeinschaft” (community) was not about uniforms and training, but rather about the 
cooperation of self-reliant people and groups.141  Heinrich Hassinger, the Culture Ministry official in charge of 
youth and sports, similarly told several hundred young people amassed in Stuttgart on Land Youth Day in June 
1946 that it should never again be allowed for Germany’s youth to be “misused for any egoistic or martial 
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purpose.”142  Hassinger believed that the “physical toughening” of young people during the Third Reich, the 
fact that the “souls of the youth had been uniformed,” and other failings of the Nazi system had contributed 
directly to the wretched physical, spiritual, and intellectual condition of Germany’s youth at the end of the war.  
His own work and the efforts of youth leaders throughout the Land, Hassinger suggested at a conference in 
January 1947, were now aimed at helping these young people and rescuing them “for civilization, culture, and, 
with that, for the future.”143 
 Other officials emphasized the importance of youth work as a vehicle for fostering peace.  In 
September 1947, Social Democratic Interior Minister Fritz Ulrich reminded a gathering of Falcons in Stuttgart 
that they had a vital mission.  According to a MG report, Ulrich told the young people that “for 80 years the 
German SPD had been fighting against militarism and hate among the nations and for peace and 
understanding.”  He then  
spoke of the determination to educate the youth in this spirit of peace and harmony among the nations.  
The nationalists used to say that he who wages war, destroys cities and sows discord among the people 
is a hero.  A new and different hero worship must be introduced.  He shall be a hero who builds cities, 
safeguards the peace and makes people happier, richer and more harmonious in their community life.   
 
Ulrich also promised the Allies “that in future the German socialists, especially the young socialists, would 
work to this end.”144  Ulm’s top youth official, Hugo Roller, likewise believed that transforming the role war 
played in the thinking of Germany’s youth was critically important.  “I give you the assurance, that all of my 
youth work stands under the motto: ‘Never Again War,’” Roller wrote to a member of a German peace group.  
“Already before the Third Reich, I promoted pacifism in youth education and will, of course, after this 
murderous war, more than ever exert all of my energy for peace.”145 
 For some Germans, concerns about the future character of German youth activities were manifested in 
doubts expressed regarding the reorganization of the Boy Scouts.  In early 1946, about the time a Stuttgart 
pastor was attempting to form a small troop of scouts, representatives of the KPD, German Peace Society, SPD 
women’s organization, and International Women’s League voiced strong reservations about the reestablishment 
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of the group, arguing that in Germany they could expect a “militant organization” to emerge—after all, the 
Weimar incarnation had merged with the Stahlhelm.146  A communist politician later told an ICD interviewer 
that he thought the Boy Scout movement was very dangerous.  Unlike in the United States, he contended, in 
Germany it had been a military organization.  The secretary of Stuttgart’s SPD agreed, calling the group “the 
militarists’ spiritual preschool” (geistliche Vorschule der Militaristen).147  In Heidelberg, youth committee 
members objected to the idea of forming a group locally by recalling that the Boy Scouts had worked with the 
Nazis even before 1933 and that the earliest leaders of the Hitler Youth had come from their ranks.148  As late as 
November 1948, a MG official was still commenting that many Germans considered scouting militaristic and 
that groups with programs similar to that of the Boy Scouts had chosen not to use the name, in light of popular 
attitudes.149  On the other hand, the socialist Falcons also came in for criticism during a national gathering in 
Stuttgart in 1947.  Some observers, noted the Stuttgarter Zeitung, “saw a danger in the uniforms, the emblems, 
[and] the marching songs, given the mentality of our nation.”150   
 While not addressing youth programs directly, writers in the licensed press likewise periodically 
discussed the problem of Germany’s young people, condemning their treatment and experiences during the 
Third Reich and calling for a transformation in youth values, one that eliminated militarism and focused on 
more constructive and presently more critical goals.151  Germany’s young people, wrote an observer in the 
Stuttgarter Zeitung, were now living in an age where their experiences in recent years were of no use.  “No one 
needs soldiers, marchers, destroyers, followers, and the exaggerated emotionalism of martial instinct,” he 
argued.  What was needed now was “noble enthusiasm for the true, good, and beautiful” and “commitment to 
the rebuilding of our homeland, to mutual help between individuals, to the preservation of peace and the 
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regaining of freedom of thinking and acting, to life values, therefore, for which one indeed does not receive 
medals and decorations, but for which one arguably receives the only desirable human prize, namely, inner 
human dignity.”152 
 Calling for change, however, was always easier than bringing it about.  “I have often asked myself,” 
noted a man from Mannheim in a letter to Württemberg-Baden’s culture minister, “what is to be done to tackle 
the difficult assignment of reeducating our youth, to lead them away from a warlike spirit to a peace-loving, 
understanding, and internationally unifying spirit.”153   
 Those promoting sports believed they had at least a partial answer to this question.  Here, too, 
influential Germans were insisting that the military overtones of athletics must be eradicated and pre-military 
training eliminated.  “Every sportsman will recognize that the mechanical, pattern-following drill of the past 
had nothing to do with true sport,” asserted a writer in the Stuttgarter Zeitung in September 1945.  “The time is 
past when one drummed military virtues into our youth in a tone meant for the barracks and, with brutal 
necessity, made sports into a duty in order to train soldiers.”  Sporting activities should instead revert to their 
original function, with an emphasis placed on their value for the health of the human body and soul.  Individuals 
should not be obsessed with defeating another person or team, but rather should focus on improving their own 
performances or enjoying themselves.  Sports should bring joy, more than one newspaper article declared.  Like 
their occupiers, many Germans also maintained that athletics could teach essential values such as fairness, 
tolerance, and understanding.  Sports, in fact, had the potential to increase international understanding and to 
restore Germany’s good name.154 
 Finally, some German young people had their own ideas about what youth activities should look like 
and needed few lectures from their elders.  Speaking to a gathering of North Baden officials in March 1946, one 
youth insisted that Germany’s young people did not want to again be trained to be soldiers and to die.  Rather, 
they wanted to acquire practical skills and to learn about a variety of subjects, including politics.  They also 
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wanted to have a chance to just have fun.155  A 24-year-old dentistry student who had co-founded a youth club 
in Buchen similarly told an ICD interviewer that “the aim of German youth organizations should be to lead 
youth away from militarism and marching, to a more human attitude; to make healthy Germans and to model 
the youthful character.”156  When in early 1946 the Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung asked its young readers what 
they expected from organized youth groups, one responded that they should no longer feed adolescents with 
plans for world conquest and teachings of hate, but instead encourage love for other people and teach the laws 
of humanity.  Overall, noted Kurt Fried, most letters had shown an unambiguous rejection of the compulsion 
and standardization of the Hitler Youth—though a few had appeared not to condemn the organization’s ideas so 
much as its approach.  More forceful was a letter that addressed the question of youth generally.  “One truly no 
longer needs to try to explain to us the effects of militarism,” wrote the young man.  “We have gotten to know 
militarism.  But we don’t want to let anyone take away from us our pride in what we had to accomplish as 
soldiers.  However, that is all behind us.  As far as we are concerned, we do not want to have to sacrifice our 
human dignity to blind obedience ever again.”157 
 
Skepticism, Violations, and Protest 
 Among the Germans, there was clearly broad agreement on the subject of changing youth and sports 
activities after the war.  One might even talk in terms of a prevailing consensus, certainly among important 
administrators and politicians, youth and sports leaders, the licensed press, most parents, and many young 
people, and certainly when it came to rejecting the intensely militarized youth experience of the Third Reich.  
Still, there were Germans were not fully on board.  While their skepticism and questioning sometimes seemed 
born of unrepentant nationalism and militarism or unflagging enthusiasm for military traditions and routines, 
these attitudes could also be caused by disorientation in a changed world or—probably most often and of least 
concern to the Americans—by resentment at the loss of a beloved hobby or passion. 
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 Especially worrisome to MG and German officials were the attitudes of those veterans who appeared 
unwilling or unable to adapt to new circumstances.  Some had a hard time letting go of their previous values or 
at least their previous status.  Others, rightly or wrongly, felt unfairly ostracized, criticized, disdained, ignored, 
or blamed.  Many had proven their merits as soldiers only to discover that their skills were no longer valued.  
Military service carried out as demanded by others was now dismissed as worthless, or, worse, something to be 
condemned.  Some interpreted criticism of the war and the values of the Third Reich as disparagement of their 
own experiences and devaluation of their contributions.  A few or all of these complaints might lead to 
skeptical, contemptuous, or defiant attitudes toward official reeducation initiatives.   
 In January 1946, for instance, a speaker participating in the Land Interior Ministry’s “Reflection” 
(Besinnung) lecture series in Stuttgart addressed the topic “Who is helping the youth?”  Following his remarks, 
which centered on the current state of Germany’s young people and what the goals, functions, and 
organizational structure of a reconceived youth program should be, there was a brief discussion period during 
which most of the commentators evidently spent little time discussing the speaker’s ideas (save to criticize his 
organizational proposals) and instead offered their own thoughts on the subject.  Among those pontificating 
were Heinrich Hassinger and representatives of the trade unions and the Schwäbische Volksjugend.  A number 
of attendees later sent the ministry descriptions of the event that not only lamented the pathetic display which 
had followed the talk but also noted that the liveliest response from the reasonably large number of young men 
attending had come during the short speech of a local pastor who had himself served as a soldier.158  One 
correspondent described the episode in terse form, beginning with a summary of the pastor’s comments: “Must 
state: It is not permissible to throw into the dirt all of the values for which many died.  (Unrest in the 
auditorium.)”159  Another writer, whose report hinted at socialist leanings, offered a microcosmic picture of the 
evening, stating that he had closely watched four young former soldiers who were probably only 19 or 20 years 
old.  “They sat there with completely hostile faces, a superior, contemptuous smile on their faces.  I had the 
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impression the four young men . . . cannot be shaken by anything any more.  They made biting comments 
continuously.”  Only when the pastor spoke did they suddenly come alive, shouting approval.160 
 The author of a July 1946 letter to Das junge Wort, a youth magazine put out in conjunction with the 
Culture Ministry, similarly suggested that some young people were developing dangerous attitudes toward the 
past.  It often seemed as if memories of the horrors of the war years were beginning to fade, he wrote, with 
many talking about the time when Germany was still the victor.  “It is part of human nature to quickly forget the 
unpleasantness of the past,” he noted, “especially when the present is anything but enjoyable.”  But, he added, 
idealizing the war and whitewashing wartime events posed a serious danger.  This was exactly what had 
occurred after the last war, with a militarized society, another war, millions of war victims, destroyed cities, and 
the loss of political autonomy as the results.  Germany’s youth could not be held accountable for these 
disastrous developments, he contended, but they would be guilty in the future if they did not draw the right 
lessons from the past.  Among other things, this meant recognizing that Germany’s current situation had been 
caused by “our former Führer and the people who made his rule possible,” not by Jews, Communists, German 
generals, or “malevolent fate.”  They should, further, not try to extract some meaning from the apparent 
nonsense of the last war.  Yes, most young men had believed they were defending their homeland and should 
thus not be reproached for their behavior.  But they should also not hold up their service as something 
meritorious, however long and brave.  In the end, it was all for a “small criminal clique” and hurtful to the 
German people.  “The objection that other nations have also not completely freed themselves from nationalistic 
or militaristic ideas is not sound,” he insisted.  “At one time, there was nowhere where these ideas exerted such 
an excessive influence on politics as in Germany; besides, after our experiences, we would have to reject 
nationalism even if the whole world were still caught up in this.”161 
 Perhaps the most visible signs of the reluctance or refusal of some young men to internalize reorienting 
lessons from the recent past, as well as of their discontent, resentment, or skepticism regarding the imposition of 
a new value system, were the problems at German universities.  “In the majority of instances, the nationalism of 
the students appears purely negative,” observed State Department analyst Henry Kellermann in assessing the 
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“militaristic and chauvinistic views” of some students in mid 1946.  “It mirrors a fundamental inability to face 
realities, an unwillingness to reform, and a fanatic adherence to the status quo ante.”  Such sentiments led these 
students and other veterans to active opposition and resistance, Kellermann noted.  Most, however, were just 
apathetic and lived their lives without taking an interest in politics or organized youth activities.162 
  In a few instances, U.S. regulations were directly violated.  In August 1946, MG officials suspended 
Boy Scout activities in Heidelberg and removed the leader of 200 scouts because the man “wore an 
unauthorized uniform, printed posters without Military Government permission, and gave militaristic titles to 
specific groups under him.”163  While these were relatively minor infractions, recent events made the swift and 
rather severe response of U.S. officials more understandable.  Earlier in the year, 12 Bavarian youths had been 
convicted of possessing explosives and using the cover of an unauthorized Christian Pathfinders organization—
one of several versions of the Boy Scouts in Germany at the time—to create a new Nazi movement.  The group 
had adopted symbols and methods used by the Hitler Youth and SA and “engaged in semi-military drill, sang 
military songs, informed on civic officials, and blacklisted, defamed, and attacked girls who associated with 
American soldiers.”  American officials had likewise determined that a scout group in Wiesbaden was planning 
subversive activities.164 
 Heidelberg was also home to the first and probably only person arrested and convicted in 
Württemberg-Baden for violating MG Law No. 154, which outlawed all forms of military training.  In mid 
September 1946, the Americans sentenced a 51-year-old physical education teacher to six months in prison.  
According to the Stuttgarter Zeitung, witnesses had reported seeing the man make his 32 teenage charges march 
in formation and perform military drills.165  The headline writers at the New York Times described the teacher as 
a “drill instructor,”166 while the Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung criticized him for apparently believing he could 
continue to indulge in his “parade ground attitude” with the boys entrusted to him by the new democratic state 
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and held up his conviction as a warning to others who “still yearn to make excursions into the parade ground 
milieu.”167 
 Closer scrutiny of the episode revealed a somewhat less stereotypically Prussian picture, however, and 
underscored yet again the interpretive challenges inherent in any campaign to root out militarism.  Describing 
the incident, a MG report explained that the  
defendant was seen by U.S. soldiers marching 38 school children in a column of twos from the school 
to the playing field.  The place of observation was a street in Heidelberg.  When vehicle approached, at 
a signal from the teacher the children gave way to the side three steps in a manner simulating a military 
movement.  The defendant teacher was then arrested for violating Military Government Law No. 154. 
 
A petition for review of the case subsequently argued that the man had handled his pupils as German teachers 
had for years and that he had not deliberately violated the law.  Such discipline was needed when ushering 
children along busy streets, it maintained, and the instructor had exercised no more discipline than was typical 
in teaching sports.  The court itself also recommended that the sentence be suspended due to the defendant’s 
lack of intent and the absence of established precedent.  Reviewing the case in late October, the Land MG’s 
Legal Division concluded that “the evidence clearly indicates that the action of the children was a simulation of 
military discipline and formation,” but that “it does not so clearly indicate an intention to violate or a violation 
of Law No. 154.”  Ultimately refusing to overturn the court’s decision, the division nevertheless decided that in 
light of the “mitigating circumstances,” the court’s recommendation, and the fact that the teacher had already 
served time in jail, the man had been “sufficiently punished” and should be released.168   
 The episode captured the attention of Heidelberg’s other teachers all the same.  Several days after the 
Legal Division’s decision, but perhaps before it was publicized, an ICD officer reported that educators were 
criticizing the sentence, contending that the man had simply ordered the children to walk “two and two in a line, 
according to an old school custom, to maintain order outside the school grounds.”  He had never been a 
militarist or party member.  “Due to this incidence [sic],” stated the American, “teachers are now afraid to teach 
calisthenics in the open air and gymnasiums are at present not available.”  Dr. Erich Kaufmann-Buehler, a high 
school teacher, city councilman, and nonconformist CDU delegate to the body finalizing the Land’s new 
constitution (which would be followed by elections for a legislature) had allegedly quipped: “Don’t count on 
                                                 
167
 “Turnlehrer ‘drillt’ Schulkinder,” SDZ, 5 Oct 46. 
 
168
 Case File, Case No. 5982, Hugo B., 18 Oct 46, NA, RG 260, OMGUS, OMGWB, Box 1053, F: Reviews Capt. Basinski 
[1]. 
 
 466 
my nomination, I only have to walk my junior class in a queue up to the [Heidelberg] castle and it’s all up with 
my candidature.”169 
 Even when they refrained from violating American regulations, some adolescents and their leaders 
clearly missed the marching, flag-carrying, and uniform-wearing that had been part and parcel of so many 
German youth activities even prior to the Nazi ascension to power.170  They may have rejected the ideology of 
war service and death that had characterized the Hitler Youth, but the pageantry and symbolic accoutrements of 
former eras remained attractive to some.  And, indeed, sporting events and youth gatherings sometimes still 
included diluted versions of these. 
More common were complaints about and requests for ending specific sports prohibitions.  The 
Americans, for example, received occasional inquiries regarding the resumption of fencing.171  However, apart 
from hunters, whose zeal was restrained not only by the Allies’ concerns about German militarism, but also by 
their unyielding refusal to compromise security, the most vocal frustrated sports enthusiasts were those 
interested in aviation.  Certainly there were observers to whom the MG aviation restrictions made perfect sense.  
When in early 1946 someone wrote to the Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung asking why gliding and model airplane flying 
were forbidden and suggesting that international meetings to discuss the newest technological developments 
could help to cleanse “Hitlerism” from the minds of German youth, a newspaper writer responded with 
sarcasm: “Of all things!  And perhaps the Hitler Youth so eagerly built model planes in order to achieve 
international understanding?”172  Using a German play on words, Kurt Fried also took a dig at Germany’s flying 
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enthusiasts, observing that Hermann Goering had insisted that “the German people must become a nation of 
Fliegern [fliers],” with the result that “we became a nation of Fliegergeschädigten [bombing victims].”173 
But others viewed the situation differently.  There is little reason to doubt that these men, boys, and 
even women were first and foremost eager to give expression to a passion.  Whether a few, or even a 
measurable percentage, had motives that went beyond this is difficult to judge.  What is undeniable is that they 
were adamant and unrelenting in their pleas.  One group of glider enthusiasts from Stuttgart actually petitioned 
President Harry Truman and later sent a letter to Secretary of State Dean Acheson asking that “these restrictions 
on the most primitive human rights” be removed.174  More commonly, aviation fans used the pages of licensed 
publications and direct appeals to MG officials to lobby for or request permission to resume their activities.   
One of their favorite tactics was to ask why aviation was receiving special treatment.  An official from 
the Baden state sports association provided a model example of this argument in June 1948 when he defended a 
petition being circulated by a Berlin group that intended to ask the ACC to change its policy.  Mistakenly 
assuming that this petition was causing a backlash from the Americans, he complained to Leon Shelnutt, head 
of youth activities for the Land MG. 
According to my opinion some gentleman has been asked for his signature to whom gliding is an 
eyesore and who looks upon every model airplane group as a militaristic club and sees a bomber in 
every glider and a newly rising Luftwaffe in a model airplane.  If anybody should be inclined to see 
things this way I can only give him fair warning: every motorcar may become a tank and its driver a 
tank man.  I might as well look upon every rowing vessel as a future U-boat and upon every swimmer 
as a Kampfschwimmer (soldier especially trained in swimming for blowing up bridges etc.)  It is 
impossible to imagine that flying be eliminated from our modern world of technics and speed.175 
 
In an August 1946 letter to Das junge Wort, well-known gliding pioneer Wolf Hirth likewise suggested 
that if one could prohibit Germany from maintaining submarines and a navy but permit rowing sports, gliding 
could be permitted without fostering a revival of military aviation.  At most, gliding could be used for pre-
military training.  But then hiking and every sport must be banned because they could also toughen individuals 
physically and thus be viewed as a form of pre-military training.176 
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There were gliding enthusiasts in countries all over the world, the sport’s proponents also argued.  
“Why is gliding only a ‘militaristic’ sport for Germany?” asked a writer in the Badische Neueste Nachrichten in 
July 1949.  Germans interested in gliding did not want to have anything to do with bombers and weapons, just 
to be allowed to rejoin the international gliding community.  If the Allies granted that permission, he added, it 
would be a sign of trust and would contribute to international understanding.  Trust and understanding, 
moreover, were the guarantors of peace and security.177  In repeated—and repeatedly rejected—appeals to the 
Land MG to form a club, a group of glider pilots from Stuttgart not only proposed to open their rolls to U.S. 
soldiers, to maintain contacts with foreign clubs, and to eventually organize an international organization, they 
described their mission in metaphysical terms.  In one of their applications, written in slightly choppy English, 
they explained the primary goal of their proposed association. 
To reduce the idea of flying to its true contents: symbol of freedom and humanity. 
To build new spiritual foundations of aviation (Flying should not be regarded from a military 
point of view, but from a sportsmanlike, and—we should like to say—even more from a religious than 
from a sportsmanlike basis). 
In the future every honest man, who feels the necessity to fly must be entitled to do so, and no 
differences between peoples and races should be made.178 
 
The arguments of aviation enthusiasts made some sense.  But they also contained their share of 
exaggeration and skewed logic.  Learning to skillfully handle a kayak, for example, would seem to offer few 
insights into operating a submarine.  Additionally, in their professed inability to understand the Allied position, 
their criticism of its obvious inequities, and their insistence that aviation could foster international 
understanding, commentators sometimes ignored the recent history of gliding and aviation in Germany.  Thus, 
Hirth could point with pride to the fact that sport gliding was a sport born in Germany during the 1920s without 
mentioning the circumstances that had nurtured this development, namely, a lost war, a humiliated nation, and a 
Versailles Treaty which had encouraged military leaders to seek means of developing German aviation 
expertise and capabilities in violation of the spirit of the treaty.179 
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Charged with enforcing Allied sports regulations, the Land MG’s youth officials remained largely 
unmoved by the appeals of Württemberg-Baden’s glider pilots.  On the other hand, they proved willing to give 
some ground in the area of model airplane building and flying.  But here they encountered obstacles strewn by 
other OMGUS officials and by America’s allies, both of whom saw in aviation the intersection of cultural 
militarism and genuine military preparedness.   
In July 1947, the new youth program regulations issued by Württemberg-Baden’s MG stated that the 
building and flying of model airplanes without motors and without accommodation for passengers did not 
violate current regulations, provided these were recreational activities.180  However, this new policy 
interpretation was under review already by October.  Model airplane enthusiasts apparently had staged an illegal 
competition near Stuttgart in April 1947 using airplanes with motors.  When OMGUS officials later learned of 
the event, they prompted Land youth officials to revisit their decision.181  Asking various other offices of the 
Land MG for formal comments regarding their interpretation—requested with reference to the overarching 
question “when does model airplanes [sic] become aviation?”—the youth officials received a mixed 
response.182  The Legal Division, for instance, argued that model airplanes did not teach “the theory, principles, 
technique or mechanics of war,” as outlawed by the ACC law on military training.  Nor were model airplane 
clubs involved in “aviation,” which, they noted, Black’s Law Dictionary defined as people “travel[ing] through 
the air by means of airplanes.”183  The Field Operations Division supported the youth officials with the 
observation that “this office does not believe that model airplane building inspires aggression in German Youth 
(or those of any other nationality) and from a psychological standpoint probably is as harmless as building or 
playing with miniature trains, racing cars, etc.”184  But public safety officials wondered whether the definition 
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was “too loose” and suggested that the scientific research control staff be consulted.185  This branch objected, 
citing not regulations relating to military training or sports, but ACC Law No. 43 banning the “manufacture, 
import, export, transport and storage of war materials,” which specifically referred to model airplanes and 
gliders, with or without means of propulsion.186 
At a meeting at OMGUS headquarters in December 1947, personnel from the education and scientific 
research control staffs decided that the ACC law did, indeed, prohibit the activities the Württemberg-Baden MG 
had approved.  Moreover, caution was needed, due to the quadripartite nature of the law.  Considering the 
various aspects of the issue, the OMGUS officials finally concluded that “intent must be a primary concern, 
rather than the attempt to specifically designate model craft” and therefore staked out a middle ground.  Land 
officials were to answer questions relating to model airplanes based on educational principles, as if Law No. 43 
did not exist, and “in advising with leaders and groups” the “educational approach” was to be maintained.  No 
groups “whose name indicated the primary purpose to be model airplane flying” would be authorized, as this 
“would raise the whole question at quadripartite level.”  In addition, “such a group would more likely violate 
the spirit of the Law #43 than would unorganized modeling.”  Land officials were not to publicize any “official 
rulings” made, but instead to deal with each case “individually and through discussion.”187  Evidently model 
building might continue below the radar as an educational activity, so long as this was not advertised. 
Shelnutt subsequently asked his Culture Ministry counterparts to delete from the July 1947 regulations 
the provision permitting model airplane activities.  But he also met personally with ministry officials and 
leaders of the North Baden and North Württemberg sports associations to discuss the newest developments and, 
apparently, to lay out the MG’s current, rather muddy policy.  He later explained to an official from OMGUS’s 
Armed Forces Division that the MG’s youth staff had “not gone into the cellars to look for boys who may have 
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made model airplanes on their own private initiative,” adding, “as we see it, the danger lies in the promotion of 
large clubs and organizations.”188   
Not surprisingly, given the circumstances, some local sports authorities now protested the renewed ban 
on model airplane construction and flying.189  Others were able to obtain only vague guidance on how they were 
to proceed.  When an Ulm youth official asked the Land youth committee whether model airplane clubs with 
“theoretical tasks and goals” would be permitted, even when denied the right to build and fly aircraft, he 
received a sketchy and probably not particularly helpful response.190   The committee’s director replied that he 
could not, or rather did not, want to answer the man precisely.  “I hope that that is clear enough,” he added. 
There are things that one does.  On the basis of a conversation with Mr. Shelnutt, I know from him that 
one sometimes should not ask too many questions.  It is important, certainly, that on the surface you do 
not appear to be doing anything forbidden and that you can at all times take responsibility for 
everything that is done, that is, not in terms of adhering strictly to the regulations [d.h. nicht streng 
nach den Vorschriften gedacht], but taking into account our own sense of responsibility.191 
 
During the year that followed, the Americans’ official position continued to vacillate.  By the fall of 
1948, the Germans were pressing for permission to establish model airplane clubs.192  As before, Shelnutt 
himself was content to say yes, but the decision was not his to make.193  In early November, a senior official in 
OMGUS’s education division told Shelnutt that OMGUS Berlin was still considering the issue of model 
airplane club formation and the recreational and educational building and flying of models, but that his office 
had received informal approval by phone.194  Aksel Nielsen, the Land MG’s top sports official, thus began 
spreading the word that model airplane activities were now permitted, although he urged a low-profile 
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approach, pending issuance of a zone-wide policy.195  Once again MG officials found themselves on the 
defensive, however, as formal approval from Berlin did not materialize, still hung up on the question of whether 
clubs were compatible with legal restrictions on scientific research.196  In late March 1949, Shelnutt finally 
documented an authoritative answer in his daily activity report: “Definite word received from OMGUS that 
model airplanes and sailing planes are forbidden.  This ruling handed down by tripartite control council.”197  He 
nevertheless remained dissatisfied, noting in late June that the day before he had seen model airplanes being 
sold in two Stuttgart shops.  “A boy in a Boy Scout uniform was purchasing six during my presence,” he added.  
“It seems to me that it is time to change our directives to conform with existing conditions.”198  Shelnutt’s 
sentiments notwithstanding, this would not occur until after control of western Germany passed into hands of 
the Federal Republic and the Allied High Commission. 
The glider enthusiasts, meanwhile, had made no gains and remained restive.  By spring 1949, their 
voices were growing louder and bolder.  Convinced that there was little chance the Americans would alter their 
policy on flying, they began to pin their hopes on obtaining the assistance of the incoming West German 
government.  In early July, roughly 75 former glider pilots gathered in Stuttgart to discuss the status of gliding 
and to plot strategies for the sport’s future.199  Because the meeting did not involve an organized club, the 
Americans could not deny the group permission to meet.200  For their part, the Germans were not attempting to 
huddle in secret, but rather invited both Shelnutt and Nielsen to attend (neither of whom did so).201  At a 
meeting in Mannheim a week later, glider enthusiasts discussed “What is an Air Pocket?” and heard a speech 
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titled “On what Basis Can Gliding Be Re-Established in Germany?”  During the latter, a MG intelligence report 
recounted, “the speaker said it was difficult to understand Allied views on gliding as a military sport, since 
much additional training was required by regular fliers; by the same token, he said, pedestrians were military 
potential for the infantry.”202 
Like their allies, at least some American MG officials continued to be wary of this particular German 
interest group and its barely legal assemblies.  The aforementioned MG report noted that, on the positive side, 
Wolf Hirth had attended the Stuttgart meeting and, “in accordance with his customary policy,” had warned his 
younger colleagues “against being hasty and rash in their efforts to resume gliding.”  In the past, he had 
reportedly “sought to deter several members who had secretly begun to build gliders.”  Other leading lights in 
the movement seemed to be equally sensible.  And the glider enthusiasts had indicated a willingness to submit 
to surveillance to avoid a recurrence of what had happened after World War I.  But the report also saw reasons 
for concern.  While the glider pilots were ready to accept controls, this did not mean that “their motives would 
necessarily remain so disinterested.”  Furthermore, excepting some of the older ones, they seemed “impatient 
and demanding.”  The report also criticized the fact that “the terms in which glider fans express their devotion 
to flying and their tendency to lift it into the realm of metaphysics and philosophy are often reminiscent of the 
emotional jargon of national socialism.”  A recent newspaper piece stating that Hanna Reitsch—“famous 
Luftwaffe pilot who moved in the highest nazi circles”—had planned to take part in a now prohibited national 
meeting was likewise “not reassuring.”  As a whole, the individuals who attended the gatherings raised some 
eyebrows as well.  The glider groups allegedly received the most support “from universities and [institute of 
technology] circles and from ex-Luftwaffe officers, particularly non-commissioned officers who were 
mechanics or members of ground crews and did not fly themselves but developed an interest in flying.”  The 
report ended by observing that “the fact that the glider groups naturally attract many ex-Luftwaffe personnel, 
obviously would facilitate development of a widely organized cadre of potential military flyers.”  Then, too, 
“the fact that some of the flying enthusiasts are fanatically interested in the new techniques of aviation” was 
“worth noting.”203 
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If there was little the Americans could do to prevent glider pilots from assembling locally, in July 1949 
the Land MGs of Hesse and Württemberg-Baden both turned down a request from the movement’s leaders to 
hold a strategy session involving representatives from all four zones.204  Already disappointed, the gliding 
enthusiasts also learned that the Allies would likely continue their prohibition on gliding even after the founding 
of the Federal Republic.  With a potentially difficult road ahead, they nevertheless anticipated a lifting of the 
ban in “some months.”205  Their frustration would not soon be relieved, however.  The Allied High Commission 
did not permit glider pilots to resume their flying until June 1951, when rearmament talks were already in full 
swing.206  
 
Organized Youth Activities 
Given the widespread agreement in Württemberg-Baden regarding the desired content and objectives 
of youth and sports programs, the Americans usually found little reason to reprimand or discipline German 
officials or organizations.  They did not always endorse the methods or tone used by the Germans, but here they 
were more concerned about autocratic tendencies that imperiled democratizing reforms than about a return to 
the militarized approach of Germany’s past.  Most youth activities appeared innocuous.  And in some cases, the 
Land’s young people stepped forward as conspicuous and vocal proponents of peace. 
In seeking to reorient Germany’s youth, American MG personnel frequently criticized the age of 
German youth officials.  As older men, sometimes returning to the field following a Nazi-imposed absence, 
they might have little understanding of the true needs and interests of Germany’s youth and often were 
unwilling or unable to abandon old pedagogical and bureaucratic approaches to youth work.  An American 
emphasis on training new, younger leaders resulted in part from a recognition of this situation.  The challenges 
posed by German youth leaders went even beyond this, however.  Youth leaders both young and old at times 
perpetuated nationalistic ideas and continued using chauvinistic, even racist, language without really perceiving, 
or conceding, the close connection between their thinking and the spiritual universe of Nazism.  These 
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tendencies came into view, for instance, in descriptions of the philosophical goals of youth clubs and in 
explanations offered for encouraging German youngsters to embrace traditional folk dancing and reject jazz 
music.207  Some groups thus retained a nationalistic flavor that was hardly what MG education officials had in 
mind when promoting youth work as a means of democratization.  
Yet the lingering residues of chauvinistic nationalism did not normally translate into explicitly 
belligerent teachings or pre-military training or drill, except perhaps of the sort practiced by Heidelberg’s “drill 
instructor.”  A late March 1947 MG report noted, for instance, that the Americans were having certain 
difficulties with the German sports organizations but that the Germans so far had not attempted to reintroduce 
paramilitary or military sports.208  Even the Turner (gymnastics) clubs, which the Allies viewed especially 
warily given their history of promoting physical exercise as a patriotic form of pre-military training, displayed 
signs of genuine transformation.  A March 1949 MG report expressed concern that the gymnastics movement in 
Württemberg-Baden still showed evidence of its heritage, citing “a sentimental reverence for [the nineteenth-
century spiritual father of German gymnastics] Father Jahn” and his accomplishments; “an irrepressible delight 
in marching onto and off the field or stage in rows and columns”; and the “performance of feats with a 
strikingly military precision and rigid attention while the performer is not in action.”  The report admitted that 
“it would be difficult to prove that the emphasis on bodily discipline or any of the mannerisms traditional in 
Turnen have any bearing on militarism, or that Turnen is in any way connected with politics,” but it also 
stressed that it had been Jahn’s “avowed purpose to develop the German ‘Volksgeist’ through physical 
training.”  More recently, the report added, the still influential Carl Diem had suggested that future state leaders 
should emerge from among Germany’s gymnasts.209  An April 1949 MG report analyzing a 1,200-member 
group in Heidelberg drew more favorable conclusions, however.  “The contrast between liberals and nationalist 
elements is expressed in the issue of modern gymnastics vs. old-time, drill calisthenics,” it observed.  Most 
members of the club, particularly the younger ones, preferred “the more easy-going modern gymnastics,” while 
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those advocating “the traditional army drill style calisthenics” were “not very significant.”210  In his balanced 
history of the Schwäbischer Turnerbund (Swabian Gymnastics Association), historian Michael Krüger likewise 
has identified a qualified, but noticeable change in the movement’s postwar activities.  Formal gatherings again 
included lofty speeches, processions, the handing over of banners, and the singing of old Turner songs.  But in 
the 1950s there was no more talk of “Wehrturnen” (military gymnastics), let alone evidence of it in practice.  
German sportsmen agreed, he notes, that “Wehrturnen was not Turnen and Wehrsport was not sport.”211 
The vast majority of other youth group activities were fundamentally harmless in form, even when 
sometimes questionable in terms of ideological content.  Organizations devoted weekends to hiking and 
camping and evenings to singing, Bible study, crafts, theater, lectures, and discussions.  As noted, scout groups 
seemed to run into trouble more often than most clubs.  Yet in June 1949 Shelnutt also described watching Boy 
Scouts being sworn in at a rally just outside of Stuttgart and reported that he “could not tell that it differed 
greatly from the investiture ceremonies that I have attended in the U.S.,” though it was “certainly less 
militaristic (perhaps because I was there).”212   
In some cases, youth organizations spent time explicitly considering the issues of war and military 
service.  In April 1946, for example, some 75 members of Ulm’s Schwäbische Jugendbund group attended a 
lecture on the book Männer gegen Tod und Teufel (Men Against Death and the Devil) in which the speaker 
presented doctors and scientists like Galen and Paracelsus as role models.  “It was not the hypocritical heroism 
of the glory- and blood-covered battlefield which captivated us, but the quiet valor of researchers and doctors 
who devoted their lives to the good of humanity,” explained a girl reporting on the talk.  “On this evening, we 
left the small auditorium deeply impressed.”213  In September 1946, some 100 Falcons and their followers 
attended an anti-war demonstration in Heidelberg at which the Social Democratic keynote speaker argued that 
the duty of Germany’s youth should be to work for their country’s welfare, not to die for it.  He called for 
honoring the German resistance movement and, according to a MG report, urged the youth to “fight for the 
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brotherhood of the world” and to do everything they could “for the re-entry of Germany into the family of 
nations.”214  The month before, a similar rally in Stuttgart had drawn about 2,000 youths aged nine to 20 years 
old, as well as approximately 500 adults.215   
More impressively, Stuttgart’s youth parliament caused a genuine stir when it took on Württemberg-
Baden’s legislature, the Landtag.  A roughly 100-member group representing some 37,000 organized young 
people, the parliament in October 1947 officially asked the legislators to amend the Land constitution to state 
that no person could be forced by law into military service, either bearing arms or in an auxiliary capacity.216  
Although widespread criticism of the misuse of Germany’s youth during the Third Reich might have made the 
prompt approval of this change a reasonable expectation despite Germany’s long history of universal 
conscription, particularly since the country currently had no armed forces, reality proved to be somewhat 
different.  The views the Land’s politicians voiced regarding war service instead were complex and 
differentiated.  Above all, the context was complicated.  Not only was Germany occupied by foreign powers 
who legally exercised complete control over the country’s governing bodies, but by this time, relations between 
the western Allies and the Soviet Union had soured nearly to the point of unworkability.  In March 1948, the 
ACC stopped meeting, and the blockade of Berlin would begin in June.  Germany’s security, which to some had 
always appeared uncertain in the absence of a war-ending peace treaty, seemed more precarious than ever.  By 
spring 1948, some European newspapers had even  begun speculating openly about the possible value of 
reestablishing a German army to strengthen western Europe’s defenses.217  These circumstances could make 
constitutional protection against conscription seem that much more important to Germany’s young people.  But 
for their leaders, the situation seemed to require political finesse and cautious thinking. 
After the Landtag’s legal committee sat on the conscription proposal for a number of months without 
taking any action, the youth parliament in early April 1948 invited members of the press, public officials, and 
Landtag representatives to a special meeting.  In a room filled to overflowing, the Landtag’s president, Social 
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Democrat Wilhelm Keil, the leaders of the four major parties represented in the Landtag, and a variety of other 
politicians offered the youth delegates their views on the proposal, with the lively discussion at times growing 
heated.  According to newspaper and other accounts of the proceedings, the politicians generally viewed the 
anti-conscription proposal as something positive and believed the youth parliament’s initiative could serve a 
beneficial educational function in the future.  Conversely, both sides agreed that changing the constitution 
would do little to prevent war.  The far more contentious question was what should be done about the proposed 
revision.  A KPD delegate supported the change unconditionally, although he saw it as only one small step on 
the road to peace.  The DVP’s Henry Bernhard, who had served as private secretary to the conciliatory Weimar 
foreign minister and chancellor Gustav Stresemann, earned loud approval from the young people by arguing 
that the Landtag could not adopt such a provision soon enough.  But in this he was speaking against the views 
of others in his own party.  Stuttgart’s Wolfgang Haussmann, a DVP member of the Landtag’s legal committee, 
argued that an important decision like this by a small Land like Württemberg-Baden could hardly make a 
difference in a state the size of Germany.  Keil, meanwhile, contended that the social, economic, and political 
conditions that led to wars needed to be changed first.218 
 The youth parliament next gave the Landtag what amounted to an ultimatum, threatening to 
demonstrate before the Landtag building on May 8, the anniversary of Germany’s capitulation, if they did not 
get an answer.219  Within a few weeks, the Landtag did, in fact, act, though hardly with the vigor the parliament 
desired.  Leaving the constitution alone, the Landtag members voted on a free-standing law that simply stated 
that “no one may be forced into war service with a weapon.”  Significantly, just 46 of 100 delegates were 
present for the vote, 43 of whom voted for the measure, 3 of whom abstained—including Minister-President 
Reinhold Maier and Ulm’s Johannes Weisser.220   
In a front-page editorial, the Stuttgarter Zeitung criticized this outcome, condemning the new law as a 
weak and ambiguous substitute that could be easily revoked and accusing the legislature of throwing out a 
meatless bone to appease the youth parliament.  It pointed to the problems faced by the legislators, among them 
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their politically feeble status and the chances that a substantive debate on the issue would have raised issues of 
sovereignty and other touchy subjects.  But it also intimated that it would have welcomed such a discussion by 
the Land’s leading politicians.221   
The newspaper piece itself provoked additional responses.  Anna Haag, an SPD Landtag delegate from 
Stuttgart who had lobbied for the provision’s adoption on behalf of the youth parliament, conceded in a letter to 
the editor that she would have preferred a change in the constitution, but she defended the law nevertheless, 
citing its inspirational value, its historical significance, and the importance of making incremental progress 
toward a more substantial goal.222  Another writer had quite another take on the matter, asking, “Is it not 
downright ludicrous when the initiative for such a law has to come from youngsters who people at every 
opportunity since the end of the war have thought it necessary to reproach with: they only know ‘marching,’ 
despotic commands, groveling obedience, war enthusiasm, uniforms, in short: militarism?”  And was it not even 
more absurd when people now passively resisted this initiative—especially when they were in part the same 
people who had been critical in the first place?  The law’s significance lay in showing clearly that the youth had 
never had, or at least had renounced, “that condemnable spirit.”223 
Weisser, meanwhile, offered a defense against accusations such as these in a lengthy opinion piece in 
the Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung that explained his decision to abstain from voting.  The world was home to 
more than lambs, he argued.  And although he hated war and the “soldierly life” and favored settling disputes 
between nations using peaceful means, he believed people had to be prepared to deal with the wolves who 
refused to submit to nonviolent pressure.  The recent histories of Germany, Japan, Italy, and Russia offered 
proof of what happened when peace-loving countries sat back passively in the face of aggression.  Now the 
Soviets were picking up where Hitler had left off and the Landtag law served their interests.  “No reasonable 
person will wish for the violent conflict that is hanging over the world like a threatening thundercloud,” Weisser 
asserted, “but we must confront the danger.”  The Germans had no control over whether there would be another 
war.  But if there was a war, they could not run and hide, particularly since it might develop on German soil.  
Any law of this kind would not survive, anyway, if this occurred.  Under these conditions, he stressed, he could 
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not endorse the law.  He would have readily supported a proposal allowing conscientious objection to war 
service based on one’s religious beliefs or Weltanschauung, but not due to political considerations.  Even in 
international relations it was too much to expect one to receive a slap on the left cheek and then to turn the right 
one.224 
During the months that followed, the Americans periodically found themselves called upon to reassure 
those who attended town hall meetings sponsored by the MG and local officials that Germany’s young men 
would not be forced to serve in the U.S. Army in the event of war.  “We are all sick and tired of being soldiers,” 
insisted one attendee in Neurat.  Military government officials, in turn, stressed that the Hague Convention 
prohibited an occupier from impressing soldiers and that it also went against American tradition.225    
Still, there were few German laws or traditions to protect the country’s young men when in autumn 
1948 the Germans themselves began talking about assisting in the maintenance of their own security.  In 
Württemberg-Baden, Dr. Rudolf Vogel, a well-known and influential member of the Land’s CDU, took the lead 
in this effort, publicly calling for German participation in a broader European defense force, arguing that 
western Europe, and Germany especially, could not be adequately protected without this.  Such a move, he 
contended, could be legally justified given the Soviet Zone’s large, heavily armed police forces.  Vogel also 
suggested that German young people should be trained outside of Germany, in the United States, England, or 
elsewhere, and used only as ground troops, in order to assuage French and British concerns about a resurgence 
of German militarism.  European soldiers could be stationed in Germany and German soldiers stationed in other 
parts of Europe or in the United States. 226  Vogel’s arguments eventually touched off a public debate in 
Württemberg-Baden that was fed in part by rumors regarding a withdrawal of Allied troops from western 
Germany and by recent events in Asia, where a newly independent South Korea had faced a communist 
uprising.227  In addition, the local press began weighing in on a national discussion concerning the remarks of 
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Hessian journalist and concentration camp survivor Dr. Eugon Kogon, who had claimed that the British and 
Americans were already secretly creating new German military forces and stressed the importance of ensuring 
that the experiences of the Weimar Republic were not repeated.228   
Some of the Land’s youth organizations now also entered this fray.  In early December, 40 members of 
Heidelberg’s Young Socialists group dealt with the issue at one of their gatherings.  “Several discussion 
speakers considered it inconceivable that the issue of re-militarization was the topic of public discussion as 
early as three years after the cessation of hostilities,” observed a MG report.  Some had argued that “the SPD 
ought to do everything in its power to prevent the spreading of militaristic ideas.”  And even though the city’s 
SPD chairman had pointed to his party’s traditional support for a national militia—as opposed to a professional 
army—and maintained that “an armed conflict becomes unavoidable when individual freedom must be 
defended against totalitarian aggression,” he had not persuaded most of his listeners, “who remained firmly 
opposed to any kind of re-militarization.”229   
A few weeks later, Stuttgart’s youth committee, which represented the city’s 19 youth associations, 
issued a resolution explicitly condemning Vogel’s proposal. 
As youth organizations which since 1945 have tirelessly raised their voices against war, we feel 
obligated to energetically reject this proposition.  We strive to give the German youth more attractive 
and better ideals than those of war and the annihilation of people, which have always brought us and 
all of humanity only hardship and misery.  Therefore, we refuse firmly—no matter for whom it might 
be—to assume the role of cannon fodder!  If the deaths of millions of people, the distress of war 
invalids and surviving military dependents, our destroyed cities—if that can all have some meaning, 
then only this, to derive from it the realization that there must be no more war.230 
 
Yet with the now full-fledged Cold War showing no signs of abating, the western Allies constructing 
the foundations of NATO, and the pending establishment of the Federal Republic encouraging Germany’s 
leaders to consider their new state’s military and international future, public discussions regarding the 
possibility of remilitarization continued throughout 1949.  In this context, Ulm’s youth committee, on behalf of 
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some 52,000 members of 27 youth organizations, also joined the protest movement, adopting its own passionate 
resolution in late December 1949. 
The grievous wounds of the war are not yet healed, the rubble not yet cleared away, the last 
POWs not yet returned, and already reactionary powers are ever more openly forging their plans for 
rearmament and, with this, for war. 
One speaks not of security and defense when in the background the preparation for a new a 
war threatens. 
We oppose militaristic propaganda of any kind and education through related literature, we 
oppose the sale of military toys, etc. 
We protest fiercely against these plans, in any form, and call the youth to active resistance. . . 
.  
Together with the youth of other nations, Germany’s young people seek a social order that no 
longer knows war!231 
 
The military question, however, was not about to go away.  Ultimately, the discussions of late 1948 
and 1949 proved to be merely the opening salvos of a debate that would rage well into the 1950s, when the 
United States and its allies began talking overtly and earnestly about the possible formation of new German 
military forces. 
While the youth initiatives of the occupation years might logically have defused concerns about the 
nationalistic tendencies of Germany’s young people, it is important to remember that only a portion of 
Württemberg-Baden’s several million children, teenagers, and young adults belonged to organized youth 
groups.232  And even fewer were actively pursuing pacifist, anti-war, or anti-conscription agendas.  Positive as 
the signs may have been for the future, skeptics could still point to the past as a check on excessive optimism, 
noting that pacifist activism after World War I had eventually been trampled underfoot by the jackboots of 
stronger nationalist and militaristic movements.  They could only wait and see whether the second postwar era 
and its vulnerabilities, insecurities, and uncertainties would bring a similar development. 
 
Conclusions 
At the end of the occupation, the jury was still out on the future character of formal education in 
Württemberg-Baden’s schools.  American literature removal and textbook vetting regulations, as well as MG 
control of the paper supply, had ensured that German schools were mostly free of militaristic books.  And the 
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Americans were still encouraging the Germans to produce textbooks that excluded military poems, songs, math 
problems, and Latin sentences and eschewed glorifying the military past of Germany or any other country in 
favor of studying society, other cultures, and admirable scientists and artists.233  But there were still very few 
history textbooks available written specifically for children in Württemberg-Baden and history instruction was 
only just resuming in some North Baden schools.  Most importantly, U.S. officials could not be sure the 
Germans would continue to respect American wishes.  Nor could they control how German teachers would use 
any of the new materials they acquired. 
Still, there were some promising signs.  The Americans could be reassured by the fact that 
Württemberg-Baden’s top educators seemed sincerely determined to redirect instruction in German schools in a 
more peaceful direction.  This could be seen in their willingness to steer teachers toward history texts that 
offered a fresh interpretation of German history—even when those texts had been written far from the Badenese 
or Swabian Heimat.  A commitment to a new approach was also suggested by the curriculum for elementary 
schools issued by the Culture Ministry for the 1950-1951 school year.  Discussing the teaching of history, it 
urged instructors to integrate local and national history with European and world history and to tell children that 
they could love their home and Fatherland without overweening nationalism and that peaceful cooperation with 
other peoples bore more fruit than a policy of force.  The ministry cautioned, as well, that “every glorification of 
war is to be avoided.”234  When the role of American officials evolved from a supervisory one to an advisory 
one in late 1949, the content of education in Württemberg-Baden seemed to be evolving in the right direction. 
More impressive was the change in youth programs outside of the classroom.  In some cases, the 
nationalist overtones and emotive pageantry of pre-1945 youth activities persisted.  And soon fencing, model 
airplane flying, gliding, and shooting would all again be sanctioned by the western Allies and German officials.  
Lasting change on all fronts could therefore not be assumed or guaranteed.  But by late 1949, military uniforms, 
soldier songs, drill instruction, paramilitary training, and Wehrsport competitions were no longer central 
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components of official youth programs.  During the years that followed, moreover, the governing documents of 
many youth organizations would continue to declare their intent to combat militarism and war.235  If perhaps 
falling short in meeting the democratic standards the Americans set for them, German youth activities had 
nevertheless been transformed, a process that was sustained, notably, by a broad consensus that Germany’s 
young people should no longer be programmed to die for the Fatherland.  This development was far from 
inconsequential.  As the final year of the occupation showed, what role the Germans envisioned for their young 
people in the new West Germany and what attitudes they might instill in them regarding some future West 
German army were rapidly becoming more than just interesting theoretical questions.
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Chapter 9 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In mid March 1949, an intelligence report drafted by the Heidelberg military government detachment 
described a recent informal poll asking “twelve ‘men on the street’” for their views on the North Atlantic 
Treaty.  This, it observed, had led to “an interesting discovery.”  
Much has been heard about preventing Germany from waging an aggressive war in the future.  Judging 
from the reactions obtained from these plain people who walk the streets anonymously and who must 
do all the real fighting when a war actually presents itself, it will be difficult to get Germany to fight 
even a defensive war.  The plain man on the street has had enough of war.  He is tired of it, afraid of it, 
and wants nothing more to do with it. . . .  
Peering ahead into the time when the Atlantic Pact signatories may be inclined to look upon 
the West German State as a possible military ally, these signatories may be surprised to find that a 
strongly pacifistic feeling exists in many of the common people, and that they fear and dislike war 
more than may be suspected.  The opinion held by some that Western Germany would jump at the 
chance to join the pact and to rearm may not be so valid.1 
 
The results of this survey, moreover, were in keeping with other developments in Heidelberg during 
the year leading up to the founding of the Federal Republic.  In late December 1948, for example, the 
Heidelberg Women’s Association had protested any remilitarizing of Germany.  One speaker at an association 
gathering had hinted at the sometimes conflicted motives which led to such protests in arguing that there should 
be no rearmament without a peace treaty and the return of all of Germany’s POWs, but she also had insisted 
that there was just one acceptable slogan: “No more wars.”  According to MG officials, she had “urged all 
women to influence men to discard the false conception of heroism which can only materialize in war,” adding 
that “real heroes secure the peace.”2  Six weeks later, they reported that more than 800 people had crowded into 
and huddled outside of a Heidelberg University auditorium for an open press forum sponsored by the Rhein-
Neckar-Zeitung and later broadcast on Radio Stuttgart.  At this event, “an elderly man” who called for the 
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newspaper to “stop publishing articles containing admittance of German guilt for World War II” and declared 
“that those powers who had preferred bolshevism to naziism [sic] were the real guilty parties” had been 
“drowned by angry protests of the majority of the audience.”  Theodor Heuss subsequently told the man that the 
paper had “never pursued a policy of admittance of German collective guilt,” but argued, too, that “a denial of 
German guilt for World War II would be nothing but a falsification of history and a delusion of the German 
people.”3 
In late March 1949, Heidelberg MG officials maintained that “the only groups that still adore the idea 
of war and strong military forces are the ultra-nationalists, the diehard Nazis, and a few expellees, who hope 
that a war against the countries behind the Iron Curtain would enable them to return to their homes.”4  In April, 
they cited the failure of “an extreme rightist group,” the Europäische Volksbewegung Deutschlands, to gain a 
foothold in the city as evidence “that overt demonstrations of preference for non-democratic government and 
for militaristic tendencies enjoy very little sympathy with the general public.”5 
Still, other reports drafted by the Americans suggested that they still had work to do.  In fact, in 
December 1948, they painted a rather gloomy picture of local conditions.  It was “regrettable,” noted one report, 
that just three years after the war’s end, leading Germans were discussing the remilitarization of Germany.  
Despite many efforts “to inculcate democracy and peace loving ideas into the minds of the Germans,” some 
were demanding the reestablishment of a German military.  “American Military Government has not succeeded 
in convincing the Germans that war and militarism are evil,” the report continued.  “The only evil that some 
Germans recognize is the losing of a war.  The Germans do not believe that suffering and hardship would have 
been theirs as a result of war.  They feel that suffering and hardship only comes to those who lose a war.”6 
The document went on to complain that of the many initiatives intended to reorient the Germans 
toward democracy “the least amount of effort has been exerted in convincing the Germans that they should 
become peace loving people.”  This, it implied, was a mistake.  There were “sufficient nationalistic die-hards” 
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who believed Germany could “once again emerge a great military power,” even if “small groups” of Germans 
condemned militarism and were working to prevent its return.  “Too many people remember the days when 
Germany was a mighty military power and at least hope that Germany will once again return to its former 
position of glory,” the report maintained.  Moreover, had the U.S. actually succeeded in fostering a desire for 
peace, the “antics of the Russians” would have undermined it.  The Germans had “once again been given an 
opportunity to demand an armed force for themselves for reasons that sound justifiable.”7 
Two weeks later, Heidelberg MG officials reported on a speech by the chairman of the “European Free 
Reconstruction Movement” that had included comments such as “Germany will be the motor of a European 
Federation because of the superior technical and spiritual qualities of her people” and “There is no soldier in the 
world who possesses better human and fighting qualities than the German soldier.”  In addition to demanding 
German remilitarization and the restoration of Germany’s eastern territories, he had asserted “that every 
German will gladly don ‘the grey coat of honor’ when the arms are taken up against the Soviet Union” and 
called for using the imperial colors of 1871 for the national flag.  His final words—“Your strength belongs to 
the fatherland and your people for all time.  When you enter the eternal hunting grounds everybody must be 
able to call you a good German.”—had reportedly been “wildly cheered by the thirty adherents of the 
[movement] who attended the meeting.”8   
On the same day, a local elementary school had held a Christmas celebration called, in true Nazi 
fashion, “Winterfest,” during which students had put on two plays.  According to the MG’s information, “in one 
play, a boy was given a rifle which he fired several times.”  In the second, the children had “clicked their heels 
together and raised their right arm and shouted Hurrah three times, when Santa Claus entered.”  Heidelberg’s 
school board had scripts for many plays that displayed no Nazi or militarist leanings, the report observed, yet 
the school’s teachers had chosen “those plays which suited their own taste best.”  It added that the school 
board’s president would be investigating the matter.9 
Taken together, the Heidelberg reports point to a number of conclusions.  First, the Americans clearly 
saw what they took to be very positive signs regarding German thinking on the issues of war and rearmament.  
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The Germans of 1949 appeared to be very different from those criticized relentlessly during American postwar 
planning sessions in the early 1940s.  On the other hand, even in late 1948, the Americans still were not entirely 
sure what to make of the Germans.  Old stereotypes and presumptions persisted in some quarters, but concerns 
were also at least occasionally triggered by legitimately disquieting activities and opinions.  The intensifying 
Cold War had certainly not caused all Americans to welcome the Germans into their fold unconditionally or to 
dismiss the continuing importance of teaching the Germans to love peace.  The reports also show that the 
German people still held a range of different opinions regarding the issues of war and the military and 
underscore the degree to which they increasingly found themselves in the darkness of shadows cast by two very 
different trees, both of which were large and seemingly immovable: World War II, with its loss of life and 
devastation, and the Cold War, with its rumors and threats of war.  German opinions could not be explained or 
understood without taking both into consideration.  The Heidelberg reports therefore offer insight into the 
perspectives of both the Americans and the Germans less than a year before West Germany was born.  They 
also provide a sense of the mixture of prejudices, opinions, goals, and concrete initiatives which comprised and 
shaped the demilitarization project in American-occupied Württemberg-Baden. 
Years after he had participated in the Allied invasion of Germany as a soldier and covered the 
occupation as a newspaper correspondent, journalist Edwin Hartrich described the wreckage of the Wehrmacht 
and the Third Reich at the end of the war and adopted the voice of conventional wisdom in asserting that, at this 
point, “Germany’s will to fight on, or to offer any resistance to the conqueror’s rule, was broken.  Germany had 
truly been ‘demilitarized,’ physically, mentally, and spiritually.”  Describing the Germans’ resistance to 
rearmament five years later, he explained that “there was widespread revulsion to the war and all things 
associated with it which had sunk deep into the German psyche.  The militarists had become disillusioned and 
converted to pacifism.” 10  Clearly, however, the Heidelberg reports raise doubts about this rather simplistic 
assessment.  Germany’s postwar transformation from a highly militaristic country to a country devoid of 
marching uniformed minions, where large numbers of people opposed rearmament and later scholars would 
detect a “culture of antimilitarism,” certainly was rooted in its wartime experiences.11  But a closer look at the 
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American demilitarization program in Württemberg-Baden shows that the nature and extent of change was also 
determined in part by what happened after the war, and not just as a byproduct of a generalized resentment of 
the occupying powers for perceived injustices and privation.  Moreover, the transformation of society and 
culture that occurred between 1945 and 1950 was not wholly spontaneous, not unchallenged, not 
comprehensive, far from uniform, and not solely a German achievement.  It was, in truth, a much more complex 
process than it might have appeared to Hartrich.   
 
Stages of Demilitarization 
The Americans entered Germany with social and cultural demilitarization as a key aim, but without a 
uniform or theoretically grounded definition of militarism and with only the outlines of a plan for achieving 
their goal.  Still, they had traced German militarism to what they believed to be its most important, deepest 
sources and had developed a basic strategy, with a multitude of components, to root out the problem.  Perhaps 
naively optimistic that they could actually realize their objective, they also knew that their efforts might take 
time to produce results.  In fact, the real significance of their work would lie in the future.  The consequences of 
war, defeat, and total occupation would likely keep most Germans subdued in the short term.  But the aftermath 
of World War I raised doubts about whether this state of affairs would last.  Similarly, it might be possible to 
undo and negate the external militarizing influences of the National Socialists and their predecessors relatively 
quickly.  But if the American analysis of the forces at work in Germany was accurate, it might take much longer 
for the German people to internalize new values and show evidence of a changed outlook.  Seemingly extreme 
in the extent of their concerns, American policymakers in virtually all postwar planning organizations 
nevertheless showed an insightful awareness of the importance of social and cultural influences on the politics, 
attitudes, and actions of nations, leading them to a proactive strategy that may appear less absurd now, in the 
wake of several decades of scholarly research treating society and culture with respectful consideration, than it 
did even at the time. 
In practice, American demilitarizing initiatives tended to follow similar chronological patterns.  They 
began haphazardly in the chaos accompanying the conquest of the western half of Germany, with Allied 
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soldiers and local military government officials handing out instructions that might be in line with basic Allied 
thinking, but that were also often independently formulated and implemented only locally.  By late summer 
1945, American officials were issuing more detailed, uniform directives and laws which, in many instances, 
were eventually complemented or superseded by more broadly applicable regulations developed by the Allied 
Control Authority.  During the first two years of the occupation, then, the Americans introduced a layering of 
policies that were never explicitly conceptualized as a unified whole, but which influenced a wide array of MG 
activities and corresponding areas of German society and culture.  By mid 1947, most tasks requiring removals 
and other physical changes, including those addressing uniforms, street signs, monuments, literature, and 
textbooks, had been completed.  By that time, too, many of Germany’s high-ranking officers were returning 
home and the work of the denazification tribunals was well underway.  From mid 1947 to mid 1949, the 
primary responsibilities of local and Land MG officials consisted of authorizing parades, new organizations, 
and the like; working with the Germans on the writing of new textbooks; reworking military pension provisions; 
fending off complaints from veterans, glider pilots, and other Germans dissatisfied with specific U.S. or Allied 
measures; advising German officials; monitoring compliance and enforcing existing regulations; and, in some 
cases, pressing higher echelons for changes in policy. 
The shift in 1947 from an interventionist approach to one that involved primarily advising and 
enforcement corresponds with a general change in the tone of the U.S. occupation as a whole in late 1946 and 
1947.  This transitional period was book-ended, in some respects, by Secretary of State James Byrnes’ 
September 1946 speech in Stuttgart promising American help with the economic recovery and reconstruction of 
Germany and assuring the Germans that they would soon be permitted to govern themselves and the issuance in 
July 1947 of JCS 1779, a less severe successor to JCS 1067.  The reconstructive approach of the State 
Department finally achieved ascendancy, scholars have asserted, helped along by the growing hostilities of the 
early Cold War which transformed the Germans from enemies into potential allies.  Although scholars 
evaluating the evolution of U.S. policy often refer to the early phase of the occupation as a “punitive” one, 
James Tent’s observation that “the term ‘reeducation’ did not seem too harsh in 1945, and the basic doctrine, 
JCS 1067, embodying it has appeared unnecessarily punitive only in retrospect”12 seems to offer a more 
accurate appraisal of the situation in the demilitarization arena.  Karl-Heinz Füssl’s contention that early MG 
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education and youth policies were more about a logical and necessary elimination of detrimental Nazi 
influences than about punishment can also arguably be more broadly applied.13  Some demilitarization measures 
frustrated the Germans and a few disrupted their lives or worsened their material situation.  And there were 
indeed Americans who cared little about injurious repercussions or who reasoned that the Germans had made 
their bed and had to lie in it.  Yet the principal motive behind the measures was not retribution, nor was the 
primary aim punishment.  The Americans wanted world peace.  And this, they believed, required the destruction 
of German militarism.  Eradicating militaristic influences in Germany was thus seen as akin to slicing off a 
layer of skin to get rid of a cancer.  It hurt and had painful side effects.  But hurting the creature—whether 
viewed as a regrettable, irrelevant, or desirable action—was not the goal.  The goal was to produce a healthier, 
less belligerent creature. 
Even though it unfolded along a track similar to that of other American programs, the social and 
cultural demilitarization project generally had its own momentum and trajectory, with its shift in focus in 1947 
resulting primarily from the fact that many of the original policies had laid out concrete objectives which, once 
achieved, no longer needed to be actively pursued, but instead merely monitored.  As the model airplane 
discussions showed, Land MG officials did slightly loosen the reins on the Germans in the later years of the 
occupation.  But this development seems to be attributable chiefly to the specific views held by individual 
officials regarding the German people and the American program, rather than to changing national priorities.  
Thus Leon Shelnutt could conclude that model airplane flying by small groups of German children did not 
constitute a security threat, while Aksel Nielsen, a rather recent arrival in the Land MG office, could confess 
ignorance about the logic behind the ban on fencing when he asked his superiors about a possible reexamination 
of the policy because he worried it just encouraged interest in the sport.14 
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It is essential to recognize, as well, that a softening of the American position toward Germany did not 
lead to a revocation or renunciation of existing demilitarization policies.  Partly this was a matter of 
circumstance.  A commitment to working with their wartime allies restricted the Americans’ ability to make 
substantial changes quickly or without consequences.  And if studies have shown that the redirection of 
occupation priorities to reflect Cold War realities resulted in fewer restrictions on former Nazis, a comparable 
phenomenon affecting militarists cannot be identified if for no other reason than that militarists had never been 
excluded and punished to the same degree.  As noted, too, most of the major demilitarization initiatives were 
already concluded by mid 1947.  But there is also little indication that local, Land, or zonal MG officials 
pressed adamantly for anything other than minor changes (such as allowing the Germans to form model airplane 
clubs) in the American regulations governing social and cultural demilitarization.  Instead, they continued to 
cast a wary eye on former officers meeting with their colleagues and demanding admission to universities, to 
worry about the mindset of German textbook writers and glider pilots, to listen attentively at German political 
meetings, and to identify and investigate violations of MG policy.  American officials may have begun 
strengthening Germany’s economy and placing new stress on programs to democratize its people and 
institutions, and American officers in the deep recesses of the Pentagon may have started to entertain the idea of 
a German contribution to western Europe’s defense, but in the U.S. Zone, training future soldiers and glorifying 
war, the Wehrmacht, and Germany’s military past remained prohibited.  
By mid 1949, then, the cultural and social landscape of Württemberg-Baden was noticeably different 
from the way it had been in 1945, although not as different as it might have been.  On an immediately tangible 
level, a few war monuments were gone, others showed evidence of alteration, and some city streets and 
squares—often important streets and squares—bore new names.  Museums had put away their military artifacts, 
with their locked storerooms also protecting for safekeeping a motley assortment of swords, rifles, and spears 
obtained from local collectors.  More obvious was the revolution that had occurred on the shelves of bookstores 
and libraries, where thousands of volumes dissecting military tactics, clamoring for war, and stirring up dreams 
of soldierly glory had vanished.  In public places, the only individuals wearing crisp, undyed military uniforms 
complete with decorations and military insignia were Allied soldiers.  Even policemen and youth group 
members who had been allowed to don uniforms wore clothing judged to be harmless and displayed openly 
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only approved insignia and badges.  There was still no national flag to fly and those who marched to the beat of 
military bands were not German.   
If military style uniforms and precision marching were gone, German associational life had changed in 
other ways as well.  Athletic clubs were no longer promoting Wehrsport, and sports publications were not 
singing the praises of young athletes who had proved themselves ready and willing to fight.  Glider pilots 
remained grounded.  No bellowing instructors were drilling youth club members, and youth organizers were not 
promoting hiking trips as pseudo-military experiences, but rather primarily as opportunities to enjoy nature and 
admire the German countryside.  In German schools, the educational resources available to teachers remained 
inadequate, and an analysis of lesson content may have revealed some confusion, peculiar gaps, or questionable 
interpretations, but Culture Ministry officials were at least making a good faith effort to encourage instructors to 
rethink their approach. 
German policemen, meanwhile, could do little more than nod politely when encountering MG officers 
and, when worried about American observers, had to refrain from saluting one another.  Some Germans still 
viewed their police with suspicion and disdain, particularly when they saw too many former career soldiers in 
police uniforms.  Yet the fact that these soldiers had joined local police forces at all was a sign of a radical 
change in German society.  Former professional officers were now selling insurance, editing journals, learning 
trades, adapting to the corporate world, and adjusting to life as civil servants.  With their ability to assemble 
severely limited, improving their own economic or social position was a challenge, to say nothing of plotting to 
regain national influence.  Although still greeted with deferential respect in certain company, this treatment 
could no longer be expected—or demanded—as a matter of course.  Instead, former officers might open the 
newspaper to find letters to the editor attacking their conduct during the war or calling for the permanent 
suspension of their undeserved pensions.  Some were active in writing military studies for the U.S. government 
and others were in regular contact with German politicians, but their power in government circles had decreased 
considerably. 
While some officers seethed at these conditions and continued to stress the inherent nobility of their 
former profession, many of Germany’s young men—even those suspected of the most unreformed and 
unrepentant attitudes—evidently did not view a career as a soldier as something particularly desirable, whether 
because they felt unfairly disparaged or because they found the profession or war itself distasteful.  Though it 
 494 
cannot be viewed as definitive for assessing the attitudes of Württemberg-Baden’s young men, an American 
survey from April 1950 is nevertheless instructive.  At that time, interviewers spoke with more than 500 
students at the Bavarian universities of Erlangen and Munich, 70 percent of whom previously had served in the 
military.  When asked if they would want to become soldiers again, should Germany form a new army, more 
than 90 percent said no.  A similarly lopsided number of those who answered “no” indicated that they would not 
want to become an officer if given the chance.15  Those young men who eventually did choose to join the 
Federal Republic’s new armed forces in the mid 1950s found that the status of the soldier in German society 
had still not regained the luster it held during the Third Reich.  “Military personnel were vilified, spat upon, and 
in some cases stoned,” writes historian David Large.  “Now, instead of attracting women, their uniforms seemed 
a guarantee of celibacy.  Bars put up signs saying ‘No Soldiers Allowed!’ and some restaurants refused to serve 
‘professional murderers.’  ‘Lepers in the middle ages probably had it better,’ insisted one veteran of the early 
Bundeswehr.”16 
Certainly not all Germans approved of all of the postwar changes or thought they were necessary.  
Heidelberg MG officials described some of these alternative views in their reports from 1948 and 1949.  In 
February 1949, another American report similarly argued that “militarism is not as dead as it is supposed to be,” 
citing a variety of activities initiated by and involving former officers, including a letter being circulated by 
former General Hans von Donat soliciting funds to help pay for the defense of former field marshals Gerd von 
Rundstedt, Erich von Manstein, and other officers who were involved in one of the later Nuremberg trials.  
Reports had indicated that the total received for this purpose was “unexpectedly large.”17   
American MG officials also could not be completely sure what sentiments lay behind the apparent 
change of heart and cooperation of many Germans.  Germany was, after all, an occupied country and German 
officials had little choice but to obey the Allies.  Had the Germans really learned?  Would the changes prove to 
be permanent?  In late 1948, Clay expressed both optimism and caution on this point.  “Physically, Germany 
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has been completely demilitarized,” he noted.  It had also “experienced the full horror of defeat in total war,” 
which had “certainly dimmed the military flame in German hearts.”  But, he added, “only time can tell whether 
or not the military spirit which dominated Germany for so many years is dead.”  For this reason, even as the 
western Allies were supervising German efforts to create a new state in western Germany, they were also 
setting up a Military Security Board “to detect and to recommend preventative measures if this spirit does 
return.”18  Though the board was primarily tasked with monitoring German industry, scientific research, and 
disarmament, it also kept an eye on veterans and sports groups and on trends in German public opinion in order 
to “detect a significant resurgence in militarism.”  The board’s work, suggested its U.S. representative in early 
1950, included making certain that Germany’s “national pride” and “aggressive spirit” were contained and 
“made the basis for decent industrious citizenship, free from the passion to regiment and dominate other men.”19   
 
A Joint Enterprise 
It is now clear that many changes in Württemberg-Baden were genuine and lasting.  Some would be 
reversed, but many would not.  And in the years following, the character of German culture and society would 
continue to evolve—if sometimes too slowly for some advocates—in the direction the Allies had hoped it 
would.  The question thus becomes: What, or who, was responsible for the transformation?  The war certainly 
influenced attitudes, reigniting old passions and stimulating new ideas.  But this alone cannot explain the nature, 
extent, and, as importantly, the limits of the transformation.  Many other factors, on both the American and 
German sides, also shaped this outcome. 
American demilitarization efforts in Germany faced clear challenges and suffered from obvious 
weaknesses.  A key problem was the absence of a reasoned, agreed upon understanding of the terms 
“militarism,” “militarist,” and “militaristic.”  Combined with the wide reach of U.S. policies, this deficiency led 
to a lack of uniformity and clarity in the overall demilitarization program.  The assorted committees, MG 
offices, and Allied directorates involved in policymaking instead relied on their own individual conceptions of 
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militarism in formulating sometimes arbitrary or vague policies.  Uneven in their scope and impact and 
sometimes influenced by the conflicting national priorities and concerns of Allied negotiators, the various 
policies also frequently failed to instill certainty and confidence in the German officials held accountable for 
carrying them out.   
Additionally, if much has been made of the difficulty of “dictating democracy” during the U.S. 
occupation, the demilitarizing project had its own inherent contradiction: the Americans set out to demilitarize 
Germany during and by way of a military occupation.  Military government officials demanded obedience while 
seeking to undermine German authoritarianism and respect for military authority, preached against uniform 
worship while requiring U.S. personnel to wear uniforms that would generate respect and underscore 
hierarchical relationships, and outlawed German marching while staging their own military parades.  These 
obvious contradictions were accompanied by more subtle ones.  American GIs had privileges—in the form of 
food, shelter, and transportation—which the Germans did not.  Even the well-known affection of U.S. soldiers 
for German children could have an unfortunate flip side.  In late 1946, for instance, youth official Heinrich 
Hassinger invoked the specter of militarism when expressing concern about GIs who let German children ride 
on their tanks.20  Taken as a whole, the American military presence did not deliver an unambiguous message. 
Like initiatives to denazify and decartelize Germany, American demilitarization plans also suffered 
from ignorance of conditions in Germany and from the inefficiencies and blunders of the occupation 
administration itself.  Early personnel demilitarization regulations in the U.S. Zone were obsessed with Prussian 
Junkers who, in the end, proved to be relatively scarce and not particularly threatening.  In addition, as 
outsiders, MG officers were poorly equipped to make fair and informed decisions regarding German personnel 
appointments.  In the absence of membership cards for “militarists” and criteria for judging attitudes, they had 
little choice but to put their faith in sometimes arbitrary categorizing and in information provided by the 
Germans themselves, conditions that could lead to both unwarranted removals and unwise appointments.  
Frustrations with this system helped bring about the March 1946 law which ultimately ensured that the Germans 
would censure or exclude few people for attitudes or conduct during the Third Reich that may have contributed 
to Germany’s—and the world’s—present predicament and did little to encourage public reflection on this point.  
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Then, too, moves such as confiscating aboriginal spears and arresting army staff doctors hardly convinced the 
Germans of the Americans’ ability to show them how things should be done, while cutting off pensions for the 
elderly and infirm without making provision for sufficient replacement income stirred up unnecessary 
resentment.   
American enforcement efforts also had their shortcomings.  Policies issued from on high were not 
always assiduously carried out and violations were not always carefully monitored.  Sometimes this was 
unintentional, perhaps the result of staffing inadequacies which made it impossible, for instance, for MG 
personnel to check every town and school library.  In other cases, MG officials chose to overlook minor 
infractions.  Tasked with staffing town administrations or maintaining order, they also consciously ignored the 
spirit or letter of the law in an effort to successfully achieve other goals. 
On the other hand, the Americans at times purposely designed policies to be less than comprehensive 
and thorough, not usually because their beliefs had changed or because they were not committed to 
demilitarizing Germany (although some obviously did find certain measures unnecessarily severe or extensive), 
but because they believed that restraint and sensitivity would be more effective in the long run.  German wrath 
and ridicule could hurt American security and prestige, which could damage the U.S. program in Germany as a 
whole.  As importantly, avoiding drastic intervention and sweeping changes in the short term would help to 
ensure lasting gains by minimizing discontent, idleness, and unrest.  In this respect, the imprecision of existing 
definitions of militarism could work to the advantage of policymakers, permitting them to define the universe of 
threatening militaristic influences to exclude, for example, pre-World War I statues and commemorative tables 
of names.  American officials could also argue that young former officers were not, in and of themselves, a 
threat to the democratizing mission of postwar universities and that there were few subjects inherently 
dangerous for them to study.  They could instead press to integrate young veterans into the mainstream of 
German life and thereby hopefully decrease their frustrations, prod their thinking in new directions, and reduce 
the threat they might pose to the occupation forces and world security.  In these cases, the Americans 
deliberately considered possible German reactions when crafting policy.  On occasion, they also responded to 
German concerns and complaints after the fact, delaying enforcement or extending timetables for carrying out 
instructions.  Most violations, moreover, did not elicit severe punishments.  Arrests were not out of the question 
when demanded by law or when infractions threatened the safety of U.S. troops, but the most common 
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responses to violations were advice, reprimands, warning letters, and the suspension of authorizations or 
licenses. 
Despite the ambiguity, ignorance, confusion, negligence, moderation, and leniency that characterized 
some or all of the various components of the U.S. demilitarization program, however, the Americans were no 
pushovers.  Their goals were ambitious and their approach was simultaneously detailed in focus and broad in 
scope.  They could respect German sensitivities when it came to commemorating the dead of World War I, but 
they officially refused to sanction a hand salute.  They might suspend enforcement of the uniform regulation in 
light of freezing temperatures, but they did not rescind it or stop enforcement altogether despite severe clothing 
shortages.   
In retrospect, some American requirements seem remarkably exacting.  Policemen could not denote 
their ranks using chevrons, tin soldiers could not march into math problems, and singing groups could not 
unfurl their flags in funeral processions.  The comments of the textbook analyst who observed that a book that 
continually used “war examples” to teach grammar might slowly poison the minds of Germany’s youth into 
thinking “that war is a natural, inevitable occurrence, part and parcel of everyday life”21 help to make this 
approach understandable.  It remains striking nonetheless. 
More obviously influential was American tenacity in other arenas.  In addition to insisting upon a 
number of permanent changes in Württemberg-Baden’s material culture landscape, the Americans ordered the 
vetting of German bookstores and libraries—in the case of school libraries, not just once, but three times.  They 
demanded that textbooks and lesson plans be demilitarized and refused to permit the use of tainted materials.  
They required the redirection of youth and sports activities.   Enforcement of these measures may have been 
imperfect, but the measures were enforced.  The Americans also kept Germany’s military elites locked up for 
several years, denying them not only an opportunity to conspire against American troops, but also the chance to 
defend their own social and political position and to insert themselves into early postwar Land and local 
governance.   
Even the paradox of a demilitarizing military occupation had a few positive byproducts, given that one 
U.S. objective was to alter German thinking regarding soldiers and how they should fit into a society.  
American “citizens in uniform” not only modeled a different relationship to their uniforms, they led at least 
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some Germans to reflect on the possibility of a different kind of military behavior.  Ulm’s Kurt Fried addressed 
this point directly in the Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung in early 1947.  Citing several recent meetings with an 
American major regarding youth matters, he praised the officer’s informality, willingness to listen to opposing 
opinions, and genuine desire to help Germany’s youth, even when he could not provide the material support for 
which the Germans were pleading.  A similar meeting involving a German officer in Poland or France was 
virtually impossible to imagine, Fried asserted.  Going on to urge his readers to recognize how good they had it 
under the Americans, despite continuing hardships and obvious shortcomings in American tactics, Fried 
concluded by noting that in conversations with Americans he had noticed repeatedly how skeptical they were 
about everything relating to the military.  For them, a general was not a figure worthy of adoration, but rather a 
necessary evil.  This, he suggested, was something worth thinking about.22   
While MG officials sometimes chose to use a gentle touch, they never backed away from the rhetoric 
of demilitarization.  As a result, even Germans unaffected by specific American policies could not escape the 
unfaltering American criticism of the evils of German militarism.  Futhermore, military government officials 
were not the only ones critiquing this aspect of Germany’s past, a fact which surely made their work easier and 
more effective.  Indeed, the Americans had real allies, even partners, among the Germans. 
Some Germans undoubtedly talked a good game merely to worm their way into the good graces of the 
Americans, perhaps obscuring some stain on their past at the same time.  But there were many others whose 
own lifelong convictions, or new view of the world, made them eager to reform—even to revolutionize—
German society and culture.  Along with city council meeting minutes, German newspapers illustrate this best.  
Of their own accord, men like Ulm’s Johannes Weisser and Karlsruhe’s Fritz Aschinger campaigned for 
measures similar to those demanded by the Americans because these policies aligned with their own thinking.  
German journalists and letter writers, in effect, justified and explained American demilitarization regulations, 
stressing the importance of removing street signs and monuments, criticizing German tendencies to kow-tow to 
dazzling uniforms, and condemning the past machinations of Germany’s military elites. 
German reactions to both the multitude of American directives and a variety of indigenous proposals 
nevertheless also show that it would be too simplistic to claim that the Germans’ experiences during World War 
II made any U.S. stimulus to social and cultural demilitarization unnecessary or that after the war all Germans 
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were fully supportive of the demilitarization project.  Few Germans wanted another war, except perhaps those 
hoping to improve their own standing or Germany’s position vis-à-vis the Allies.  And Württemberg-Baden’s 
new leaders and others readily agreed that “militarism” was abhorrent.  As a result, they were often ready to 
take concrete steps to redirect school curricula and youth programs and to purge public institutions and police 
forces of the influence of soldiers and military attitudes and conduct.  Yet even apart from outright dissenters, 
there were many Germans who questioned the scope and depth of the program introduced by the Americans. 
In truth, fault lines emerged across national boundaries as well as within them during the occupation.  
There were Americans as well as Germans who viewed specific U.S. demilitarization tactics as too harsh, and 
others who wanted deep-cutting, thorough change.  Interestingly, however, evidence suggests that shared 
political perspectives were not always the cause of shared views concerning demilitarization.  The materials 
reviewed for this study frequently do not provide a clear picture of the rationale lying behind differences of 
opinion on the American side.  The specifics of the larger U.S. program were typically worked out either by 
zonal level policymakers and negotiatiors or by local MG officials who were often recruits from the private 
sector or career officers below the general officer level.  The activities of the former have received little 
concentrated attention here and ascertaining the political leanings or personal motivations of the latter is 
difficult.  Both groups are certainly worthy of more intense scruitiny.  In light of the sources available, however, 
it seems wrong to assume that the New Deal liberal and business-friendly conservative beliefs which so 
substantially shaped the American debate on economic questions (seen most clearly in the quarrels between the 
Treasury Department and the State Department during the war) also heavily influenced any disagreements 
regarding the demilitarization project.   
Although sympathetic attitudes toward the German people that led some Americans to push for 
rehabilitation may also have shaped their thinking on the subject of demilitarization, social and cultural 
demilitarization, for the most part, did not noticeably either impede or facilitate Germany’s economic recovery, 
which presumably made it less of a concern to those passionately advocating or resisting German economic 
reconstruction.  OMGUS’s Political Division, backed by the State Department, did tend to be wary of measures 
such as confining German officers, confiscating books, and changing the names of streets named after pre-Nazi 
military heroes.  But if the Political Division’s sensitivities correlated well with their desire for the rapid 
economic rehabilitation of Germany, they also reflected a concern for creating the best conditions for the 
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growth of a healthy democracy.  Officials from the Intelligence and Armed Forces Divisions, by contrast, often 
took a hard line position.  Yet they were hardly crusading New Dealers.  Rather, the career colonels and 
generals weighing in on policy questions in these areas were pragmatists.  Simply put, they were concerned 
about security.  Hence pressing for the continued internment of former general staff officers, the destruction of 
military training manuals, or, in the words of General Robert Harper, “spiritual and intellectual 
demilitarization” was fully in keeping with their mission, regardless of any desire for vengeance individual 
officers may well have felt.  This may also explain why American Military Directorate officials could preserve 
commemorative name tablets from destruction and sanction the admission of former army captains to German 
universities, but still desire close surveillance of former German generals. 
In German circles, opinions more often than not followed a right to left political breakdown, with those 
on the right, predictably, most resistant to and least convinced of the necessity of the American measures.  
Official U.S. policies therefore frequently corresponded most closely with the agenda of Württemberg-Baden’s 
Communists and Social Democrats, requiring changes that many right-leaning and moderate Germans did not 
believe were warranted.  On the other hand, the Americans did not always push far enough for the left-leaning 
parties—although the parties themselves did not raise this complaint.  Instead, those on the left saw social and 
cultural changes as their own responsibility.  In part, their position had long-standing ideological underpinnings, 
including socialism’s traditional condemnation of Germany’s professional army and the army’s social and 
political influence.  But it also reflected their belief that making changes would provide proof of a healthy 
German soul, or show the world that the Germans were turning over a new leaf.   
Engagement with the problem of militarism was not limited to the politically active, however.  Indeed, 
in Württemberg-Baden an informal conversation regarding militarism and demilitarization developed which 
involved many more people than just the Land’s leading politicians and a variety of intellectual elites pondering 
the nature of German militarism and its social, political, and historical implications.  Local administrators, 
youth officials, police directors, veterans, and ordinary Germans who took the time to draft letters to state 
officials and local newspapers all had something to say. 
For some German administrators and elected officials, the greatest impediments to demilitarization 
were labor, costs, and time.  They had a mess on their hands, and some saw physically demilitarizing Germany 
by removing uniforms, street signs, books, and museum pieces as time-consuming and expensive, and not 
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especially urgent in light of more pressing concerns.  While German schools might have evolved in a terrible 
direction during the Third Reich, there were school buildings to repair, fuel supplies to obtain, teachers to hire, 
and writing tablets to procure.  Vetting school libraries and even drafting new textbooks could wait.  Denying 
the relative importance and urgency of demilitarizing measures, this type of reaction could also betray 
skepticism regarding the gravity and necessity of such actions. 
Beyond this, individuals disagreed on what constituted a militarizing agent.  Consequently, 
“demilitarization” did not mean the same thing to every person.  A large number of Germans, for instance, 
refused to question basic soldierly values that the Americans frequently thought were suspect.  Some did not see 
militarism in monuments, casual salutes, or military training. 
In many respects, this informal conversation revolved around the issue of what the war, with its 
suffering, devastation, and loss, should mean for German society and culture.  Was change warranted?  If so, 
how fundamental should this be?  What was broken, distorted, or flawed?  Were minor adjustments sufficient?  
Could internal change be achieved or confirmed without external alterations?  Or did internal change caused by 
the war obviate external changes?  The subtext of this dialogue was centered on questions pertaining to 
Germany’s past.  Had Germany’s history and its traditions, culture, and social practices (particularly as shaped 
and directed by Prussia) been fundamentally good or at least innocuous, with the Third Reich an aberration?  Or 
had they been intrinsically flawed?  Should the alteration process end after the work of the Nazis had been 
undone?  Or was it important to reach further back and dig deeper?  Views on street signs, monuments, physical 
training, the honor of average soldiers, and other issues were deeply rooted in historical interpretations and 
assessments.   
To some Germans, pulling the rug of German history and tradition—which provided a sense of identity 
and orientation—out from under their own feet during a period of upheaval and disorientation was unacceptable 
even apart from the financial costs associated with any changes.  But the implications of advocating a deeply 
penetrating demilitarization program could be unsettling in other ways, too, if one considered them carefully.  
Just as condemning a wide range of pre-war behaviors, attitudes, and practices as militaristic could expand the 
pool of culpable collaborators to include friends, neighbors, and oneself, to advocate extensive demilitarization 
was to admit that German institutions and customs had harmful qualities and that the nation’s history was 
problematic.  Taken one step further, this made the Germans at least partially responsible for their own 
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predicament.  In this regard, it was no doubt easier for those on the left and for non-Prussians to call for greater 
changes.  In Württemberg-Baden, many Communists and Social Democrats, some individuals linked to other 
parties, and a good number of ordinary people writing letters to newspapers refused to deposit all of the blame 
for their current plight at the feet of the Third Reich’s Nazi leaders or to deny the war guilt of Germans outside 
of activist Nazi circles.  But impugning Prussian militarism and Germany’s imperial past probably caused 
relatively few qualms of conscience for good Communists, Socialists, Swabians, and Badenese, who could 
assure themselves that they had done little—proactively—to bring about these problems.23   
Whether German women were more consistently supportive of the American demilitarization project 
than were German men is difficult to assess on the basis of the records reviewed for this study.  The Americans 
apparently did not target German women directly or explicitly solicit their support in this endeavor, nor did they 
regularly track the responses of women as a separate category of analysis.  Furthermore, the implementation of 
American regulations was largely the province of men, both on the military government side and in German 
council chambers and government offices.  Even German newspapers remained a sphere inhabited, not 
exclusively, but predominantly by men.24   
A deeper investigation of the reaction of German women to the American demilitarization project 
would undoubtedly be fruitful, however.  On one hand, the Americans’ efforts may well have been facilitated 
by the fact that occupied Germany was a “country of women,” many of whom had suffered greatly during the 
war and immediately afterwards.  A woman’s sense of self was also less likely to be integrally tied up with her 
military prowess or magnificent uniform.  Women therefore would seemingly be less likely to perceive the U.S. 
regulations as a threat to their self-identity or denigration of their past achievements.  Certainly the newly 
authorized organizations in Württemberg-Baden included several women’s groups that were outspoken 
advocates for peace.  Local activists, for instance, periodically issued pamphlets, sponsored meetings and 
penned articles for area newspapers that called for women to act to prevent future wars, encouraging them to 
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promote international understanding and to ensure that their children were educated in a “new spirit.”25  In 
keeping with its statutes, which explicitly condemned militaristic attitudes, the Württemberg section of the 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom also printed flyers urging German women to refuse to let 
their children play with toy soldiers and toy weapons, to give books about animals and plants as gifts rather than 
those glorifying war, and to present to their children as heroes and role models scientists working for the good 
of humanity rather than military men.26 
On the other hand, the pride of some women in their nation’s military history may have been equal to 
that of their male countrymen, and their praise for the accomplishments of the men in their lives may have been 
just as strong.  Furthermore, a desire for peace would not necessarily have translated into support for the 
American agenda or for the specifics of the American demilitarization program.27  The ACC uniform ordinance, 
for example, was yet another burden placed upon women who were already worn down by their ongoing 
struggle to feed and clothe their families. 
In one instance where the Americans did deliberately raise the issue of gender in examining the 
Germans’ engagement with militarism, they discovered some skepticism regarding the likelihood that German 
women would help to foster peace.  Cognizant of the male-female imbalance in occupied Germany and the 
support German women had provided to Hitler and his program, military government officials directing the 
1948 ICD study on militarism asked German “opinion leaders”—most but not all of whom were men—“if they 
considered women in general a pacifist influence in German society.”  Those who said yes, the ICD’s final 
report observed, usually argued that “women are by nature less militaristic than men and that mothers always 
fear losing their sons in war.”  One Catholic leader had maintained, too, “that after their experiences during this 
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last war German women certainly have had enough of war.”  The report also noted, however, that a “large 
group” of those interviewed had responded that “German women are potentially a force for peace, but have 
been dangerously indoctrinated by nazi militarism” and that those not infected with this were not trained to be 
politically active.  Still “another large group” had been “emphatic in the opinion that German women are more 
dangerous militarists than German men are.”  They cited the “ardent feminine support given the Hitler regime 
and criticized women for admiration of uniforms and military display.”28 
Significantly, an August 1946 military government report suggests that this skepticism regarding 
German women cannot be dismissed as just an exculpatory strategy or a reflection of German male bias.  Using 
a complex questionnaire designed by a Columbia University professor, ICD officials had solicited the opinions 
of several groupings of Germans, including political prisoners, Marburg university students, young people in 
Württemberg-Baden aged 17 to 27, and a general sampling of nearly 1,500 residents of the U.S. Zone.  In 
evaluating the “attitudes toward war and militarism” revealed by the survey, ICD researchers reported that just 
43 percent of those surveyed had responded to all of five relevant statements in a way the Americans preferred.  
Strikingly, they also contended that “more widows, who had suffered the deprivation of their husbands as 
breadwinners and companions, were disposed to glorify war and war-making than were married people.”  In 
fact, they added, “women in general seemed to admire militaristic values more frequently than did men.”  Only 
35 percent of the German women surveyed had responded to all five of the relevant statements in the way the 
Americans thought best.29  If these reports intimate that the opinions of German women could not always be 
easily predicted, they also hint at the insights further study of women’s views of the American program, their 
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thoughts on German militarism, and, as importantly, the opinions of German men regarding the beliefs and 
actions of German women in this respect might yield concerning postwar gender relations more generally. 
Overall, it is clear that even those Germans living in Württemberg-Baden who claimed to be against 
militarism did not necessarily endorse the broad contours of the U.S. program.  That leap required a certain 
view of Germany’s history, an interpretation of the causes, symptoms, and character of militarism similar to that 
which anchored American thinking, and, frequently, a desire for a fresh start.  At the same time, the unique 
origins and nature of the German conversation meant that German prescriptions for the future were not always 
the same as American ones, even when Germans theoretically approved of the Americans’ paramount objective. 
The wide-ranging, if not always conspicuous, German conversation regarding militarism points to two 
other ways MG officials combined forces with the Germans themselves to shape the character of 
demilitarization in the immediate postwar period.  First, in instructing the Germans to make changes, the 
Americans also effectively required them to discuss what changes were warranted and, to some degree, to think 
about why such changes might be warranted.  Second, and more importantly, MG officials preserved the public 
sphere for critical native voices, thereby enabling and promoting a discourse of antimilitarism and 
condemnation of war.  In effect, they steered the debate.  The Americans policed all information sources, 
including not only newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasts, but entertainment, education, and youth 
programs.30  Especially early on, they appointed and approved German officials, politicians, teachers, editors, 
journalists, youth leaders, and others, while excluding those with questionable pasts or credentials.  Once 
approved, individuals might have to defend themselves and could eventually even lose their positions if MG 
officials caught them voicing unacceptable views, as the experience of the schoolteacher in Schwäbisch Gmünd 
confirmed.  As late as the fall of 1948, the Americans forced changes in the editorial staff of the journal Christ 
und Welt after it repeatedly used cover photos of men in uniforms and articles dealing with Field Marshal Erwin 
Rommel, the Eastern Front, German victimization, and similar topics to attract new subscribers.31   
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Thus for four years the voices Germans heard most frequently were those that condemned war and 
“militarism.”  There were Germans who held very different views on these subjects, but MG officials, along 
with other Germans, made sure that they had very few platforms from which to preach their ideas.  This did not 
preclude public discussion of matters such as officer pensions and gliding.  But to glorify war or clamor for 
conquest was out of the question.  In addition, where individuals disagreed with prevailing attitudes and 
opinions—for example, in advocating the benefits of military training for Germany’s youth—they, like former 
General Johannes Friessner, had to couch their arguments within the dominant discourse of antimilitarism by at 
least explaining why their views should not be considered “militaristic” or of a war-mongering nature.  This 
rhetorical requirement, the need to condemn “militarism,” originated in the occupation period, perhaps due in 
part to the Allies’ relentless use of the couplet “Nazism and militarism” to identify the sources of the world’s 
miseries.  It was possible to learn lessons regarding war—“war is bad”—from war.  It did not necessarily follow 
that “militarism” would be tagged as responsible for the disaster.  Discussing issues relating to war and the 
military, moreover, would continue to require caution and sensitivity.  Even after the founding of the Federal 
Republic, the Germans could not risk offending the rest of the world or provoking the suspicion of the western 
Allies, lest they lose their ongoing struggle to regain political independence, respect, and international standing. 
By late 1949, it was obvious that there was little support in Germany for either the waging of war or 
“militarism.”  German society was increasingly characterized far less by militarism than by “civilianism,” in the 
sense described by Alfred Vagts in the late 1930s.32  Uniforms no longer revealed and defined social 
hierarchies, high-ranking officers no longer were given priority of place, and children’s youth programs no 
longer glorified war and soldierly achievements.  There was, indeed, a nascent “culture of antimilitarism.”33  
There was not, however, a culture of pacifism or a “culture of peace.”34  Nor was this transformed—or 
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transforming—culture distinguished by a consensus regarding the idea of war, the phenomenon of militarism, or 
the nature of Germany’s military past and how that past should be judged.  In the end, one could be against war, 
against a new army, against “militarism,” and even a pacifist and not necessarily condemn everything having to 
do with war, soldiers, or Germany’s military past or see the need for altering street signs or changing the 
content of elementary school history lessons.   
To say that the American military government “psychologically disarmed” the Germans living in 
Württemberg-Baden is to go too far.  To the degree that this process occurred in the mid twentieth century, it 
was a complicated psychological, emotional, and spiritual one with many inputs, both internal and external, 
during the war and in the years (in some cases even decades) that followed.  By the birth of the Federal 
Republic, however, the society and culture in which these Germans lived had been cleansed of what the 
Americans thought were their most offensive militaristic excesses.  And local and Land leaders were being 
pushed, from inside and outside of Germany, to make further changes.  This evolution was advocated and 
promoted by many Germans, particularly on the left of the political spectrum, but evidence suggests that, had 
they been left to their own devices, the transformation would not have taken on the character and proportions it 
did.  The most outspoken advocates of change usually could not, by themselves, overcome a variety of political, 
economic, intellectual, psychological, and practical constraints impeding and slowing their efforts.  To do this, 
they needed the authority and dictates of the occupying power.  But this also meant that change often stopped 
where the Americans stopped pushing.  The changes carried out with the least amount of resistance, and 
arguably the most noticeable and substantial changes, occurred, not surprisingly, where there was the greatest 
amount of agreement among the Germans themselves on what their goals should be.  
 
The Ironies of Rearmament 
Almost immediately after the formal occupation of Germany ended in late 1949, the Americans had 
the opportunity to better judge the extent to which “the military flame in German hearts” had dimmed and to 
assess how likely it was to flare up again.  Washington policymakers provided a perfect testing device when 
they chose to openly advocate the rearmament of the new West German state in order to shore up the defenses 
of western Europe.  The results were enlightening.  With the Americans now pressing for rearmament, a 
majority of Germans showed spirited opposition to their plans.  What they stated unambiguously in newspaper 
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articles, posters, and graffiti, the West Germans also put quantitatively to various pollsters.  In November 1950, 
the Institut für Demoskopie reported that roughly half of the individuals it had consulted were against 
rearmament, with just one-third coming out in favor and one fifth undecided.35 
This development has long interested historians, not least because it involved an apparent role reversal.  
The Americans now saw Soviet communism as a greater threat to their security than German militarism.  The 
German response, meanwhile, revealed a substantial shift in German opinion since the early 1940s, hinting at 
both German lessons learned and at American success in encouraging new German values.  Although this 
appraisal is certainly not wholly false, it masks certain complexities and ambiguities, which are worth exploring 
briefly.  For if understanding the American demilitarization program and the German conversation regarding 
militarism that took place during the occupation years helps to provide a sense of context for the German 
response to rearmament, it also makes possible a more nuanced reading of the decisions and debates relating to 
rearmament. 
After years of condemning German militarism, the American policy reassessment understandably 
caused some turmoil.  Writing in the late 1950s of his experiences in Germany as an assistant to U.S. High 
Commissioner John McCloy, Charles Thayer recalled that many Germans had “derived a secret pleasure from 
watching the almighty occupiers hoist by their own petards” when the Germans resisted rearmament.  He 
remembered, in particular, a joke making the rounds that described two Americans meeting at an airport, each 
about to begin work for the High Commission.  “‘What’s your job?’ one of them asked.  ‘Demilitarization,’ the 
other answered.  ‘That’s odd, the first one exclaimed.  ‘Mine’s remilitarization.’”36  Highlighting the irony and 
confusion of the situation, the witticism also mocked the Americans’ apparent about face.  Some American 
observers, meanwhile, initially regarded German opposition to rearmament with incredulity because, as Harvard 
University professor and German émigré Carl Friedrich put it, “it ran so much counter to established views and 
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set opinions.”37  In fact, U.S. newsmagazines and journals produced a steady stream of articles in the early 
1950s dissecting West German views regarding the creation of a new army.38  Variations on a popular theme 
pointed to the war-weary Germans’ new aversion to military conflict and their related concern that Germany 
would become the setting for a destructive war in which their troops would serve as little more than cannon 
fodder.  If some scholars have since suggested that American military planners were dismayed to learn that they 
had been too successful in demilitarizing the Germans, contemporary critics on both sides of the Atlantic 
accused the U.S. government of foolishly abandoning its labors, worrying especially about the possible 
consequences of placing the new army in the hands of Germany’s old generals.39   
The American decision to push the West Germans to form a new military certainly denoted a change in 
American thinking.  Committed to the long-term disarmament of Germany at the end of the war, U.S. 
policymakers now called for the opposite.  Furthermore, as scholars have noted, when confronted with German 
military reformers who wanted to alter the spirit and character of the Federal Republic’s future armed forces to 
correspond more closely with the values of their new democratic state, the western Allies’ military planners 
worried not that the Germans would not change, but that their new soldiers would not be as competent and 
skilled as their predecessors.40 
A closer look, however, suggests that the reversal in American thinking was not quite as complete as it 
might first appear.  American attitudes toward German officers were, in reality, relatively consistent.  Policies 
for handling German generals and general staff officers at the end of World War II had been embedded in the 
assumption that German officers were highly skilled military men and therefore dangerous to both the Allied 
occupation forces and world security.  Repeated discussions regarding exile, internment, and reeducation turned 
on the pivot of how best to neutralize this threat.  When the western Allies chose to rearm West Germany, their 
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views of Germany’s officers did not change; rather, the context changed.  Now those highly skilled military 
men could be unleashed as a potent force working for them, rather than against them. 
More importantly, reconstituting a West German military did not obviate the need for social and 
cultural demilitarization or make continuing efforts in this direction hypocritical.  Instead, it made these efforts 
all the more crucial.  The thinking of American policymakers concerning this aspect of rearmament is beyond 
the scope of this inquiry and needs more study.  But it seems fair to assert that American conceptions of 
German militarism did not preclude simultaneous rearmament and demilitarization—in the sense of eradicating 
and undoing the work of militarizing influences in German society and culture.  American policymakers and 
military planners may have considered an army an essential precondition for militarism, but many would not 
have assumed an unavoidable cause and effect relationship.  Even retaining a skepticism of German national 
tendencies, they could point to the United States as exemplifying the successful coexistence of a professional 
army and an (at least perceived) non-militaristic society.  Viewed from another angle, an army would not 
inevitably give rise to militarism, provided a nation’s institutions, traditions, and attitudes were not designed or 
inclined to encourage militarism and were resistant to the influences of the army, with civilian control of the 
armed forces a top priority.  A 1948 MG report alluded to just this relationship in rejecting Dr. Rudolf Vogel’s 
call “to inculcate German youth . . . with democratic soldierly values” by training them in foreign countries.  
Such an approach, it argued, was “based on a grave misconception.”  Democratized armies were “modeled 
primarily after the democratic pattern of the home country,” which meant that “only if democracy is firmly 
established in government, education, local administrations, etc., of a given country, are the prerequisites 
present for creation of a democratic army.”  In short, it was “not the army which moulds democracy but 
democracy which moulds the army.”41  Similarly, any new military would have to be anchored not only in a 
western European community, but also in a non-militaristic society and culture. 
What clearly gave some Americans pause was that messages coming out of Germany were not always 
consistent.  Many Germans appeared to condemn war and militarism, yet, according to the disapproving 
compilers of the MG’s 1948 report on German militarism, some German opinion leaders still approved of 
military training as a valuable way of instilling “discipline, order, and respect for society” in children, while 
more than half were already then asserting that it might be necessary to reestablish a new army for security 
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reasons.42  Late in the occupation, university students were itching to climb back into gliders, some Germans 
could not understand why traditional history teaching in German schools was suspect, and others were donating 
funds to support former elite officers accused of war crimes.  By the early 1950s, moreover, loud-mouthed 
former generals and new veterans associations were raising eyebrows both inside and outside of West Germany.  
In this regard, Michael Geyer’s recent study analyzing the seeming paradox of, on one hand, 
widespread German opposition to rearmament, conscription, and eventually the deployment of nuclear weapons 
in West Germany during the 1950s, and, on the other, strong support for the conservative Adenauer government 
at the ballot box, seems convincing.  The response to rearmament, he maintains, was a more complicated 
phenomenon than first meets the eye.  Evaluating public opinion surveys conducted by West Germans in the 
early 1950s, he argues that citizens of the Federal Republic opposed rearmament for a variety of different 
reasons, not just because they rejected war in and of itself.  Specifically, he contends that one half to two thirds 
of “public opinion had withdrawn from the modern state-compact.”  Included in this group were not only 
pacifists, but also a contingent, comprising one quarter to one third of all West Germans, who questioned the 
new state’s very legitimacy and its ability and desire to provide security and protect “personal integrity.”  A key 
reason for this perspective was the fact that the state challenged many West Germans’ view of the past—that the 
war was justified and Germany had fought honorably—a challenge which, in essence, threatened their sense of 
personal identity.  As a result, they refused to serve in any army on the state’s behalf.  Notably, too, Geyer 
points to a third set of Germans who resisted the state’s proposed rearmament in a western European framework 
for nationalist reasons; they wanted a German army or none at all.43  In parsing public opinion polls from the 
early 1950s, Geyer thus uncovers lines of continuity with the diverse attitudes and beliefs Germans were 
expressing throughout the occupation to MG survey officials, to colleagues in city council chambers, and to the 
readers of local newspapers.44 
While a German army can be identified as an element of “restoration” from the pre-war era, the change 
in the relationship between German society and the new German armed forces should not be overlooked.  The 
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founders of the new Bundeswehr consciously sought to create an institution that was different from its 
predecessors, even if it ultimately resembled the Wehrmacht more than some reformers within and outside of its 
ranks may have hoped.  More significantly, the army established in 1955 emerged in a changed environment.  
The Federal Republic was not a pacifist state, but the upper hand in West German political life now belonged to 
men who tenaciously insisted on civilian control of the nation’s military.  When military reformers called for an 
army of “citizens in uniform,” this was not a peculiar concept; many of the foreign soldiers who had proved 
themselves capable of winning a war and who had lived among the West German people for a decade had, for 
better or worse, shown themselves to be just that.  Then, too, the Bundeswehr’s youngest recruits and conscripts 
were young men who had spent little time marching in formation as adolescents and teenagers.  A notable 
percentage of their peers, in fact, had protested rearmament and conscription.  German society still honored the 
service of its soldiers in World War II, perhaps holding them up as pitiable victims or recognizing them as 
POWs whose time in Soviet camps had ennobled them in some fashion.  But the masculine soldier-hero of the 
interwar period was no longer universally present.  Instead, ideal men were gentle, loving “citizen-fathers.”  
Ready to defend their country, they were not defined by uniforms, but by their families and civilian dress.45  
The western Allies, moreover, retained a pronounced interest in German affairs, demonstrating a watchfulness 
that lingered to a greater or lesser degree even into the period following German reunification. 
If Bonn was not Weimar, the Federal Republic was not the Kaisserreich or the Third Reich.  In the 
second half of the twentieth century, West Germany was characterized by a “civilianism” whose earliest 
formative influences were not limited to the nation’s wartime experiences, but instead also included the 
deliberate actions, public discussions, and personal reflections of the occupation period that followed. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Enrollment in Institutions of Higher Learning 
in Württemberg-Baden46 
 
 
  
 
 
1939 
 
Jul 1946 
 
Feb 1947 
 
University of Heidelberg 
 
 
1,818 
 
3,167 
 
4,002 
 
Stuttgart Institute of Technology 
 
 
797 
 
1,984 
 
3,965 
 
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology 
 
 
661 
 
1,800 
 
2,980 
 
Hohenheim Agricultural College 
 
 
141 
 
260 
 
388 
 
Stuttgart Academy of Music 
 
 
-- 
 
350 
 
459 
 
Stuttgart Academy of Plastic Arts 
 
 
262 
 
250 
 
344 
 
Mannheim College of Commerce 
 
 
-- 
 
60 
 
586 
 
Total 
 
 
3,679 
 
7,871 
 
13,724 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Excerpts from the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism, 5 March 194647 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
* * * 
 
Article 5 
Major Offenders are: 
(1) Persons who, out of political motives, committed crimes against victims or opponents of National Socialism; 
(2) Persons who, in Germany or in the occupied areas, treated foreign civilians or prisoners of war contrary to 
International Law; 
(3) Persons --who are responsible for excesses, plundering, deportations, or other acts of violence, even if 
committed in fighting against resistance movements; 
(4) Persons who were active in leading positions in the NSDAP, one of its formations, or affiliated 
organizations, or in any other Nazi or Militaristic organization; 
(5) Persons who in the government of the Reich, of a Land, or in the public administration of formerly occupied 
areas, were active in leading positions which could 'have been held only by leading Nazis or supporters of the 
National Socialistic tyranny. 
(6) Persons who otherwise gave major political, economic, propagandistic or other support to the National 
Socialist tyranny or who, by reason of their relations with the National Socialist tyranny, received very 
substantial profits for themselves or others. 
(7) Persons who were actively engaged for the National Socialist tyranny in the Gestapo, the SD, the SS, or the 
Geheime Feldpolizei or Grenzpolizei. 
(8) Persons who, in any form whatsoever, participated in killings, tortures, or other acts of cruelty in a 
concentration camp, a labor camp, an internment camp, or a medical institution or asylum. 
(9) Persons who, for personal profit or advantage, actively collaborated with the Gestapo, SD, SS or similar 
organizations by denouncing or otherwise aiding in the persecution of the opponents of the National Socialistic 
tyranny. 
 
Article 6 
Until rebuttal anyone who is listed in Class I of the list attached to this Law is deemed to be a Major Offender. 
 
Article 7 
I. Activists are: 
(1) Persons who, by reason of their position or activity, substantially assisted the tyranny of the NSDAP. 
(2) Persons who exploited their position, their influence or their connections to impose force and utter threats, to 
act with violence, and to carry out oppressions or other unjust measures.  
(3) Persons who manifested themselves as avowed believers in the National Socialistic tyranny and especially 
in racial creeds.  
 
II. Activists are, in particular, the following persons insofar as they are not Major Offenders: 
(1) Anyone who substantially contributed to the establishment, consolidation or maintenance of the National 
Socialistic tyranny, by word or deed, especially in public through speeches or writings or through voluntary 
donations out of his own or another's property or through using his personal reputation or his position of 
influence in political, economic or cultural life; 
(2) Anyone who by teaching National Socialist doctrines or as educator poisoned the spirit and soul of the 
youth; 
(3) Anyone who, to strengthen the National Socialistic tyranny, undermined family and marital life by this 
contemptuous disregard of recognized moral principles; 
(4) Anyone who, in the service of National Socialism, illegally interfered in the administration of justice or 
                                                 
47
 Office of Military Government for Germany, Military Government Regulations, Title 24, Important German Legislation, 
1 May 47, NA, RG 466, Entry UD3, Box 28, F: C-38 Arrest and Punishment of War Criminals, Nazis and Militarists [etc].   
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abused politically 'his office as judge or prosecutor; 
(5) Anyone who, in the service of National Socialism, agitated with incitement or violence against churches, 
religious communities or ideological groups; 
(6) Anyone who, in the service of National Socialism, derided, damaged or destroyed artistic or scientific 
values;  
(7) Anyone who took a leading or active part in destroying trade unions, suppressing labor, and squandering 
trade union property; 
(8) Anyone who as a provocateur, agent or informer caused or attempted to cause the initiation of proceedings 
to the detriment of others because of their race, religion, or political opposition to National Socialism, or 
because of violations of National Socialistic regulations; 
(9) Anyone who exploited his position of influence under the National Socialistic tyranny to commit offenses, 
in particular, extortions, embezzlements or frauds;  
(10) Anyone who, by word or deed, took an attitude of hatred towards opponents of the NSDAP at home or 
abroad, towards prisoners of war, the population of formerly occupied territories, foreign civilian workers, 
internees or similar persons; 
(11) Anyone who favored the exemption from military service (UK-Stellung) or from combat service of 
individuals because of their National Socialist attitude, or who effected or attempted to effect their induction 
into military service or their transfer to the front because of their opposition to National Socialism. 
 
III. Activists will also include persons who after 8 May 1945 have endangered the peace of the German people 
or of the world by advocating National Socialism or Militarism. 
 
Article 8 
I. Militarists are: 
(1) Persons who attempted to bring the life of the German people in line with a policy of militaristic force: 
(2) Persons who advocated or are responsible for the domination of foreign peoples, their exploitation or 
deportation; or 
(3) Persons who promoted armament for these purposes.   
 
II. Militarists are in particular the following persons, insofar as they are not Major Offenders: 
(1) Persons who, by word or in writings, formulated or disseminated militaristic doctrines or programs or who 
were active outside the Wehrmacht in any organization which served to promote militaristic ideas;  
(2) Persons who before 1935 organized or participated in the organization of the systematic training of youth for 
war; 
(3) Persons who, exercising power of command, are responsible for the wanton devastation of cities and rural 
areas after the invasion of Germany; 
(4) Persons who, as members of the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht), the Reich Labor Service (Reichsarbeitsdienst), 
the Organisation Todt (OT), or the Transport Group Speer, without regard to their rank, abused their authority 
to obtain special personal advantages or to mistreat subordinates brutally. 
 
* * * 
Article 10 
Until rebuttal anyone who is listed under Class II of the list attached to this Law is deemed to be an Offender 
(Activist, Militarist or Profiteer). 
 
Article 11 
I. A Lesser Offender is: 
(1) Anyone who would otherwise belong to the group of Offenders who, however, because of special 
circumstances(Article 39-II) merits milder consideration and who, because of his character may be expected, 
after he has proved himself in a period of probation, to fulfill his duties as a citizen of a peaceful, democratic 
state  
(2) Anyone who would otherwise belong to the group of Followers but who, because of his conduct and 
character, should first have to prove himself.  
 
II. The probationary period shall be at least two years and, as a rule, not more than three years. The group to 
which the person concerned will be finally assigned will depend upon 
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his conduct during the period of probation (Article 42).  
 
III. A Lesser Offender in particular is: 
(1) Anyone born after 1 January 1919 who is not a Major Offender but appears to be an Offender, without 
however having manifested despicable or brutal conduct and who because of his character may be expected to 
prove himself. 
(2) Anyone not a Major Offender who appears to be an Offender but who, at an early stage, turned away from 
National Socialism and its methods unqualifiedly and clearly. 
 
Article 12 
I. A Follower is: 
Any person who was not more than a nominal participant or an insignificant supporter of National Socialism 
and who did not manifest himself as a Militarist. 
 
II. Subject to this test, a Follower is in particular: 
(1) Anyone who as a member of the NSDAP or of any of its formations, except HJ and BDM, did no more than 
pay his membership dues, participate in meetings where attendance was obligatory, or fulfilled unimportant or 
purely routine duties which were prescribed for all members. 
(2) Anyone who was a candidate for membership in the Party and who was not finally admitted as a member. 
 
Article 13 
Exonerated are: 
Persons who in spite of their formal membership, candidacy or other external indications, not only showed a 
passive attitude but also actively resisted the National Socialistic tyranny to the extent of their powers and 
thereby suffered disadvantages. 
 
* * *  
 
APPENDIX 
 
Part A (Class I and Class II) 
 
Class I includes persons who, on the basis of rebuttable presumption, are classified as Major Offenders 
 
Class II includes persons who, on the basis of rebuttable presumption, are classified as Offenders (activists, 
militarists, and profiteers) 
 
* * *  
 
Section L – “The German Armed Forces and Militarists” 
 
Class I 
(1) NS-Führungsoffiziere -  All full-time NS Führungsoffiziere down to and including division in the OKW, 
OKH, OKM, and OKL. 
(2) General Staff Officers - All officers of the German General Staff who since 4 February 1938 belonged to the 
Wehrmachtsführungsstab of the OKW, OKH, OKM or OKL. 
(3) Heads and Deputy Heads of Military and Civil Administration of countries and territories formerly occupied 
by Germany. 
(4) All former officers of the Freikorps "Schwarze Reichswehr". 
 
Class II 
(1) NS-Führungsoffiziere - All regular officers regardless of whether they were professional or reserve officers, 
not included in Class I. 
(2) General Staff Officers - All officers serving as General Staff Officers since 4 February 1938 not included in 
Class I.  
(3) All military and civilian officials with special authority, including heads and deputies of any functional or 
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regional divisions in the military or civil administration of occupied countries and territories, as well as 
executive officials of RUK (armament and war production) except those included in Class I. 
(4) All officials of the Raw Material Trade Association (Rohstoffhandelsgesellschaft). 
(5) Military Commanders and their deputies in cities and townships. 
(6) Die Wehrmacht - All regular officers of the Deutsche Wehrmacht including the rank of Generalmajor or 
equivalent rank, provided they were promoted to this rank after 1 June 1936, and all Wehrmacht officials down 
to the professional rank of Oberst. 
(7) Organisation Todt (OT). Transportgruppe Speer – All officers down to and including the rank of 
"Einsatzleiter".  
(8) All members of the training staffs and executive officials of the war academies and Kadettenanstalten. 
(9) All professors, speakers and authors in the field of military science since 1933. 
(10) All members of the Schwarze Reichswehr and all members of the Freikorps who became members of the 
NSDAP insofar as they are not included in Class I. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Sampling Procedure for Denazification Case Files  
 
 
Denazification case files from Stuttgart’s tribunals, which are located at the Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg, can be 
accessed using an alphabetized file of index cards that typically include the name, date of birth, and occupation 
of the individuals judged in the cases. In my research, I reviewed several hundred cards filed under the letter 
“R” and, from these, selected 65 case files for more careful scrutiny.  I chose 40 of these solely on the basis of 
the age and gender of the individual, selecting files for both men and women from different age cohorts.  Given 
my interest in determining how the March 1946 law’s provisions regarding militarism were applied in tribunal 
proceedings, I intentionally selected more case files pertaining to men than to women, hoping thereby to be able 
to assess the degree to which the tribunals discussed the issue of militarism in considering the cases of men who 
had served in the Wehrmacht in a variety of capacities.  I chose another 24 case files based on occupation as 
well as age and gender.  I was particularly interested in professional soldiers and teachers—the latter because I 
hoped to determine whether the law’s provisions regarding the dissemination of “militaristic doctrines” and the 
“systematic training of youth for war” came into play in these cases.  The latter group included 18 teachers, two 
professors, three men identified as soldiers, and one Gausportwart, or district sports official.  The final 
individual was a banker and former Wehrmacht reserve officer who was discussed in several newspaper articles 
as someone who had been charged as a militarist under the terms of the law.  See table below.48 
 
My initial review of index cards yielded just three cards describing the subject’s occupation as a military one.  
Many of the case files relating to younger men ultimately showed that they had served in the Wehrmacht, but 
none of these men were professional senior officers who fell into the March 1946 law’s Class I and Class II 
categories.  That few men were listed on the cards as professional soldiers is not entirely surprising, given the 
fact that by the time the law took effect, the Wehrmacht had been dissolved and most former soldiers, including 
officers, had assumed new positions and listed these—or nothing—when asked to indicate their occupation.  
Identifying any high-ranking officers among the many persons referenced in the case file index cards was 
therefore almost impossible without knowledge of individual names or case numbers.  Accordingly, I used 
names and addresses culled from the Nachlass Hans von Donat at the Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv to identify 
higher-ranking officers who were living in Stuttgart during the 1950s.  With these as a guide, I was able to 
identify additional officers’ case files and to review files pertaining to 13 generals and two colonels, 
intentionally selecting a variety of ages, ranks, and responsibilities (artillery, tanks, etc.).  These included 
documentation relating to men ranging from the storied tank general Hermann Balck to an obscure colonel who 
had been in ill health throughout the war and retired in 1943.49 
  
Finally, the holdings of the Haupstaatsarchiv include copies of Spruchkammer decisions (generally without 
supporting documentation) for 23 general staff officers from Württemberg-Baden.  They were tried by a special 
Spruchkammer established by Land officials which primarily handled men who had participated in a history 
writing program run by the U.S. Army.50 
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1V/9445, 12/796, 6/15356, 12/18019, 17/6828, 019/3095, 10/9566, 6/9517, 6/5610, 05/5955, 13/10240, 37/SV/794, 
011/845, 37/12/34002, 37/SV/228, 37/SV/2903, 19/5766, 19/13509, 4/7516, 10/3903, 13/6756. 
 
49
 StAL EL902/20 case file numbers 019/266/10, 5/11797, 17/10116, 9/14521, 6/16871, 7/4396, 9/14277, 18/30067, 
15/17069, 16/13817, 8/18859, 16/13157, 17/9738, 5/20843. 
 
50
 HStA EA11/101 Bü 1899.  For more regarding the history program, see Chapter 5. 
 520 
 
STUTTGART TRIBUNAL CASE FILES FILED UNDER THE LETTER “R” 
 
Year of Birth Random Teachers1 Professors Military Men2 Other3 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
1871-1880 3 1 1       1   1   
                      
1881-1890 4 2 2   1   1   1   
                      
1891-1900 5 2 2 2             
                      
1901-1910 8 2 1 2 1           
                      
1911-1920 7 1 5 2     1       
                      
1921-1930 3 2   1             
  
                    
Totals  30 10   11  7  2    3    2   
           
1Includes four sports teachers         
2All deceased           
3One Gausportwart (district sports manager) and one banker identified in newspaper articles  
           
 521 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
ARCHIVES 
 
Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau (BA-MA) 
N528 Nachlass Johannes Friessner 
N571 Nachlass Hans von Donat 
 
Deutsches Tagebucharchiv, Emmendingen (DTA) 
No. 85/II 
No. 845 
 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY (FDRL) 
Official File (OF) 
President’s Secretary’s File (PSF) 
President’s Personal File (PPF) 
 
Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe (GLA) 
GLA 235      Kultusministerium / [1640] 1803-1945 [1973]   
GLA 345 G   Bezirks-/Landratsamt Buchen: Generalia / 1802-1972 
GLA 356      Bezirks-/Landratsamt Heidelberg: Generalia, Orte / 1705-1951 
GLA 356 Zug. 1969-10    Bezirks-/Landratsamt Heidelberg: Generalia / 1804-1953 
GLA 356 Zug. 1977-31    Bezirks-/Landratsamt Heidelberg: Generalia / 1821-1973 
GLA 357    Bezirks-/Landratsamt Karlsruhe: Generalia, Orte / 1715-1970 
GLA 481      Präsident des Landesbezirks Baden / 1906-1954 
 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart (HStA) 
EA 1/013    Staatsministerium, Amt für Heimatdienst / 1946-1947 
EA 1/014    Staatsministerium, Vertretung von Württemberg-Baden beim Länderrat / 1945-1948 
EA 1/016    Staatsministerium, Abteilung Vereinigtes Wirtschaftsgebiet bzw. Trizonal 
     Angelenheiten / 1946-1951 
EA 1/106    Staatsministerum, Pressestelle / 1945-1969 
EA 1/161    Staatsministerium: Eingaben an den Ministerpräsidenten / 1945-1980 
EA 1/920    Staatsministerium: Ablieferungen 1964/1965, 1969 / 1945-1962 
EA 2/007    Innenministerium, Abteilung Sozialwesen / 1945-1975 
EA 2/301    Innenministerium, Abteilung III: Landespolizeipräsidium / 1945-1966 
EA 2/302    Innenministerium, Abteilung III: Landespolizeipräsidum / 1946-1981 
EA 3/101    Kultusministerium: Allgemeine Verwaltung / 1944-1969 
EA 3/201    Kultusministerium, Abteilung Kunst / 1945-1964, Vorakten 1930-1944 
EA 3/202    Kultusministerium, Abteilung Kunst, Referat Denkmalpflege / 1944-1980 
EA 3/301    Kultusministerium, Abteilung VI: Jugend und Sport / 1946-1981 
EA 3/603    Kultusministerium: Allgemeinbildendes Schulwesen / 1944-1959 
EA 3/604    Kultusministerium: Allgemeinbildendes Schulwesen / 1945-1964 
EA 11/101  Ministerium für politische Befreiung, Abteilungen I-IV / 1946-1950 
J 170        Berichte von Gemeinden über die Kriegsereignisse 1945 und das  
     Ausmass der Zerstörungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 1948-1952, 1955, 1960-1962 
 
Kempowski Archiv, Nartum 
No. 277/2 
No. 5814 
 
Landesdenkmalamt, Aussenstelle Karlsruhe (LDAK) 
III/201 Generalia – Denkmalpflege; Militär Waffenamnestie; Rückgabe historischer  
Waffen, 1947-1952 
 522 
III/214 Generalia – Denkmalpflege; Beseitigung von deutschen militärischen und nazistischen  
Denkmälern und Museen, Allgemeines, 1946-1947  
III/215 Beseitigung von deutschen militärischen und nazistischen Denkmälern und Museen;  
Landkreis Bruchsal, 1946 
III/216 Beseitigung von deutschen militärischen und nazistischen Denkmälern und Museen;  
Landkreis Buchen, 1946 
III/218 Beseitigung von deutschen militärischen und nazistischen Denkmälern und Museen;  
Landkreis Heidelberg, 1946 
III/219   Beseitigung von deutschen militärischen und nazistischen Denkmälern und Museen;  
Landkreis Karlsruhe, 1946 
III/220   Beseitigung von deutschen militärischen und nazistischen Denkmälern und Museen;  
Landkreis Mosbach, 1946 
III/221 Beseitigung von deutschen militärischen und nazistischen Denkmälern und Museen;  
Landkreis Pforzheim, 1946-  
III/245   Beseitigung von deutschen militärischen und nazistischen Denkmälern und Museen;  
Landkreis Mannheim, 1946 
III/246  Beseitigung von deutschen militärischen und nazistischen Denkmälern und Museen;  
Landkreis Sinsheim, 1946 
 
Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, DC (LoC-MD) 
Records of the Library of Congress, European Mission & Cooperative Acquisitions Project 
 
U. S. National Archives, College Park, MD (NA) 
RG 43     Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions 
RG 56     General Records of the Department of the Treasury 
RG 59     General Records of the Department of State 
RG 107   Records of the Office of the Secretary of War 
RG 165   War Department General and Special Staffs 
RG 260   U.S. Occupation Headquarters, World War II 
RG 218   U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
RG 331   Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II 
RG 407   Adjutant General’s Office, 1917- 
RG 466   U.S. High Commissioner for Germany 
RG 498   Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (World War II) 
 
Stadtarchiv Heidelberg (StAH) 
Altaktei (AA) 
F11 Heidelberger Amtsblatt 
Protokolle der Stadtratssitzungen 
 
Stadtarchiv Karlsruhe (StAK) 
Bezirkverwaltungsamt (Bez.Verw.Amt) 
Hauptregistratur (1/H-Reg) 
Stadtgeschichtliche Sammlung (8/StS) 
Stadtratsprotokolle (3/B) 
Zeitgeschichtliche Sammlung (8/ZGS) 
 
Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg (StAL) 
EL 209    Oberschulamt Stuttgart, Verwaltungsakten, 1936-1973 
EL 902/20    Spruchkammer 37, Stuttgart, Verfahrensakten 
FL 20/9 I      Landratsamt Heilbronn, Verwaltungsakten, ca. 1941-1961 
FL 20/19      Landratsamt Waiblingen, 1884-1970 
 
Stadtarchiv Stuttgart (StAS) 
Gemeinderatsprotokolle 
 523 
Hauptaktei ab 1945 
 Gruppe 0    Allgemeine Verwaltung 
 Gruppe 1    Oeffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung 
 Gruppe 3    Kultur- und Gemeinschaftspflege     
 Gruppe 4    Soziales 
Personalamt  
Wirtschaftsamt 
 
Stadtarchiv Ulm (StAU) 
Bestand B   Städtische Ueberlieferung ab 1810 
Bestand E   Privatarchive und Archive von Institutionen 
Bestand F   Historische Sammlungen 
Bestand G  Chroniken, Schrift-, Bild- und Tondokumentation 
 
University at Albany, State University of New York,  
M.E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives  
Henry W. Ehrmann Papers 
 
SERIALS 
 
Amtsblatt des Kultministeriums  
Amtsblatt für den Stadtkreis Stuttgart 
Amtsblatt der Stadt Ulm und des Landkreises Ulm 
Badische Neueste Nachrichten 
Das junge Wort 
New York Times 
Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung 
Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung 
Stuttgarter Zeitung 
 
PUBLISHED SOURCES 
 
“AHR Conversation: On Transnational History.” American Historical Review 111, no. 5 (2007): 464-479. 
 
Abelshauser, Werner. German History and Global Enterprise. BASF: The History of a Company.  
New York:Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
 
Abenheim, Donald. Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. 
 
Adler, Selig. “The War-Guilt Question and American Disillusionment, 1918-1928.” Journal of Modern  
History 23, no. 1 (1951): 1-28. 
 
Albrecht, Ulrich. “Der preussisch-deutsch Militarismus als Prototyp—Aspekte der internationalen 
wissenschaftlichen Diskussion.” In Wette, Militarismus in Deutschland, 38-60. 
 
Alpers, Benjamin L. Dictators, Democracy, and American Public Culture: Envisioning the Totalitarian  
Enemy, 1920s-1950s. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. 
 
———. “This is the Army: Imagining a Democratic Military in World War II.” Journal of American  
History 85, no. 1 (June 1998): 129-163. 
 
Ambrose, Stephen F. “The Military and American Society: An Overview.” In The Military and American 
Society: Essays and Readings, edited by Stephen F. Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr, 3-18.  
New York: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan, 1992. 
 
 524 
Asche, Susan, Ernst Otto Bräunche, Manfred Koch, Heinz Schmitt, and Christina Wagner. Karlsruhe:  
Die Stadtgeschichte. Karlsruhe: Badenia Verlag, 1998. 
 
Assmus, Erhard. “Die Publizistische Diskussion um den Militarismus unter besonderer Berücksichtigung  
der Geschichte des Begriffes in Deutschland und seiner Beziehung zu den politischen Ideen zwischen 
1850 und 1950.” Dissertation, Erlangen, 1951. 
 
Azaryahu, Maoz. “The Purge of Bismarck and Saladin: The Renaming of Streets in East Berlin and Haifa,  
a Comparative Study in Culture-Planning.” Poetics Today 13, no. 2 (1992): 351-367. 
 
———. “Renaming the Past: Changes in ‘City Text’ in Germany and Austria, 1945-1947.” History and 
Memory 2, no. 2 (1990): 32-53. 
 
———. “Street Names and Political Identity: The Case of East Berlin.” Journal of Contemporary History 21,  
no. 4 (1986): 581-604. 
 
Bach, Julian Jr. America’s Germany: An Account of the Occupation. New York: Random House, 1946. 
 
Banks, Richard Griffin. “The Development of Education in Württemberg-Baden Under United States Military  
Government.” M.A. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1949. 
 
Barclay, David E. and Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt, eds. Transatlantic Images and Perceptions: Germany and 
America Since 1776. Washington, DC: German Historical Institute; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997. 
 
Bassford, Christopher. Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945. 
 New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
 http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Bassford/TOC.htm 
 
Bauer, Theodore W., Oliver J. Frederiksen, and Ellinor F. Anspacher. “The Army Historical Program in the 
European Theater and Command, 8 May 1945-31 December 1950.” In Detwiler, World War II 
German Military Studies. 
 
Bausch, Ulrich M. Die Kulturpolitik der US-Amerikanische Information Control Division in Württemberg- 
Baden von 1945 bis 1949: Zwischen militärischem Funktionalismus und schwäbischem  
Obrigkeitsdenken. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992. 
 
Behrenbeck, Sabine. Der Kult um die toten Helden: Nationalsozialistische Mythen, Riten und Symbole 1923  
bis 1945. Vierow: SH-Verlag, 1996.  
 
———. “Heldenkult oder Friedensmahnung? Kriegerdenkmale nach beiden Weltkriegen.” In Niedhart and  
Riesenberger, Lernen aus dem Krieg, 344-364. 
 
Bender, Thomas. Rethinking American History in a Global Age. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. 
 
Bennack, Jürgen. “Volksschulbücher der Nachkriegszeit zwischen Erneuerung und Restauration.” In Zwischen  
Restauration und Innovation: Bildungsreformen in Ost und West nach 1945, edited by Manfred  
Heinemann,1-15. Cologne: Boehlau Verlag, 1999. 
 
Berger, Thomas U. Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. Baltimore: Johns  
 Hopkins University Press, 1998. 
 
Berghahn, Volker R. The Americanization of West German Industry. New York: Cambridge University  
Press, 1986. 
 
———. Der Stahlhelm. Bund der Frontsoldaten, 1919-1935. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1966. 
 525 
———. Europe in the Era of Two World Wars: From Militarism and Genocide to Civil Society, 1900-1950.  
 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. 
 
———. Militarism: The History of an International Debate, 1861-1979. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982. 
 
Bernett, Hajo. Der Weg des Sports in die nationalsozialistische Diktatur. Die Entstehung des Deutschen  
(Nationalsozialistischen) Reichsbundes für Leibesübungen. Schorndorf: Verlag Karl Hofmann, 1983. 
 
Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt, ed. Sackgassen: Keine Wendemöglichkeit für Berliner Strassennamen. Berlin:  
Verlag Dirk Nishen, 1988. 
 
Bessel, Richard. Nazism and War. New York: Modern Library, 2004. 
 
Biess, Frank. Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany. Princeton, NJ:  
 Princeton University Press, 2006. 
 
———. “Men of Reconstruction—The Reconstruction of Men: Returning POWs in East and West Germany, 
1945-1955.” In Hagemann and Schüler-Springorum, Home/Front, 335-358. 
 
———. “Survivors of Totalitarianism: Returning POWs and the Reconstruction of Masculine Citizenship in 
West Germany, 1945-1955.” In Schissler, Miracle Years, 63-72. 
 
Bird, Kai. The Chairman: John J. McCloy and the Making of the American Establishment. New York: Simon  
and Schuster, 1992. 
 
Blackburn, Gilmer W. Education in the Third Reich: A Study of Race and History in Nazi Textbooks. Albany:  
 State University of New York Press, 1985. 
 
Boatner, Mark M. Military Customs and Traditions. New York: David McKay, 1956. 
 
Boehling, Rebecca. A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reforms and Economic Recovery in Postwar  
 Germany. Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996. 
 
Borgstedt, Angela. Entnazifizierung in Karlsruhe 1946 bis 1951. Konstanz: Universitätsverlag Konstanz, 2001.  
 
Borst, Otto. Schule des Schwabenlands: Geschichte der Universität Stuttgart. Stuttgart: Deutsche  
Verlags-Anstalt, 1979. 
 
Braun, Birgit. Umerziehung in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone. Die Schul- und Bildungspolitik in  
Württemberg-Baden von 1945 bis 1949. Münster: Lit, 2004. 
 
Bredow, Wilfred von. Moderner Militarismus: Analyse und Kritik. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1983. 
 
Breitenkamp, Edward C. The U.S. Information Control Division and Its Effect on German Publishers and  
Writers, 1945 to 1949. Grand Forks, ND: n.p., 1953. 
 
Brinkley, David. Washington Goes to War. New York: Ballantine Books, 1988. 
 
Bungenstab, Karl-Ernst. Umerziehung zur Demokratie? Re-education-Politik in Bildungswesen der US-Zone  
1945-1949. Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1970. 
 
Carr, G. A. “The Synchronization of Sport and Physical Education Under National Socialism.” Canadian  
Journal of History of Sport and Physical Education 10, no. 2 (1979): 15-35. 
 526 
Caspar, Gustav-Adolf. “Die militärische Tradition in der Reichswehr und in der Wehrmacht 1919-1945.” In  
Tradition in deutschen Streitkräften bis 1945, edited by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 209- 
258. Herford: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1986. 
 
Clay, Lucius D. Decision in Germany. Melbourne: William Heinemann, 1950. 
 
Cohen, Warren I. The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I. Chicago: University  
 of Chicago Press, 1967. 
 
Coles, Harry L. and Albert K. Weinberg. Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors. Washington, DC: Office  
of the Chief of Military History, 1964. 
 
Cooper, Matthew. The German Air Force, 1933-1945: An Anatomy of Failure. London: Jane’s, 1981. 
 
Craik, Jennifer. Uniforms Exposed: From Conformity to Transgression. Oxford: Berg, 2005. 
 
Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. New York: Oxford University  
Press, 1995. 
 
Davis, Brian L. Badges and Insignia of the Third Reich, 1933-1945. Poole: Blandford Press, 1983. 
 
———. German Army Uniforms and Insignia, 1933-1945. New York: World Publishing, 1972. 
 
De Maiziere, Ulrich. In der Pflicht: Lebensbericht eines deutschen Soldaten im 20. Jahrhundert. Herford: E.S.  
Mittler & Sohn, 1989. 
 
Detwiler, Donald S., ed. World War II German Military Studies. Vol.1. New York and London: Garland, 1979. 
 
Diehl, James M. “1918 and 1945: Some Comparisons and Contrasts.” The History Teacher 22, no. 4 (1989):  
397-409. 
 
———. Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. 
 
———. The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans After the Second World War. Chapel Hill: University  
of North Carolina Press, 1993. 
 
Echternkamp, Jörg. Nach dem Krieg. Alltagsnot, Neuorientierung und die Last der Vergangenheit. Zurich:  
Pendo Verlag, 2003. 
 
———. “Wut auf die Wehrmacht? Vom Bild der deutschen Soldaten in der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit.” In  
Müller and Volkmann, Die Wehrmacht,1058-1080. 
 
Ehrlen, Burkhard and Ulrich Schubert. Offene Jugendarbeit in Baden-Württemberg: Von der Nachkriegszeit bis  
zum Ende der 60er Jahre. Leinfelden-Echterdingen: Verlag Burkhard Fehrlen, 1997. 
 
Eisenberg, Carolyn Woods. Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949.  
Cambridge: Cambridge Unversity Press, 1996. 
 
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1949. 
 
Epstein, Catherine. A Past Renewed: A Catalog of German-Speaking Refugee Historians in the United States  
after 1933. Washington, DC: German Historical Institute; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
1993. 
 
Faulenbach, Bernd. “Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach den beiden Weltkriegen.” In Niedhart and  
Riesenberger, Lernen aus dem Krieg, 207-240. 
 527 
Fay, Jennifer. “Constructing America for German Reconstruction: American Films and Re-education in  
Occupied Germany, 1945-1947.” Southern Quarterly 39, no. 4 (2000): 87-100. 
 
Fehrenbach, Heide. Cinema in Democratizing Germany: Reconstructing National Identity After Hitler. Chapel  
Hill: University of North Carolina, 1995.  
 
———. “Rehabilitating the Fatherland: Race and German Remasculinization,” Signs 24, No. 1 (1998):  
107-127. 
 
Fehrenbach, Heide, and Uta G. Poiger, eds. Transactions, Transgressions, Transformations: American Culture 
 in Western Europe and Japan. New York: Berghahn Books, 2000. 
 
Fischer, Alexander. Entmilitarisierung und Aufrüstung in Mitteleuropa, 1945-1956. Herford: E.S. Mittler &  
Sohn, 1983. 
 
Fisher, Jaimey. Disciplining Germany: Youth, Reeducation, and Reconstruction after the Second World War.  
 Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2007. 
 
Foerster, F. W. Europe and the German Question. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1940. 
 
Foerster, Roland, ed. Von der Kapitulation bis zum Pleven Plan. Vol. 1 of Anfänge westdeutscher 
         Sicherheitspolitik, 1945-1956, edited by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt. Munich:  
         R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1982. 
 
Förster, Stig. “Der deutsche Militarismus im Zeitalter der totalen Krieges.” Neue Politische Literatur 27, no. 2  
(1982): 133-146. 
 
Foschepoth, Josef. “German Reaction to Defeat and Occupation.” In West Germany Under Construction:  
Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era. Edited by Robert G. Moeller, 73-89. Ann Arbor:  
University of Michigan Press, 1997. 
 
Frevert, Uta. A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society. Translated by 
Andrew Boreham and Daniel Brückenhaus. Oxford: Berg, 2004. 
 
Fried, Hans Ernst. “German Militarism: Substitute for Revolution.” Political Science Quarterly 58, no. 4  
(1943): 481-513. 
 
———. The Guilt of the German Army. New York: Macmillan, 1942. 
 
Fritz, Stephen G. Frontstoldaten: The German Soldier in World War II. Lexington: University Press of  
Kentucky, 1995. 
 
Fritzsche, Peter. A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination. Cambridge, MA: Harvard  
 University Press, 1992. 
 
Füssl, Karl-Heinz. Die Umerziehung der Deutschen. Jugend und Schule unter den Siegermächten des Zweiten  
Weltkriegs, 1945-1955. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1994. 
 
Fussel, Paul. Uniforms: Why We Are What We Wear. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002. 
 
Gavin, James M. On to Berlin: Battles of an Airborne Commander, 1943-1945. New York: Viking Press, 1978. 
 
Gerhardt, Uta. “Die Amerikanischen Militäroffiziere und der Konflikt um die Wiedereröffnung der Universität  
Heidelberg 1945-1946.” In Hess, Lehmann, and Sellin, Heidelberg 1945, 28-54. 
 
Gersdorff, Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von. Soldat im Untergang. Frankfurt am Main: Ulstein, 1977. 
 528 
Geyer, Michael. “Cold War Angst: The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear  
Weapons.” In Schissler, Miracle Years, 378-385. 
 
———. “Insurrectionary Warfare: The German Debate about a Levee en Masse in October 1918.” Journal of  
 Modern History 73, no. 3 (2001): 459-527. 
 
Gienow-Hecht, Jessica C. E. “Shame on US? Academics, Cultural Transfer, and the Cold War—A Critical  
Review.” Diplomatic History 24, no. 3 (2000): 465-494. 
 
———. Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany. Baton  
 Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999. 
 
Gimbel, John. The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949. Stanford: Stanford  
 University Press, 1968. 
 
Glaser-Schmidt, Elisabeth. “Between Hope and Skepticism: American Views of Germany, 1918-1933.”  
In Barclay and Glaser-Schmidt, Transatlantic Images and Perceptions, 191-216. 
 
Glaser, Mattias. Das Militärische Sicherheitsamt der Westalliierten von 1949-1955. Witterschlick/Bonn:  
Verlag M. Wehle, 1992. 
 
Goedde, Petra. GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949. New Haven, CT: Yale  
 University Press, 2003. 
 
Goldbach, Marie-Luise, ed. 1. Januar bis 31. Dezember 1943, Amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik. Vol. 4 of  
Dokumente Zur Deutschlandpolitik, Series I. Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1991. 
 
Greiner, Bernd. Die Morgenthau-Legende: Zur Geschichte eines umstrittenes Plans. Hamburg: Hamburger  
Edition, 1995. 
 
Griffiths, Eldon W. “Retrospect on Germany.” Yale Review 39 (September 1949): 96-107. 
 
Grünewald, Guido and Dieter Riesenberger. “Die Friedensbewegung nach den Weltkriegen.” In Niedhart and  
Riesenberger, Lernen aus dem Krieg, 96-120. 
 
Guenther, Irene. “Nazi ‘Chic’? German Politics and Women’s Fashions, 1915-1945.” Fashion Theory 1, no. 1  
(1997): 29-58. 
 
———. Nazi Chic? Fashioning Women in the Third Reich. Oxford: Berg, 2004. 
 
Guttmann, Barbara. “Zwischen Trümmern und Träumen”—Karlsruherinnen in Politik und Gesellschaft der  
Nachkriegszeit. Portraits. Karlsruhe: Stadt Karlsruhe, Frauenbeauftragte und Stadtarchiv, 1997. 
 
Hagemann, Karen. “Home/ Front: The Military, Violence and Gender Relations in the Age of the World Wars.”  
In Hagemann and Schüler-Springorum, Home/Front, 1-41. 
 
Hagemann, Karen and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum, eds. Home/Front: The Military, War, and Gender in  
Twentieth-Century Germany. Oxford: Berg, 2002. 
 
Hahlweg, Werner. “Die neue Silhouette des deutschen Soldaten.” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 6, no. 3  
(1956): 142-150. 
 
Hahn, Brigitte J. Umerziehung durch Dokumentarfilm? Ein Instrument amerikanischer Kulturpolitik im  
Nachkriegsdeutschland (1945-1953). Münster: Lit, 1997. 
 
 529 
Hammond, Paul Y. “Directives for the Occupation of Germany: Washington Controversy.” In American Civil- 
Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies, edited by Harold Stein, 311-464. Birmingham: University  
of Alabama Press, 1963. 
 
Hartenian, Larry. Controlling Information in U.S. Occupied Germany, 1945-1949: Media Manipulation and  
Propaganda. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2003. 
 
Hartrich, Edwin. The Fourth and Richest Reich. London: Macmillan, 1980. 
 
Hauser, Andrea. “Frauenöffentlichkeit in Stuttgart nach 1945—Gegenpol oder hilflos im Abseits?” In “Das  
Schicksal Deutschlands liegt in der Hand seinerFrauen”—Frauen in der deutschen  
Nachkriegsgeschichte, edited by Anna-Elisabeth Freier and Annette Kuhn, 51-89. Düsseldorf:  
Pädagogischer Verlag Schwann-Bagel, 1984. 
 
Hayes, Peter. Industry and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi Era. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
 
Hechler, Kenneth W. “The Enemy Side of the Hill: The 1945 Background on Interrogation of German  
Commanders.” In Detwiler, World War II German Military Studies. 
 
Heer, Hannes, and Klaus Naumann. War of Extermination: The German Military in World War II, 1941-1944.  
 New York: Berghahn Books, 2000.  
 
Heineman, Elizabeth D. What Difference Does a Husband Make?  Women and Marital Status in Nazi and  
Postwar Germany. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 
 
Heinemann, Manfred, ed. Hochschuloffiziere und Wiederaufbau des Hochschulwesens in Westdeutschland  
1945-1952, Part 2: Die US-Zone. Hildesheim: Lax, 1990. 
 
Henke, Klaus-Dietmar. Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995. 
  
Hess, Jürgen C., Hartmut Lehmann, and Volker Sellin, eds. Heidelberg 1945. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner  
Verlag, 1996. 
 
Heuer, Uwe. Reichswehr—Wehrmacht—Bundeswehr.  Zum Image deutscher Streitkräfte in den Vereinigten  
Staaten von Amerika; Kontinuität und Wandel im Urteil amerikanischer Experten. Frankfurt am Main:  
Peter Land, 1990. 
 
Heyman, Norbert, Gertrud Pfister, und Irmhild Wolff-Brembach. “Erziehung zur Wehrhaftigkeit im  
Sportunterricht.” In Schule und Unterricht im Dritten Reich, edited by Reinhard Dithmar, 163-179.  
Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1989. 
 
Höhn, Maria. GIs and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany. Chapel Hill:  
University of North Carolina Press, 2002. 
 
Hönicke-Moore, Michaela. “American Interpretations of National Socialism, 1933-1945.” In The Impact of  
Nazism: New Perspectives on the Third Reich and Its Legacy, edited by Alan E. Steinweis and Daniel  
E. Rogers, 1-18. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003. 
 
———. “‘Prevent World War III’: An Historiographical Appraisal of Morgenthau’s Programme for Germany.”  
In The Roosevelt Years: New Perspectives in American History, 1933-1945, edited by Robert A.  
Garson and Stuart S. Kidd, 155-172. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Unversity Press, 1999. 
 
Hönicke, Michaela. “‘Know Your Enemy’: American Interpretations of National Socialism, 1933-1945.”  
Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1998. 
 
 530 
———. “‘Know Your Enemy’: American Wartime Images of Germany, 1942-1943.” In Enemy Images in  
American History, edited by Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase and Ursula Lehmkuhl, 231-278. Providence, RI: 
Berghahn Books, 1997. 
 
Holborn, Hajo. American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies. Washington, DC: Infantry  
Journal Press, 1947. 
 
Hosseinzadeh, Sonja. Nur Trümmerfrauen und Amiliebchen? Stuttgarterinnen in der Nachkriegszeit. Stuttgart:  
Silberburg-Verlag, 1997. 
 
Howard, Michael. The Lessons of History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991. 
 
Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. 2 vols. New York : Macmillan, 1948. 
 
Iriye, Akira. Cultural Imperialism and World Order. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. 
 
———. “Culture and International History.” In Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, edited  
Michael Hogan and Thomas G. Paderson, 214-225. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
 
———. “Transnational History.” Contemporary European History 13, no. 2 (2004): 211-222. 
 
Irwin-Zarecka, Iwona. Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory. New Brunswick, NJ:  
Transaction Publishers, 1994. 
 
Joseph, Nathan. Uniforms and Nonuniforms: Communication Through Clothing. New York: Greenwood  
Press, 1986. 
 
Karwelat, Jürgen. “Ein Berliner Stadtplan von 1946—seiner Zeit voraus.” In Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt,  
Sackgassen, 9-23. 
 
———. “Neutempelhof: Statt Pazifistenecke ein ‘Fliegerviertel.’” In Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt,  
Sackgassen, 27-45.  
 
Kater, Michael H. Hitler Youth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. 
 
Kershaw, Ian. Hitler. Vol. 2, 1936-1945: Nemesis. New York: W.W. Norton, 2000. 
 
Kimball, Warren F. Swords or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany, 1943-46.  
 Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1976. 
 
Kleindienst, Jürgen. Und weiter geht es doch: Deutschland 1945-1950. 45 Geschichten und Berichte von  
Zeitzeugen. Berlin: JKL Publikationen, 1999. 
 
Klemperer, Victor. I Will Bear Witness: A Diary of the Nazi Years, 1942-1945. Translated by Martin Chalmers.  
 New York: Random House, 1998. 
 
Klessmann, Christoph. Die doppelte Staatsgründung: deutsche Geschichte, 1945-1955. Bonn: Bundeszentrale  
für Politische Bildung, 1991. 
 
Klönne, Arno. “‘Kulturkampf’: Bemerkungen zur Schul- und Jugendpolitik der Besatzungsmächte in  
Deutschland nach 1945.” In Jahrbuch für zeitgeschichtliche Jugendforschung 1994/95, 28-39. Berlin:  
Metropol Verlag, 1995. 
 
Knappen, Marshall. And Call It Peace. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947. 
 
 531 
Kochavi, Arieh J. Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment. Chapel  
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998. 
 
Köhler, Heinrich. Lebenserinnerungen des Politikers und Staatsmannes, 1878-194. Edited by Josef Becker,  
with the assistance of Franz Zilken. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1964. 
 
Kohn, Richard H. “The Constitution and National Security: The Intent of the Framers.” In Kohn, United States  
Military under the Constitution, 61-94. 
 
———, ed. The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States. New York: New York  
University Press, 1991. 
 
Koselleck, Reinhardt. “Einleitung.” In Der politische Totenkult: Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne, edited by  
Reinhardt Koselleck and Michael Jeismann, 9-20. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1994. 
 
———. “Kriegerdenkmale als Identitätsstiftungen der Ueberlebenden.” In Identität, edited by Odo Marquard  
and Karlheinz Stierle, 255-276. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1979. 
 
Koshar, Rudy. From Monuments to Traces: Artifacts of German Memory, 1870-1990. Berkeley: University of  
 California Press, 2000. 
 
———. “‘Germany Has Been a Melting Pot’: American and German Intercultures, 1945-1955.” In The  
German-American Encounter: Conflict and Cooperation between Two Cultures, 1800-2000, edited by  
Frank Trommler and Elliott Shore, 159-172. New York: Berghahn Books, 2001. 
 
———. Germany’s Transient Pasts: Preservation and National Memory in the Twentieth Century. Chapel Hill:  
 University of North Carolina Press, 1998. 
 
Krammer, Arnold. “American Treatment of German Generals During World War II.” Journal of Military  
History 54, no. 1 (1990): 27-46. 
 
Krieger, Wolfgang. General Lucius Clay and die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik, 1945-1949. Stuttgart:  
Klett-Cotta, 1987. 
 
Krönig, Waldemar and Klaus-Dieter Müller. Nachkriegs-Semester. Studium in Kriegs- und Nachkriegszeit.  
 Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1990. 
 
Krüger, Arnd. “Germany and Sports in World War II.” Canadian Journal of History of Sport 24, no. 1  
(1993): 52-62. 
 
Krüger, Michael. Von Klimmzügen, Aufschwüngen und Riesenwellen. 150 Jahre Gymnastik, Turnen, Spiel und  
Sport in Württemberg. Jubiläumsschrift des Schawäbischen Turnerbundes. Tübingen: Silberburg- 
Verlag, 1998. 
 
Kühne, Thomas, ed. Von der Kriegskultur zur Friedenskultur? Zum Mentalitätswandel in Deutschland seit  
1945. Münster: Lit, 2000.  
 
Kultministerium Württemberg-Baden. 5 Jahre Kultministerium Württemberg-Baden: Ein Tätigkeitsbericht  
1945-1950. Stuttgart: Kultministerium Württemberg-Baden, 1951. 
 
Kunsthistorisches Institut der Universität Heidelberg. Heidelberger Denkmäler, 1788-1981. Heidelberg: Verlag  
Brausdruck, 1982. 
 
Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart. Die Stuttgarter Strassennamen. Tübingen: Silberburg-Verlag, 2003. 
  
 532 
Lange, Wigand. Theater in Deutschland nach 1945. Zur Theaterpolitik der amerikanischen  
Besatzungsbehörden. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1980. 
 
Large, David Clay. Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era. Chapel Hill:  
 University of North Carolina, 1996. 
 
Lasswell, Harold D. “The Garrison State.” American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (1941): 455-68. 
 
Lauterbach, Albert T. “Militarism in the Western World: A Comparative Study.” Journal of the History of  
Ideas 5, no. 4 (1944): 446-478. 
 
Lincoln, Charles. Auf Befehl der Militärregierung. Translated by Hans and Elsbeth Herlin. Munich: Moderne  
Verlags-GmbH, 1965. 
 
Lingen, Kerstin von. “Soldiers Into Citizens: ‘Wehrmacht’ Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany (1945- 
1960).” Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London 27, no. 2 (2005): 45-67. 
 
Lockenour, Jay. Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945- 
1955. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001. 
 
Lurie, Alison. The Language of Clothes. New York: Random House, 1981. 
 
Lurz, Meinhold. Kriegerdenkmäler in Deutschland. Vol. 4, Weimarer Republik. Heidelberg: Esprint, 1985. 
 
———. “Oeffentliches Gedächtnis in den Jahren 1945 and 1946.” In Hess, Lehmann, and Sellin, Heidelberg  
1945, 231-254. 
 
Maase, Kasper. Bravo Amerika: Erkundungen zurJugendkultur der Bundesrepublik in den fünfziger Jahren.  
 Hamburg: Junius, 1992. 
 
Manchester, William. The Arms of Krupp. Boston: Little Brown, 1968. 
 
Mandell, Richard D. “Carl Diem on Sport and War.” Canadian Journal of History of Sport and Physical  
Education 5, no. 1 (1974): 10-13. 
 
Manig, Bert-Oliver. Die Politik der Ehre: Die Rehabilitierung der Berufsoldaten in der frühen Bundesrepublik.  
 Hamburg: Wallstein Verlag, 2004. 
 
Marquardt-Bigman, Petra. Amerikanische Geheimdienstanalysen über Deutschland, 1942-1949. Munich:  
R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995. 
 
Marszolek, Inge. “‘Ich möchte Dich zu gern mal in Uniform sehen’: Geschlechterkonstruktionen in  
Feldpostbriefen.” WerkstattGeschichte 22, No. 8 (1999): 41-59. 
 
Mausbach, Wilfried. Zwischen Morgenthau und Marshall: Das wirtschaftspolitische Deutschlandskonzept 
 der USA, 1944-47. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1996. 
 
McCreedy, Kenneth O. “Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany.” Journal of  
Military History 65, no. No. 3 (2001): 713-739. 
 
Merrit, Richard L. Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945-1949. New  
 Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995. 
 
Messerschmidt, Manfred. “Das neue Gesicht des Militarismus in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus.” In Wette,  
Militarismus in Deutschland, 352-353. 
 
 533 
———. Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Zeit der Indoktrination. Hamburg: Rv.Decker, 1969. 
 
———. “The Military Elites in Germany Since 1870: Comparisons and Contrasts with the French Officer  
Corps.” In Müller, Military in Politics and Society in France and Germany, 43-72. 
 
Meyer, Georg. “Soldaten Ohne Armee: Berufssoldaten im Kampf um Standesehre und Versorgung.” In Von  
Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland, edited by Martin  
Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, and Hans Woller, 683-750. Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1990. 
 
———. “Zur Situation der deutschen militärischen Führungsschicht im Vorfeld des westdeutschen  
Verteidigungsbeitrages 1945-1950/51.” In Foerster, Von der Kapitulation bis zum Pleven 
Plan, 577-735. 
 
Moeller, Robert G. “‘The Last Soldiers of the Great War’ and Tales of Family Reunions in the Federal Republic  
of Germany.” Signs 24, no. 1 (1998): 129-145.  
 
———. Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany. Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1993. 
 
———.  “The ‘Remasculinization’ of Germany in the 1950s: Introduction.” Signs 24, no. 1 (1998): 101-106. 
 
———. War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany. Berkeley: University  
 of California Press, 2001. 
 
Monod, David. Settling Scores: German Music, Denazification, and the Americans, 1945-1953. Chapel Hill:  
 University of North Carolina Press, 2005. 
 
Morgenthau, Henry J. Jr. Germany Is Our Problem. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1945. 
 
Mosse, George L. Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars. Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 1990. 
 
———. The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
———. “Two World Wars and the Myth of War Experience.” Journal of Contemporary History 31, no. 4  
(1986): 491-513. 
 
Müller, Klaus-Jürgen. Das Heer und Hitler: Armee und Nationalsozialistisches Regime, 1933-1940. Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1969. 
 
———. “Military and Diplomacy in France and Germany in the Inter-war Period.” In Müller, Military in  
Politics and Society in France and Germany,1-23. 
 
———, ed. The Military in Politics and Society in France and Germany in the Twentieth Century. Oxford:  
Berg, 1995. 
 
Müller, Klaus-Jürgen and Hans-Erich Volkmann, eds. Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität. Munich: R.  
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999. 
 
Nagler, Jörg. “From Culture to Kultur: Changing American Perspectives of Imperial Germany, 1870-1914.” In  
Barclay and Glaser-Schmidt, Transatlantic Images and Perceptions, 131-154. 
 
———. “Pandora’s Box: Propaganda and War Hysteria in the United States During World War I.” In Great  
War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, edited by Roger  
Chickering and Stig Förster, 485-500. Washington, DC: German Historical Institute; Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 534 
 
Nawyn, Kathleen J. “Ausrottung des ‘Kämpferischen Geistes!’: Zur Beseitigung militaristischer Denkmäler in  
amerikanisch besetzten Württemberg-Baden, 1945-1947.”  In Banal Militarism.  Zur Veralltäglichung  
des Militärischen im Zivilen, edited by Tanja Thomas and Fabian Virchow, 129-147. Bielefeld:  
Transcript, 2006. 
 
Neidiger, Bernhard. “Entnazifizierung und Bevölkerungsstimmung aus der Sicht der Stuttgarter  
Stadtverwaltung.” In Stuttgart in den ersten Nachkriegsjahren, edited by Edgar Lersch, Heinz H.  
Poker, und Paul Sauer, 131-174. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1995. 
 
Neumann, Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, eds. Jahrbuch der Oeffentliche Meinung, 1949-1955.  
Allensbach: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1956. 
 
Niedhart, Gottfried and Dieter Riesenberger, eds. Lernen aus dem Krieg? Deutsche Nachkriegszeiten 1918 and  
1945. Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1992. 
 
Niethammer, Lutz. Entnazifizierung in Bayern: Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter amerikanische Besatzung.  
Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1972. 
 
Notter, Harley A. Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945. Washington, DC: GPO, 1949. 
  
Office of the Chief Historian, Headquarters, European Command, U.S. Army. Disarmament and Disbandment  
of the German Armed Forces. Frankfurt am Main: Office of the Chief Historian, European Command,  
1947. 
 
The Officer’s Guide. 9th ed. Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1942. 
 
Olick, Jeffrey K. In the House of the Hangman: The Agonies of German Defeat, 1943-1949. Chicago:  
 University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
 
Osterhammel, Jürgen. “Transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Erweiterung oder Alternative.” Geschichte und  
Gesellschaft 27, no. 3 (2001): 464-479. 
 
Padover, Saul K. Experiment in Germany: The Story of an American Intelligence Officer. New York: Duell,  
Sloan & Pearce, 1946. 
 
Pape, Birgit. Kulturelle Neubeginn in Heidelberg und Mannheim 1945-1949. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C.  
Winter, 2000. 
 
Pelzer, Otto. Sport. Ein Weg zu Freiheit und Kultur. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1946. 
 
Peterson, Edward N. The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory. Detroit: Wayne State  
 University Press, 1977. 
 
Pilgert, Henry P. The West German Educational System: Historical Division, Office of the U.S. High  
Commissioner for Germany, 1953. 
 
Plischke, Elmer. “Denazification Law and Procedure.” American Journal of International Law 41, no. 4  
(1947): 807-827. 
 
Plato, Alexander von. “The Hitler Youth generation and its role in the two post-war German states.” In  
Generations in Conflict: Youth revolt and generation formation in Germany 1770-1967, edited by  
Mark Roseman, 210-226. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
 
Pogue, Forrest C. “George C. Marshall on Civil-Military Relationships in the United States.” In Kohn, United  
States Military under the Constitution, 193-222. 
 535 
 
Poiger, Uta G. Jazz, Rock and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany.  
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 
 
———. “A New, ‘Western’ Hero?  Reconstructing German Masculinity in the 1950s,” Signs 24, No. 1  
(1998): 147-162. 
 
Pollock, James K. Besatzung und Staatsaufbau nach 1945: Occupation Diary and Private Correspondence,  
1945-1948. Edited by Ingrid Krüger-Bulcke. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994. 
 
Puaca, Brian. “Learning Democracy: Education Reform in Postwar Germany, 1945-1946.” Dissertation,  
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2005. 
 
James I. Quillen. Textbook Improvement and International Understanding. Washington, DC: American Council 
on Education, 1948.  
 
Rautenberg, Hans-Jürgen. “Zur Standortbestimmung für künftige deutsche Streitkräfte.” In Foerster, Von der  
Kapitulation bis zum Pleven Plan, 737-879. 
 
Redding, Kimberly A. Growing Up in Hitler’s Shadow: Remembering Youth in Postwar Berlin. Westport, CT:  
Praeger, 2004. 
 
Remy, Steven P. The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification of a German University.  
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
 
Reutter, Fredericke. Heidelberg 1945-1949: Zur Politischen Geschichte einer Stadt in der Nachkriegszeit.  
Heidelberg: Verlag Brigitte Guderjahn, 1994. 
 
Ritter, Gerhard. The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany.  Translated by Heinz  
Norden. 4 vols. Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1969-1973. 
 
Rohe, Karl. Das Reichsbanner Schwarz Rot Gold. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Struktur der politischen  
Kampfverbände zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1966. 
 
———. “Militarismus, Soldatische Haltung, und Führerideologie.” In Militarismus, edited by Volker R.  
Berghahn, 267-282. Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1975. 
 
Rose, Arnold M., ed. Human Behavior and the Social Processes: An Interactionist Approach. New York:  
Houghton Mifflin, 1962. 
 
Rosenfeld, Gavriel D. Munich and Memory: Architecture, Monuments, and the Legacy of the Third Reich.  
 Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 
 
Rosenman, Samuel I., ed. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 13 vols. New York:  
Harper & Brothers, 1938-1950. 
 
Rosenzweig, Beate. Erziehung zur Demokratie? Amerikanische Besatzungs- und Schulreformpolitik in  
Deutschland und Japan. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998. 
 
Rosinski, Herbert. The German Army. Washington, DC: Infantry Journal, 1944. 
 
Rosner, Bernat and Frederic C. Tubach. An Uncommon Friendship: From Opposite Sides of the Holocaust. In 
 collaboration with Sally Patterson Tubach. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. 
 
Ruff, Mark Edward. The Wayward Flock: Catholic Youth in Postwar Germany, 1945-1965. Chapel Hill:  
 University of North Carolina Press, 2005. 
 536 
Ruhm von Oppen, Beate, ed. Documents on Germany Under Occupation, 1945-1954. London: Oxford  
 University Press, 1955. 
 
Rupieper, Hermann-Josef. Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie. Der amerikanische Beitrag  
1945-1952. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993. 
 
Sauer, Paul. Demokratischer Neubeginn in Not und Elend. Das Land Württemberg-Baden von 1945 bis 1952.  
 Ulm: Vaas Verlag, 1978. 
 
Sauer, Wolfgang. “Die politische Geschichte der deutschen Armee und das Problem des Militarismus.”  
Politische Vierteljahresschrift 6, no. 3 (1965): 341-353. 
 
Schissler, Hanna, ed. The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968. Princeton: Princeton  
 University Press, 2001. 
 
Schüler-Springorum, Stephanie. “Flying and Killing: Military Masculinity in German Pilot Literature, 1914- 
 1939.” In Hagemann and Schüler-Springorum, Home/Front, 205-232. 
 
Schulze, Winfried. Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1989. 
 
Searle, Alaric. Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959.  
Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003. 
 
Sellin, Volker. “Die Universität Heidelberg im Jahre 1945.” In Hess, Lehmann, and Sellin, Heidelberg 1945,  
91-106. 
 
Smith, Arthur L. Heimkehr aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg: Die Entlassung der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen.  
 Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985. 
 
Smith, Bradley F. Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg. New York: Basic Books, 1977. 
 
Smith, Helmut Walser. “For a Differently Centered Central European History: Reflections on Jürgen  
Osterhammel, Geschichtswissenschaft Jenseits des Nationalstaats.” Central European History 37,  
no. 1 (2004): 115-136. 
 
Smith, Jean Edward, ed. The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, Germany 1945-1949. 2 vols. Bloomington:  
 Indiana University Press, 1974. 
 
Spayd, P.A. Bayerlein: From Afrikakorps to Panzer Lehr. The Life of Rommel’s Chief-of-Staff Generalleutnant 
 Fritz Bayerlein. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2003. 
 
Specker, Hans Eugen, ed. Tradition und Wagnis. Ulm 1945-1972. Stuttgart: Kommissionsverlag W. 
 Kohlhammer, 1974. 
 
Speier, Hans. From the Ashes of Disgrace: A Journal from Germany, 1945-1955. Amherst: University of 
 Massachusetts Press, 1981. 
 
Stadt Karlsruhe and Stadtarchiv Karlsruhe. Denkmäler, Brunnen und Freiplastiken in Karlsruhe, 1715-1945.  
 Karlsruhe: Badenia-Verlag, 1987. 
 
Statistisches Bundesamt. Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1952. Stuttgart-Cologne: 
 W. Kohlhammer, 1952. 
 
Steiert, Thomas. “Zur Musik und Theaterpolitik in Stuttgart während der amerikanischen Besatzungszeit.” In 
 Kulturpolitik im besetzten Deutschland, 1945-1949, edited by Gabriele Clemens, 55-68. Stuttgart: 
 Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994. 
 537 
 
Stein, Hans-Peter. “Symbole.” In Symbole und Zeremoniell in deutschen Streitkräften vom 18. bis zum 20. 
 Jahrhundert, edited by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 27-125. Herford: Verlag E. S. Mittler & 
 Sohn, 1984. 
 
Stieg, Margaret F. “The Postwar Purge of German Public Libraries, Democracy, and the American Reaction.” 
 Libraries and Culture 28, no. 2 (1993): 143-164. 
 
Stimson, Henry L. and McGeorge Bundy. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York: Harper &  Brothers, 
 1947. 
 
Stoehr, Irene. “Cold War Communities: Women’s Peace Politics in Postwar West Germany, 1945-1952.” In 
 Hagemann and Schüler-Springorum, Home/Front, 311-333. 
 
Stokes, Raymond G. Divide and Prosper: The Heirs of I.G. Farben under Allied Authority, 1945-1951.  
 Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. 
 
Stoler, Mark A. Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in 
 World War II. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 
 
Stone, Gregory P. “Appearance and the Self.” In Dress and Identity, edited by Mary Ellen Roach-Higgins, 
 Joanne B. Eicher, and Kim K. P. Johnson, 19-39. New York: Fairchild Publications, 1995. 
 
Straub, W. “Die neue Ausgeh-Uniform.” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 6, no. 7 (1956): 391-394. 
 
Strych, Eduard. Der westdeutsche Sport in der Phase der Neugründung 1945-1950. Schorndorf bei Stuttgart: 
 Verlag Karl Hofmann, 1975. 
 
Tauber, Kurt P. Beyond Eagle and Swastika: German Nationalism Since 1945. Middletown, CT: Weslyan  
 University Press, 1967. 
 
Taylor, Telford. Sword and Swastika: The Wehrmacht in the Third Reich. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1952. 
 
Tent, James F. “Edward Yarnall Hartshorne and the Reopening of the Ruprecht-Karls-Universität in 
 Heidelberg, 1945: His Personal Account.” In Hess, Lehmann, and Sellin, Heidelberg 1945, 53-72. 
 
———. “Food Shortages in Germany and Europe, 1945-1948.” In Eisenhower and the German POWs: Facts 
 Against Falsehood, edited by Günter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, 95-112. Baton Rouge:  Louisiana 
 State University, 1992. 
 
———. Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany. Chicago: 
 University of Chicago Press, 1982. 
 
Teske, Hermann. Vormilitärische Schülerziehung. Langenfalza-Berlin-Leipzig: Verlag von Julius Belz, 1936. 
 
———. Wir Marschieren für Grossdeutschland: Erlebtes und Erlauschtes aus dem grossen Jahre 1938. Berlin: 
 Verlag “Die Wehrmacht,” 1939. 
 
Thelen, David. “The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History.” Journal of 
 American History 86, no. 3 (1999): 965-975. 
 
Todd, Frederick P. “The Military Museum in Europe.” Military Affairs 12, no. 1 (1948): 36-45. 
 
Toppe, Alfred. “The Story of a Project: The Writing of Military History at Allendorf and Neustadt.” In 
 Detwiler, World War II German Military Studies. 
 
 538 
Turner, Henry Ashby. German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 
 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the 
 Internal Security Act and Other Security Laws. Morgenthau Diary (Germany). Washington, DC: 
 GPO, 1967. 
 
U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945. Washington, DC: GPO, 1968. 
 
———. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. Washington, DC: GPO, 1969. 
 
———. Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference at Quebec, 1944. Washington, DC: GPO, 1972. 
 
———. Foreign Relations of the United States. Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945. Washington, DC:  
GPO, 1955. 
 
———. Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress, 1945-1946. Washington, DC: GPO, 1947. 
 
U.S. Library of Congress. Textbooks: Their Examination and Improvement. A Report on International and 
 National Planning and Studies. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, European Affairs Division, 1948. 
 
Ueberhorst, Horst. “The Importance of the Historians’ Quarrel and the Problem of Continuity for the German 
 History of Sport.” Journal of Sport History 17, no. 2 (1999): 232-244. 
 
Ueberschär, Gerd R., ed. Der Nationalsozialismus vor Gericht: Die alliiertern Prozesse gegen 
 Kriegsverbrecher und Soldaten, 1943-1952. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999. 
 
Vagts, Alfred. A History of Militarism: Romance and Realities of a Profession. New York: W. W. Norton,  
 1937. 
 
Vansittart, Sir Robert. Black Record: Germans Past and Present. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1941. 
 
Vaughn, Stephen. Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public 
 Information. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980. 
 
Vietzen, Hermann. Chronik der Stadt Stuttgart, 1945-1948. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1972. 
 
Völker, Karl-Heinz. Die Deutsche Luftwaffe, 1933-1939: Aufbau, Führung und Rüstung der Luftwaffe sowie 
 der Entwicklung der deutschen Luftkriegstheorie. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967. 
 
Vollnhals, Clemens. Entnazifizierung. Politische Säuberung und Rehabilitierung in den vier Besatzungszonen 
 1945-1949. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991. 
 
Wegner, Gregory P. “The Power of Tradition in Education: The Formation of the History Curriculum in the 
 Gymnasium of the American Sector in Berlin, 1945-1955.” Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-
 Madison, 1988. 
 
Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. The German Empire, 1871-1918. Leamington Spa: Berg, 1985. 
 
Weigley, Russell F. “The American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to 
 the Present.” In Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, edited 
 by Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, 215-246. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. 
 
———. “The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell.” Journal of 
 Military History 57, no. 5 (1993): 27-58. 
 
 539 
Weinstein, Adelbert. Armee Ohne Pathos: Die deutsche Wiederbewaffnung im Urteil ehemaligen Soldaten. 
 Bonn: Koellen Verlag, 1951. 
 
Weisspfennig, Gerd. “Der Neuaufbau des Sports in Westdeutschland bis zur Gründung des Deutschen 
 Sportbundes.” In Band 3/2 of Geschichte der Leibesübungen, edited by Horst Ueberhorst, 759-794.  
Berlin: Bartels & Wernitz, 1982. 
 
Welles, Sumner. The Time for Decision. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944. 
 
Werner, Josef. Karlsruhe 1945. Unter Hakenkreuz, Trikolore und Sternenbanner. Karlsruhe: G. Braun, 1985. 
 Westphal, Siegfried. Erinnerungen. Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler, 1975. 
 
Wette, Wolfram. “Die deutsche militärische Führungsschicht in den Nachkriegszeiten.” In Niedhart and  
Riesenberger, Lernen aus dem Krieg, 39-66. 
 
———. “Für eine Belebung der Militarismusforschung.” In Wette, Militarismus in Deutschland, 13-37. 
 
———. “Ideology, Propaganda, and Internal Politics as Preconditions of the War Policy of the Third Reich.” 
In The Build-up of German Aggression, edited by Wilhelm Deist, Manfred Messerschmidt, Hans-Erich  
Volkmann, and Wolfram Wette, 9-155. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. 
 
———, ed. Militarismus in Deutschland 1871 bis 1945: Zeitgenössische Analysen und Kritik. Münster:  
Lit, 1999.  
 
———. “Der Militarismus und die deutschen Kriege.” In Schule der Gewalt: Militarismus in Deutschland,  
1871-1945, edited by Wolfram Wette, 9-30. Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005. 
 
———. The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality. Translated by Deborah Lucas Schneider. Cambridge, MA:  
Harvard University Press, 2006. 
 
Wettig, Gerhard. Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland, 1943-1955. Munich: R.  
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1967. 
 
Wiesen, S. Jonathan. West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past, 1945-1955. Chapel Hill:  
 University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 
 
Wolfe, Robert. “Revival of Democratic Culture during the American Occupation of Heidelberg, 1945-1949.”  
In Hess, Lehmann, and Sellin, Heidelberg 1945, 13-27. 
 
Wood, James A. “Captive Historians, Captivated Audience: The German Military History Program, 1945- 
1961.” Journal of Military History 69, no. 1 (2005): 123-147. 
 
Wulfhorst, Traugott. “Der ‘Dank des Vaterlandes’—Sozialpolitik und –verwaltung zur Integration ehemaliger  
Wehrmachtsoldaten und ihrer Hinterbliebenen.” In Müller and Volkmann, Die Wehrmacht, 1037-1057. 
 
Ziemke, Earl F. The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946. Washington, DC: Center of Military  
 History, United States Army, 1975. 
 
